AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Punjab Co-operative Societies Act read with Punjab Co-operative Land Mortgage Banks
  • Government of India (Allocations of Business) Rules, 1961
  • SOCIETIES REGISTRATION ACT
  • provisions of the Society Registration Act,
  • provisions of the Relief Undertakings Act,
  • Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1915
  • Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1935.
  • provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 25
  • Co-operative Societies Act
  • Societies Act, 1925
  • Societies Act, 1912
  • Orders) Act, 1946,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Punjab Co-operative Societies Act read with Punjab Co-operative Land Mortgage Banks
  • Government of India (Allocations of Business) Rules, 1961
  • SOCIETIES REGISTRATION ACT
  • provisions of the Society Registration Act,
  • provisions of the Relief Undertakings Act,
  • Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1915
  • Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1935.
  • provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 25
  • Co-operative Societies Act
  • Societies Act, 1925
  • Societies Act, 1912
  • Orders) Act, 1946,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from a conflict of views regarding whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India lies against a Co-operative Society. Various benches of this Court and other High Courts have expressed differing opinions on this question. To resolve this ambiguity, the matter was referred to a Full Bench for an authoritative decision. The Full Bench considered arguments and precedents from both sides before delivering its judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India lies against a Co-operative Society.
  2. Whether a Co-operative Society is a statutory authority or an instrumentality/agency of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.
  3. Whether the appointment of a Special Officer or Government official to administer a Co-operative Society affects its amenability to writ jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Writ jurisdiction should lie against a Co-operative Society as it is controlled or significantly influenced by the State, making it an instrumentality or agency of the State under Article 12.
  • Reliance on Supreme Court judgments such as Sukhadev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujid Sehravardi, Rimana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India, and P.K Ramchandra Iyer v. Union of India which support writ jurisdiction against bodies that are State instrumentalities.
  • Pointed to the bye-laws of the Co-operative Society, highlighting Government nominees on the Board, Government approval requirements for decisions, and the Collector acting as Chairman, to show pervasive State control.
  • Argued that when a Co-operative Society is under control of a Special Officer appointed under statutory provisions, it should be considered a public authority amenable to writ jurisdiction.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Writ petitions do not lie against Co-operative Societies as they are not statutory bodies or State instrumentalities.
  • Relied on decisions such as K. Kannappan v. The Sriperumbudur Taluk Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. and others holding that the relationship between a Co-operative Society and its employees is purely contractual (master-servant) and not public employment.
  • Emphasized precedents from various High Courts and the Supreme Court holding that Co-operative Societies, being registered under the Societies Registration Act or similar laws, are not created by statute but merely governed by statutory provisions.
  • Argued that appointment of Special Officers does not convert the Society into a public authority or make it amenable to writ jurisdiction.
  • Relied on statutory provisions, including Section 32 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, to show that ultimate control lies with the general body of the Society, not the State.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sukhadev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi (1975) AIR 1331 Distinction between bodies created by statute and bodies governed by statute for Article 12 applicability. Supported the view that Co-operative Societies are governed by statute but not created by it, hence not statutory bodies.
Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujid Sehravardi (1981) AIR 487 Tests to determine whether a body is an instrumentality or agency of the State under Article 12. Applied to conclude Co-operative Societies do not satisfy these tests to be State instrumentalities.
Rimana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India (1979) Criteria for classifying bodies as State instrumentalities. Referenced in support of principles distinguishing statutory bodies from others.
P.K Ramchandra Iyer v. Union of India (1984) Clarification on statutory character of bodies and their amenability to writ jurisdiction. Used to reinforce that Co-operative Societies are not statutory bodies.
K. Kannappan v. The Sriperumbudur Taluk Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. (1979) Writ petitions do not lie against Co-operative Societies; relationship is master-servant. Upheld the preliminary objection that writs are not maintainable against Co-operative Societies.
Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. v. Additional Industrial Tribunal (1969) Bye-laws of Co-operative Societies do not have force of law; Societies are not statutory bodies. Supported the conclusion that Co-operative Societies are not public authorities amenable to writs.
Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India (1975) Societies registered under Societies Registration Act are not authorities under Article 12. Applied to show that Government control does not convert a society into a State instrumentality.
Bhaskaran v. State Bank of India (1984) Reaffirmed no writ jurisdiction over Co-operative Societies; relationship is private. Supported respondents' position that no writ lies against Co-operative Societies.
Satish Kumar v. Punjab State Co-operative Bank Ltd. (1981) Co-operative Societies are not authorities under Article 12 and not amenable to writ jurisdiction. Reiterated the non-applicability of writ jurisdiction on Co-operative Societies.
Pritam Singh Gill v. State of Punjab Punjab State Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank not an instrumentality of State. Held no writ jurisdiction against the Bank.
Harender Narain Bakner v. State of Bihar (1985) Tests in Ajay Hasia case not satisfied by Co-operative Society; no writ jurisdiction. Concluded Bihar State Co-operative Marketing Union Ltd. is not a State instrumentality.
Banabihari Tripathy v. Registrar Co-operative Societies (Orissa High Court) Tests of State control and statutory character not satisfied; no writ jurisdiction. Supported the conclusion that Co-operative Societies are not amenable to writ jurisdiction.
S.S Dhanoa v. Municipal Corporation, Delhi (1981) AIR 1395 Distinction between statutory corporations and bodies incorporated under statute. Held that officers placed at disposal of Co-operative Societies are not public servants.
Tekraj Vasandi & K.L Basandi v. Union of India Considered whether Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies is a State under Article 12. Illustrated that Government funding and control alone do not make a body a State instrumentality.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the conflicting precedents and submissions by closely examining the nature of Co-operative Societies in light of constitutional principles and Supreme Court tests. It emphasized the crucial distinction between bodies created by statute and those merely governed by statutory provisions. Co-operative Societies, though regulated by statutes such as the Co-operative Societies Act, are not created by statute and have a separate legal existence. The Court noted that bye-laws of Co-operative Societies do not have the force of law akin to statutory enactments.

