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  • provisions contained in S. 132 of the Evidence Act
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  • s. 132 of the Evidence Act
  • s. 235, sub-section (1)
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  • provisions contained in S. 132 of the Evidence Act
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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Narayana Aiyar, was the accused in a criminal complaint (C.C No. 2 of 1950) before the Joint Magistrate of Kumbakonam, arising from defamatory statements alleged to have been made in affidavits filed in support of an execution application (E.A No. 383 of 1949) related to a civil suit (O.S No. 37 of 1944) concerning the ownership and possession of motor buses. The respondent, Veerappa Pillai, filed a complaint under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) alleging that the petitioner’s affidavits contained false and defamatory statements. The petitioner raised a preliminary objection that the complaint could not be entertained without a prior complaint by the court under Section 195(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C), as the alleged defamatory statements also constituted an offence under Section 193 IPC (giving false evidence). The Joint Magistrate overruled this objection, prompting the petitioner to seek revision before this Full Bench to resolve conflicting precedents on whether a court’s complaint is necessary in such circumstances.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a complaint under Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C is necessary before a court can take cognizance of a defamation offence under Section 500 IPC when the defamatory statement is also alleged to constitute giving false evidence under Section 193 IPC in judicial proceedings.
  2. Whether witnesses or parties making statements in judicial proceedings enjoy absolute privilege against criminal prosecution for defamation under Sections 499 and 500 IPC.
  3. Whether the procedural requirements of Sections 195 and 198 Cr.P.C can be reconciled when the same act constitutes offences both requiring a court’s complaint and those requiring a complaint by the aggrieved person.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The statements in the affidavits, if false, constitute an offence under Section 193 IPC (giving false evidence), which requires a prior complaint by the court under Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C before cognizance can be taken.
  • If the statements also amount to defamation under Section 500 IPC, the petitioner enjoys absolute privilege as a witness or party in judicial proceedings, shielding him from criminal prosecution for defamation.
  • Allowing prosecution for defamation without a court’s complaint would undermine the protections intended by Section 195 Cr.P.C and could lead to conflicting prosecutions.
  • The procedural law should be strictly followed to avoid multiple complaints and prosecutorial confusion, especially where offences overlap.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • The case of absolute privilege for witnesses in criminal defamation prosecutions is not supported by Indian law, which grants only qualified privilege under Sections 499 and 500 IPC.
  • The English common law absolute privilege does not apply to criminal prosecutions for defamation in India due to codification of the Penal Code.
  • The offences under Sections 193 and 500 IPC are distinct and separate, so the procedural bar under Section 195 Cr.P.C for false evidence should not prevent prosecution for defamation under Section 500 IPC.
  • Requiring both a court’s complaint and a complaint by the aggrieved person would create procedural impossibilities and could be used to evade prosecution, particularly since defamation offences under Section 500 IPC can be compounded but false evidence offences under Section 193 IPC cannot.
  • There is sufficient protection for witnesses under Section 132 of the Evidence Act against vexatious prosecutions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nallappa Goundan v. Chinnammal (1941 M.W.N 1076) Prosecution for defamation by a witness in judicial proceedings can be initiated without a court's complaint under Section 195 Cr.P.C if no finding of false evidence is made. Recognized as authoritative in holding that defamation prosecution does not always require a court’s complaint, especially absent judicial finding of false evidence.
Manjayya v. Sesha Shetti (1888 I.L.R 11 Mad. 477) Witnesses have absolute privilege in giving evidence in judicial proceedings, protecting them from civil suits for defamation. Discussed and distinguished by the Court as not applying to criminal defamation prosecutions under Indian Penal Code.
Tiruvengada Mudali v. Tirupurasundari Ammal (1926 M.W.N 606, Full Bench) English common law absolute privilege does not apply to criminal defamation prosecutions under Indian law; witnesses have only qualified privilege. Followed as overruling earlier decisions granting absolute privilege in criminal defamation cases.
Satish Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Dayal De (Full Bench) Defamatory statements made in judicial proceedings are not absolutely privileged in criminal prosecutions; no bar to defamation prosecution even if court refused complaint under Sections 181 and 193 IPC. Applied to reject absolute privilege claim and support prosecution for defamation without court’s complaint under Section 195 Cr.P.C.
Peddabba Reddi v. Varada Reddi (1929 M.W.N 84) Witnesses have qualified privilege only; they are not immune from criminal defamation prosecution under Sections 499 and 500 IPC. Followed by this Court to reject absolute privilege in criminal defamation prosecutions.
Gopal Naidu v. King Emperor (1923 I.L.R 46 Mad. 605, Full Bench) Criminal law codified by IPC and Cr.P.C displaces English common law absolute privilege in criminal defamation cases. Held as binding precedent limiting privilege to qualified privilege, followed in this case.
Perianna Muthirian v. Vengu Ayyar (1929 M.W.N 196) Prosecution cannot circumvent Section 195 Cr.P.C by filing complaint under a different Penal Code section if the offence requires court’s complaint. Agreed with principle but distinguished inapplicability where offences are distinct and separate.
Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor (1939 M.W.N 497, Federal Court) Prosecution for an offence not requiring sanction may proceed without sanction even if connected with a more serious offence that requires sanction. Considered but found not directly supportive of petitioner’s argument due to differing facts.
Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby (1875 L.R 7 H.L 744) In English law, witnesses have absolute privilege from civil and criminal liability for statements made in judicial proceedings. Not adopted as binding in Indian criminal law; English common law privilege limited to civil cases in India.
U Aung Po v. The King (1938 A.I.R Rang. 232, Full Bench) No exception to Section 499 IPC for defamatory statements made in court proceedings; prosecution under Section 500 IPC can proceed without sanction. Discussed as supporting prosecution for defamation without court’s complaint where no prior finding of false evidence.
Prafulla Kumar Ghose v. Harendra Nath Chatterjee (1917 44 Cal. 970) Suggested absolute privilege in criminal defamation cases where court found false evidence. Rejected as good law by this Court in light of later Full Bench decisions.
Satish Chandra Chakravarthi v. Ram Doyal De (Full Bench) Reiterated that criminal defamation is not absolutely privileged and can proceed without court’s complaint even if false evidence complaint denied. Followed as authoritative on the limitation of absolute privilege.
Guru Prasad v. Rameswar (1938 A.I.R Cal. 527) Confirmed that prosecution for defamation under Section 500 IPC can proceed without court’s complaint even if related false evidence offence exists. Applied to support respondent’s position on separate prosecution for defamation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by acknowledging the conflict in earlier decisions regarding whether a complaint by the court under Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C is necessary before prosecuting a defamatory statement made in judicial proceedings that also allegedly constitutes giving false evidence under Section 193 IPC. It examined the nature of privilege accorded to witnesses and parties in judicial proceedings, distinguishing between absolute privilege recognized under English common law and the qualified privilege under Indian law as codified in the IPC and Cr.P.C.

The Court reviewed extensive precedents, noting that earlier decisions granting absolute privilege in criminal defamation cases have been overruled or qualified by later Full Bench rulings. It found that witnesses and parties have only qualified privilege in criminal cases under Sections 499 and 500 IPC, meaning they can be prosecuted for defamatory statements made in judicial proceedings.

Considering the procedural provisions, the Court analyzed the interplay between Sections 193 and 500 IPC offences and the complaint requirements under Sections 195 and 198 Cr.P.C. It held that requiring both a court’s complaint for false evidence and a separate complaint by the aggrieved for defamation would cause procedural chaos and allow circumvention of the law, especially since defamation offences can be compounded but false evidence offences cannot.

The Court further reasoned that the absence of a prior judicial finding that the statements were false evidence should not bar prosecution for defamation under Section 500 IPC. It emphasized that the legislature’s codification reflects a qualified privilege, not absolute, and that witnesses have some protection under Section 132 of the Evidence Act against vexatious prosecutions.

Ultimately, the Court concluded that a complaint by the court under Section 195 Cr.P.C is not required for a Magistrate to take cognizance of a complaint under Section 500 IPC for defamation, even if the same facts may constitute an offence under Section 193 IPC.

