AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Delivered by the Chief Justice)

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent instituted C.S. No. 260 of 1948 seeking recovery of Rs. 15,050 alleged to be due for principal and interest in respect of a cheque dated 9 March 1948 drawn by the second defendant in favour of the first defendant and endorsed over to the plaintiff; the cheque was dishonoured on 18 March 1948. The suit was filed under Order VII of the Original Side Rules. No application for leave to defend was made by the defendants within the prescribed time. Consequently, the Master passed a decree on 22 September 1948 for Rs. 15,462-8-0 with interest at six percent per annum from the date of the decree until payment and for costs.

On 12 January 1949 the first defendant filed an application purportedly under Section 151 and Order 37, Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code (the Code) praying that the decree drawn up by the Master on 22 September 1948 be set aside and that leave be granted to the applicant to appear and defend on such terms as the Court deemed reasonable and just. Yahya Ali, J. dismissed that application in limine on the ground that Order 37, Rule 4 of the Code did not apply to the Original Side of this Court. The first defendant appealed that decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Order 37, Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code applies to the Original Side of this High Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • General proposition: provisions in the body of the Civil Procedure Code and the rules in the first schedule of the Code apply to the Original Side of the High Court unless specifically excluded or superseded by rules made by the High Court.
  • Where the Original Side Rules are silent on a matter, the corresponding rule in the Code should apply to the Original Side.
  • Reliance on precedents said to support the view that many Code provisions apply to the Original Side unless excluded (specifically citing the decision in Yelumalai v. Kuppammal and Ashutosh v. Sudhangabhushan Mukherji).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Yelumalai v. Kuppammal Held that Rules 10 and 11 of Order 33 of the Code were applicable to suits by paupers filed on the Original Side; used to support the general proposition that the Code is generally applicable to the High Court's ordinary original civil jurisdiction unless excluded or superseded. The appellant relied on this decision to support the contention that Code provisions apply unless excluded; the Court considered the case but treated it as part of the broader inquiry into which Code provisions are displaced by Original Side Rules.
Ashutosh v. Sudhangabhushan Mukherji Held that Order 21, Rule 89 of the Code applied to a sale under a mortgage in a suit filed on the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court. The appellant relied on this decision to show instances where Code rules were held applicable on the Original Side; the Court treated it as authority relied upon for the general applicability principle but proceeded to examine the specific interaction between Order 37 and Order VII.
Beheman Jung (Nawab) v. Haji Sultan Ali Shustry Dealt with a rule made by the Bombay High Court which was inconsistent with provisions of the Code and therefore prevailed over the latter. Referenced by the appellant to show that a High Court rule inconsistent with the Code can prevail; the Court noted this authority in assessing whether the Original Side Rules supersede corresponding Code provisions.
Pratapgir Narsingji v. The Official Liquidator of the Prahlad Mills Ltd. Explained the decision in Beheman Jung and held that Order 41, Rule 10 did apply to appeals on the Original Side (as explained by Beaumont, C.J.). The Court cited this explanation to illustrate situations where Original Side practice and Code provisions were reconciled or where the High Court's own rules governed; used in the analysis of when Original Side Rules supersede Code provisions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded from statutory and rule-making provisions governing the relation between the Civil Procedure Code and the Original Side Rules:

