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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • Mr. K.C Rajappa for Applt. Govt. pleader for Respt.
Judges
  • Ramanujam
  • Sathar Sayeed, JJ.
Acts
  • Nadu Urban Land Tax Act (Act XXII of 1966)
  • Urban Land tax Act, 1963,
  • Urban Land Tax Act,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • Mr. K.C Rajappa for Applt. Govt. pleader for Respt.
Judges
  • Ramanujam
  • Sathar Sayeed, JJ.
Acts
  • Nadu Urban Land Tax Act (Act XXII of 1966)
  • Urban Land tax Act, 1963,
  • Urban Land Tax Act,
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Ramanujam, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant is the owner of urban land (R.S. Nos. 1575/1 and 1575/13) in Mylapore. The land was assessed under the Urban Land Tax Act, 1963 (came into force 1 July 1963). A Full Bench of the High Court had earlier struck down Section 6 of that Act in a batch of writ petitions (more than 300 petitions), which prevented valid assessments under the Act for the relevant period. The Supreme Court, in Asst. Commissioner of Urban Land Tax, Madras v. Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd. (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 169), set aside that Full Bench decision and upheld the validity of the Act.

After the Supreme Court decision, the Act was amended and an assessment was made against the appellant. The appellant objected that no assessment could be made for the period prior to the amendment and that a writ of prohibition issued by the High Court in the appellant's favour (which had not been appealed to the Supreme Court) prevented assessment for the faslis 1373 to 1379 (corresponding to years 1963–1969). The objection was overruled initially, but the Urban Land Tax Tribunal allowed the appellant's appeal and set aside the assessment for those years, relying on the continuing effect of the writ of prohibition issued in the appellant's favour.

The respondent (Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax, Madras) filed W.P. 325 of 1978 in the High Court seeking to quash the Tribunal's order. Padmanabhan, J. (the learned single Judge) allowed that writ petition, holding that once the Supreme Court upheld validity of the Act, the Act must be treated as valid from inception and that the writ of prohibition issued by the High Court had become ineffective; the Judge also relied on the introduction of Section 7-A as making the appellant liable even from inception. The appellant appealed from that order to the present Court (Ramanujam, J.).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the effect of the Supreme Court's decision upholding the validity of the Urban Land Tax Act on a writ of prohibition previously issued by the High Court in favour of a particular litigant where that specific High Court order was not taken in appeal to the Supreme Court and has become final between the parties?
  2. Does the subsequent insertion of Section 7-A in the Urban Land Tax Act render ineffective a writ of prohibition previously issued by the High Court that has become final in favour of the appellant?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Though the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Act in the Buckingham Mills case, the writ of prohibition granted in the appellant's favour by the High Court was not appealed to the Supreme Court and thus remained final and binding between the parties for the period in question (faslis 1373 to 1379).
  • The appellant relied on the judgment in Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India, where the Supreme Court held that a final High Court judgment (mandamus) remained enforceable notwithstanding subsequent parliamentary enactment that would otherwise have interfered with the relief; by analogy, the appellant contended its High Court writ could not be nullified by a later Supreme Court decision in another case or by statutory amendment.
  • Because only a small subset (four) of the more than 300 writ petitions was taken to the Supreme Court, the appellant asserted it acquired a vested legal right from the unappealed High Court order which could not be cancelled automatically by the Supreme Court decision in other petitions.