Holding and Implications

The Court held that a complaint by the court under Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C is not a prerequisite for taking cognizance of a defamation offence under Section 500 IPC, even where the defamatory statement is alleged to also constitute false evidence under Section 193 IPC.

The direct effect of this decision is that an aggrieved party may initiate criminal proceedings for defamation without awaiting or requiring a prior complaint by the court for an offence under Section 193 IPC. This preserves the personal right of the individual to seek redress for defamation independently of the procedural safeguards applicable to offences against public justice. The Court recognized that witnesses have only qualified privilege in criminal defamation cases under Indian law, differing from the absolute privilege under English common law.

No new precedent was created beyond clarifying the existing conflict, and the Court emphasized that legislative intervention would be required to alter the balance between witness protection and the right of individuals to prosecute defamatory statements made in judicial proceedings.

    Narayana Ayyar v. G. Veerappa Pillai

    (Govinda Menon & Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, JJ. August 1st 1950)

    Govinda Menon, J. We think that the point of law involved in this case on which there is a conflict of opinion should be decided by a Full Bench. The decision of Leach C.J and Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. in Nallappa Goundan v. Chinnammal 1941 M.W.N 1076 runs counter to four earlier decisions, Shunmugasundaram Pillai v. Manicka Mudaliar 1939 M.W.N 192 1 and Ganapathi Asari v. Kuppuswamy Asari 1939 M.W.N 320; CR. 44, and Gurubasayya v. Siddalingappa 1940 M.W.N 392; CR. 60 and Ramaswami Konar v. Nachiar Ammal. Recently one of us considered the point in Crl.R.C No. 1524 of 1949 and distinguished the case in Nallappa Goundan v. Chinnammal. The same case was considered in Chinnayya Goundan v. Emperor 1948 M.W.N 357; Cr. 69. Sen, J. of the Calcutta High Court in Bushan Singh v. Ram Nagina Singh 1950 A.I.R Cal. 77 expresses the opinion that where an offence of defamation is committed by a person during the course of a proceeding in Court, no complaint under S. 500 can be made against that person, except under a complaint filed by the Court or the Officer concerned under S. 195 of the Cr.P.C The ratio decidendi of quite a large body of case law, namely, Manjayya v. Sesha Shetti 1888 I.L.R 11 Mad. 477, Perianna Muthirian v. Vengu Ayyar 1929 M.W.N 196; Cr. 19, Ravanappa Reddi In re9 and Dholliah v. Sub Inspector of Police, Wellington Station is to the effect that in similar circumstances, where the facts constitute two offences for one of which a complaint by the Court is necessary and for the other no such complaint is necessary, it is not possible to circumvent the provision of S. 195 Cr. P.C by filing a complaint for an offence for which a previous complaint under S. 195 is not necessary. Chandra Reddi, J. who referred the case to a Bench, was also of the view that there is a conflict. We therefore are of the opinion that the entire case may be posted before a Full Bench for resolving the conflict on the point of law involved.

    K.S Jayarama Aiyar, C.K Narasimham & Padmini Raghavan, for Petr.
    Public Prosecutor, for the State.
    M.K Nambiar & M. Srinivasagopalan, for Complainant.

    ORDER (of Full Bench)

    Govinda Menon, J. The petitioner was the accused in C.C No. 2 of 1950 on the file of the Court of Joint Magistrate of Kumbakonam and he seeks to revise the order of the Joint Magistrate overruling a preliminary objection raised, that without a complaint from the court under S. 195 (1) (b) of the Cr. P.C the proceedings now pending in C.C No. 2 of 1950 cannot be enquired into.

    The petitioner is the managing director of Messrs. Raman & Raman Limited, a joint stock company running a fleet of motor buses in the Tanjore District. O.S No. 37 of 1944 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonam was a suit for a declaration that a sale by the third defendant therein to the first defendant (present petitioner) was void and inoperative and for recovery of possession of a number of buses which formed the subject-matter of the suit. The plaintiff in that suit is the present respondent and his claim was that he purchased the buses from the third defendant, but that after having sold the same to the plaintiff, the third defendant again purported to sell them to the first defendant firm, which sale had no authority or justification. O.S No. 37 of 1944 filed on 3 — 10 — 1944 was on the ground that the plaintiff purchased the buses on 10 — 4 — 1944. The contentions of the first defendant, the present petitioner, among others, were that the sale to the plaintiff by the third defendant was a collusive transaction made with the object of resiling from the earlier sale to him. While the suit was pending, the plaintiff applied for the appointment of a receiver and he was appointed receiver on 7-3-1945. As receiver, the plaintiff got possession of the buses and was running the same. There was a decree as prayed for in O.S No. 37 of 1944 and the plaintiff who functioned as a receiver till then applied to continue in possession in his own right and this was ordered on 18-9-1946. Thereupon, the first defendant filed an appeal to this Court again t the decree of the Subordinate Judge and the same came up for hearing before the Honourable Chief Justice and Mack, J. By their judgment dated 2-9-1949, they allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs. Thereafter, the present petitioner, as first defendant, applied by E.A No. 383 of 1949 in E.P No. 133 of 1949 to the Subordinate Judge, Kumbakonam, for restitution of the buses taken away from his possession. In that application it was claimed that damages amounting to a lakh of rupees should be ascertained, and also that before the amount was ascertained, the buses in the possession of the plaintiff-respondent should be attached. The affidavit in support of the application states that the attachment of all the properties of the plaintiff described in the schedule to the application filed along with the affidavit should be ordered under O. XXI, r. 42 of the C.P.C and that the plaintiff should be called upon to give security for Rs. 84,000 due as damages and Rs. 31,000 being the value of the buses and if the plaintiff failed to give adequate security to the satisfaction of the Court, the order of attachment should be made absolute. The third prayer was for the appointment of a receiver. E.A No. 389 of 1949 supported by the affidavit was filed in Court on 26-10-1949 praying for the reliefs mentioned above. In addition to the affidavit dated 26-10-1949, another affidavit was also filed in support of the application.

    Thereafter, the plaintiff-respondent filed a complaint on 5-1-1950 before the Joint Magistrate of Kumbakonam alleging that in the affidavit filed by the defendant-petitioner in support of his restitution application, there are statements which are false and also defamatory of the plaintiff-respondent. He therefore prayed that as the first defendant has committed an offence under s. 500 I.P.C, the matter should be enquired into and the defendant punished. In the sworn statement of the same date the complainant alleged that the accused filed an affidavit containing false imputation in order to defame him and that all the defamatory statements are set out in the complaint. After summons was issued to the accused, he filed an application on 10-2-1950 raising a preliminary objection that the complaint cannot be proceeded with in the absence of a complaint by the Court under s. 195 (1) (b) of the Cr. P.C The reasons alleged are that the subject matter of the complaint relates to statements made by the accused in an affidavit filed before the Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonam in support of the prayer for attachment of the complainant's properties and the appointment of a receiver and since, according to the complainant, the statements are false, they constitute an offence under s. 193 I.P.C for taking cognisance of which a complaint by Court is a necessary pre-requisite, and in the absence of a complaint from the Subordinate Judge as provided for under s. 195 (1) (b) Cr. P.C, the Joint Magistrate has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and proceed with the enquiry. The learned Joint Magistrate overruled the preliminary objection on the ground that s. 195 Cr. P.C did not apply to a case of defamation. He distinguished an unreported decision of this Court and found that a complaint by the Court was not necessary for taking action for an offence of defamation under s. 500 I.P.C As stated already it is against the order of the Joint Magistrate overruling the preliminary objection that this revision petition has been filed. The entire case has been posted before this Full Bench on account of a conflict of decisions in this Court and with the object of resolving this conflict.