The Court reviewed the extent of State control, including government nominees on Boards and appointment of Special Officers, and found that such factors do not amount to deep and pervasive State control sufficient to classify Co-operative Societies as State instrumentalities under Article 12. The Court also considered authoritative decisions from various High Courts and the Supreme Court, which consistently held that Co-operative Societies are not public authorities amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

Further, the Court addressed arguments regarding the appointment of Special Officers replacing governing bodies and held that such appointments do not convert the Society into a government entity or public authority. The Court found that the tests laid down in the leading Supreme Court cases, particularly Ajay Hasia, were not satisfied by the Co-operative Societies in question.

Consequently, the Court concluded that writ petitions under Article 226 do not lie against Co-operative Societies as they are neither statutory bodies nor State instrumentalities or agencies.

Holding and Implications

The Court held that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not lie against a Co-operative Society.

This decision clarifies the legal position by resolving conflicting views and confirms that Co-operative Societies are not statutory bodies nor State instrumentalities or agencies for the purpose of writ jurisdiction. The direct effect is that such Societies are not amenable to writ petitions under Article 226. No new precedent was set beyond affirming and consolidating existing jurisprudence on this issue.

    P. Kannan, In W.A 607 & 608 Of 1984. v. H. Tamilarasan & Others, Petitioner In W.P 4124 Of 1986.

    I find that there is a conflict of opinion as to whether a Writ Petition will lie against the Co-operative Society, A Division Bencn of this Court in K. Kannappan v. The Sri ‘Perumbudut Taluk Co-operative Society Ltd., Nazarathpet, Madras-56,1 has taken view that no writ will lie. As against this, contrary view is found expressed in L. Venkdtachalam v. The Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Madras and another W.A No. 74 of 1970 judgment dt. 13-11-1973. as well as W.A 1134 of 1984. A learned Single Judge of this Court has also taken the similar view as seen from S. Varadarajan v. The Special Officer, T.V.C.S Ltd. Madras and others 1985 Writ L.R 251. In view of the conflicting views, I am of the opinion that an authoritative decision has to be rendered to avoid any ambiguity on an important question like this. Therefore, I direct the papers be placed before my Lord, the Chief Justice for such appropriate orders for reference to the larger Bench as my Lord, the Chief Justice may deem fit.

    JUDGMENT

    (Venkataswami, J. on behalf of the Full Bench) (28-3-1989):

    1. The question that has been referred to the Full Bench by one of us (Mohan, J. as His Lordship then was) is.

    “Whether a writ would lie against a Co-operative Society under Art 226 of the Constitution of India?”

    2. This question seems to loom large for quite some time not only in this Court but in the other High Court as well, as could be seen from the cases cited by the counsel on both sides.

    3. Mr. M. Ravindran, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P Nos. 4124, 4154 and 4167 of 1986 and Mr. Somayaji, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in W.A Nos. 607 and 608 of 1984, have advanced main arguments inviting this Court to answer the question in the affirmative.

    4. On the other hand, Mr. M.R Narayanasamy, learned counsel appearing for the respondents., has advanced arguments inviting this Court to answer the question in the negative.

