JUDGMENT.
1. The Writ Petition No. 3234 of 2006 is directed against the order is order dated 23rd March 2006 passed by Member, Industrial Court, Nagpur in Complaint (U.L.P) No 1044 of 2000. Petitioner Employer before this Court is a cooperative spinning mill i.e a textile industry while the Respondents are its employees. It is duly registered under the provisions of Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 as a cooperative society. By impugned order, Industrial Court has directed Employer to pay wages to employees after adjusting 50% amount thereof already paid because of its interim orders. It has declared that employees are entitled to wages until their services are brought to an end by adopting due procedure of law and has held that Employer has indulged in unfair labour practice under Items 9 of Schedule IV of Maharashtra Recognition Of Trade Union and Prevention Of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to be as MRTU Act) by not paying wages to these employees. Representative Union has filed Writ Petition No. 4295 of 2006 for modification of that order of Industrial Court by adding in it a direction to pay the quantified amounts mentioned against name of each employee in the list exhibits 117 and 118 on the ground that Industrial Court has failed to consider that these dues are/were payable to each employee before it. This Court has on 7/2/2007 ordered disposal of both these writ petitions at the stage of admission itself. In W.P 3277/2008 same challenge is being raised by the Employer in relation to subsequent similar judgment dated 19/4/2008 of the Industrial Court in individual 117 ULP Complaints filed by the workers. At the earlier hearing at the thresh hold, Advocate Kulkarni appearing for workers therein attempted to point out that due to Government intervention the dispute about salary was settled to the satisfaction of employees and present Writ Petition had become infructuous. This was denied by the Petitioner and it was stated that though steps were taken in that direction, ultimately no settlement could be reached. Advocate Puranik urged that the Respondents should withdraw their U.L.P Complaints if they claimed any settlement. Advocate Kulkarni then preferred to argue the Writ Petition on merits but then on 3/2/2009 made request by a pursis to refer the matter to lok-adalat as State Government had initiated steps for settlement. The letter dated 16/10/2008 accompanying it written by Asst. Secretary of State Govt. to Director of Textiles expresses that Mill can not be restarted and hence out of court settlement should be attempted. Advocate Puranik denied possibility of any such settlement and informed that he had instructions to argue the Petitions on merit.
2. Employer is a cooperative society registered on 15/6/1962 under the provisions of Maharashtra Cooperative Society's Act, 1960 (MCS Act hereafter) established with object of running a Spinning Mill in cooperative sector. It started working in 1966 with about 1100 workers. It was governed by Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, referred to as B.I.R Act hereafter. Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangha is the representative Union for local area of Nagpur Municipal Corporation under B.I.R Act for textile industry. On 9/5/1996 Additional Registrar Cooperative Societies, Nagpur passed an interim order for winding up affairs of Employer Society under section 102 of mcs act. This interim order appointing Liquidator was confirmed by another order i.e final order on 24/6/1996 and Liquidator continued to run Spinning Mill for its beneficial winding up. As amount of Rs. 5,65,00,000.only (Five Crore Sixty five Lakhs Only) was outstanding towards its electricity bills, State Electricity Board disconnected power supply from 8/10/1996 and thereafter the Mill could not be run even for beneficial winding up. Liquidator could not pay wages of employees for September 1996 and for few days they worked in month of October 1996. The Representative Union {mentioned as Union hereafter for short} filed application before Additional Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Nagpur and sought permission as per section 107 of mcs act to institute proceedings against Employer for recovery of wages and said permission was rejected on 16/10/1997. Union challenged this rejection by filing revision before State Government and on 8/8/2000 State Government granted it necessary permission. On its strength, Union filed Complaint U.L.P 1044/2000 before Industrial Court on 17/11/2000 and claimed wages for total 853 workers for the period from 1/9/1996 to 31/10/2000 contending that as no permission for closure was obtained under Section 25-O of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 all these employees are/were deemed to be in service and hence entitled to receive wages. It also filed application under s. 30(2) of mrtu act for direction to release 50% of the wages as interim relief. Main Complaint as also application for interim relief were opposed by Employer i.e present Petitioner. In the meanwhile State of Maharashtra and Director Handlooms, Powerlooms and Textiles were also joined as parties to that U.L.P complaint. On 18/12/2002 Industrial Court allowed application for grant of interim relief and directed Employer to pay 50% of the amount. Employer filed Writ Petition No. 626/2003 in which initially stay was granted in favour of Employer but later on the same was vacated and Employer was directed to pay amount to concerned workers as per interim orders. Said Petition was admitted for final hearing on 19/11/2003. Employer had no