    The learned Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonam before whom the affidavits containing the alleged defamatory statements have been filed has not decided about the truth or otherwise of the averments contained therein. It is necessary to preface the discussion with that statement. This is not a case where a Court has found that false evidence has been intentionally given in any stage of a judicial proceeding. It has yet to be decided as to whether the statements contained in the affidavits are false or not, though the complainant alleges that those statements are false and therefore an offence under s. 193 I.P.C has been committed. The further allegation is that not only are most of the statements false to the knowledge of the person who made the same, but that all of them are defamatory intended to harm and injure the reputation of the complainant. The alleged false and defamatory statements are recited in paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 10 of the complaint. The allegation in paragraph 7 of the complaint that the imputation that the complainant may collude with his friends and agree to have the ownership transferred to third parties is said to be a grossly defamatory one; but that is a matter which the Court, when it enquires into the truth or falsity of the other statements contained in the affidavit, would be able to decide because only a possibility is alleged and not an actuality.

    We have heard elaborate and learned arguments on the various points of law arising in the case both from Mr. K.S Jayarama Ayyar for the petitioner and from Mr. M.K Nambiar, for the respondent and a wealth of judicial authority has been cited before us by both of them to substantiate the point of view which each of them seeks to justify.

    The petitioner's counsel elaborates and builds up his argument in this way. According to the complaint, the averments contained in the affidavit are false, though the petitioner disputes that description. If the averments are false, according to the respondent, then the declarant of the affidavit has given false evidence in a judicial proceeding and thereby committed an offence under s. 193 I.P.C If this is so assuming, without admitting, that false evidence has been given, the result is that an offence under s. 193 I.P.C is committed, in which case, by virtue of s. 195 (1) (b), Cr. P.C no court can take cognisance of an offence under s, 193 I.P.C committed in relation to, or in the course of, a judicial proceeding without a complaint from the court before which the offence has been committed. There is no such complaint in the present case. If the alleged false statements partake of the nature of defamatory statements also, then the person who, as a witness, who in this case is the same as a party to the proceeding, makes such a false statement, has absolute privilege in the making of those statements, and therefore cannot be proceeded with in a criminal court for an offence under s. 500 I.P.C If the plea of absolute privilege has to be accepted, then the only other imaginable offence which could have been committed is one under s. 193 I.P.C for which there is no complaint from court and hence the lower court ought not to have entertained the complaint. Secondly, even if the declarant has no absolute privilege in relation to the statements made, still, since, according to the complaint, by the self-same statement not only an offence under s. 193, I.P.C but also an offence under s. 500, I.P.C is committed according to the decisions of this and other courts, an offence under s. 499 I.P.C, cannot be enquired into in the absence of a complaint from the Court for an offence under s. 193 I.P.C Various authorities were cited in favour of the above proposition. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent urges that the case of absolute privilege has not been put forward in the lower court at all but the objection to the entertainability of the complaint was put forward on the assumption that an offence under s. 500 I.P.C has been committed. It is further contended that the Indian law of defamation as enacted in Ss. 499 and 500 I.P.C is different from the Law of England because the English Common Law relating to libel and slander cannot be administered in India in the face of the statutory provision contained in Ss. 499 and 500 I.P.C Though some earlier cases of this court and other courts had taken the view that witnesses have an absolute privilege in India in the same manner as they enjoy in England, later cases have veered round to the view that the question is only one of qualified privilege as enunciated in Ss. 499 and 500 of the Code. In England ordinarily libel, alone is indicatable in a criminal Court whereas slander is an actionable tort. But both libel and slander have been included in s. 499 I.P.C and therefore even though a slanderous statement cannot ordinarily be criminally indicted in England, in India slander can be made the subject of a criminal prosecution on account of the statutory provision contained in ss. 499 and 500 of the I.P.C The English common law regarding civil remedies for libel and slander are alone administered in India and not where it relates to a crime. Therefore the contention is raised that there is only a qualified privilege so far as witnesses are concerned. The decisions which lay down that, where one and the same set of circumstances or transaction creates offences for one of which a complaint from Court is necessary and for entertaining the other, such a complaint is not, a court cannot take cognisance of the minor complaint and thereby circumvent the provisions of s. 195 Cr. P.C, cannot apply to this case, where the two offences alleged to have been committed, viz., under s. 193 and s. 500 I.P.C, cannot be termed to be offences related to each other in any way but are totally separate and independent offences. The reason put forward is that a conviction or acquittal for an offence under s. 193 I.P.C does not bar the conviction or acquittal for an offence under s. 500 I.P.C on the same set of facts. In other words, the merger of offences, viz., a minor one being merged in a major one, which requires a complaint from a Court, or a graver crime in which is included a less serious crime, cannot apply where the offences are giving false evidence and defamation as in this case. The two are distinct and separate, the elements of the one having nothing to do with the elements of the other. In this view, it is urged by the learned Counsel for the respondent that the view taken in some of the decisions that the provisions of s. 195 Cr. P.C do not apply to defamation, that a person who is defamed by a witness is at liberty to file a complaint against the person who defamed him under the Penal Code and that in such a case it is not necessary that a Court should itself complain or that the sanction of the Court should be obtained, is the more acceptable and correct view. In any event, there are statements in the affidavit per se defamatory and which could not possibly be made the subject of an enquiry and decision by a Court as to the truth or falsity of the same, and therefore at least with regard to those statements the complaint should be entertained. In addition, it is urged that since the court has not adjudicated upon the truth or otherwise of the allegations in the affidavit, it cannot be surmised that simply because the complaint states that the allegations are false they are really untrue.

    In support of the contention that no difference exists between sworn statements contained in an affidavit and those made orally in a Court on solemn oath our attention has been invited to Adapala Adivaramma v. Rabala Ramachandra Reddy 1910 M.W.N 155 where it is held that there is no difference between evidence given in the box and evidence given on affidavit in that they are both absolutely privileged and no suit for damages will lie in respect of evidence given therein Wallis J. relies upon the observations contained in Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby 1875 L.R 7 H.L 744 752, 755. It is not seriously contended that we should make any difference with regard to the applicability of s. 193 I.P.C between sworn statements contained in an affidavit and those given in the witness box. But as we have already stated, so far as a suit for damages is concerned, the law in India is still the common law of England, viz., that witnesses are absolutely privileged and that the dictum in Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby holds good in this country. In that case, in response to a question from the Lord Chancellor the consulted Judges through the Lord Chief Baron (Sir F. Kelley) expressed the opinion that

    “no action will lie against a witness for what he says or writes in giving evidence before a Court of Justice. This does not proceed on the ground that the occasion rebuts the prima facie presumption that words disparaging to another are maliciously spoken or written. If this were all, evidence of express malice would remove the ground. But the principle, is that public policy requires that witnesses should give their testimony free from any fear of being harassed by an action on allegation, whether true or false, that they acted from malice”.

    The House of Lords accepted the opinion of the Judges.

    Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby is a decision of the same case in the trial court where Kelley, C.B expressed the same opinion:

    “The authorities are clear, uniform and conclusive, that no action of libel or slander lies, whether against Judges, Counsel witnesses or parties, for words written or spoken in the ordinary course of any proceeding before any court or tribunal recognised by law”.

    It is therefore clear, as already remarked by us, that in England witnesses are absolutely privileged both against criminal prosecutions and against civil suits for damages. In India, since we have no codified law relating to the tort of defamation the English law prevails. Mr. K.S Jayarama Iyer relied upon the decisions in Sullivan v. Norton 1887 I.L.R 10 MAD. 28, F.B, Manjaya v. Sesha Shetti In the matter of Alraja Naidu13. In re Venkata Reddy14, Re Muthusami Naidu15 and Baboo Gunnesh Dutt Singh v. Mugneeran Chowdry for the contention that witnesses have absolute privilege in India, even against criminal prosecutions. The early case in Sullivan v. Norton did not relate to a witness or to a criminal proceeding. It was a case of an advocate having made defamatory statements while in the course of his professional work and a Full Bench of this Court held that an advocate in India cannot be proceeded against civilly or criminally for words uttered in his office as an advocate. The earlier decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Baboo Gunnesh Dutt Singh v. Mugneeram Chowdry related to a suit for damages for defamation and their Lordships held that witnesses cannot be sued in civil courts for damages in respect of evidence given by them upon oath in a judicial proceeding. This maxim which certainly has been recognised in this country by all the courts, is based upon the principle of public policy in that it concerns the public and the administration of justice that witnesses giving their evidence on oath in a Court of Justice should not have before their eyes, the fear of being harassed by suits for damages but that the only penalty which they should incur, if they give evidence falsely, should be an indictment for perjury.