    5. Before giving our answer to the question referred to us, it will be fruitful to refer the cases cited on both sides and also point out the principles laid down in those cases.

    6. We may also state that the counsel inviting for an affirmative answer have derived support substantially from the following judgments of the Supreme Court and the principles laid down thereunder:

    Sukhadev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi 19751 LLJ 399.

    Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujid Sehravardi 1981 I LLJ 103.

    (c) Rimana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India 1979 II LLJ 217.

    (d)P.K Ramchandra Iyer v. Union of India 1984 1 LLJ 314.

    7. Let us now take the cases cited by the counsel who are advocating the proposition that a writ will lie against a co-operative Society.

    8. In Venkatachatam v. The Registrar of Co-operative Societies W.A No. 7 of 1970. Veeraswmi, C.J, speaking for the Bench has been observed as follows:

    “Tbe Special Officer is one appointed under S. 72 and as such, he is a statutory Officer and, therefore, he should be regarded as a public authority. Apart from that. Art. 226 of the Constitution is not confined to issue of writs only to a public authority. The power extends also to issue directions to any person.”

    In Ramnathan v. President, Perambalur Co-operative Milk Supply Society Ltd., Perambalur, Trichy District W.A No. 2811 of 1976. Mohan, J. (as His Lordship then was), in passing has negatived an argument that no writ will lie against a Co-operative Society. The learned Judge observed as follows:

    “It is too late in the date to contend that in a matter like this, no writ will lie.”

    In Varadarajan v. The Special Officer T.U.C S. Ltd,10 one of us (Venkataswami, J.) following the Division Bench ruling in Venkatachalam v. The Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Madras (supra) has taken the view that in cases where the Co-operative Society is under the control of a Special Officer, a writ would lie.

    9. In Madan Mohan v. States AIR 1966 Calcutta 23., a learned single Judge of that court has taken the view that a writ will lie against a Co-operative Society by observing thus:

    “The Managing Committee of the Society is to be constituted under S 23 of the Act (see S 2(m) and in accordance with the Rules and also the Bye-laws. Such Managing Committee is therefore, created by the Act and not merely registered. The cases of the Managing Committee of the School and of the sponsored colleges refeired to above, might be categorised as not being created by the statute or statutory rules. By several provisions of the Act (which I have given copiously in the beginning) and specially by Ss. 25, 86 and 129 of the lame. I am inclined to hold that the management of the affairs and the activities of such Societies, as in the instant Rule, are entirely controlled by the Registrar of the Co-op;rative Society (respondent No. 2) who is undoubtedly a public authority. Such affairs, therefore, cannot be private affairs. It might be stated that Rr. 43 and 44 and specially the opening words thereof in the said Rules, specifically provide that the Managing Committee shall observe the provisions of the Act, the Rules and the Bye-laws. The powers and the duties are, therefore, created by the Act and the Rules though it is not incumbent that a body in order to be a public body must always be constituted be a statute.”

    A Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Dukhooram v. Co-oper. Agrl. Asson. Kawardhai 196211 LLJ 353. has also taken the view that a writ lies against a co-operative society by observing as follows (p. 357):

    “Shri Choubey states that the terms and conditions of employment are a matter of contract between the society and its servants and reliefs arising out of contracts cannot form the subject matter of prerogative writs. This contention is correct where the relation between the mister and servant is a matter of contract alone. The position is, however is different where in addition to the contract, there is a specific bye law on the point. The bye-law gives a legal right to the servant apart from the contract and both the society and the servant are bound by it In our opinion, the enforcement of such a legal right forms an appropriate subject matter for the issue of a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitutiou.”

    In J. Ganapathy v. M.D Nellore Co-op. Spinning Mills Ltd 1979 1 LLJ 364., a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has taken the view that when a Co-operative Society is taken over as a relief undertaking under the provisions of the Relief Undertakings Act, it is amenable to writ jutisdiction.

    10. We would like to point out here itself that though this judgment was cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the contention that a writ would lie against a Co-operative Society, the learned Judges have specifically stated in paragraph 10 as follows, which is against the contention advanced by him J. Ganapathy v. M.D Net-lore Co-op. Spinning Mills Ltd. 1979 1 LLJ 364 at 365-370.

