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  • S. 7 of the Benami Transaction Prohibition Act, 1988. According to S. 7(1) Ss. 81, 82 and 94 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (2 of 1882) S. 66, C. P. C. 1908 and S. 281A of the Income-tax Act, 1961(43) 61
  • Prohibition Act.17. S. 81 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (2/1882)
  • S. 4(1) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (Act
  • S. 82 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, A.I.R 1957 S.C 49
  • provisions of the Benami Prohibition Act
  • Ss. 81 and 82 of the Indian Trusts Act.
  • Ss. 81 and 82 of the Trusts Act, 1881
  • S. 92 of the Indian Evidence Act.19.
  • S. 7 of the Benami Prohibition Act
  • S. 82 of the Trusts Act
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citation codes
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  • S. 7 of the Benami Transaction Prohibition Act, 1988. According to S. 7(1) Ss. 81, 82 and 94 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (2 of 1882) S. 66, C. P. C. 1908 and S. 281A of the Income-tax Act, 1961(43) 61
  • Prohibition Act.17. S. 81 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (2/1882)
  • S. 4(1) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (Act
  • S. 82 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, A.I.R 1957 S.C 49
  • provisions of the Benami Prohibition Act
  • Ss. 81 and 82 of the Indian Trusts Act.
  • Ss. 81 and 82 of the Trusts Act, 1881
  • S. 92 of the Indian Evidence Act.19.
  • S. 7 of the Benami Prohibition Act
  • S. 82 of the Trusts Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from the judgment and decree in O.S. No. 80 of 1981 dated 12-12-1983, which the trial court dismissed with costs. The plaintiff (appellant before this court) had filed O.S. No. 80 of 1981 seeking declaration of title to certain properties (situated in Andaikulam and Santhiniapatti village), permanent injunction against defendants interfering with possession and enjoyment, and costs.

The factual account set out in the plaint (summarized in the opinion) describes a sequence of conveyances and leases involving the suit properties: original ownership by Jain Bivi Ammal and her two sons; a sale deed dated 21-10-1941 in favour of Syed Mohammad Rowther (Ex.A-1/B-4); registered rent deeds dated 24-10-1941; a later sale dated 5-4-1955 (Ex.A-7) by Mohammad Ibrahim (heir of Syed Mohammad Rowther) to P.K. Kadhar Ibrahim Rowther; possession and enjoyment by P.K. Kadhar Ibrahim Rowther and later delivery of possession to his daughter (the plaintiff) with a later registered settlement deed dated 21-4-1980 (Ex.A-9/B16) in her favour. The plaintiff alleged forcible attempts by the defendants in 1981 to take possession and alleged forged documents prepared from papers obtained under threat.

The first defendant contended that the transactions were benami or that the 1941 sale deed was a sham and nominal document, that he was allotted parts of the property in arbitration, and that he was entitled to a portion by arbitration award (and subsequent decree in O.P. No. 2/82). The trial court framed seven issues, heard evidence (plaintiff examined herself and three witnesses; defendant examined himself and two witnesses) and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff appealed; A.S. No. 15 of 1984 (before the District Court Pudukottai) was transferred and numbered A.S. No. 986 of 1986 in this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sale deed dated 21-10-1941 executed by the plaintiff's husband, his brother and their mother in favour of Syed Mohammad Rowther is a sham and nominal document (as contended by the first respondent) or a benami transaction (as pleaded and found by the trial court).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The plaintiff became owner of the suit property by a registered settlement deed dated 21-4-1980 (Ex.A-9/B16) executed by her brothers in fulfillment of their late father's wishes, and she has been in possession, paying kists and house tax.
  • The trial court correctly found that the earlier transactions (Exs. B-4 and B-5) were benami transactions; those findings support the plaintiff's title.
  • Even if those transactions were claimed to be sham and nominal, the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act and specifically S.7 (which repealed Ss. 81 and 82 of the Indian Trusts Act) prohibit relying on the sham/nominal distinction; therefore the Benami Act covers such transactions.
  • The first defendant obtained the husband's signatures under threat on blank stamped papers and the arbitration award obtained through those papers is not binding on the plaintiff, who was not a party to the arbitration and had no notice of it.
  • Reliance was placed on S.4(1) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (quoted in the opinion) and on the decision in Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khara (holding the Benami Act applies to pending suits).