  • Letters Patent (Clause 37) authorized the High Court to make rules for regulating proceedings in civil cases and directed the Court to be guided by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code "as far as possible." The Court identified the Letters Patent as the source of the High Court's rule-making power.
  • Part IX of the Code and related sections were examined: Section 117 states that, "Save as provided in this Part or in part X or in rules the provisions of this Code shall apply to such High Courts." Section 120 contains express exceptions. Section 122 permits High Courts to make rules regulating their procedure and to annul, alter or add to rules in the first schedule. Section 129 allows Chartered High Courts to make rules not inconsistent with their Letters Patent to regulate original civil jurisdiction.
  • The Original Side Rules themselves were considered. Order I, Rule 3 of the Original Side Rules expressly repealed and superseded prior rules and "the provisions of the Code, so far as such provisions are inconsistent with these rules and forms."
  • The Court compared Order 37 of the Code with Order VII of the Original Side Rules:
    • Scope: Order 37 of the Code applies to suits on negotiable instruments (bills, hundis, promissory notes). Order VII of the Original Side Rules has a broader scope: it was made applicable not only to suits on negotiable instruments but also to suits to recover a debt or liquidated demand arising on contract, bond or guarantee.
    • Option vs. compulsion: Order 37 of the Code gives the plaintiff an option to proceed under its summary procedure. Order VII of the Original Side Rules compels the plaintiff to resort to that procedure for suits falling under its Rule 1—there is no option.
    • Post-decree relief: Order 37, Rule 4 of the Code expressly permits a court, "after decree," under special circumstances, to set aside the decree and give leave to the defendant to appear and defend. Order VII of the Original Side Rules contains no provision corresponding to Order 37, Rule 4; instead it contains provisions (notably a power for the Registrar under Rule 4) to extend time for applying for leave before decree is entered.
  • Given these material differences in scope, effect and procedure, the Court concluded that Order VII of the Original Side Rules "supersedes and stands in lieu of" Order 37 of the Code for suits falling within the scope of Order VII.
  • The Court rejected the appellant's submission that silence in the Original Side Rules as to post-decree procedure meant that Order 37, Rule 4 still governed after decree. The Court reasoned that Order 37, Rule 4 forms part of the summary procedural regime that Order VII regulates; therefore, because Order VII governs the summary procedure in respect of the categories it covers, Order 37, Rule 4 cannot be applied to those suits.
  • The Court acknowledged that hardship might arise in special cases from the absence of a provision like Order 37, Rule 4 in Order VII, but held that such considerations did not alter the legal conclusion on the rule-making relationship between the Code and the Original Side Rules.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED. The Court held that, in respect of suits falling within the scope of Order VII of the Original Side Rules, Order 37, Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code has no application because Order VII supersedes and stands in lieu of Order 37 of the Code.

Direct consequences:

  • The appellant's appeal against the dismissal of the application under Section 151 and Order 37, Rule 4 fails; the judgment below is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed with costs.
  • For suits that fall within the specific categories governed by Order VII of the Original Side Rules, defendants cannot rely on Order 37, Rule 4 of the Code to obtain post-decree leave to appear and defend; the procedural regime established by Order VII controls.

No broader implications were discussed in the opinion beyond the foregoing direct effect on the parties; the decision is confined to the relation between Order VII of the Original Side Rules and Order 37 of the Code as applied to the facts and rule-structure described in this opinion.

Delivered by the Chief Justice. (N.R.R.)

    Bysani Kamalamma v. Syed Ismail Ispahani E. Venkata Sastri

    (Delivered by the Chief Justice)

    The only question which arises in this appeal is whether O. 37, R. 4 Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as the Code) applies to the original side of this Court. The respondent filed the suit (C.S No. 260 of 1948) for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 15,050 alleged to be due for principal and interest in respect of a cheque dated 9th March 1948 drawn by the second defendant in favour of the first defendant and endorsed over by her in favour of the plaintiff and which was dishonoured on 18th March 1948. The suit was filed under the provisions of O. VII, Original Side Rules. No application for leave to defend was made by the defendants within the prescribed time and therefore the Master passed a decree on 22nd September 1938 for the sum of Rs. 15,462-8-0 with interest thereon at the rate of six per cent, per annum from the date of the decree till date of payment and for the costs of the suit. On 12th January 1949 the first defendant took out an application purporting to be under S. 151 and O. 37, R. 4 of the Code praying that the decree drawn up by the Master on 22nd September 1948 may in the special circumstances of the case be set aside and leave may be granted to the applicant to appear and to defend the suit on such terms as may be deemed reasonable and just. Yahya Ali J. dismissed the application in limine on the ground that O. 37, R. 4 of the Code had no application to the Original Side of this Court. The first defendant appeals against this decision.

    Learned Counsel who appeared before us conceded that the matter was bereft of direct authority and our decision must therefore rest almost entirely on the material provisions in the Original Side Rules and of the Code. It becomes therefore necessary to examine the scope of the application of these two sets of provisions to the Original Side. Cl. 37 of the Letters Patent conferred power on this High Court to make rules and orders from time to time

    “for the purpose of regulating all proceedings in civil cases which may be brought before the said High Court, including proceedings in its admiralty, vice-admiralty, testamentary, intestate and matrimonial jurisdiction respectively provided always that the said High Court should be guided in making such rules and orders as far as possible by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code.”