    In Manjaya v. Sesha Shetti a Bench of this Court held that when a person was convicted under s. 500 I.P.C for defaming another by making a statement when under cross-examination in a judicial proceeding before a criminal Court, such a conviction was bad because the statements of witnesses are privileged and, if false, the remedy is by indictment for perjury and not for defamation. The learned Judges relied upon the decisions of the English Courts to that effect. This decision was followed in In the matter of Alraja Naidu where Benson J. held that it is contrary to public policy that a person bound to state the truth in answer to questions put to him by a Court should be liable to be prosecuted for defamation in respect of answers so given, though untrue and not given in good faith. The matter was elaborately discussed later on by a Full Bench in re Venkata Reddy where Arnold White C.J reviewing all the cases and relying upon the dicta contained in the English cases held that where a person was charged with an offence and when replying to the magistrate in answer to a question put to him made a statement defamatory of one of the prosecution witnesses, that statement was absolutely privileged and that he was not liable to be punished in respect thereof for an offence under s. 499, I.P.C The Full Bench further went on to hold that although the English doctrine of absolute privilege is not expressly recognised in s. 499 I.P.C, it does not necessarily follow that it was the intention of the legislature to exclude its application from the law of this country. Reference was made to the observations of Lopes L.J in Royal Acquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society v. Parkinson 1892 1 Q.B 431 451 as well as to the decision in Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby (13 and 14). We need not dilate upon the observations contained in this case because it came up for consideration in a larger Full Bench in Tiruvengada Mudali v. Tirupurasundari Ammal 1926 M.W.N 606, though In re Venkata Reddy was followed in a later case In re Muthuswami Naidu where a Bench held that a defamatory statement in a complaint to a magistrate is absolutely privileged. In Gopal Naidu v. King Emperor 1923 I.L.R 46 MAD. 605 F.B a Full Bench of five Judges came to the conclusion that since the Criminal Law of India has been codified in the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code the court is not entitled to invoke the Common Law of England in such matters at all, because the law has to be ascertained by interpreting the language used in the Codes themselves. In the judgment of Devadoss J. reference was made to the decision in In re Venkata Reddy, though the other Judges have not adverted to that decision or expressed an opinion regarding the correctness of that particular case. What they were concerned was regarding the correctness of the decision in In re Ramaswami Aiyar which the Full Bench held to be correct not for the reasons given by the learned Judges in In re Ramaswami Aiyar but on other grounds.

    As mentioned, a Full Bench of five Judges in Tiruvengada Mudali v. Tirupurasundari Ammal had to consider about the correctness of In re Venkata Reddy and in the opinion of the Full Bench, In re Venkata Reddy was wrongly decided and was therefore overruled. The actual decision in Tiruvengada Mudali v. Tirupurasundari Ammal was that according to the eighth exception defamatory statements made in complaint to magistrates are not absolutely privileged, because matters specifically dealt with by the Penal Code such as the one under consideration should not be decided by the application of the English Common Law. The learned Judges of the Full Bench reserved the question as to whether absolute privilege attaches to advocates and witnesses in the following words at page 737:

    “The question of privilege that may attach to an advocate or witness is not before us and we express no opinion as to whether it might or might not be possible to distinguish their position.”

    In view of the clear exposition contained in Tiruvengada Mudali v. Tirupurasnndari Ammal we have now to take it that In re Venkata Reddy stands overruled. Though the matter was left open in Tiruvengada Mudali v. Tirupurasundari Ammal, it came up for consideration regarding the absolute privilege claimed by a witness in Peddabba Reddi v. Varada Reddi 1929 M.W.N 84; CR. 27 2 where Devadoss and Waller, JJ. held, dissenting from Manjayya v. Sesha Shetti that in India statements made by witnesses are entitled not to an absolute but to only a qualified privilege so far as criminal prosecutions are concerned. They further held that a witness who answers a question put to him by counsel without seeking the protection of the Court under s. 132 of the Evidence Act is not entitled to that protection, Devadoss, J. notes the distinction between the English and Indian law regarding defamation both as an indictable offence as well as a civil remedy. The learned Judge exhaustively discussed the law on the point citing a large body of case law both English and Indian and we are in entire agreement with him. It is therefore now too late in the day for Mr. Jayarama Aiyar to contend that a witness has absolute privilege with regard to evidence given by him in a Court of law when he is prosecuted for defamation under Ss. 499 and 500 I.P.C The other High Courts in India have also taken the same view. The whole subject is discussed in Ratanlal's Law of Crimes, Seventeeth Edition at page 1263, where the decisions of the various High Courts have been noted. All the High Courts have held that a person giving evidence in a Court of law is not entitled to an absolute privilege in respect of statements which he makes, and consequently he is not immune from a complaint of defamation by reason of words uttered on oath in the witness box. So far as the Bombay High Court is concerned, we need only refer to the Full Bench decision in Bai Shanta v. Umrao Amir 1926 I.L.R 50 BOM. 162 F.B. It is unnecessary for us to refer to the decisions of the other High Courts because all of them are found collected by the author at pages 1263 and 1264. In this connection we may refer to a decision by a Full Bench of five Judges in Satis Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Dayal De21, where Mukherjee, Ag. C.J, after reviewing the entire body of case law, held that a defamatory statement, on oath or otherwise, by a party to a judicial proceeding, falls within s. 499 of the Penal Code and is not absolutely privileged, it is not open to the Court to engraft exceptions derived from the common Law of England on the statute law of India. What happened in that case was this: A party made an accusation against his vakil of professional misconduct and requested the Court to take disciplinary action. The High Court, after enquiry, refused to take any action, whereupon the pleader filed a complaint before the Presidency Magistrate charging his accuser for defamation under s. 500 I.P.C in respect of statements contained in the petition which he filed before the High Court. This complaint was filed despite the refusal by the High Court to sanction prosecution of the client for an offence under ss. 181 and 193, I.P.C when objection regarding the maintainability of the complaint under s. 500 I.P.C was taken on the ground that Court had refused to file a complaint under ss. 181 and 193 I.P.C, the Full Bench held that there is no bar to the maintainability of the prosecution for defamation even though the court refused to sanction the complaint for offences under ss. 181 and 193, I.P.C In Re Venkata Reddy was referred to and dissented from. It seems to us that the consensus of opinion in the various High Courts in India has converged on the conclusion that the question of absolute privilege to a witness does not arise in view of s. 499 I.P.C, which relates to a criminal prosecution.