First Respondent's (First Defendant's) Arguments

  • The 21-10-1941 sale deed is not a benami transaction but a sham and nominal document — the parties who executed it never intended to part with title and used the deed to keep away creditors.
  • The first defendant and his co-owners continued to exercise acts of ownership and possession; arbitration proceedings resulted in an award allotting portions to the first defendant (and a decree in O.P. No. 2/82), which are binding.
  • The first defendant sought an opportunity to adduce evidence to establish that the 1941 deed is sham/nominal (relying on authorities and procedural provisions such as Order 41 Rules 25, 33 CPC and Section 107 CPC), and cited precedents (including Sree Meenakshi Mills v. C.I.T. Madras) to support the contention that the transaction should be treated as sham/nominal rather than benami.
  • The first defendant argued that the Benami Prohibition Act does not expressly cover sham and nominal transactions, so the real nature of the deed should be examined and evidence on that point permitted.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sree Meenakshi Mills v. C.I.T., Madras (1957-I-M.L.J S.C. 1) Relied upon by the first respondent's counsel to support the contention that the 21-10-1941 sale deed is a sham and nominal document. The counsel for the first respondent relied on this decision to argue the deed was sham/nominal; the court noted the reliance but, given the first defendant's prior pleadings and the subsequent operation of the Benami Prohibition Act, did not accept reopening of the defence on that ground.
Bhim Singh v. Kan Singh (cited in opinion as 1957-I-M.L.J 1 S.C) The opinion quotes this authority for the exposition that two kinds of benami transactions are generally recognised in India: (1) purchase with one's own money in the name of another (transferee holds for real owner), and (2) a conveyance by an owner to another without intention to part with beneficial interest (resulting trust). The court used the explanation of the two kinds of benami transactions to frame the issue, but emphasized that the first defendant had earlier pleaded and accepted the characterisation of the 1941 deed as benami in the written statement and in depositions.
Mithilesh Kumari & another v. Prem Behari Khara (A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 727) Held that the Benami Prohibition Act is applicable to pending suits. The court relied on this holding to support the proposition that the Benami Prohibition Act applies to suits pending when it came into force, thereby supporting the appellant's contention that benami rules (and their consequences) apply.
A. Rakkiavana Gounder v. Chinnu Gounden Authority cited for the proposition that attendant circumstances may be used to establish a resulting trust where there was no intention to dispose of the beneficial interest (citing Petheperuma Chetti v. Muniandi Servai). The court observed that decisions allowing attendant circumstances to show lack of intention to transfer beneficial interest would, because the Benami Prohibition Act came into force on 19-5-1988, no longer render assistance to the first respondent in this case; the decision therefore did not help the first respondent's position post-Benami Act.
Nataraja Deekshidar v. Aiyathurai Padayachi Held that where the burden of proof has been wrongly cast on a person who is not liable to discharge it, the matter must go back for fresh disposal to enable the correct person to discharge the burden. The court noted this precedent but concluded it did not render assistance to the first respondent for the reasons given in the opinion (including prior pleadings and the Benami Act implications).
Petheperuma Chetti v. Muniandi Servai (referenced) Referred to in the context of principles governing resulting trusts and attendant circumstances showing intention (or lack thereof) to transfer beneficial interest. Referenced within the discussion of A. Rakkiavana Gounder; the court noted that such principles would not assist the first respondent after the Benami Prohibition Act's commencement.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court identified the sole question for determination as whether the sale deed dated 21-10-1941 is a sham and nominal document (as contended by the first respondent) or a benami transaction (as pleaded by the parties and found by the trial court).

