Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

W.P Nos. 794, 795 and 796 of 1959.

Advocates

Mr. M.R Narayanaswami for Petr.
Mr. R.G Rajan for The Addl Govt. Pleader and Mr. B.R Dolia for Respts.

Judges

Veeraswami, J.

Acts

section. Sub-S. (1) of S. 5
Act. Sub-S. (1) of S. 3
Orders) Act, 1946.

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Three writ petitions under Article 226 were heard together because they arose from a common order of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Coimbatore, acting as the Appellate Authority under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. The petitioners are three separate textile companies that submitted draft Standing Orders to the Certifying Officer as required by Section 3(1) of the Act. After notice to workmen and hearings under Section 5, the Certifying Officer certified the Standing Orders subject to certain alterations and modifications. Each petitioner appealed to the prescribed Appellate Authority; that Authority disposed of the appeals together and substantially confirmed the Certifying Officer's orders. In this Court, three grounds were raised (one specific to W.P. No. 795 of 1959 and two common to all petitions) challenging aspects of the Certifying Officer's and Appellate Authority's adjudication and scope of appellate authority.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Certifying Officer may adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of provisions of draft Standing Orders in the absence of any objections being filed by the workmen (raised specifically in W.P. No. 795 of 1959).
Whether the Certifying Officer's failure to give reasons for alterations or modifications to Draft Standing Orders precludes the Appellate Authority from adjudicating and giving reasons for the first time on those alterations.
Whether the Appellate Authority exceeded its jurisdiction by dealing with and altering Clause (o) of paragraph 19 of the Standing Orders when the managements were not aggrieved by that particular clause and had not appealed against it.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners / Managements' Arguments

In W.P. No. 795 of 1959: The petitioners argued that because the workmen of Pioneer Textiles, Peelamedu, had filed no objections, the Certifying Officer had no power to adjudicate on the fairness or reasonableness of any provisions; adjudication under Section 4 would arise only where there was an opposition (a "lis") between parties.
On the second ground: The petitioners argued that the Certifying Officer gave no reasons when making modifications, and therefore there was no evidence of adjudication by that Officer; it was improper for the Appellate Authority to adjudicate for the first time and supply reasons.
On the third ground: The managements contended that the Appellate Authority exceeded the scope of appeals under Section 6(1) by dealing with Clause (o) of paragraph 19, since the managements had accepted the Certifying Officer's adjudication on that clause and had not appealed against it; only matters in which the appellant is "aggrieved" fall within the appellate jurisdiction.

Workmen's Arguments

The workmen contended that after the 1956 amendment (Act XXXVI of 1956) which substituted the words “shall be the function” in Section 4, the Certifying Officer had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of Standing Orders irrespective of whether objections had been filed by workmen; the Certifying Officer should apply his own mind and decide on fairness based on prevailing labour conditions even absent objections.

Table of Precedents Cited

The opinion discusses statutory provisions and an amendment but does not cite any judicial precedents (case law).

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded from a textual and contextual reading of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, particularly Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 and the amendment introduced by Act XXXVI of 1956.

1. Interpretation of the Certifying Officer's adjudicatory jurisdiction (First ground): The Court examined the phrase "to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the provision of any Standing Orders" in Section 4 together with the procedural provisions of Section 5 (notice to trade union or workmen and opportunity to be heard). The Court concluded that "adjudicate" does not mean that the Certifying Officer must of his own motion investigate and decide the fairness of provisions where there has been no contest. Rather, read in conjunction with Section 5, adjudication by the Certifying Officer is triggered when the parties are "at issue" (i.e., when objections are filed). Although the 1956 amendment expanded the Certifying Officer's powers to include adjudication on fairness or reasonableness, this power is exercisable in the context of a dispute presented by objections; absent objections, the Certifying Officer's role is limited to confirming compliance with clauses (a) and (b) of Section 4 and certifying the Standing Orders if those requirements are met.

2. Effect of failure to give reasons by the Certifying Officer (Second ground): The Court acknowledged that the Certifying Officer should give reasons when making modifications or additions. However, the absence of stated reasons does not mean that no adjudication took place. The lack of reasons only deprived the Appellate Authority of the benefit of those reasons, but did not nullify the existence of an adjudicatory act by the Certifying Officer. The Appellate Authority was therefore entitled to review the matter, consider the pros and cons, and give reasons for upholding the Certifying Officer's orders. The Court found no error in the Appellate Authority adjudicating and supplying reasons.