    We have next to see how far the contention, that the alleged defamatory statement, being also one to which is attached the characteristic of an offence under s. 193, I.P.C cannot be made the subject of a prosecution because of the absence of a complaint from court under s. 195, Cr.P.C, can be acceded to or not. A large number of cases have been quoted in relation to this topic. The second part of the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that even if there is no absolute privilege or immunity from criminal prosecution still, since the passages complained againt, according to the present complainant respondent are false and constitute an offence under s. 193, I.P.C, it is more in consonance with natural justice and equity that where, on the same facts, a general offence, which does not require a complaint by a court or public servant, is committed along with a more aggravated and particularised form of offence, it is not open to the prosecution to circumvent the provisions of s. 195 Cr. P.C by resorting to proceed with the general minor offence without attempting to move the court, or the officer concerned, for taking action under s. 195 Cr. P.C It is hence urged that the court must consider the facts in the complaint as a whole and if they disclose an offence for which a special complaint is necessary under s. 195 Cr. P.C, the court cannot take cognisance of the case at all unless such a complaint has been filed. Various decisions are cited in support of this contention, but it is not quite necessary to refer to them in detail. The latest case is by one of us in Chinnayya Goundan In re where it was held that when certain persons are prosecuted under s. 143 read with s. 188 I P.C, for definance of an order under s. 144 Cr. P.C, the real offence committed is one under s. 188 I.P.C, and the accused cannot be tried for a minor general offence like the one under s. 143 I.P.C, without a proper complaint under s. 195 (1) (a) of the Cr. P.C, and the trial and conviction without such a complaint would be without jurisdiction. In this case reference has been made to the decision of Curgenven J. in Perianna Muthirlan v. Vengu Aiyar, to the decision of a Bench consisting of Jackson and Curgenven JJ. in Ravanappa Reddi v. Emperor and to other decisions. The decision of Madhavan Nair and Burn JJ. in Appadurai Nainar v. Sampath Rao Nainar 1935 M.W.N 946 2 has also been discussed and followed. Happel, J. in Antarvedi Sarma, In re23 has also referred to the earlier cases and analysed them exhaustively and the learned Judge followed the decision in Appadurai Nainar v. Sampath Rao Nainar. We are in entire agreement with the decision in Perianna Muthirian v. Vengu Aiyar which was followed in Ravanappa Reddi v. Emperor, which again was followed in Appadurai Nainar v. Sampath Rao Nainar, where the proposition of law has been laid down that parties should not be allowed to evade the provision of s. 195 (1) (d) of the Cr.P.C by filing a complaint under another provision of the Penal Code if, clearly, an offence under s. 193 I.P.C or any other section mentioned in s. 195 (1) (b) Cr.P.C has been committed. This view is supported not only by the three cases adverted to above but also by Antarvedj Sarma In re, Chinnaya Goundan In re, Srinivasa v. Ramaswami 1944 M.W.N 684; CR. 155; I.L.R 1945 MAD. 459, Subramania Aiyar v. Swamikannu Chetty 1933 M.W.N 217; CR. 25, Somayya v. Satyanarayana 1934 M.W.N 694; CR. 134 and Gopalaswami Kurukondar v. Emperor 1935 M.W.N 1344 2.

    But the question is, does this principle apply where, on the same set of facts, an offence under s. 499 I.P.C, as well as one for which a complaint is required under s. 195 (1) (b) Cr.P.C are both committed? Ss. 195 to 198 of the Cr. P.C deal with the conditions requisite for taking cognisance of cases by Courts and s. 195 enumerates the classes of cases dealing with contempt of lawful authority of public servants, false evidence and offences against public justice, as well as using as genuine a false document, counterfeiting device or mark used for authenticating documents, etc. s. 196 Cr. P.C deals with prosecution of offences against the State and s. 196-A Cr. P.C with prosecution for certain classes of criminal conspiracy. S. 197 Cr. P.C deals with prosecution of Judges and public servants; s. 198 Cr. P.C with prosecution for breach of contract, defamation and offences against marriage. Each of these sections deals with a separate class or classes of cases and provide for different contingencies. Whereas under s. 195 Cr. P.C the complaint should be by the public servant or Court, under Ss. 196 and 196-A Cr.P.C, the complaint should be under the authority of the Provincial Government or the officer empowered by the Provincial Government. In the case of s. 197 Cr.P.C, the complaint should be after getting the previous sanction of the President or the Governor of the State. All these sections refer to offences against the public and do not have any concern whatever with crimes committed as against individuals. S. 198 Cr.P.C makes it obligatory that for offences failing under Chapter XIX or Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code or under Ss. 493 to 496 of the same Code, the aggrieved person must be the complainant. Therefore, what is sought to be complained against is an infringement of a personal right and in such a case no court can take cognisance of a complaint except upon complaint made by a person aggrieved. We have to decide as to whether, when the same set of facts or circumstances constitute an offence against public justice, say under s. 193 I.P.C as well as an infringement of a personal right of an individual, for example one of defamation, the personal right of the individual should be subordinated to the supreme interests of the public as controlled by the State and whether a person can be permitted to invoke the provisions of s. 499 I.P.C, by filing a complaint under s. 198 Cr.P.C without having recourse to moving the Court, or the public officer concerned, before whom the offence under s. 193 I.P.C was committed. On the facts of the case in Nallappa Goundan v. Chinnammal there was no finding by the court before which the defamer had given evidence that what he had stated was false evidence punishable under s. 193 I.P.C All that is gatherable from the report of the case is that the defamatory words were uttered by the defamer when giving evidence in support of a complaint filed by him to the effect that his wife had been guilty of theft. The Court before which that evidence was given did not give a finding that the complainant-witness had committed an offence under s. 193 I.P.C Such being the case, the view adumbrated by the learned Judges that the provisions of s. 195 Cr.P.C do not apply to defamation and that a person who is defamed by a witness when in the witness box is at liberty to file a complaint against his defamer, cannot be said to be unjustified, and has got to be upheld. If the Court before which the evidence had been given had come to a conclusion that the evidence was false, which evidence at the same time amounted to a defamatory statement as well, in such a case the question as to whether the supreme interests of the public as controlled by the State should override the personal right of the individual, would, have to be considered. As the decision stands, we cannot say that the ruling in Nallappa Goundan v. Chinnammal is unsound. The three cases decided by Lakshmana Rao, J. are referred to in Nallappa Goundan v. Chinnammal, viz., Shanmugasundaram Pillai v. Manicka Mudaliar, Ganapathi Asari v. Kuppuswamy Asari and Ramaswami Konar v. Nachiar Ammal. In two out of the three cases decided by Lakshmana Rao, J. there had been a finding by the Court before which the evidence was let in that the party had given false evidence. Under these circumstances Lakshmana Rao, J. held that without a complaint by the Court under s. 193 I.P.C, the party aggrieved should not be allowed to take advantage of the provisions contained in s. 499 I.P.C, and prosecute the defamer for an offence under s. 499 I.P.C The following cases — viz. Krishna Row v. Appaswami Aiyar 1881 1 Weir 585. Venkataramanjulu Chetty v. Kanniah Chetty 1933 M.W.N 1263. Segu Moideen v. Sheik Muhammad 1936 M.W.N 490 and Muhammad Isa v. Nazim Hussain 1940 I.L.R All. 314 are all cases where it has been held that if the defamatory words were uttered in the course of giving evidence in a judicial proceeding, then there is no necessity for the filing of a complaint by the court if the aggrieved person seeks recourse to a criminal prosecution for an offence under s. 499 I.P.C The question then arises as to what shall be the position when there is no finding by the court as to the falsity or otherwise of the evidence given or statements made by the witness. For example let us take a case where the Court has had no opportunity of adjudging whether the alleged defamatory statement amounted to giving false evidence at all as for instance where after the evidence was given the proceedings were withdrawn without affording an opportunity for the Court to pronounce upon the truth or otherwise of the statement, or a case where the Court found that the statement is not false but at the same time it may be defamatory. In such a case, it is impossible for the Court to file a complaint under s. 195 Cr.P.C Can it be said that the personal right of the aggrieved party, i.e, the party defamed, will be taken away by the non-existence of a complaint by Court? In our opinion it cannot be. The only way of reconciling the various decisions of this and the other High Courts is to confine the pre-requisite of a complaint by the Court, where the statement amounted to false evidence as well as to defamation, to cases where the Court or the public officer before whom the evidence was given on oath has already found, in the judicial proceeding, that such statement was false. If that were so, without a complaint by the Court, the aggrieved person who claims to have been defamed should not be permitted to proceed with a complaint of defamation without a complaint by the Court. But we think any such reconciliation will defeat the very purpose and object of s. 198 Cr.P.C For, after all the court can file a complaint only in respect of offences mentioned in s. 195 Cr. P.C and the offence of defamation is not one mentioned by the said section. The aggrieved party must be left to his own right and remedy as it will not be within the province of the court to prosecute for private wrongs.