    “In a recent decision of ours in W P. No. 818 of 1975, dated 29-7-1979, after considering a number of decisions of the Supreme Court including the decisions relied on by the respondents referred to at the commencement ol this judgment, we observed that the present view of the Supreme Court is that a writ petition does not lie against a cooperative society especially as against an order ierinating the services of an employee. We are therefore, unable to agree to the extreme contention of Sri Kannabiran that even treating the respondent as an ordinary Co-operative Society the writ petition would be maintainable. But Sri Kannabiran submitted that it is unnecessary for him to so go far as the respondent stands on a special footing. In view of the fact that it has been declared as a relief undertaking, his contention is that it is an agency or an instrumentality of the State and hence falls within the definition of ‘State’ under Art. 12 of the Constitution.”

    (Emphasis supplied).

    Apart from citing the above decisions, Mr. Ravindran, learned counsel for the petitioner, took us through the bye-laws of Society and pointed out that among the Board of Directors, Director of Handlooms and Textile is one, that the Government have power to nominate ex-officio Director, that the Collector acts as Chairman in the Board meeting and all the decisions taken by the Board, can be given effect to only after the Government approves the same. Apart from that, certain special powers are vested with the Government in dealing with the powers of the Society. All these factors will go to show that it is an instrumentality or an agency of the State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India.

    11. Mr. Somayajee contended that the co operative Society is a person and as such amenable to writ jurisdiction. Further, in case? where the Board of Directors is superseded and special officers are appointed, they must be considered to be public authorities as they were appointed under the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 25 of 1976. A look into the preamble to Act 25 of 1976 and Ss. 3 and 4 will support the contention that the Society is amenable to writ jurisdiction.

    12. Mr. M.R Narayanaswamy, learned counsel appearing for the respondents in rep ly to the above contentions submitted thac there are direct decisions on the point not only of this Court but of other High Courts and also the Supreme Court taking the view that no writ will lie against co-operative society.

    13. He cited a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Kannappan v. The Sriperumbudur Taluk Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. W.P No. 677 of 1977, dt. 27-9-1979. In that case, Ramanujam, J. after referring to various decisions of this Court and also of the Supreme Court, speaking for the Bench has held as follows:

    “The relationship between the co-operative Society and its employees is that of a Master and Servant, and that, therefore, even if there is a wrongful dismissal of the employee, the Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus directing reinstatement or a declara tion that the termination of service is wrongful…

    The relationship of the respondent society and the petitioner is one of master and servant and there is no public or statutory employment. Nor can the petitioner claim to have any statutory status. The dispute between a master and servant cannot be decided in proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In this view of the matter we are inclined to hold that the decisions cited by the petitioner have no relevance on the question of maintainability of this writ pet:tion. The writ asked for by the petitioner cannot, therefore, be issued in the circumstances. We therefore uphold the preliminary objection raised by the respondents.”

    14. S. Nainar Sundaram. J., in the case reported in Bhaskaran v. State Bank of India 1984 Writ L.R 96. after referring to the Division Bench Judg ment in Kannappan v. The Sriperumbudur Taluk Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd.,(supra) has taken the same view. It is cited at the Bar that this Judgment of S. Nainar Sundaram, J., has been subsequently confirmed by a Division Bench of this Court (in W.A No. 108 of 1985).

    15. One of us (K. Venkataswami, J.) in the case reported in Vijay Rajan v. State of Tamil Nadu,17 after distinguishing the case reported in Varadarajan v. The Special Officer., T.U.C S. Ltd., (supra) and following the Division Bench Judgment of Ramanujam, J., (in W.P No 677 of 1977) had taken the view that no writ will lie against a co-operative Society.

    16. Coming to the judgments of the Supreme Court cited by the learned counsel for the respondents, we may refer to them chronologically. The first case is reported in Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. v. Addional Industrial Tribunal 1969 II LLJ 698. Though the maintainability of writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution was not directly involved, the following passage in the judgment will help us to appreciate the points raised before us (p. 707):

    “We are unable to accept the submission that the by-laws of a co-operative society framed in pursuance of the provisions of the Act can be held to be law or to have the force of law. It has no doubt been held that, if a statute gives power to a Government or other authority to make rules so framed have the force of statute and are to be deemed to be incorporated as a part of the statute. That principle, however, does not apply to bye-laws that a co-operative society is empowered by the Act to make. The bye-laws that are contemplated by tha Act can be merely those which govern the internal management, business or administration of a society. They may be binding between the persons affected by them, but they do not have the force of a statute. In respect of bye-laws laying down conditions of service of the employees of society, the bye-laws would be binding between the society and the employees just in the same manner as conditions of service laid down by contract between the parties In fact, after such bye-laws lay ing down the conditions of service are made and any person enters the employment of a society these conditions of service will have to be treated as conditions accepted by the employee when entering the service and will thus bind him like conditions of service specifically forming part of the contract of service The bye-laws that can be framed by a society under the Act are similar in nature to the Articles of Association of a Company incorporated under the Companies Act and such Articles of Association have never been held to have the force of law In a number of cases, conditions of service for industies are laid down by Standing Orders certified under the Industrial Employment (“Standing Orders) Act, 1946, and it has been held that, though such Standing Order9 are binding between the employers and the employees of the industry governed by these Standing Orders, they do not have such force of law as to be binding on Industrial Tribunal adjudicating an industrial dispute.”