Respondent's Position / Single Judge's View

  • The respondent argued before the single Judge that once the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Act, the Act should be enforceable against all persons, irrespective of whether particular High Court writs had been appealed to the Supreme Court.
  • Padmanabhan, J. held that the Supreme Court's judgment establishing validity of the Act made the Act effective from its inception and that the writ of prohibition issued by the High Court had thereby become ineffective. The learned Judge also regarded the introduction of Section 7-A as sufficient to render the appellant liable under the Act even from inception.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Asst. Commissioner of Urban Land Tax, Madras v. Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 169 Establishment by the Supreme Court of the validity of the Urban Land Tax Act (set aside the Full Bench decision of the High Court). The opinion records that the Supreme Court set aside the High Court Full Bench decision and upheld the Act; this Supreme Court decision prompted amendment of the Act and subsequent assessments. However, the Court did not treat that decision as automatically nullifying High Court writs that had become final in favour of particular parties who had not appealed.
Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India, AIR 1978 S.C. 803 Principle that a final High Court judgment granting relief (here, writ of mandamus) remains enforceable between the parties even if subsequent legislative action or other developments would otherwise alter the legal position, where the judgment was allowed to become final and appeal was not pursued. The Court held that this decision "squarely applies." It relied on Madan Mohan Pathak to conclude that a writ of prohibition issued by the High Court and allowed to become final remains binding between the parties and is not automatically taken away or rendered ineffective by a later Supreme Court decision in other matters or by subsequent statutory amendment lacking a non obstante clause.
Jivjee Rao Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer, 130 I.T.R. 710 (Calcutta High Court) The proposition that a Supreme Court decision declaring or interpreting law is not necessarily retrospective so as to obliterate prior conflicting judicial decisions or the existence of debate or doubt that preceded the Supreme Court ruling. The opinion cites this case in support of the proposition that a Supreme Court ruling does not automatically erase prior judicial outcomes; the Court used it to bolster the view that earlier High Court decisions (and the legal effects that flowed from them between parties) are not necessarily nullified by a later Supreme Court ruling resolving the legal question.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by focusing on the legal effect of a High Court writ that has become final between the parties and the temporal reach of a subsequent Supreme Court ruling that resolves the same legal question in other proceedings.

First, the Court observed the factual posture: a Full Bench of the High Court had issued writs in a large batch of petitions, but only a limited number of those decisions were taken to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court set aside the Full Bench decision in respect of the matters before it and upheld the Act's validity. For the other High Court orders (including the appellant's), no appeal was filed, and attempts to secure review of those unappealed orders were dismissed by the High Court, making them final and binding between the parties.

The Court then applied the Supreme Court's decision in Madan Mohan Pathak. That decision, as recounted in the opinion, held that where a High Court judgment has been allowed to become final (appeal not pressed), the relief granted by that judgment (there, a writ of mandamus directing payment) remains enforceable between the parties notwithstanding subsequent statutory modification. The present Court treated that principle as directly analogous: a writ of prohibition issued by the High Court and allowed to become final is not automatically nullified by a later Supreme Court decision in other matters which upheld the statute.

The Court further considered Section 7-A (inserted in the Act). It concluded that S. 7-A merely prescribes the form and necessity to file a return and was not made expressly retrospective; importantly, S. 7-A does not contain a non obstante clause overriding prior judicial orders. The Court held that even if S. 7-A were treated as retrospective, in the absence of an express non obstante clause it would not nullify the effect of a final writ of prohibition issued by the High Court.

On the combined basis that (a) the High Court writ had become final between the parties, (b) Madan Mohan Pathak establishes that such final judgments remain enforceable notwithstanding later developments, (c) the Supreme Court decision cannot be taken to have retrospective operation so as to erase the binding effect of the earlier writ for the period prior to the Supreme Court judgment, and (d) Section 7-A contains no non obstante provision to displace the writ, the Court found the appellant's contention legally tenable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed; the order of the single Judge (Padmanabhan, J.) is set aside and the order of the Urban Land Tax Tribunal (which had set aside the assessment for the faslis 1373 to 1379 / years 1963–1969) is restored. There will be no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The appellant's writ of prohibition, having become final between the parties, continues to protect the appellant from assessment under the Urban Land Tax Act for the specified period (faslis 1373 to 1379 / years 1963–1969); the Tribunal's order setting aside those assessments is restored.
  • Statutory change and Supreme Court rulings in other matters do not automatically nullify final High Court orders in individual cases where those orders were not appealed; in particular, the insertion of S. 7-A without a non obstante clause does not displace a final writ of prohibition.
  • The Court applied existing authority (Madan Mohan Pathak and related reasoning) rather than announcing a novel principle; the decision resolves the dispute between these parties but does not purport to create a new broad precedent beyond the application of established authorities.

Order pronounced by Ramanujam, J.; judgment restores the Tribunal's decision and sets aside the single Judge's order. (VCS.)

Show full summary ...

    Rajah V.V Seetharamayya Bahadur v. The Asst. Commissioner Of Urban Land Tax, Madras-35

    JUDGMENT

    Ramanujam, J.

    1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of Padmanabhan, J. in W.P 325 of 1978, allowing the writ petition filed by the Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax, Madras, the respondent herein, for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order, dated 20th November, 1975 on the file of the Urban Land tax Tribunal, Madras.