    Mr. Nambiar contends that even where the court has found that an offence under s. 193 I.P.C has been committed, still, if the party defamed wants to proceed against the deponent of the false evidence on a charge of defamation there can be no impediment even if a complaint by court has not been filed. For this argument he places reliance upon the distinctive nature of the two offences, viz., that of giving false evidence and of defamation. The ingredients of the one cannot be said to be the ingredients of the other; nor can it be said that the offence of false evidence relates to the same group as that of defamation. The learned counsel invites our attention to the observations of the Calcutta High Court in Ramsebak Lal v. Kuneswar Singh 1910 37 cal. 604 608 and to the Full Bench Judgment of the same Court in Satish Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Doyal De. He also stresses that the Federal Court in Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor 1939 M.W.N 497; Cr. 69 F.C has held that where a person has committed two offences one of which can be tried only with the pre-requisite of a sanction by the Government and the other can be tried without such a sanction, it is possible to try the case for which no sanction is necessary and convict the offender. Observations of Sulaiman J. and Varadachariar J. in that case were relied upon. What their Lordships held was that if a public servant were to commit the offence of embezzling property entrusted and thereby commits a breach of trust under s. 409 I.P.C, it cannot be said that he is doing an act or purporting to do an act in execution of his duty as a servant of the Crown. But where he falsifies an account and thereby commits an offence under s. 477-A of the Penal Code, he is certainly purporting to act, thought not actually acting, in the execution of his duty. The case there is a converse one for the reason that the more serious offence under s. 409 I.P.C does not requite any sanction by the authority under whom the public servant was working and it seems to us that not much support can be gained for the proposition enunciated by the learned counsel from the observations of their Lordships of the Federal Court. The other case on which he places reliance is the Full Bench decision in U Aung Po v. The King 1938 A.I.R Rang, 232 F.B where the decision was that there is no exception to s. 499 I.P.C, saying that when the defamation is made in a statement to a public servant or in Court proceedings, by virtue of which the offence was punishable under s. 182 or s. 211, Penal Code or some other section, then no prosecution under s. 500 I.P.C would lie, and hence a complaint under s. 500 I.P.C cannot be dismissed even if the same facts constitute also an offence under s. 182 and sanction required by s. 195 Cr.P.C is not obtained. Even here there was no finding given by the Court before which the defamatory statement was made that an offence under s. 193 I.P.C had been committed.

    Mr. Jayarama Aiyar on the other hand wants us to follow the observations contained in Prafulla Kumar Ghose v. Harendra Nath Chatterjee* 1917 44 Cal. 970 973, 974 as well as the observations of Rankin, C.J and Ghose, J. in Ibrahim v. Emperor 1928 III I.C 433 both of which were considered by a single Judge, Sen, J. in Bishan Singh…Accused, v. Ram Nagina Singh…Complainant, Opposite Party. 1950 A.I.R Cal. 77. In our opinion, in view of the dissenting note sounded in Satish Chandra Chakravarthi v. Ram Doyal De, Prafulla Kumar Ghose v. Harendra Nath Chatterjee* cannot be considered as good law, even though Sen J. in Bishan Singh…Accused, v. Ram Nagina Singh…Complainant, Opposite Party. was of a contrary view. Both in Prafulla Kumar Ghose v. Harendra Nath Chatterjee* and Bishan Singh…Accused, v. Ram Nagina Singh…Complainant, Opposite Party. there had already been a finding by the Court before which the evidence was given that the testimony was false and therefore an offence under s. 193 I.P.C had been committed. So far as Ibrahim v. Emperor is concerned there was an adjudication that the complaint was false. Though on the facts of the particular cases, the decisions in Ibrahim v. Emperor and Bishan Singh…Accused, v. Ram Nagina Singh…Complainant, Opposite Party. can be justified as correct, we cannot, in view of the Full Bench judgment in Satish Chandra Chakravarthi v. Ram Doyal De, subscribe to some of the very wide observations contained in these judgments.

    Another case on which the learned counsel for the respondent places some reliance is in Guru Prasad v. Rameswar 1938 A.I.R Cal. 527 where Jack and Khundkar, JJ. following Satish Chandra Chakravarthi v. Ram Doyal De were of opinion that since the Legislature has not chosen to include s. 500 I.P.C, amongst those sections in which the prosecution must be initiated by the Court in connection with which the offence has been committed, there is no provision of law by which the Court can refuse to permit a prosecution under s. 500 I.P.C, where the facts appear to justify such a prosecution, on the ground that the proceedings have not been initiated under s. 476 Cr. P.C, by the Court before which the offence is alleged to have been committed and that the prosecution is designed to evade the provisions of s. 195 Cr.P.C This decision only reiterates what has been exhaustively considered by Mukherjee, A.C.J, in Satish Chandra Chakravarthi v. Ram Doyal De. If the offences of giving false evidence in a judicial proceeding and defamation do not belong to the same genus, but are distinct and separate in their characteristics and ingredients, we are not able to perceive any serious inhibition by the Criminal Procedure Code for initiation and trial of one of these offences independently of anterior resort to fulfilling the conditions necessary to commence a prosecution for the other. Therefore it is not possible to hold that s. 195 Cr. P.C should supersede the later provision in s. 198 Cr.P.C

    My conclusion therefore is that even when the court before which the alleged defamer had given evidence finds that the deposition is false, it is open to the person defamed to institute proceedings under s. 499 I.P.C without the court filing a complaint in accordance with the provisions laid down in s. 195 Cr. P.C All the more so is such a complaint unnecessary where a defamatory statement is made by a witness in the course of a judicial proceeding and the court has not adjudicated upon the truth or falsity of it, or where the court was deprived of an opportunity of so adjudicating; in all such cases it is open to the party defamed to take proceedings under s. 499 I.P.C It is not essential to emphasize the point of difference viz., that the prior decision by the court regarding the falsity of the statement made would deprive the party defamed from proceeding with the complaint. In the present case the Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonam has not even adjudicated upon the allegations made in the affidavits and therefore it is premature to say that an offence under s. 193 I.P.C has been committed.

    It has been pressed upon us that if a party against whom a witness deposes is permitted to run to a criminal court and file a complaint of defamation, then, the safeguard of protection given to witnesses would be lost and that even truthful and honest witnesses would be reluctant to come forward and give evidence. We do not think that the picture so presented is real. It is more than eight years since the decision in Nallappa Goundan v. Chinnammal has been passed. No serious calamity has so far occurred. It is safer to depend upon the good sense of the common man rather than provide for extreme contingencies. Witnesses can always seek the protection of the court under s. 132 of the Evidence Act if they are compelled to answer questions involving defamatory answers. As I have already stated, in the present case as the Sub Court has not even adjudicated upon the truth of the allegations contained in the affidavits, the Criminal Revision Petition has to be dismissed and we order accordingly.

    Balakrisana Ayyar, J.: One Narayana Aiyar, the accused in C.C No. 2 of 1950 on the file of the Joint Magistrate or Kumbakonam is the petitioner before this court. In October 1949 he filed an execution application No. 383 of 1949 in the court of the Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonam in which among other reliefs he prayed for: (1) the attachment of all the properties of Veerappa Pillai, the plaintiff in the suit; (2) an order requiring Veerappa Pillai to give security for certain amounts and (3) the appointment of a receiver. In support of this application he filed two affidavits in the course of which he alleged: (1) “I am now reliably informed that there are several other claims of a very huge magnitude against the plaintiff.” (2) Veerappa Pillai owed on 31-7-1949 over Rs. 42,000 to the Hanuman Bank and the balance due to the bank was still very large; (3) Veerappa Pillai had borrowed large amounts from several other persons: (4) Veerappa Pillai's properties consisted largely of shares which “are of no value now”; and his immoveable properties were only of insignificant worth: (5) there are various criminal charges against him, (6) Veerappa Pillai was in such embarrassed circumstances that “I am reliably informed that he is arranging to dispose of all his properties and secrete the money so as to defraud me and the other creditors;” and (7) it was understood that the Official Liquidator, Madras, was about to institute proceedings against Veerappa Pillai for the appointment of a receiver. Narayana Aiyar also prayed in his affidavit that after the court had effected the attachment of some buses in the possession of Veerappa Pillai the District Superintendent of Police, Tanjore, should be informed of the fact as “I am afraid that to frustrate the application that is now filed by me the plaintiff may collude with his friends and agree to the ownership being transferred to third parties and if the District Superintendent of Police, Tanjore, orders the transfer it will be later difficult for the receiver to run the buses even if one is appointed.”