    17. In Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India,19 while answering the question that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not an authority within the meaning of Art 12 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court has held as follows (p. 375):

    “The council is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. Reliance was placed by counsel for the petitioner on these features of the society. Under K. 3, the Prime Minister of India is the Ex-Officio President of the Society. The Governing Body under R. 30 consists of inter alia some persons appointed by the Government of India representing the administrative Ministry under which the council of Scientific and Industrial Research is included, and the Ministry of Finance and one or more members appointed by the Government of India. The Government of India may terminate the membership of any member or at one and the same time of all members other than the ex-officio members of the Governing Body. R. 45 states that the Governing Body shall have the management of all the affairs and funds of the Society. R. 46 states that the Governing Body shall have power, with the sanction of the Government of India to frame, amend or repeal bye-law not inconsistent with the rules for the administration and management of the affairs of the Society and in particular to provide for the terms and tenure of appointments, emoluments, allowances, rules of discipline and other conditions of service of the officers and staff of the Society. Reference was also made to the Government of India (Allocations of Business) Rules, 1961 and in particular to page 76 where it is stated that all matters relating to the Council of Scientific; and Industrial Research are under thi Department of Science and Technology.

    Extracting the features as aforesaid, it was contended that thsie would indicate that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research was really an agency of the Government. This contention is unsound. The Society does not have a statutory character like the Oil and Natural Gas Commission or the Life Insurance Corporation or Industrial Finance Corporation. It is a society incorporated in accordance with the provisions of the Societies Registration Act. The fact that the Prime Minister is the President or that the Government appoints nominees to the Governing Body or that the Government may terminate the membership will not establish anything more than the fact that the Government takes special care that the promotion, guidance and co-operation of scientific and industrial research, the institution and financing cf specific research establishment or development and assistance to speciat instiiutions or departments of the existing institutions for scientific study of problem affecting particular industry in a trade, the utilisation of the result of the researches conducted under the auspices of the Council towards the development of industries in the country are carried out in a responsible manner.”

    In Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain AIR 1976 S.C 888. after referring to an earlier decision of that Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvamshi (supra) the Supreme Court has held as follows:

    It is therefore, clear that there is a well marked distinction between a body which is created by the statute and a body which after having come into existence is governed in accordance with the provisions of the statute. In other words the the position seems to be that the institution concerned must owe its very existence to a statute which would be the fountainbead of its powers. The question in such cases to be asked is, if there is no statute would the institution have any legal existence. If the answer is in the negative, then undoubtedly it is a statutory body, but if the institution has a separate existence of its own without any reference to the statute concerned but is merely governed by the statutory provisions, it cannot be said to be a statutory body,”

    In Kulchhinder Singh v. Hardayal Singh Brar 1976 II LLJ 204, fine distinction between a body with a personality created by and owing its existence solely to a statute and an entity which is recognised by and is registered under a statute has been nicely brought out in the following words (p. 207):

    “Indeed the distinction between a body with a personality created by and owing its existence solely to a statute and an entity which is recognised by and is registered under a statute is real, dramatic and makes for a world of difference in jural impact.”

    The Supreme Court in that very judgment, though pointed out the existing controversy regarding the maintainability of a writ against a co-operative society, did not directly answer that question, as in the opinion of the Supreme Court, that was not necessary for the reasons given in paragraph 10, which reads as follows:

    “The reason why we are not inclined to add to the enormous erudition on the point already accumulated in case law is that a close perusal of the writ petition will disclose that essentially the appellant is seeking merely to enforce an agreement entered into between the employees and the co-operative Bank.”

    Again in The Nayagarh Cooperaiive Central Bank Ltd. v. Narayan Rath AIR 1977 S C. 112. the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

    ‘The High Court has dealt with the question whether a writ petition can be maintained against a co-operative society, but we are inclined to the view that the observations made by the High Court and its decision that such a writ petition is maintainable are not strictly in accordance with trie decisions of this Court.

    We would like to observe that the judgment of the High Court should not be treated as an authority for the proposition that a writ petition is maintainable against a co-operative society.”

