Sri Mahaliamman Temp... v. Vijayammal, Madras High Court, Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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Case Number

App. No. 12 of 1977

Advocates

S. Ramalingam, R. Mohan and N. Thiagarajan for Applt.
Mr. N. Varadarajan for Respt.

Judges

V. Ramaswami
Ratnam, JJ.

Acts

provisions of S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT
S. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act,

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent-plaintiff (the widow of Manickam) filed a suit seeking a declaration of her title to the properties described in the A and B schedules of the plaint. The properties originally belonged to the family of C.S. Arumugham Pillai and his son Manickam. Manickam pre-deceased his father in 1934; Arumugham died in 1946 leaving his widow Sadaichi Ammal (who later died in 1957).

Arumugham executed a Will (Ex. B11) dated 29 August 1932. By that Will:

In respect of the A schedule properties: a life estate was given to his wife Sadaichi Ammal, with the remainder to the first defendant (a temple) subject to directions to perform certain charities.
In respect of the B schedule properties: a life interest was given to the plaintiff, with the remainder to the first defendant for the performance of the specified charities.

The plaintiff challenged the Will and claimed the properties were joint family properties (acquired by joint exertions of father and son) or at least treated as family property, arguing the testator lacked testamentary capacity to dispose of them as self-acquired. She also alleged that, on the facts, the instrument created only a charge for the performance of charities rather than an outright gift to the temple.

There were 25 defendants, many being tenants; the first defendant temple was the main contesting party. The trial court found that the properties were joint family properties and that the Will was not valid and binding on the plaintiff, and accordingly decreed the suit as prayed. The first defendant temple appealed to the present court.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the A and B schedule properties were self-acquired by C.S. Arumugham Pillai or constituted joint family property with his son Manickam, and the effect of that characterization on the validity of the Will.
Whether the Will (Ex. B11) executed by Arumugham Pillai was legally valid and binding on the plaintiff (including questions of testamentary capacity and whether the Will operated as an effective alienation to the temple).
Whether, under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, a life estate granted by the Will to a female who had a pre-existing right of maintenance (Sadaichi Ammal in respect of A schedule, and the plaintiff in respect of B schedule) would be enlarged into an absolute estate on the coming into force of the Succession Act.
Whether a prior maintenance proceeding (O.S. 191 of 1937) and the settlement/decree relating to maintenance affected the existence of a pre-existing right of the plaintiff and hence the application of Section 14(1) to the B schedule life estate.
A procedural issue raised by the respondent regarding maintainability of the appeal because tenants bound by the decree below were not impleaded in the appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (First Defendant Temple) Arguments

The properties were acquired in the name of C.S. Arumugham Pillai during the period 1907–1933 and therefore were his self-acquired properties, not joint family property.
The trial finding that the properties were joint family properties lacked evidence because there was no proof of the father treating or throwing the properties into a common hotchpot; thus the finding on character of property should be set aside.
The Will was legally and validly executed, and even if the properties were joint family properties, because the Will takes effect on the death of Arumugham and Manickam had pre-deceased him, the case should be treated as one of a Will executed by a sole surviving coparcener and is valid in law.

Respondent's (Plaintiff) Arguments

As regards the A schedule properties, the life estate given to Sadaichi Ammal under the Will enlarged into an absolute estate by operation of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act.
As regards the B schedule properties, the life estate given to the plaintiff under the Will was in lieu of or in recognition of her right to maintenance; therefore, under Section 14(1) that life estate also enlarged into an absolute estate.
The plaintiff relied on the prior maintenance proceedings (O.S. 191 of 1937) in which the parties reached a compromise or decree for maintenance, asserting this demonstrated a pre-existing right to maintenance that brought the B schedule disposition within Section 14(1).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
V. Tulasamma v. V. Sesha Reddi, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1944	The Supreme Court's interpretation that sub-section (2) of Section 14 must be read in the context of sub-section (1); if the disposition under a gift, will or similar instrument is to a person who already has a pre-existing right in the property, sub-section (1) will operate to enlarge a restricted or life estate into an absolute estate.	The court applied this principle to hold that (a) Sadaichi Ammal had a pre-existing right to maintenance so her life estate in A schedule properties enlarged into an absolute estate, and (b) the plaintiff's life interest in the B schedule properties likewise enlarged into an absolute estate because it was given in recognition of an existing maintenance right (as evidenced by prior proceedings/compromise).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the key statutory provision at issue—Section 14(1) and (2) of the Hindu Succession Act—and relied on the authoritative guidance in the Supreme Court decision V. Tulasamma v. V. Sesha Reddi. The Supreme Court's ratio was summarized: subsection (2) must be read so as not to unduly restrict subsection (1), and subsection (1) applies unless the disposition is to a person who had no pre-existing right in the property (in which restricted grants might survive).