    Part IX of the Code contains special provisions relating to the Chartered High Courts of which this Court is one. S. 117 declares that “Save as provided in this Part or in part X or in rules the provisions of this Code shall apply to such High Courts.”

    An exception is contained in S. 120 which enacts that Ss. 16, 17 and 20 of the Code shall not apply to the High Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction. Under S. 122 any of the High Courts may, from time to time, make rules regulating its own procedure and the procedure of the civil Courts subject to its superintendence and may by such rules annul, alter or add to all or any of the rules in the first schedule. S. 129 specially provides for Chartered High Courts. It runs thus:

    “Notwithstanding anything in this Code, any High Court constituted by His Majesty by Letters Patent may make such rules not inconsistent with the Letters Patent establishing it to regulate its own procedure in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction as it shall think fit, and nothing herein contained shall affect the validity of any such rules in force at the commencement of this Code.”

    O. 49, R. 3 of the Code mentions the rules which shall not apply to any Chartered High Courts in the exercise of its ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction.

    O. 1, R. 3 of the Original Side Rules now in force is as follows:

    “The rules and forms mentioned in Appendix III hereto and all previous rules and forms, and the provisions of the Code, so far as such provisions are inconsistent with these rules and forms, are hereby repealed and superseded and the following rules, orders and forms shall stand in lieu thereof.” (The Code must mean the Civil Procedure Code).

    O. 37 of the Code relates to summary procedure, applicable to suits on negotiable instruments such as bills of exchange, hundies or promissory notes. All suits upon such documents may in case the plaintiff desires to proceed under the provisions of that order be instituted by presenting a plaint in a particular prescribed form. Under O. 37, R. 2, Sub-R. (2) in any case in which the plaint is filed under that order, the defendant shall not appear or defend the suit unless he obtains leave from a Judge as provided in that order so to appear and defend. In default of his obtaining such leave or of his appearance and defence in pursuance thereof, the allegations in the plaint shall be deemed to be admitted and the plaintiff shall be entitled to a decree.

    Rule 4 of that order runs thus:

    “After decree the Court may, under special circumstances, set aside the decree, and if necessary, stay or set aside execution, and may give leave to the defendant to appear to the summons and to defend the suit, if it seems reasonable to the Court so to do, and on such terms as the Court thinks fit.”

    Rule 7 provides that save as provided by that order, the procedure in suits filed under the provisions of that order shall be the same as the procedure in suits instituted in the ordinary manner.

    The rules made by this Court which are in force immediately before the Rules now in force contained a separate order, Order VI-A, dealing with procedure on negotiable instruments, corresponding to O. 37 of the Code. One rule in that order expressly laid down that the procedure prescribed by O. 37 of the Code shall be followed in all suits on negotiable instruments in the modification mentioned in that order. But in 1932, a new order, O. VII was substituted in place of O. VI-A. This order considerably enlarged the scope of the application of the summary procedure. It was made applicable not only to a suit and a negotiable instrument but also to a suit to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money payable by the defendant with or without interest arising on a contract or a bond or a guarantee. R. 2 expressly excludes the ordinary procedure in regard to suits specified in R. 1 of that order. Suits falling under R. 1 have to be instituted under that order. There is no option to the plaintiff in such suits. R. 4 confers power on the Registrar to extend the period of ten days for applying to obtain leave to appear and defend. If leave to appear and defend is not granted, the Master shall on proof by affidavit of service of the summons on the defendant pass a decree for the amount claimed and costs. There is no provision in that order corresponding to O. 37, R. 4 of the Code.

    The main contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant was that all the provisions in the body of the Code and in the rules in the first schedule of the Code apply to the Original Side of this Court unless they are excluded from application or unless they are superseded by rules made by this Court. He conceded that if in respect of the same subject matter there were two rules, one in the Code and another in the Original Side Rules, inconsistent with each other, then the rule made by this Court on the Original Side would apply. But he argued that where the Original Side Rules were silent in respect of any matter, then the rule in the Code relating to it would apply to the Original Side. In support of this contention he relied upon the decision of Venkatasubba Rao, J., in Yelumalai v. Kuppammal (1). The learned Judge held that Rr. 10 and 11 of O. 33 of the Code were applicable to suits by paupers filed on the Original Side of the High Court. After a consideration of the various relevant provisions he observed:

    “The result of these various provisions is that the Code of Civil Procedure is generally applicable to the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, except where it is specifically excluded or unless the High Court itself has made rules superseding any particular provisions of the Code.”