    According to Veerappa Pillai, all these allegations and others appearing in the affidavits of Narayana Aiyar are false and defamatory and were made maliciously in order to lower his reputation. He therefore filed a complaint under s. 500 of the I.P.C against Narayana Aiyar before the Joint Magistrate, Kumbakonam. The Magistrate recorded a sworn statement from Veerappa Pillai and thereafter took the complaint on file under s. 500 I.P.C and issued processes. After Narayana Aiyar appeared before the Magistrate, a petition was filed on his behalf raising a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate on the ground that since the averments in the complaint of Veerappa Pillai “preliminary disclose offences which come within the purview of s. 195 Cr. P.C” a complaint by the appropriate court was necessary and that in the absence of such a complaint the accused should be discharged under s. 253 (a) Cr.P.C The learned Magistrate overruled this objection and Narayana Aiyar has now come to this Court to have that order quashed.

    The main question of law that we have now to determine is whether when the allegation in a private complaint are tantamount to an accusation of an offence which falls both under s. 193 and s. 500 I.P.C, a complaint of the court is necessary where the prosecutor desires to proceed only in respect of the offence under s. 500 I.P.C On this question there has been a sharp cleavage of opinion and that is why this case has been referred to a Full Bench.

    A large number of decisions was cited on both sides but it is unnecessary for me to examine them. In the judgment which he has just delivered, my learned brother Govinda Menon, J. has reviewed them as comprehensively as is possible. It is therefore sufficient for me to say which of the two opposing views I prefer and why.

    Mr. K.S Jayarama Aiyar, the learned advocate for the accused argued that in this country a witness is entitled to absolute privilege against proceedings both civil and criminal. In support of this view he referred to some of the earlier decisions of this court two of which are reported in Manjaya v. Sesha Shetti and In the matter of Alraja Naidu.

    But all these decisions are seen to be based on a rule of the English Common Law which though it still holds good so far as civil proceedings are concerned, has ceased to apply to criminal proceedings. As has been explained in the later decisions of this court, vide Gopal Naidu v. King Emperor and Tiruvengada Mudali v. Tirupurasundari Ammal, the rule of the English common law has in this respect been superseded by the provisions contained in the Indian Penal Code. The Penal Code insists on good faith and does not confer absolute privilege on witnesses when they are being proceeded against in a criminal court for defamation. Where a law on a particular subject has been codified by Statute, it is not permissible to add to it, or subtract from it or modify it by referring to the earlier rules of the common law which occupied the field before the enactment of the Statute. The resulting position is no doubt anomalous that where a witness is being sued in tort for damages he can plead absolute privilege but that when he is being prosecuted before a criminal court and therefore presumably placed in greater peril, his privilege should be more qualified and his protection correspondingly circumscribed. But as has been pointed out in some of the decisions that anomaly can be rectified only by the legislature.

    Mr. Jayarama Aiyar next contended that the accused in the present case has only filed an affidavit in court and that, therefore, there has been no “publication” of the defamatory matter and in support of this argument refer- red to some passages in the decision in Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby. But the observation read out by Mr. Jayarama Aiyar stem out of the peculiarities of the English law and it does not appear that these observations have been followed by any court in this country. This argument also must be repelled.

    Mr. Jayarama Aiyar next elaborated an argument based on S. 195 (1) (b) of the Cr. P.C So far as is now material that section runs as follows:

    “No court shall take cognizance … …

    (b) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the same code, namely, S. 193 … … . . 211 … … when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceedings in writing of such court … … .”

    The word offence has been defined in S. 4 (c) of the same Code as “any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force … . .”

    Now, argued Mr. Jayarama Aiyar, if we insert the definition of ‘offence’ occurring in S. 4 (c) in S. 195 (1) (b) the passage will read as follows:

    “No court shall take cognizance of any act or omission made punishable under S. 193 … … except on the complaint in writing of the court.

    In other words, where the act or omission falls under S. 193 I.P.C a complaint of the court is necessary.

    This argument looks straightforward and attractive but if followed to its logical end, it would produce some very startling results. S. 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enacts that:

    “No court shall take cognizance of an offence falling under Chapter XXI of the I.P.C… … except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by such offence.”

    Chapter XXI of the Penal Code is the one dealing with defamation. Now, if the argument of Mr. Jayarama Aiyar on this point were sound and if a complaint of the court were necessary in respect of an offence on the ground that it falls under S. 193 it would also follow that a complaint of the person aggrieved would be necessary if the alleged illegal act or omission falls under S. 500 I.P.C also. That means that where an offence falls both under S. 193 and under S. 500 I.P.C two complaints would be necessary, one by the court and the other by the person aggrieved. Now, it is perfectly evident that the Cr. P.C does not envisage such a situation. It would mean that where a witness has committed perjury by making a statement which is at the same time defamatory it would be impossible for the court to prosecute the offender except with the concurrence of the person defamed. It has to be borne in mind here that though there are provisions in the Code which enable an aggrieved person to move the court to lay a complaint under S. 193 I.P.C he can proceed by way of an application under Chapter XXXV of the Code. It does not contain any provision whereby the court can obtain the concurrence of the person aggrieved by the making of a defamatory statement. It is not to be supposed that if the legislature intended that there should be two separate complaints it would not have made some clear provision for co-ordinating the two complaints and the further conduct of the prosecution. If the argument of Mr. Jayarama Aiyar is accepted two complaints would as already, stated become necessary; who would then be in charge of the prosecution? Who would decide which witnesses should be examined and which witness given up. The Public Prosecutor representing the State and the Court or the private party and his advocate? It is easy to see that there will be an impasse.

    This is not the only aspect of the matter. An offence under S. 193 I.P.C is not compoundable under any circumstances while an offence under S. 500 I.P.C can be compounded by the person defamed even without the leave of the court. If, therefore, the contention of Mr. Jayarama Aiyar is acceded to, it would become possible for a person who is being prosecuted for perjury to circumvent the prohibition against the compounding of such an offence, by compounding the offence of defamation with the person aggrieved. He could thus effectively bar a prosecution under s. 193 I.P.C It is a familiar rule that you cannot do indirectly what you are prohibited from doing directly and an argument which enables an accused person indirectly to compound a non-compoundable offence cannot be countenanced.

    The difficulty raised by the argument of Mr. Jayarama Aiyar would apply not merely to an offence under s. 193; it would extend to a series of other offences enumerated in Ss. 195 to 199 Cr.P.C I would mention only one more. Let us take for instance a case where X goes to a Magistrate and falsely states on oath that A murdered B. Now by making such a false statement X would have committed three offences; he would have committed prejury under s. 193; he would have made a false charge with intent to injure punishable under the 2nd part of s. 211 I.P.C with imprisonment for a period of seven years; he would have also defamed A. Now, if the view that Mr. Jayarama Aiyar pressed before us were accepted, X could compound the offence of defamation with A and thus effectively prevent his being prosecuted either for the offence under s. 193 or for the offence under s. 211 I.P.C It is thus clear that the contention put forward by Mr. Jayarama Aiyar would permit the law to be evaded in a manner and in circumstances which the legislature could never have intended.

    These considerations suggest that the better view would be that where an offence falls both under s. 193 and under s. 500 I.P.C a prosecution under s. 500, I.P.C would lie without a complaint by a court for the offence under s. 193. One objection to this view would be that to a certain extent it would enable a private individual to circumvent the prohibition imposed by s. 195 (1) (b) of the Cr.P.C against prosecuting a person for an offence under s. 193 I.P.C without the leave of the Court. It must be recognised that to some extent this is so. But then this does appear to be a contingency which if not manifestly envisaged is provided for in our criminal law. S. 235 (2) Cr.P.C enacts:

    “If the acts alleged constitute an offence falling within two or more separate definitions of any law in force for the time being by which offences are defined or punished, the person accused of them may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, each of such offences”.

    S. 403 (1) and (2) run as follows:

    “ (1) A person who has been once tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall while such conviction or acquittal remains in force not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under s. 236, or for which he might have been convicted under s. 237.

    (2) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him on the former trial under s. 235, sub-section (1) “.