The court's step-by-step reasoning, as set out in the opinion, was:

  1. The first defendant had in the written statement repeatedly characterised the transactions under Exhibits B-4 and B-5 (including the 21-10-1941 deed) as benami. The opinion reproduces portions of the written statement where the first defendant admitted that the transactions were benami and that Jain Bivi Ammal and her sons continued in possession and enjoyment.
  2. The trial court applied the accepted tests for establishing benami transactions and held that the transactions under Exs. B-4 and B-5 were benami. The trial court's finding on this point was therefore a matter of record.
  3. The first defendant later attempted to change his case and assert that those earlier transactions were not benami but rather sham and nominal. The court emphasised that a party cannot, having taken a stand and obtained findings on that stand, go back and seek to substitute a different case in the appellate forum without an appropriate basis.
  4. The court considered the effect of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988: S.4(1) (quoted in the opinion) bars suits/claims to enforce rights in respect of property held benami and S.7 repeals Ss. 81 and 82 of the Indian Trusts Act (and certain other provisions). The appellant relied on these statutory provisions and on the Mithilesh Kumari decision that the Benami Act applies to pending suits.
  5. Given the first defendant's prior pleadings and the trial court's benami finding, together with the legislative effect of repealing Ss. 81 and 82 of the Trusts Act (which were the textual home for the "sham and nominal"/resulting trust arguments), the court concluded that the first defendant could not now be allowed to reframe his defence as one of sham/nominal transaction.
  6. The court considered but found unpersuasive attempts to invoke procedural doctrines or precedents (such as remand to permit fresh evidence under Order 41 rules or reliance on decisions permitting attendant-circumstance proof) because the changed legal context after the Benami Act and the first defendant's prior admissions and the trial court finding made such course inappropriate.
  7. On these bases, the court found it not permissible to accept the first respondent's new line of defence and therefore proceeded to set aside the trial court's dismissal and to allow the appeal in favour of the plaintiff.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appellate court allowed the appeal, set aside the trial court's judgment and decree, and decreed O.S. No. 80 of 1981 as prayed for by the plaintiff. The parties were directed to bear their own costs throughout.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The plaintiff's suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction (O.S. No. 80 of 1981) succeeds and the decree is granted in her favour; the earlier dismissal by the trial court is set aside.
  • The court concluded that the first defendant cannot now abandon his earlier plea that the 1941 transactions were benami (and the trial court's finding on that point) to adopt a different defence (that the transactions are sham and nominal), particularly in light of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 and the specific statutory repeals cited. This blocks the first defendant from relitigating the characterisation of those transactions on the basis of sham/nominal arguments in this appeal.
  • No broader new precedent beyond the application of existing law to the facts is explicitly stated in the opinion; the decision resolves the parties' rights and applies statutory and precedent material to the case facts rather than announcing a novel legal rule. (The opinion does not state that it establishes a new, general rule beyond its application to the present facts.)

    Kathoom Bivi Ammal v. S. Mohamad Alias Sheik Mohamad & 4 Ors,

    JUDGMENT:

    1. This appeal arises out of the judgment and decree rendered in O.S No. 80 of 1981 dated 12-12-1983. As against the judgment and decree in O S. No. 80 of 1981, A.S No. 15 of 1984 was filed before the District Court Pudukottai which was later on transferred to this Court and numbered as A.S No. 986 of 1986. The plaintiff is the appellant herein. O.S No. 80 of 1981 was filed for declaration of plaintiff's title to the suit properties and permanent injunction restraining the defen-dants from interfering with the plaintiff's possession and enjoynment of the suit properties and for costs. The case of the plaintiff is as under: The suit properties are situate in Andaikulam and Santhiniapatti village. A Schedule property in the house and its apurtenants and D-schedule properties are both wet and dry lands. The suit properties originally belonged to one Jain Bivi Ammal and her two sons viz. Kadhar Ibrahim Rowther and S. Sheik Mohamad alias S. Shah Mohamed, who is the first defendant in the suit. The plaintiff is the wife of Kidhar Ibrahim Rowther. Mother and two sons sold the suit properties besides other items of properties by means of a sale deed dated 21-10-1941 marked as Exhibit A-1(B-4) for a consideration of Rs. 1000/- to Syed Mohamad Rowther. Syed Mohamed Rowther leased out the suit A-schedule properties in favour of Jain Bivi Ammal and her two sons by a registered rent deed dated 24-10-1941. B schedule properties besides other properties were also leased out by Syed Mohamed Rowther by another registered rent deed dated 24-10-1941 in favour of Jain Bivi Am trial and her two sons. They were enjoying the suit properties and thereafter they surrendered the same to Syed Mohamed Rowther. After the death of Syed Mohamed Rowther, his only son and heir, Mohamad Ibrahim succeeded to his father's properties and sold the same to P.K Kadhar Ibrahim Rowther for a valid consideration by means of a sale deed dated 5-4-1955. The said P.K Kadhar Ibrahim Rowther took possesion of the suit properties and he was in possession and enjoyment of the same. The plaintiff is the daughter of the said P.K Kadhar Ibrahim Rowther. She married S S. Kadhar Ibrahim Rowther one of the vendors of the sale deed dated 21-10-1941 about 35 years ago.