3. Scope of appellate jurisdiction and dealing with Clause (o) (Third ground): The Court accepted the petitioners' contention that the scope of the Appellate Authority's jurisdiction under Section 6(1) is determined by what the appellant is "aggrieved" by; the Appellate Authority should not address matters that were not the subject of the appeals. The Appellate Authority acted beyond its powers by dealing with and altering Clause (o) of paragraph 19 when none of the appeals before it raised that clause as a subject of complaint. Notwithstanding that conclusion on jurisdictional scope, the Court declined to interfere with the Appellate Authority's order on that point because the matter was trivial in nature.

4. Practical consequence for W.P. No. 795 of 1959: Applying these principles, the Court held that because no objections were filed by the Pioneer Textiles' workmen, the Certifying Officer should not have adjudicated on fairness and, therefore, the Standing Orders as submitted by the management in W.P. No. 795 must be certified after fresh consideration by the Certifying Officer.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

W.P. No. 795 of 1959 is allowed and the orders of both the Certifying Officer and the Appellate Authority are quashed in respect of that petition; the other two writ petitions are dismissed.

Direct consequences and implications (as stated in the opinion):

The Standing Orders submitted by the management in W.P. No. 795 of 1959 must be certified: the matter is remitted to the Certifying Officer for fresh consideration consistent with the Court's interpretation that adjudication on fairness requires an objection-triggered dispute.
The Appellate Authority exceeded its powers by altering Clause (o) of paragraph 19 on matters not appealed against; however, the Court did not set aside the Appellate Authority's alteration on this point because it was considered too trivial to warrant interference.
There will be no order as to costs in any of the writ petitions.

The opinion does not discuss broader doctrinal consequences beyond these direct effects on the parties or purport to establish a general precedent beyond its reasoning about the statutory construction of Sections 4, 5 and 6 in the factual context before the Court.

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The Coimbatore Pioneer Mills, Ltd., B Mills, Coimbatore v. The Presiding Officer Labour Court, Coimbatore And Others

These three petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution have been heard together, as they arise out of a common order of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Coimbatore, which is constituted as the Appellate Authority under the the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. The petitioners are three different companies newly started and carrying on business as textile mills. As required by S. 3 (1) of the Act, each of them submitted to the Certifying Officer Draft Standing Orders for adoption in the industrial establishment concerned. After complying with the provisions of S. 5 as to notice to workmen calling for their objections if any, and hearing them, the Certifying Officer certified the Standing Orders with certain alterations and modifications. To the extent to which the petitioners felt aggrieved against the certification, each of the petitioners filed a separate appeal before the prescribed Appellate Authority. That Authority disposed of the appeals together, substantially confirming the orders of the Certifying Officer.

In this Court, three grounds have been raised, one peculiar to W.P No. 795 of 1959 and the rest of them common to all the petitions. The first ground is that upon notice service upon them, the workmen of the Pioneer Textiles, Peelamedu, raised no objection before the Certifying Officer to the Standing Orders as submitted by the management of that company, but nevertheless the Certifying Officer assumed jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the fairness and reasonableness or otherwise of some of the provisions of the Standing Orders. This, it is said, the Certifying Officer had no power to do in the absence of objections being raised by the workmen concerned, and thus the Certifying Officer being called upon to adjudicate upon them. The second ground is that while making alterations and modifications in the Standing Orders, the Certifying Officer gave no reasons there for, and that in such circumstances it is not within the ambit of the Appellate Authority to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of such modifications or alterations and give reasons there for. The third ground is that in respect of Cl. (o) of paragraph 19 of each of the three Standing Orders, the petitioners were not aggrieved against the orders of the Certifying Officer and did not file appeals so that it is not open to the Appellate Authority to enlarge the scope of the appeals and make alterations to that clause on his own view of the fairness or reasonableness or otherwise of that clause.