    It will be seen from these provisions that though they prohibit a person who has been tried and either acquitted or convicted from being again prosecuted for an offence for which a different charge might have been framed against him under S. 236 or 237 Cr. P.C they do not cover cases falling under S. 235 (2) of the Code. S. 236 makes provision in respect of offences of such a nature that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute, as for instance whether the offence would amount to theft or receipt of stolen property or criminal misappropriation. S. 235 deals not with such cases but with cases where the acts alleged constitute an offence falling under two or more different sections, e.g S. 193 I.P.C and others if any. S. 235 Cr. P.C is not referred to in S. 403 Cr. P.C This would suggest that if an act constitutes an offence falling under Ss. 193 and 211 and 500 I.P.C a conviction or an acquittal under S. 500 I.P.C will not bar a prosecution for an offence either under S. 193 or under S. 211 I.P.C Similarly a conviction or an acquittal with respect to an offence under S. 193 I.P.C would not bar a subsequent prosecution for an offence under S. 211 I.P.C or S. 500 I.P.C Likewise, a conviction or acquittal under S. 211 will not bar a prosecution for an offence under S. 193 or 500, I.P.C

    But, it might be objected this would mean that for one and the very same act a person is liable to be punished several times over and this is manifestly unjust. But sufficient safeguard against any possible injustice exists in s. 71 I.P.C, the second paragraph of which reads

    “Where anything is an offence falling within two or more separate definitions of any law in force for the time being by which offences are defined or punished … . the offender shall not be punished with a more severe punishment than the court which tries him could award for any one of such offences.”

    By applying this section we would get this result: a person who has by the same act committed an offence under Ss. 193, 211 and 500 I.P.C and who has been convicted and sentenced under either s. 193 or S. 211 and sentenced, let us suppose for seven years, would not when he is subsequently prosecuted under S. 500 I.P.C be given any additional sentence. If, on the other hand, he is first prosecuted and convicted under s. 500 I.P.C and he is subsequently prosecuted under s. 193 or s. 211 I.P.C, the sentence imposed on the second conviction would not after taking into account the punishment already imposed exceed the maximum prescribed for the offence under s. 211 I.P.C

    Another objection that has been urged against the view that a complaint by a court is not necessary is that witnesses who give evidence would have before them a standing threat of a prosecution for defamation; that this would naturally make them hesitate to speak the truth and that the administration of justice, with which the interests of the community are bound up would suffer. One answer to this objection is that this is really a matter of substantive law, that the legislature, for reasons it thought sufficient declined to grant absolute privilege to witnesses when it codified the criminal law on this matter, and that when the substantive law deliberately declined to confer absolute privilege it does not seem to be appropriate that the procedural law should be strained to confer such absolute privilege.

    In the second place a certain measure of protection is conferred on witnesses by s. 132 of the Evidence Act which after laying down:

    “that a witness shall not be excused from answering any question as to any matter relevant to matter in issue in any suit or in any civil or criminal proceeding, upon the ground that the answer to such question will criminate, or tend directly or indirectly to criminate such witness, or that it will expose, or tend directly or indirectly to expose, such witness to a penalty or forfeiture of any kind”

    goes on to provide that

    “no such answer, which a witness shall be compelled to give, shall subject him to any arrest or prosecution or be proved against him in any criminal proceeding except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such answer”.

    No doubt, there are observations in the decision in Peddabba Reddi v. Varada Reddi which suggest that before the protection conferred by this proviso can be claimed something one must appear than that a witness has been put into the box and sworn to tell the truth and nothing but the truth. It seems to us that the requirement of this section has been laid down too stringently in the above case. Ordinarily when a witness is sworn and a question is put to him and no objection is raised to the question everybody expects him to answer it; the command of the court to answer the question is implicit and there is nothing improper in inferring that the witness has been compelled to answer the question. Of course, the position would be different where the witness to whom a question is put makes that a pretext for launching out into something wholly irrelevant. We think that where a question is put to a witness and no objection is taken to the question and his answer is a relevant answer to the question, we may properly presume that he has been compelled to answer the question within the meaning of the proviso and that therefore he cannot be prosecuted.

    If s. 132 of the Evidence Act is understood in this manner the risk of witnesses being threatened with vexatious prosecutions would be practically confined to cases where they have sworn to affidavits. These figure more in civil proceedings than in criminal and even there only in respect of matters in which viva voce examination of the witnesses is considered unnecessary and proof by affidavit sufficient. It the position be such that it is necessary to make in an affidavit a statement that might expose the person making it to a prosecution under S. 500 I.P.C it is always open to the party who wants to avail himself of such evidence to move the court to examine the witness viva voce when s. 132 of the Evidence Act will come into operation. We recognise that there would still be a residuary field wherein persons who swear to affidavits would run the risk of being prosecuted for defamation; but it is to be doubted whether the risks are large and in any case that would be a matter for the legislature.

    For these reasons we take the view that where an alleged offence falls both under Ss. 193 and 500 of the I.P.C a complaint of the Court is not necessary to enable a Magistrate to take cognisance of a complaint under S. 500 I.P.C alone.

    It follows that the revision petition must be dismissed.

    Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J. I agree with my learned brother Govinda Menon J. and I wish to add only a few words. The common law of England allows an absolute privilege, both in the criminal and civil spheres, to advocates, parties and witnesses in regard to statements and averments made and evidence given in the course of any judicial proceedings, When such is the state of law in English society which is one of the most advanced societies, in every respect, one would very much wish that in our country, where the society has yet to make considerable advance in education and other spheres of life, the state of law had been similar. Actually, such was the position prior to the decision in Gopal Naidu v. King Emperor notwithstanding the fact that the criminal law in force in the country had been codified long prior thereto. But after that decision such absolute privilege obtains only in the civil sphere in regard to statements and averments made and evidence given in the course of judicial proceedings. However eminently desirable it may be that such absolute privilege should also be made available in the field of criminal law, in the interests of the promotion of justice, in so far as the Full Bench decisions in Gopal Naidu v. King Emperor and Tiruvengada Mudali v. Tirupurasundari Ammal have held that the criminal law in this country having been codified, the common law doctrine could not be imported any more in this country, they leave no room for us to hold that there is anything more than a qualified privilege available to parties and witnesses in regard to statements and averments made and evidence given in the course of judicial proceedings. Until the law is amended by the competent legislature they must hold the field and we are bound by these decisions.

    But the question which is referred to us for decision whether any statement or averment made in the course of judicial proceedings, whether false or true could be made the subject matter of a criminal prosecution by the person aggrieved, when the said statement or averment or evidence is also capable of being brought within the scope of s. 193 of the I.P.C, without a complaint being given by the court before which the statement or averment was made or evidence given. This point has been elaborately dealt with by my learned brother Govinda Menon, J. and I think, in view of the authorities discussed by him, the only safe conclusion to arrive at is to give an answer to the question in the affirmative. The answer has to be in the affirmative notwithstanding the fact that this is likely to give enough room for abuse of the process of law; by parties to litigation, such abuse tending not; merely to harass opposing parties and their witnesses but also to defeat and delay the ends of justice. My learned brother, Balakrishna Ayyar, J. however thinks that there is sufficient protection afforded to witnesses and parties by the provisions contained in s. 132 of the Evidence Act and other provisions of the criminal law and that if witnesses seek to avail of these, there need be no difficulty in securing immunity from harassment by criminal prosecution. But how far s. 132 of the Evidence Act should be availed of by parties or witnesses giving evidence by means of affidavits or averments in plaints and written statements is a doubtful matter. However that be it seems to me that a negative answer to the question referred to us will be fraught with more serious consequences in the shape of unjustly affecting the rights of individual citizens to vindicate the wrongs done to them by statements and evidence of a nature tending to damage the reputation and character of parties. It is unnecessary for me to say that it is within the province of the legislature to prevent the abuse of the process of law in this matter by amending s. 195 of the Cr P.C in a suitable manner. In the result this petition must be dismissed.

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    Narayana Ayyar v. G. Veerappa Pillai
    (Sep 29, 1950)