    2. P.K Kadhar Ibrahim Rowther is having 5 daughters., since the plaintiff has been married in a poor family, her father wanted to provide her with some properties. Hence he delivered possession of the suit properties to the plaintiff promising her to execute a gift deed in her favour in respect of the suit properties. Unfortunately, thereafter he became incapacitated by paralytic attack and was bedridden and therefore he was unable to execute a gift deed in respect of the suit properties. Ultimately, plaintiff's father died and the plaintiff continued to be in possession of the suit properties even after the death of her father. Thereafter, her brothers who are the sons of P.K Kadhar Ibtahim Rowther executed a settlement deed dated 21-4-1980 in respect of the suit properties in favour of the plaintiff conveying the suit properties to fulfil the desires of their father. Patta for the suit property stands in the name of the plaintiff and she is paying kists for the B-schedule properties. She also paying house tax for the A-schedule is property.

    3. The plaintiff's husband, family did not own any properties worth mention. The 1st defendant is the brother of the plaintiff's husband. The first defendant went to Ceylon to eke out his livelihood and thereafter he came to India and joined the military service. He came to plaintiff's house in the middle of 1980 and stayed there. According to the plaintiff her husband's brother would have taken some of the documents from her house. After this, the 1st defendant claimed share in the suit properties and the plaintiff denied his claim. So, the first defendant with the help of other defendants attempted to take possession of the suit properties. In the month of March 1981, the defendants came to the plaintiff's house and obstructed her and her family members from enjoying the suit properties. She sent a complaint to the Inspector of Police, Keeranur in March 1981, but the police did not take any action on the complaint. She filed a petition before the Revenue Divisional Officer, Pudukottai in detail. The Revenue Divisional Officer. Pudukottai sent a notice on 8-4-1981 directing the plaintiff and the first defendant to appear before him. Thereafter the Revenue Divisional Officer, Pudukottai, directed them to appear before the Tahsildar, Kulathur. The enquiry before the Tahsildar, Kulathur is pending. The first defendant also compelled the plaintiff's husband to sign some blank as well as stamped papers under threat and the plaintiff's husband signed those papers in order to save his life. When the plaintiff came to know about this incident, she gave a complaint to the police. In the meanwhile, the plaintiff came to know that the defendants are making arrangements to create some documents in the blank and stamped papers obtained from her husband. Therefore, the plaintiff states that if there is any such document, such document is forged document which will not be binding upon the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff the defendants are not entitled to claim any right over the suit properties. Therefore, the plaintiff came forward with the suit.

    4. The first defendant's case is that Jain Bivi ammal and her two sons continued to be in possession of the suit properties and the title is still vest in them. Jain Bivi Animal and her two sons are exercising acts of ownership and have been in possession and enjoyment of these properties according to their own right. The transaction referred to in para 2 of the plaint are benami transaction. The plaintiff's husband unequivocally admitted in bis statement before the arbitrators that the plaintiff's husband and the first defendant returned to India from Ceylon after their business incurred loss. In the year 1944, when the first defendant joined in the military service, be allowed his brother to manage the family affairs and he was looking after the property as co-owner. Their mother died in the year 1963. The plaintiff's husband S S. Khadir Ibrahim in the course of management has made alienations and purchased properties out of the common funds and he was in possession and enjoyment of the same by paying kists etc, This was done on behalf of himself and his brother while he was in militaay service. The first defendant has been sending monies to his mother and brother as his contribution towards the upkeep and maintenance of the family and for payment of common tax burden. On his return to native place in 1979, the first defendant demanded his share from the properties and the income therefrom, but his brother was not amenable nor inclined to comply with his demand for partition and separate possession. The first defendant complained about the matter to the elders in the locality. He and his brother thereafter agreed to settle the dispute by referring the same to the arbitrators. To this effect a muchalica was drawn and the arbitrators decided the issue and rendered arbitration award alloting seperate properties. The first defendant was allotted in the arbitration a portion of A-schedule house with the new house built thereon and items 4 to 8 of the B-schedule properties. According to the first defendant, the plaintiff and her husband are well aware of the arbitration proceeding. It is not correct to say that he forced his brother to sign on blank papers. Therefore, the first defendant states that according to the arbitration award he is entitled to a portion of the suit property.