    2. The appellant is the owner of the urban land in R.S Nos. 1575/1 and 1575/13, measuring about 50 grounds, situate in Kasthuri Iyengar Road, Mylapore. The assessment was made under the Urban Land Tax Act, 1963, which came into force on 1st July, 1963. The same was challenged before this Court as having violated Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution and a Full Bench of this Court struck down S. 6 of that Act, as a result of which no assessment could be validly made under the provisions of the said Act. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court in Asst. Commissioner of Urban Land Tax, Madras v. Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd. . A.I.R-1970 S.C-169., has set aside the decision of the High Court and upheld the validity of the Act. Thereafter, the Act was amended and under the said amended Act, assessment has been made on the appellant in respect of the said urban land. At the stage of the assessment, the appellant took the objection that no assessment could be made under the provisions of the Act for the period prior to the date of the amendment of the Act and that in view of the writ of prohibition issued by this Court in the writ petition filed by the appellant questioning the validity of the provisions of Sec. 6 of the Act, which has not been challenged by filing an appeal before the Supreme Court, no assessment could be made for the period prior to the date of the Supreme Court judgment. The said objection was overruled; but the same was upheld in the appeal filed by the assessee before the Urban Land Tax Tribuy nal. The Tribunal took the view that in view of the existence of a writ of prohibition issued by a Full Bench of this Court prohibiting the authorities from enforcing the provisions of the Act as against the appellant, merely because later, a similar writ of prohibition was set aside by the Supreme Court at the instance of some other assessee, will not automatically modify or cancel the writ of prohibition issued in favour of the appellant, as against the authorities constituted under the Act, and, therefore, no assessment could be made under the provisions of the Act, even after the decision of the Supreme Court for the faslis 1373 to 1379. The respondent herein filed W.P 325 of 1978 questioning the said order of the Urban Land Tax Tribunal setting aside the assessment made for the years 1963 to 1969, on the ground that once the Act has been held to be valid by the Supreme Court, the Act should be enforced against all irrespective of the fact whether the writ of prohibition issued by the Full Bench of this Court is set aside in appeal or not. Padmanabhau, J. has held that once the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Act, the Act must be held to be valid from its very inception and that the writ of prohibition issued by this Court in favour of the appellant should be taken to have become ineffective. The learned Judge also took the view that the introduction of Sec. 7-A in the Act is sufficient to make the appellant liable under the Urban Land Tax Act, even from its inception, notwithstanding the writ of prohibition issued by this Court.

    3. This view taken by the learned Judge has been challenged in this writ appeal. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, though the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Buckingham Mills case, has set aside the judgment of this Court and upheld the validity of the Act, the writ of prohibition issued in favour of the petitioner by this Court, not having been appealed against to the Supreme Court, the judgment of the Supreme Court cannot be taken to automatically cancel the writ of prohibition issued in favour of the petitioner. Though this Court dealt with a batch of more than 300 writ petitions, only four of them have been taken to the Supreme Court and, therefore, the appellant has acquired a legal right flowing from the issue of the writ not to be assessed from faslis 1373 to 1379, the date of the judgment of the Supreme Court being 10th April, 1969. The learned counsel also points out that as a matter of fact, the respondent filed a review petition before this Court for reviewing the judgment of this Court in the batch of writ petitions in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court; but the said review petitions were dismissed by this Court in December, 1971, resulting in the writ of prohibition issued in favour of the appellant becoming final. The question is how far the appellant's said contention could be accepted as tenable.

    4. There is no dispute as to facts. The Tamil Nadu Urban Land Tax Act (Act XXII of 1966) was challenged before a Full Bench of this Court in as many as 309 writ petitions. The entire batch was heard together and a judgment was delivered by this Court allowing the same. The respondent herein, however took only the orders passed in four writ petitions alone in appeal to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court allowed the said appeals and set aside the judgment of this Court and upheld the validity of the Act. In respect of the orders passed in other writ petitions, no appeal has been filed before the Supreme Court and when an attempt was made by the respondent before this Court to have those orders reviewed in the light of the latter judgment of the Supreme Court, this Court dismissed those review petitions. The question is what is the effect of the Supreme Court judgment on the orders passed by this Court allowing the appellant's writ petition, which has not been specifically questioned before the Supreme Court and which has become final and binding as between the parties. The further question that will arise is as to whether the introduction of S. 7-A in the Act will make the writ of prohibition issued by this Court ineffective.