    (Emphasis supplied)

    The learned Judges, however, observed that the order impugned in that particular case was one passed by the Registrar, acting as a statutory authority and, therefore, the writ petition was maintainable in that case. In S.S Dhanoa v. Municipal Corporation, Delhi 1981 2 LLJ 231=AIR 1981 S.C 1395. the Supreme Court has observed as follows (p 235):

    “There is a distinction between a corporation established by or under an Act and a body incorporated under an Act. This distinction was brought out by this Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhogatram Sardur Singh Reghunansei 1975-I-LLJ. 399 = AIR 1975 S.C 1331. It was observed:

    “A company incorporated under the companies Act is not created by the Companies Act but comes into existence in accordance with the provisions of the Act. There is thus a well-marked distinction between a body created by a statute and a body which, after coming into existence is governed in accordance with the provisions of a statute. In Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India 1975-I-LLJ. 374=AIR 1975 S.C 1329., the question arose whether the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research which was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, was a statutory body was urged that because the Council of Scientific and lndustiial Research had government nominees as the President of the body and derived guidance and iinaucial aid from the Government, it was a statutory body Repelling the contention the Court observed (at p 1330 of AIR);

    “The Society does not have a statutory character like the Oil and Natural Gas Commission or the Life Insnrance Corporation or Industrial Finance Corporation. It is a society incorporate in accordance with the provisions of the Society Registration Act, The fact that the Prime Minister is the President or that the Government, appoints nominees to the Governing hody of that the Government may terminate the membership will not establish anything more than the fact that the Government takes special care that the promotion, guidance and co-operation of scientific and industrial research, the institution and financing of specific researches establishment or development and assistance to special institutions or departments of the existing institutions for scientific study of problems affecting particular industry in a trade, the utilisation of the result of the researches conducted under the auspices of the Council towards the development of industries in the country are cirri ed out in a responsible manner.

    Whatever had been said with regard to the Council of Scietific and Industrial Research which was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, equally applies to the Co-operative Store Limited which is a society registered under the Bombay Co operative Societies Act, 1925 It is not a statutory body because it is not created by a statute It is a body created by an act of a gtoup of industries in accordance with the provisions of a statute.”

    (Emphasis supplied)

    In that case, the Supreme Court was considering the question whether a member of the Indian Administrative Service, whose services are placed at the disposal of a cooperative society is or is not a public servant within the meaning under S 21 (Col. 12) of the Indian Penal Code for the purposes of S 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Supreme Court, while answering the point in the negative, has observed as follows (p. 236);

    “Legally speaking, the Super Bazaars are owned and managed by the Society and not by the Central Government and, therefore, the appeltant was not employed in connection with the affairs of tne Union within the meaning of S. 107 of C.P.C, 1973.”

    In Tekraj Vasandi & K.L Basandi v. Union of India,26 the Supreme Court was considering the question whether the Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies is a State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. After considering the judgments of the Supreme Court on this point upto that date, the learned Judges have held as follows (pp. 353-354):

    “The objects of the Society were not governmental business but were certainly the aspects which were expected to equip Members of Parliament and the State Legislature with the requisite knowledge and experience for better functioning. Many of the objects adopted by the Society were not coniud to the two Houses of Parliament and were intended to have an impact on society at large.

    The Memorandum of the Society permitted acceptance of gifts, donations and subscriptions. There is material to show that the Ford Foundations, a US oised Trust, had extended support for some time. Undoubtedly, the annual contribution from the Government has been substantial and it would not be wrong to say that they perhaps constitute the main source of founding, yet some money has been coming from other sources. In later years, foreign funding came to be regulated and, therefore, it became necessary to provide that without Government clearance, like any other institution 1CPS was not to recive foreign donations. No material has been placed before us for the stand that the Society was not entitled to receive contributions from any indigenous source within Since Government money has been coming, the usual conditions attached to Government grants have been applied and enforced. It the Society's affairs were really intented to be cazried on as part of the Lok Sabha or Parliament as such the manner or functioning would have been different. The accounts of the Society are separately maintained and subject to audit in the same way as the affairs of the societies receiving Government grants to be audited. Government usually impose certain conditions and restrictions when grants are made. No exception has been made in respect of the Society and the mere faet that such retrictions are made is not a determinative aspects.”

    18. Let us now look into the decisions of the other High Courts cited by learned counsel for the respondents: In Satish Kumar v. Punjab State Co-operative Bank Ltd. 1981-II-LLJ. 256. a learned single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that a society registered under the Co operative Societies Act, 1912 perse cannot be treated as an authority within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. The learned Judge further held that such a Society is neither an instrumentality nor an agency of the Government and therefore not amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. A Pull Bench of the same Punjab and Haryana High Court in Pritam Singh Gill v. State of Punjab,28 has taken the view that no writ will lie against the Punjab State Cooperative Land Mortgage Bank.