    5. On these pleadings, as many as 7 issues were framed by the trial court. The: plaintiff marked as many as 27 documents. Exhibit X I and X-2 are third party exhibits. Tne plaintiff examined herself as a witness and he also examined three other persons as witnessess on her behalf. The first defen dant examined himself as a witness and he also examined two other witnesses on his side. On considering the facts appearing in this case, and after hearing the arguments advanced on both sides, the trial court dis missed the suit with costs. It is against this judgment and decree, the present appeal is filed before this court.

    6. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the 1st defendant is the brother of the plaintiff's husband. The suit properties originally belonged to her mother-in-law, her husband and the first defendant in the suit. They sold the suit properties along with other properties by a sale deed dated 21-10-1941 for a considera tion of Rs. 1,000/- to Syed Mohamad Rowther. Thereafter the said property was leased in favour of Jain Bivi Ammal and her two sons. After the said lease period was over, the properties were handed over to Syed Mohamad Rowther. After the death of Syed Mohamad Rowther, his son Mohamad Ibrahim Rowther succeeded to the properties of his father and then he sold the same to P.K Kadher Ibrahim Mohamad for valid consideration by means of a sale deed dated 5-4-1955. The purchaser took possession of the suit property and he was enjoying the same. In order to fulfil the wishes of her late father, her brothers con veyed the suit properties by executing a settlement deed in her favour. After executing the registered settlement deed dated 24-4-1980 under Ex.A-9, the appellant was paying kists and other Government dues and she was enjoying the same. According tc the appellant, the first defendant went to Ceylon to eke-out his livelihood and since his business incurred loss, he returned tc this country and thereafter joined the mili tary service. Therefore, according to the appellant the first defendant has no manner of right, title or interest over the suit properties. The appellant's case is that the first defendant obtained signature of her husband under threat on certain blank stamped papers. With the help of those papers he obtained an arbitration award. According to her, the award will not be binding upon her since she is not a party to that award proceedings and she has also no notice of such proceedings.

    7. Syed Mohamad Rowther executed a sale deed to Vela Gounder for Rs. 1000/-conveying 1.51 acres under Ex.A-5 dated 30-4-1944. So also, Ex.A-C dated 22-12 1946, a sale deed was executed to Kathu Jain Bivi ammal for consideration of Rs 1000/-. The first defendant has not raised any objection to the abovesaid two sale transactions and he is attacking only the transaction under Exhibit A-7 dated 5-4 1955 a sale deed executed by Mohamad Ibrahim Rowther to Kadhar Ibrahim Rowther for Rs. 1000. According to the learned counsel, the plaintiff became the owner of this property by settlement deed dt. bx.A9 (B16), dated 21-4-1980. The learned counsel submitted that even according to the first defendant the sale in favour of Syed Mohammad Rowther by a deed dated 24-10-1941 and the transactions in para 2 of the plaint are benami transaction and therefore according to the learned counsel after the Benami Prohibition Act came into force, Syed Mohammad Rowther would have become a full owner and if that is so the plaintiff's title to the suit properties is perfect and unquestionable. Therefore, the first defendant cannot question the plaintiff's title to the suit properties since she obtained the same by way of settlement deeds executed by her brothers, after the death of their father. Even according to the trial court, the learned counsel pointed out that the transactions under Exhibits B-4 and B-5 are benami transactions. If that is so, according to the learned counsel after coming into force of the Benami Prohibition Act, the plaintiff became the full owner of the plaint sehedule properties. Therefore the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant's right to the suit properties is unquestionable.