    5. The learned counsel for the appellant placed strong reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India, as clearly supporting his contention that so long as the writ issued by this Court has not been challenged in appeal, that writ will continue to have its force till the date of the judgment of the Supreme Court. In that case, at the instance of certain employees of the Life Insurance Corporation, the Calcutta High Court issued a writ of Mandamus directing the Life Insurance Corporation to pay cash bonus for the year 1975—76 to the employees in class III and class IV in terms of a Settlement, dated 24th January, 1974, between the Life Insurance Corporation and its employees. The judgment of the Calcutta High Court was allowed to become final. Immediately after the said decision of the Calcutta High Court, the Parliament enacted the Life Insurance Corporation (Modification of Settlement) Act. The appeal filed against the judgment of the Calcutta High Court was not pressed by the Life Insurance Corporation and the judgment was allowed to become final and binding as between the parties. Subsequently, on the basis of the said enactment, the bonus was not paid as directed by the Writ of Mandamus. The question then arose as to whether the subsequent enactment, referred to above, will nullify the writ of Mandamus earlier issued by the High Court The Supreme Court held that the writ of Mandamus issued by the Calcutta High Court directing the Life Insurance Corporation to pay the amount of bonus for the year 1975—76 remained untouched and was not taken away by the Life Insurance Corporation (Modification of Settlement) Act, that so far as the right of class III and class IV employees to annual cash bonus for the year 1st April, 1975 to 31st March, 1976 was concerned, it became crystallised by the judgment and thereafter, they became entitled to enforce the writ of Mandamus granted by the judgment notwithstanding the enactment, that as the judgment was allowed to become final and the appeal against it was not pressed, the judgment could not be disregarded or ignored and that the Life Insurance Corporation was bound to obey the writ of Mandamus issued by the Calcutta High Court and to pay annual cash bonus for the year 1st April, 1975 to 31st March, 1976.

    6. The learned counsel also relies on the decision of Calcutta High Court in Jivjee Rao Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer . 130 I.T.R 710., with reference to his submission that the decision of the Supreme Court declaring the law or interpreting a provision in a statute cannot be held to have retrospective effect in the sense that although a debate or doubt of a confict of judicial opinion is resolved and settled by the Supreme Court, yet that does not obliterate the existence of such debate or doubt or conflict that existed prior to the decision of the Supreme Court setting at rest such debate or doubt or conflict. In the said decision it was held that though the Supreme Court had laid down that the principle of retrospective legislation is not applicable to the decision of the Supreme Court, declaring the law or interpreting a provision in a statute the law is laid down or a provision in a statute is interpreted by the Supreme Court only when there is a debate or doubt on the interpretation of any provision of a statute requesting interpretation by the Supreme Court and that the law laid down by the Supreme Court cannot be said to have obliterated the decision rendered by the courts prior to its decision.

    7. On the facts of this case, the decision of the Supreme Court in Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India . AIR 1978 S.C 803,, referred to above, squarely applies. As in that case, here also, a writ of prohibition issued by the High Court has been allowed to become final and binding between the parties. Since the decision of the Supreme Court setting aside the judgment of this Court cannot be taken to be retrospective in operation for the period prior to the decision rendered by the Supreme Court, the binding nature of the writ of prohibition issued by this Court has to be taken as still operative. S. 7-A of the Act, in our opinion does not take away the efficacy of the writ of prohibition issued by this court. It merely provides for the form of and the necessity to file the return. S. 7-A also has not been made retrospective. Even if it is retrospective, it will not make the writ of prohibition issued by this Court ineffective, unless the provision contains a non obstante clause. Here, admittedly S. 7-A of the Act does not contain a non obstante clause nullifying the decision of this Court. In my view, the appellant's contention is legally tenable, and therefore, the writ appeal is allowed and the order of the learned single Judge is set aside and that of the Urban Land Tax Tribunal restored. There will be no order as to costs.

    VCS.

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    Comments

    Rajah V.V Seetharamayya Bahadur v. The Asst. Commissioner Of Urban Land Tax, Madras-35
    (Apr 26, 1985)