    Now, the application of O. 37, R. 4 has not been specifically excluded by the Code itself. O. 49, R. 3 of the Code does not mention O. 37. R. 4 among the rules declared not applicable to the Original Side. The argument is that it follows that it is applicable to the Original Side. For a general application of the provisions in the Code to the Original Side reliance was placed on the decision in Ashutosh v. Sudhangabhushan Mukherji(2) which held that O. 21, R. 89 of the Code applied to a sale under a mortgage in a suit filed on the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court (Vide also Virjivan Das Moolji v. Biseswar Lal Hargobind . Appellant's Counsel refer, red us to the decision in Beheman Jung (Nawab) v. Haji Sultan Ali Shustry as dealing with a rule made by the Bombay High Court which was inconsistent with the provisions of the Code and therefore prevailed over the latter. This decision was explained by Beaumont, C.J, in Pratapgir Narsingji v. The Official Liquidator of the Prahlad Mills Ltd.,(3) in which it was held that O. 41, R. 10 did apply to appeals on the Original Side.

    There is no doubt that there is neither specific exclusion nor repeal of O. 37, R. 4 so far as the Original Side is concerned to be found either in the Code or in the Original Side rules. Yahya Ali, J., was inclined to hold that the adoption of a few of the rules under O. 37 and a deliberate avoiding the adoption of the rules including O. 37, R. 4 by compelling implication amounts to a repeal of the portions not adopted. After a careful consideration, we have arrived at more or less the same conclusion. We may describe the result thus: O. 37 of the Code lays down a summary procedure for suits on negotiable instruments which may be availed of by a plaintiff. O. VII of the Original Side rules deals with the same topic generally, but differs in material particulars from O. 37 of the code in its scope. As we have already mentioned, O. 37 of the Code deals only with suits on negotiable instruments, whereas O. VII Original Side rules applies to other suits also on debt and liquidated demands. While O. 37 of the Code gives the plaintiff an option, Order VII of the Original Side Rules compels the plaintiff to resort to the procedure prescribed therein. While there is no provision in O. 37 of the Code for enlargement of time over and above ten day for applying and obtaining leave to defend, there is provision in Order of the Original Side Rules for extension of time by the Registrar. Having regard to all these vital differences, it is clear that Order VII of the Original Side Rules supersedes and stands in lieu of O. 37 of the Code.

    Yahya Ali, J., discovered a plausible reason for the absence of a provision like O. 37, R. 4 of the Code in the Original Side Rules. We do not think we are called upon to find any justification for the omission. We can imagine cases in which the power of the Registrar to extend time under O. 7, R. 4 read with O. IV, R. 6 of the Original Side Rules may not be sufficient to give adequte relief. We are however not concerned with the hardship that might occur in special cases. We do not see why if this Court chooses a provision corresponding to O. 37, R. 4 of the Code should not be included in Order VII of the Original Side Rules. But as Order VII now stands, we think that in regard to suits coming within the scope of that order, O. 37, R. 4 of the Code can have no application.

    The learned Counsel for the appellant pointed to the fact that Order VII of the Original Side Rules was only concerned with the procedure upto the passing of the decree but was silent as to what happened after that stage and he contended therefore that O. 37, R. 4 of the Code could not be deemed to have been repealed or superseded. We are of opinion that though the argument appears plausible, it is not sound. O. 37, R. 4 of the Code relates to the summary procedure laid down under that Order just as any other rule in that Order. Whether before or after the decree, the peculiar feature of this procedure is obtaining leave of the Court to appear and defend. While O. 37 of the Code permits the defendant to obtain such leave even after the decree in special circumstances, Order VII of the Original Side Rules does not so permit him.

    The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

    N.R.R

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Bysani Kamalamma v. Syed Ismail Ispahani E. Venkata Sastri
    (Feb 16, 1951)