Applying that principle, the court examined the two categories of properties:

For the A schedule properties: the widow Sadaichi Ammal, who had been given a life estate, clearly had a pre-existing right to maintenance. On the authority of the Supreme Court, her life estate enlarged into an absolute estate on the coming into force of the Succession Act.
For the B schedule properties: the court considered the history of the plaintiff's maintenance claim in O.S. 191 of 1937 against Arumugham. That suit involved an allegation that the properties were joint family property and sought maintenance; the father answered claiming self-acquired nature and denying maintenance. The suit proceeded, the plaintiff gave evidence, and the matter was subsequently compromised with maintenance fixed and charged on the first item of the B schedule. The court interpreted this compromise or decree as evidence that the plaintiff had a pre-existing right to maintenance (or at least that the father recognized such a right for maintenance purposes). Given that the B schedule life interest was given against the background of that recognized maintenance obligation, the life estate to the plaintiff was treated as a disposition to a person with a pre-existing right and therefore enlarged into an absolute estate under Section 14(1).

The court considered the appellant's arguments concerning the character of the properties (self-acquired versus joint family) and the timing/age circumstances but concluded that those factual contests were immaterial to the dispositive statutory point: once Section 14(1) operated (because the donees had pre-existing rights), the life estates were enlarged to absolute estates regardless of whether the properties were ultimately categorized as self-acquired or joint family. On that basis the court held that the plaintiff's title had become absolute with effect from 1956 (when the Succession Act came into force).

The court also noted a preliminary procedural objection raised by the respondent about tenants who were bound by the decree not being impleaded in the appeal, but it declined to decide that question because it dismissed the appeal on the merits under the statutory interpretation and application set out above.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct effects on the parties:

The decree of the trial court declaring the plaintiff's title to the A and B schedule properties is affirmed as not assailable on the statutory grounds addressed by this court.
By operation of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act (applied in light of V. Tulasamma), the life estate granted to Sadaichi Ammal (A schedule) and the life estate granted to the plaintiff (B schedule) were enlarged into absolute estates; the plaintiff's title became absolute with effect from 1956, when the Succession Act came into force.
The appellant, although granted in forma pauperis, was directed to pay the court fee due to the Government on the appeal memorandum. There was no order as to costs in the appeal.

Broader implications: The opinion applies established Supreme Court authority on the interpretation of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act to the facts of this case. The decision affirms the operation of Section 14(1) where a life interest was given to a woman who had a pre-existing right to maintenance; the opinion does not purport to set new legal precedent beyond applying the cited authority to these facts.

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Sri Mahaliamman Temple And Vigneswaran Koil, Rep. By Its Trustee, T. Subramaniam Chettiar & Anr. v. Vijayammal

(V. Ramaswami, J.)

1. The first defendant temple is the appellant. The suit was filed by the respondent-plaintiff for a declaration of her title to the plaint A and B schedule properties. The case of the plaintiff was that the suit properties originally belonged to the joint family of one, C.S Arumugham Pillai and his son Manickam. The plaintiff is the widow of Manickam. Manickam pre-deceased his father Arumugham in the year 1934. Arumugham died in 1946 leaving his widow Sadaichi Ammal who also died in 1957. Arumugham Pilllai died leaving a Will Ex. B11, dated 29th August, 1932. Under the Will he bequeathed a life estate in respect of A schedule properties in favour of his wife Sadaichi Ammal and the remainder to the first defendant temple with certain directions for the performance of certain charities. In the B schedule, a life interest was given to the plaintiff and the remainder to the first defendant temple for the performance of the said charities. The case of the plaintiff was that this Will was not intended to be acted upon and it was a device to shield the properties from the son of the testator who was said to be leading a wayward life. It was also the case of the plaintiff that the properties are not the self-acquired properties of Arumugham Pillai, that they were acquired by the joint exertions of Arumugham Pillai and his son Manickam Pillai and in any case, they were treated as the joint family properties for a long time and that therefore, the testator had no testamentary capacity for executing the Will. There was a further allegation that having regard to the charities to be performed and the amount of income allocated to them, the property itself could not be said to have been given to the temple and that only a charge had been created in favour of the temple for the performance of the specific charities mentioned in the document.

2. There were twenty-five defendants, many of whom appear to be tenants in possession of the properties. The first defendant temple is the main contestant in the suit. The case of the first defendant was that all the properties are the self-acquired properties of Arumugham Pillai, that the Will was legally and validly executed, that under the document, the entirety of the A schedule properties were given to the temple after the lifetime of Sadaichi Ammal and the B schedule properties are to be given to the first defendant after the lifetime of the plaintiff.

3. The court below held that the properties were the joint family properties of Arumugham Pillai and Manickam, that the will executed by the deceased Arumugham Pillai was therefore, not valid and binding on the plaintiff and in that view, decreed the suit as prayed for. The first defendant has filed the present appeal.