    8. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent contended that the sale deed executed by first defendant, his brother and mother dated 21-10.1941 in favour of Syed Mohammad Rowther is not a benami transaction but it is only a sham and nominal document. The learned counsel pointed out that in the said transaction they do not want to part with the title of the suit property, and they never intended to convey their title. The said deed was executed only to keep away the creditor. According to him, even in the written statement there are pleadings to show that the transaction is only a sham and nominal transaction and therefore the title to the properties still vest with the first defendant, his brother and mother. The learned counsel contended that the finding of the trial court and the averments made in the written statement that it is a benami transaction, is loosely worded expression and really the transaction is not a benami transaction, but only a sham and nominal transaction. The learned counsel further contended that Ex A-5 and A-6 were executed with the consent of the first defendant and therefore he is not against those transactions. Exhibit A-7 was executed against the intention of the first defendant and his brother and therefore that transaction is not a valid transaction. The learned counsel submitted that in the arbitration proceedings, the first defendant's brother agreed to partition the properties and on that basis the arbitration award was passed and in terms of that award a decree was also passed in O.P No. 2/82. Therefore, the award and the decree are binding upon the plaintiff. In support of bis contention, that the sale deed dated 21-10-1941 Ex.A1 is a sham and nominal document, the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent relied upon the decisions reported in Sree Meenakshi Mills v. C.I.T Madras . 1957-I-M.L.J S.C 1.. In order to support his contention the learned counsel relied upon the provisions contained in O. 41, Rr 25, 33 C.P.C and S 107, C P.C The learned counsel ultimately contended that the case of the first defendant is that the document executed on 21-10-1941 is a sham and nominal document and the transaction is not benami transaction. According to the learned counsel the parties and the trial court went on a wrong direction and came to the conclusion that it is a benami transaction. For this reason, the learned counsel contended that an opportunity may be given to the first defendent to adduce evidence to show that the deed dated 21-10-1941 is a sham and nominal document. He further contended that since this is a transferred appeal and if in case the judgment of this court goes against his client, he cannot file a second appeal. For all these reasons, the learned counsel made a request to set aside the judgment and decree rendered bv the trial court and remit back the same with a direction to dispose of the case afresh on the evidence adduced by the parties.

    9. By way of reply, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant pointed out that even if the transaction is sham and nominal that transaction is also prohibited by the Benami Prohibition Act. According to the learned counsel the first defendant fully knew about the nature of the transaction. He categorically stated in the written state ment in more than one places that it is a benami transaction. Even in the deposition it is stated that the sale transaction dated 21-10-1941 is a benami transaction and now it is not open to him to go back and say that it is not a benami transaction, but only a sham and nominal transaction.

    10. According to the learned counsel S. 7 of the Benami Prohibition Act prohibits even the transaction which is sham and nominal. The learned counsel pointed out that such a right given to a party to plead that a trans action is sham and nominal under Ss. 81 and 82 of the Trusts Act is not now available, because both these Sections of the Trusts Act are repealed by the said Act. There fore according to the learned counsel, Benami Prohibition Act not only prohibits benami transaction but also any transaction which is sham and nominal.

    11. However, the learned counsel for the first defendant contended that Benami Prohibition Act cannot be made applicable to a transaction which is sham and nominal, because in the said Act there is nothing expressly stated as such. Therefore according to the learned counsel for the first defendant it is not correct to state that the provisions of the Benami Prohibition Act is also applicable to sham and nominal transaction. The learned counsel for the first defendant also contended that in deciding the issue arising in this case, the real nature of the said deed dated 2110-1941 should he looked into.

    12. I have beard the rival submissions made by the parties. I have set out the facts in detail. The only question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the sale deed dated 21-10-1941 executed by the plaintiff's husband, his brother and their mother in favour of Syed Mohammad Rowther is sham and nominal document as contended by the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent. According to the first defendant/first respondent, the said sale deed dated 21-10-1941 is a sham and nominal document and the parties never intended to part with their title. According to the appellant the said transaction is a benami transaction as pleaded in the written statement and as found by the trial court. In more than one place in the written statement, the first defendant categorically stated that the sale deed dated 21-10-1941 is a benami sale deed.