In order to appreciate the said grounds it will be first necessary to briefly notice the relative statutory provisions. The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, was enacted to require employers in industrial establishments formally to define the conditions of employment under them and to make conditions known to workmen employed by them. ‘Standing Orders’ are defined to mean, rules relating to matters set out in the Schedule to the Act. Sub-S. (1) of S. 3 requires that within six months from the date of the Act becoming applicable to an industrial establishment, the employer concerned should submit to the Certifying Officer the Draft Standing Orders proposed by him with certain number of copies for adoption in his industrial establishment. Sub-Ss. (2) and (3) enjoin that the Standing Orders shall conform to the Schedule appended to the Act and also the Model Standing Orders prescribed by the Rules in the matters of not only topics but also of particulars in respect of each of such topics. S. 4, which is material in these petitions reads:

“Standing orders shall be certifiable under this Act if—

(a) provision is made therein for every matter set out in the Schedule which is applicable to the industrial establishment, and

(b) the standing orders are otherwise in conformity with the provisions of this Act; and it shall be the function of the Certifying Officer or Appellate Authority to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the provision of any Standing Orders.”

It may be mentioned that by Act XXXVI of 1956 the words “shall be the function” were substituted for the words ‘shall not be the function’ in that section. Sub-S. (1) of S. 5 states that the Certifying Officer shall give due notice of the receipt of the Draft Standing Orders to the Trade Union, if any, of the workmen, or where there is no such Trade Union, to the workmen in such manner as may be prescribed, requiring objections. If any, to the Standing Orders to be submitted within a specified time. Sub-S. (2) also requires that the Certifying Officer should give the Union or representatives of the workmen an opportunity of being heard before certifying whether or not any modification of or addition to the Draft submitted by the employer is necessary, to render the Draft Standing Orders certifiable under the Act. After following this procedure, under Sub-S. (3) the Certifying Officer has to certify the Draft Standing Orders after making such modifications as he may think are required. S. 6 provides for an appeal to the Appellate Authority by any person aggrieved by the order of the Certifying Officer and the appeal has to be filed within the prescribed time. Once the Standing Orders are certified under the Act they shall not, except on agreement between the employer and the workmen, be liable, under S. 10 (1) of the Act, to modification until the expiry of six months from the date on which the Standing Orders or the last modifications thereof came into operation.

With reference to the above statutory provisions, in support of the first ground the contention on behalf of the petitioner in W.P No. 795 of 1959 is that the word ‘adjudicate’ in S. 4 coupled with the provision In S. 5 for notice to the workmen and opportunity to them of being heard, unmistakably indicate that it is only where there is a proposal and opposition or in other words, there is a lis in that sense, that any occasion arises for the Certifying Officer to adjudicate on the rival claims. It is argued on that basis that in this case the workmen of the Poineer Textiles, Peelamedu, having filed no objection before the Certifying Officer, it was not within the power of the Certifying Officer, nevertheless, to assume that the Standing Orders were not fair or reasonable in any particular matter and proceed upon that view to adjudicate upon these issues. On the other hand, for the workmen it is said that as after the amendment effected by Act XXXVI of 1956, the Certifying Officer is given the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions of any Standing Orders, the Certifying Officer could exercise that jurisdiction irrespective of whether the workmen have filed objections or not. It seems to me that the contention on behalf of the workmen overlooks the phraseology used in section 4 and the effect, in relation to it, of Sub-S. (1) and (2) of S. 5. ‘Adjudicate’ in S. 4, to my mind, without doubt, indicates not that the Certifying Officer will of his own accord apply himself and decide as to the fairness or reasonableness of any Standing Orders, but he will do so only when the parties are at issue on the fairness or reasonableness of such provision. It is true that before the amendment introduced by Act XXXVI of 1956 the Certifying Officer had no Jurisdiction to adjudicate on a matter of that sort and he had merely to see whether Cls. (a) and (b) of S. 4 were complied with. It they were complied with, the Certifying Officer had no option but to certify the Standing Orders. But after the amendment the Certifying Officer is empowered to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions of the Standing Orders. Even approaching the interpreation of S. 4 from the standpoint of how Ss. 4 and 5 read before the amendment, I think the effect of a combined reading of Ss. 4 and 5 is that the Certifying Officer will have jurisdiction to pronounce upon the fairness or reasonableness of any of the provisions of the Standing Orders, only if and when the concerned Union or the workmen raised an objection and thus the parties come into controversy, and not otherwise. It is, however, contended that the Act being mainly intended for the benefit of the workmen, it should be taken, as a result of the amendment introduced by S. 32 of Act XXXVI of 1956, that the Certifying Officer is irrespective of whether the workmen filed objection or not, required to apply his own mind and, with his knowledge of the prevailing conditions of labour in similar concerns decide upon the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions of the Standing Orders. I can see no warrant or Justification for introducing into S. 4 any such principle. Ss. 5 and 6 clearly contemplate filing of objections, hearing, and decision, and then making it open to the aggrieved party to file an appeal before the prescribed authority. All these point to the nature and scope of the jurisdiction of the Certifying Officer, when he Is entrusted with the authority to adjudicate upon the matters mentioned. I hold, therefore, that the Certifying Offices could only have jurisdiction under Section 4 to adjudicate upon the objections from workmen or the management in relation to the faireness or reasonableness of the provisions of the Standing Orders, and that if there are no objections to the Standing Orders, as submitted by the Management the Certifying Officer has then only to see whether Cl. (a) and (b) of S. 4 have been complied with and if they have been complied with, to certify the Standing Orders. It follows, therefore, that the Standing Orders as filed by the management in W.P No. 795 of 1599 will have to be certified. The matter will go before the Certifying Officer for fresh consideration of the Standing Orders submitted by the Pioneer Textiles, Peelamedu.