    “‘The Punjab State Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank is not an instrumentality or agency of the State. Consequently it cannot be deemed to be an ‘authority’ within the meaning of Art, 12 and as such is not amendable to a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 In this connection it cannot be urged that it is such an instrumentality on the ground that the 4th test of deep and pervasive State control laid down in Ajay Hasla's Case29 for determining whether a co-operative society is an instrumentality of the State is satisfied in view of the provisions of Punjab Co-operative Societies Act read with Punjab Co-operative Land Mortgage Banks Act.”

    The above said Full Bench judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court was delivered by S.S Sandhawalia, C.J The same teamed Chief Justice as Chief Justice of Patna High Court had occasion to consider the very same question, and the same is reported in Harender Narain Bakner v. State of Bihar 1985 Lab. I C. 1807. Speaking for the Bench the learned Chief Justice again reiterated the same conclusion. In this Division Bench judgment, the learned Chief Justice, after referring to the six tests laid down by the Supreme Court in Ajay Hasia's case (supra) held that none of the tests laid down in that case is satisfied to hold the Bihar State Co-operative Marketing Union Limited is an authority or atleast an agency or instrumentality of the State for the purposes of Art. 12 of the Constitution. It may be noted that factually, it was found in that case that the State Government had 99 per cent shares in the State Co operative Marketing Union Limited and the Fourth Pay Revision Committee was also made applicable to its employees. The Managing Director of the State Co-operative Marketing Union Limited was appointed by the State Government. Nevertheless, the Division Bench held that those factors were not sufficient to hold that this Bihar State Co-operative Marketing Union Limited is amendable to writ jurisdiction. After elaborately discussing the matter the Court concluded as follows:

    “To finally conclude, it is manifest that not one of the six authoritative tests spelt out in Ajay Hasia's Case stands BISCOMAUN. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner as discussed are wholly distinguishable. Consequently, it must be held that the Bihar State Co-operative Marketing Union Ltd.. is in no way an instrumentality or agency of the State. Admittedly, BISCOMAUN is a co-operative society registered under the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1935. Inevitably, it follow it is not there ore, amendable to the writ jurisdiction under Art. 226- The answer to the threshold quest on posed at the very outset is, therefore, rendered in the negative.”

    19. P. Bhaskaran v. Addl. Secretary, Agricultural {Cooperation) Dept31. a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court has taken the same view and observed as follows (p. 316):

    “The Co-operative Societies are not created by the Co-operative Societies Act and they are not statutory bodies. Tney are only functioning in accordance with the privisionsof the Act. These institutions would have legal existencd even it the Co operative Societies Act was not in force More-ever, the Government have no shares in the Co-operative Societies. There is no deep and pervasive State control. The management of the socisties does not vest in the Government or in the representatives of the Government Bank. The managenennt is under the effective control of a cammittee elected by the members of the Societies. The statutory regulation or restriction in the functioning of the Societies is not “an impriut of State under Art. 12”. Hence no writ wilt lie against a Co-operative Society governed by the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act.”

    20. Recently, a Full Bench of the Orissa High Court in Banabihari Tripathy v. Registrar Co operative Societies,32 has taken the identical view after referring to the case law on the subject by observing as follows:

    “The matter, therefore, has to be examined in the light of the tests indicated by the Supreme Court in the case of Som Prakash33 an Ajay Hasia34 which shall hold the field.

    Out of the several tests, the main tests on the anvil of which the case of the opposite party Bank rests is to examine the formation of the share capital and the functions of the Bank. In this connection, I have already referred to the relevant provisions of the bye-laws of the Bank to show how the capital of the Bank is to be raised and the functions and activities. The petitioner has singularly failed to establish that these tests were satisfied in this case. Then again there is no existence of any deep and pervasive State Control over the affairs of the opposite party-Bank. In any case, no material except the statutory and formal regulatory supervision was placed before us even in the course of the subnissions made by Dr. Dash on which any finding on this incredent can be recorded in favour of the petitioner. The relevant tests therefore stricte sensu are not satisfied here so as to bring the case of the opposite party Bank within the ambit of Art, 12 of the Constitution and that make it amendable to the writ jurisdiction.”