    13. In the written statement filed by the first defendant it is stated as under:

    “The various transactions referred to therein are not real but make believe affairs without any idea or intention to pass title and in spite of them, Jain Bivi Ammal, and her sons continued to be in possession and are still in their possession and of the sons' enjoyment. As a matter of fact, Jain Bivi Ammal and her 1st son S.S Khadir Ibrahim, who is none other than this plaintiff's husband, have been exercising acts of ownership and have been is possession and enjoyment of these properties in their own right and allegations to the contrary, are false and are not admitted. The fact, that the transactions referred to in paragraph 2 of the plaint are beaami transactions have been unequivocally admitted by plaintiff's husband ia his statements before the arbitrators and hence it is not open to the plaintiff to go behind the same.”

    14. Now the contention put forward by the learned counsel appearing for the 1st defendent/1st respondent is that the said transactions are not benami transactions but only a sham and nominal. Therefore, the Benami Prohibition Act will not be applicable to the facts of this case. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent further contended that in view of the fact that in the written statement filed by the first defendant there are certain allegations to the effect that the said transaction is sham and nominal, the 1st defendant must be given an opportunity to establish his case that the said transaction is a sham and nominal transaction. In support of his contention that the Benami Transation and the transaction which is sham and nominal are two different concepts, the learned counsel for the 1st defendant relied upon a decision in the case of Sri Meenakashi Mills v. C.I T. Madras. In this context, the learned counsel also relied upon a decision reported in Bhim Singh v. Kan Singh 1. 1957-I-M.L.J 1 S.C, wherein it was held as under:

    “Two kinds of benami transactions are generally recognised in India. Where a person buys a property with his own money but in the name of another person without any intention to benefit such other person, the transaction is called benami. In that case, the transferee holds the property for the benefit of the person who has contributed the purchase money, and he is the real owner, The second case which is loosely termed as a benami transaction is a case where a person who is the owner of the property executes a conveyance in favour of another without the intention of transferring the title to the property thereunder. In this case, the transferor continues to be the real owner. The question whether a transaction is a benami transaction or not mainly depends upon the intention of the person who has contributed the purchase money in the former case and upon the intention of the person who has executed the conveyance in the latter case. The principle underlying the former case is also statutorily recognised in S. 82 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, A.I.R 1957 S.C 49 relied on.”

    The fact remains that the trial court had categorically held, that the transactions under Ex.B-4 and B-5 are benami. All along it was the case of the first defendant that those transactions are benami transactions not intended to be acted upon. Therefore, now he cannot go back and say that the transactions under Exs.B-4 and B-5 are only sham and nominal and not benami. The first defendant has not filed any cross-objection against the finding given by the trial court that the transactions nnder Exs.B4 and B5 are benami transactions. It is also significant to note that the transactions under Exs.A5 and A6 are not attacked by the first defendant, but he is attacking only the transaction under Ex.A7 The reason given by the first defendant for attacking Ex.A7 and not attacking Exs.AS and A6 is not convincing.

    15. According to S. 4(1) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (Act No. 45 of 1988.

    “No suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respect of any property held benami against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person shall lie by or on behalf of a persoa claiming to be the real owner of such property. (2) No defence based on any right in respect of any property held benami whether against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person, shall be allowed in any suit, claim or action by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property.”

    16. In the case of Mithilesh Kumari and another v. Prem Behari Khara 2. A.I.R 1980 S.C 727., it was held that the Benami Prohibition Act is applica ble to pending suits also. The learned counsal for the appellant contended that even the transactions which are sham and nominal are also hit by the Benami Prohibition Act. He placed reliance on the provisions con tained in S. 7 of the Benami Transaction Prohibition Act, 1988. According to S. 7(1) “Ss. 81, 82 and 94 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (2 of 1882) S. 66, C. P. C. 1908 and S. 281A of the Income-tax Act, 1961(43) 61 are hereby repealed.” Therefore accord ing to the learned counsel for the appellant the respondent cannot put forward the plea that the transaction which is sham and nominal is net hit by the above said Act. The concept of a transaction being sham and nominal is envisaged only in Ss. 81 and 82 of the Indian Trusts Act. Since those sections are repealed, it is not now open to the learned counsel appearing for the respondent to contend that the transaction which is sham and nominal, is not hit by the Benami Prohibition Act.

    17. S. 81 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (2/1882) reads as under:

    “Where the owner of property transfers or bequeaths and it cannot be inferred consistently with the attendant circumstances that he Intended to dispose of the beneficial interest therein, the transferee or legatee must hold such property for the benefit of the owner or his legal representative.”