4. The main contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that all the properties were acquired in the name of Arumugham Pilllai during the nerved from 1907 to 1933, that at the time in 1934, when Manickam died, he was only 27 yeare of age and that the plea of joint acquisition could not be true. He also contended that there was absolutely no evidence of the father treating the properties or throwing the properties into the hotch pot so to say and that therefore, the finding on the question whether the properties are the self-acquired properties or not is liable to be set aside. He also con tended that even if the properties were to be treated as joint family properties, since the Will takes effect on the death of Arumugham Pillai and since Minickam Pillai had pre-deceased him, it should be treated as a case of Will executed by a sole surviving coparcener which is valid in law. The learned counsel for the plaintiff—respondent on merits has taken a slightly different line of argument from that taken in the trial court. In this Court, the learned counsel contended that in so far as the A schedule properties are concerned, the life estate given to Sadaichi Ammal under the Will enlarged into an absolute estate in view of the provisions of S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. He also contended that even in respect of the B schedule properties, the life estate given to the plaintiff under the Will was in lieu of or in recognition of her right to maintenance and that therefore, under S. 14(1), that life estate had now enlarged into an absolute estate and that therefore, the declaration of title given by the court below does not call for any interference. If this contention were to be accepted, it does not matter whether the properties were joint family properties or the self-acquired properties of Arnmugham Pillai.

5. A number of cases have considered the scope and ambit of S. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, with reference to the provisions of S. 14(2). But suffice it to refer the decision of the Supreme Court in V. Tulasamma v. V. Sesha Reddi . A.I.R 1977 S.C 1944.. In that decision, Bhagwati, J. for himself and on behalf of A.C Gupta, J. held as follows—

“Sub. S. (2) must therefore be read in the context of sub-S. (1) so as to leave as large a scope for operation as possible to sub-S. (1) and so read, it must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without pre-existing right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property.”

Therefore, unless the testamentary disposition is to a person who had no pre-existing right in the property, the disposition itself will come within the provisions of S. 14(1) so that the life estate will get itself enlarged into an absolute estate and the reverter will come to an end.

6. In this case, there could be no doubt that Sadaichi Ammal, the widow of Arumugham Pillai, who was given the life estate in respect of the A schedule properties had a pre-existing right to maintenance and that therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court directly covers, and the life estate will get enlarged. Even in respect of the B schedule properties, we are of the view that the plaintiff who had a life estate under the Will now has an absolute interest in view of the provisions of S. 14(1). It must be mentioned that after the death of her husband Manickam, the plaintiff filed O.S 191 of 1937, on the file of the Sub-Court, Coimbatore, claiming maintenance against her father-in-law. She put forward a case for maintenance on the ground that all the suit properties were the joint family properties of Arumugham Pillai and his son Manickam and that she was entitled to maintenance. Arumugham Pillai filed a written statement claiming that the suit properties were his self acquired properties and not the joint family properties and that legally the the plaintiff is not entitled to maintenance. The suit went on for trial and the plaintiff examined herself as a witness. At that stage, the parties seemed to have compromised the matter by which the father-in-law agreed to pay maintenance at the rate of Rs. 15 per month on a charge of the first item of the B schedule in this suit.

7. The learned counsel for the appellant wanted to contend that this decree given for maintenance could not be treated as one recognising the claim of the plaintiff for maintenance, but it is only evidence of acceptance of a moral obligation to maintain the daughter in-law. The question whether the suit properties were the joint family properties or the self-acquired properties was not decided. In the circumstances when the defendant in that suit agreed to pay maintenance on a charge of the property, which was claimed as joint family property we can reasonably presume that it was on the basis either that they did not want to go into the question of joint family nature of the properties or the acceptance of the right of the plaintiff for maintenance. On the basis that it was an acceptance of the right of the plaintiff to maintenance, there would be no doubt that she had a pre-existing right which in fact fructified into a decree for maintenance and therefore when the very same property was shown as the first item in the B schedule and given as a life interest, it could only be on the basis of recognition of the pre-existing right. The plaint B schedule consisted of only two items. The second item is an insignificant one and from the description it appears that it is part of the first item itself. We are satisfied that the testator was conscious of the fact that he had already accepted his liability to maintain the daughter-in-law and when he was disposing of the entirety of the properties, he shall be deemed to have given this as a provision for maintenance. In fact, at the time when the document was executed the son was alive and there is no dispute even in these proceedings that the father and son were not divided, though what were the joint family properties was is dispute. In these circumstances, even at the time when the document was executed, we can easily assume that the testator wanted to provide for the maintenance of his daughter-in-law who would have been entitled even on that date to claim maintenance as against his own son who was a member of the joint family. We are therefore of the view that the decision of the Supreme Court cited supra would be applicable even in respect of the B schedule properties and that by virtue of the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, the plaintiff's title had become absolute with effect from 1956, when the Succession Act came into force. The decree for declaration of title given by the court below is not assailable and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.

8. The learned counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that the tenants who were impleaded as parties to the suit and who are bound by the decree of declaration in favour of the plaintiff have not been impleaded in the appeal. But in view of the fact that even on the other contentions we have dismissed the appeal, it is not necessary for us to go into that question.

9. The appeal has been filed in forma pauperis by the temple. The appellant is directed to pay the court fee due to the Government on the appeal memorandum. There will be no order asto costs in this appeal.

VCS.

Sri Mahaliamman Temp... v. Vijayammal