    21. Mr. M.R Narayanaswamy also placed reliance on the provisions of the Act viz.. S 32 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983, corresponding to S. 26 of the Tamil Nadu. Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 and submitted that the ultimate decision relating to the affairs of the Society vest9 with the general body. On the basis of the rulings cited above and the contentions Mr. M.R Narayanaswamy submitted that no writ will lie against co-operative societies in the light of the above decisions of various High Courts and of the Supreme Court. Let us now examine the issue.

    22. As pointed out at the outset, the counsel who argued for an affirmative answer relied on passages from the judgments of the Supreme Court referred to in paragraph 9 (supra) In this back ground let us consider the question.

    23. The main and important factor that has to be borne in mind in dealing with the issue on hand is the fine distinction that has been pointed out by the Supreme Court on more than one occasion between a body which is created by the statute and a body which after having come into existence is governed in accordance with the provisions of the statute (Vide AIR 1975 1331 A AIR 1976 2216). We are clearly of the view that a co-operative society is a body which after having come into existence is governed in accordance with the provisions of the statute In other words, a co-operative society does not owe its very existence to any statute which would be the fountain-head of its powers. Still further, it can be held that even if there is no statute a co-operative society can have a legal existence. If this is the position, applying the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in the above said two cases, a co-operative society is an institu tion merely governed by the statutory provi sions and it cannot be said to be a statutory body. In this connection, the observations of the Full Bench Judgement of the Kerala High Court, at the risk of repetition, can again be extracted:

    ‘The Co-operative Societies are not created by the Co-operative Societies Act andthey are not statutory bodies. They are only function in accordance with the provisions of the Act. These institutions woud have legal existence even if the Co-operative Societies Act was not in force. Moreover the Government have no shares in the Cooperative Societies. There is no deep and peruasive State control The management of the Societies does not rest in the Government or in the representatives of the Government Bank. The management is under the effective control of a conmittee elected by the members of the Societies. The statutory regulation or restriction in the functioning of the Societies is not “an imprint of State under Art. 12”. Hence no writ will lie against a Cooperative Society governed by the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act.”

    24. The issue can be looked from another angle. The Supreme Court io Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. v. Additional Industrial Tribunal 1969-II-LLJ. 698. has held that the bye-laws of a cooperative society framed in pursuance of the provisions of the Act cannot be held to be law or to have the force of law. This also supports the view that a co-operative society is not a statutory functionary. Whether the fact that whenever the governing body is superseded and in its place a Special Officer or other Government official is appointed to administer the affairs of the society makes any difference has to be considered now. We are of the view that having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in S S, Dhanoa v. Municipal Corpn. Delhi 1981-II-LLJ. 231 at 235. (supra) the position is that it does not make any difference. Any Officer appointed in the place of the governing body stepping into the shoes of the governing body and discharging the functions as such definitely is not a Government servant. In the case referred to above the Supreme Court has clearly held that when the services of an Indian Administrative Officer are placed at the disposal of a cooperative society, he was not discharging the functions as a public servant.

    In that case, the Supreme Court has positively held as follows:

    “Whatever has been said with legard to the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research which was a society registered under the Societies Act, equally applies to the Co-operative Store Limited, which is a society registered under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1915 It is not a statutory body because it is not created by a statute. It is a body created by an act of a group of individuals in accordance with the provisions of a statute.” [Side line passage]

    (Emphasis supplied)

    The above passage places beyond doubt that a co-operative society is not a statutory body.

    25. Viewed from any angle and in the light of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court and of the other High Courts, parti cularly the two Full Bench judgments of different High Courts referred to above, in appears to us that a co-operative society is not an authority nor an instrumentality on agency of the Government to attract Art. 12 of the Constitution and therefore not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. As observed by the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Harender Narain Banker v. State of Bihar 1985 Lab. I.C 1807. and also the Full Bench decision of Orissa High Court in Banabihari Tripathy v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies,38 we are also of the view that the tests laid by the Supreme Court in various cases on which heavy reliance was placed by the counsel, who invited the Court to answer the issue in the affimative are not satisfied by the co-operative societies in question to come under Art. 12 of the Constitution as an authority or agency or instrumentality of Government. It is not necessary to set out the various tests laid down by the Supreme Court once over to find out whether the co-operative society will satisfy any or some of the tests so laid down by the Supreme Court in view of the fact that we are in agreement with the views expressed by the Division Bench Judgment of the Patna High Court and the two Full Bench judgments of Kerala and Orissa High Courts.

    26. Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us in the negative.

    CH/VCS.

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    P. Kannan, In W.A 607 & 608 Of 1984. v. H. Tamilarasan & Others, Petitioner In W.P 4124 Of 1986.
    (Mar 29, 1989)