    So also S. 82 of the Trusts Act states:

    “Where property is transferred to one person for a consideration paid or provided by another person, and it appears that such other person did not intend to pay or provide such consideration for the benefit of the transferee, the transferee must hold the property for the benefit of the person paying or providing the consideration.”

    18. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant further contended that it is not open to the first resdondent now to plead against what is stated in the documents Exs.B4 and BS. Because such a plea is expressly prohibited under S. 92 of the Indian Evidence Act.

    19. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent contended that since the parties and the court below went on a wrong direction, the first defendant must be given an opportunity to establish his case that the transaction under Exs.B4 and B5 are only that of sham and nominal. In this respect, the learned counsel for the first respondent relied upon a decision of this court as reported in A. Rakkiavana Gounder v. Chinnu Gounden, wherein it was held as under:

    “But following the principles of Petheperuma Chetti v. Muniandi Servai, the appellant can establish, if he can, that by reason of the attendant circumstances there was no intention to dispose of the beneficial interests in the property to the first defendant and that there was a resulting trust so far as the balance of course of the property was concerned The agreement to reconvey pleaded in defence by 1st defendant related only to the balance of property i.e, the undisposed property and which was not required for the discharge of the debts. The attendant circumstance such as the previous execution of the trust deed, its failure, the position occupied by the 1st defendant in the way of a near relation of the plaintiff, the value of property being much more than price for which the property was sold, could not take away the full legal title which was vested in the defendant and they do not either contradict, vary or add to that title so as to attract S. 92 of the Evidence Act,

    Though the plaintiff could not show by oral evidence that the beneficial interest was not intended to be conveyed, the same result could be achieved by establishing attendant circumstances which would be consistent with the case that there was no intention to transfer the beneficial interest within the meaning of S.S1 of the Indian Trusts Act.”

    In view of the fact that Benami Prohibition Act came into force with effect from 19-5-1988 this decision will not render any help to the first respondent.

    20. Again the learned counsel for the first respondent relied upon a decision reported in Nataraja Deekshidar v. Aiyathurai Padayachi wherein this Court held as under:

    “Where the burden of proof was wrongly cast On a person who is not liable to discharge the burden, in such circumstances of the case, the matter has got to go back for fresh disposal so as to enable the correct person to discharge the burden.”

    For the abovesaid reasons this decision also will not render any assistance to the first respondent. The learned counsel for the first defendant also placed reliance on the provisions contained in O. 41, Rr. 23, 25 and 33 and S. 107, C.P.C, in order to support his case that the first defendant must be given a fresh oppertunity to adduce evidence to establish his case that the transaction under Exs.B4 and B5 are not a benami transaction, but a sham and nominal transaction.

    21. The question is whether the first defendant is entitled to ask for this relief. First of all, in the written statement the first defendant had categorically pleaded that the transactions under Exhibits B-4 and B-5 are only benami transactions. Again, the trial court by applying all the tests applicable to establish the benami transaction, came to the conclusion that the transactions, under Exhibition B-4 and B-5 are benami transac tions. In view of the stand taken by the first defendant before the trial Court and the findings gtven by the court below on this point, I am of the opinion that now it is not open to the first defendant/first respon dent to go back from his own case and requesting for an opportunity to adduce evidence to establish a new line of defence. In view of the fact that Ss. 81 and 82 of the Trusts Act, 1881 were repealed by the Benami Prohibition Act, it is not now open to the first defendant to support his case on the plea that the transactions under Exhibits B-4 and B-5 are sham and nominal since those transactions are also hit by the Benami Prohibition Act. In view of the reasons as stated above and on a careful consideration of the facts appearing in this case, I hold that it is not possible to accept the conten tions put forward by the first defendant/first respondent. Further, the fact that the present appeal is transferred appeal and if the appeal is allowed the first defendant/first respondent may not get an opportunity to file a second appeal before this court cannot be a good cause to remand this matter to the trial court for fresh disposal as requested by the learned counsel for the first respondent.

    22. In that view of the matter, the judg ment and decree rendered by the trial court are set aside, the appeal is allowed and the suit O.S No. 80 of 1981 is decreed as prayed for. Considering the relationship betweea the parties, they are directed to bear their own costs throughout.

    VCS

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