On the second ground urged on behalf of the petitioner, I think there is little substance in it. The argument is that since the Certifying Officer failed to give any reasons and, therefore, there is no evidence of adjudication by that Officer it is not within the province of the Appellate Authority to adjudicate for the first time and give reasons. It cannot, of course, be denied that the Certifying Officer, while making certain modifications or additions to the Draft Standing Orders, while to give in his reasons thereof. But this, in my opinion, does not in itself mean that the Certifying Officer has not made any adjudication. All that can be said is that while adjudicating, the Certifying Officer has not given his reasons, and no more. Had he given reasons, the Appellate Authority would have had their benefit. But their absence did not in any manner make the adjudication by the Certifying Officer any the less as such. But what the Appellate Authority has done is, he himself went into the pros and cons of the reasonableness of fairness or otherwise of the modifications or additions and gave his reasons for upholding the orders of the Certifying Officer. I can see no error in such a procedure. The second ground is rejected.

The third ground relates to a trivial matter, but nevertheless, it has been argued before me because it rs said, it involves a principle. As I said this ground relates to Cl. (o) of paragraph 19 in the Standing Orders. There were objections raised by the workmen before the Certifying Officer in respect of this clause and they were adjudicated by the Certifying Officer. But the Managements have accepted the adjudication by the Certifying Officer and have confined their appeals to other matters. Nevertheless, the Appellate Authority has chosen to deal with the propriety of this clause and has found that it should be altered. On behalf of the Managements it is contended that in so doing the Appellate Authority went beyond the scope of the appeals, According to the petitioners, the measure or scope of the appellate jurisdiction is controlled by the ambit of the expression ‘aggrirved’ in S. 6 (1) of the Act. It is only where the appellant felt aggrieved that a right of appeal has been given to him and where the appellant is not aggrieved about the matter adjudicated upon and has filed no appeal, that is not a matter which can at all be dealt with by the Appellate Authority. I think this contention has force. It may be that until the appeale are disposed of the Standing Orders do not come into effect or operation as provided by S. 7. But that has no bearing upon the scope of the appeals and the jurisdiction of the Appellate Authority under S. 6 (1). I think the Appellate Authority acted in excess of its powers in dealing with Cl. (o) of paragraph 19, which was not the subject-matter in any of the appeals before it and making alterations in respect thereto. While making this clear, I am, however, not disposed to interfere with the order of the Appellate Authority on this question for the reason that it is too trivial a manner.

In the result, W.P No. 795 of 1959 is allowed, and the orders of both the authorities are quashed. The other two writ petitions are dismissed. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs in any of the writ petitions.

V.C.S

The Coimbatore Pione... v. The Presiding Office...