funds to comply with interim orders and therefore 21 acres of land belonging to it was sold for Rs. 12.50 crores. Out of this amount Rs. 681.32 lakhs were paid to employees and Rs. 102.40 Lakhs were paid towards Employer's contribution of Provident Fund and ESI. Employer also paid amount of Rs. 43.02 lakhs as arrears of provident fund. On 14/12/2005, Writ Petition No. 626 of 2003 was disposed of by directing Industrial Court to decide main Complaint on merits within three months. Union then moved application for amendment of Complaint before Industrial Court and sought deletion of names of those employees who did not pay 3% amount to it as its entitlement. It also claimed wages for further period up to August 2005 and also wanted to add names of other workers. Industrial Court allowed amendment only to the extent of bringing claim before it up to August 2005. Employer effected consequential amendment. Union examined one of the employees Shri Dekate while Employer examined Liquidator and then Industrial Court passed final order on 23/3/2006. This final order forms subject of challenge in Writ Petition No. 3234/2006 filed by Petitioner Liquidator and Writ Petition No. 4295 of 2006 filed by the Representative Union. The employees whose names were not included by the Union had tried to intervene unsuccessfully in ULP 1044/2000 and then said employees approached this High Court in Writ Petition No. 5267/2004. On 12/4/2005 that writ petition was allowed to be withdrawn giving liberty to employees to move representation to the liquidator. Liquidator did not grant them complete relief and then Employees instituted individual ULP Complaints for the very same relief as granted to Union. They claimed salary for 102 months i.e from September, 1996 to February, 2005, D.A, amount of Chef Minister Award and Kale Committee, HRA, bonus, leave encashment etc. After hearing both sides the Industrial Court has passed common but similar order in favour of these workers. This subsequent judgment dated 19/4/2008 is questioned by the Petitioner Liquidator in Writ Petition No. 3277/2008.
3. Though in Writ Petition No. 3277/2008, Advocate Puranik initially raised the ground about limitation but in the course of arguments he gave it up. He urged that order obtained by Union can not inure to the benefit of the individual Respondents and they ought to have filed fresh case before the Registrar and secured permission under section 107 of mcs act. In any case, permission obtained earlier was for limited period and fixed amount, and as Union recovered more amount than permitted, that permission got exhausted. He also states that as Representative Union had already filed U.L.P 1044/2000 before Industrial Court on 17/11/2000 for this, the 117 ULP Complaints individually filed and in which impugned order came to be passed were itself barred and not maintainable.
4. After mentioning the facts as discussed above, Advocate Puranik for Employer Mill's has contended that while disposing of Writ Petition No. 626/2003 on 14/12/2005 this Court has expressly observed that Industrial Court would not be influenced by any order made by High Court in said writ petition and still the Industrial Court got carried away by the sale of land permitted by this Court for paying salaries. He contended that Industrial Court has failed to appreciate the fact that Employer is an artificial person born under provisions of MCS Act and its existence has been put to an end by passing winding up order under section 102 thereof. He argues that as Employer itself has ceased to exist, industry is automatically closed/discontinued and hence, there is no question of obtaining permission or approval under Section 25-0 of IDA in the matter. He argues that initially Industrial Court has recorded that it has to consider question of law only but then it lost sight of this aspect and has decided the controversy only on facts disregarding law. He states that Liquidator issued to employees certificates about their continuance in employment and issue of closure has been decided because of this conduct of Liquidator and not on the basis of legal provisions. He has argued that provisions of MCS Act constitute Special law and override provisions of IDA which becomes a General law. He has taken me through the entire order to state that Industrial Court has erroneously appreciated the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Life Insurance Corporation of India v. DJ Bahadur reported at the (1981) 1 SCC 315= AIR 1980 S.C 2181. He has invited attention to judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court in case of Bombay Metropolitan Transport Corporation Ltd v. Employees of B.M.T.C (CIDCO) reported at 1987 (I) CLR 430 and judgment delivered by Division Bench in appeal therefrom reported at 1991 (II) LLJ 443 Bombay Metropolitan Transport Corporation Ltd v. Employees of B.M.T.C (CIDCO). He states that whether particular law is or is not Special law and what is General law on the subject depends on facts of each case and this settled position in law has been totally overlooked by giving undue importance to beneficial running of Employer Mill by Liquidator for brief period.
5. He also invites attention to various provisions in mcs act and rules framed thereunder to contend that after interim order is confirmed, not only the elected body i.e managing committee members vacate the office but then the employees also loose their jobs. Hence, employer-employee relationship comes to an end and law does not envisage any such relationship with the Liquidator. Beneficial running of a Mill in liquidation is the discretion of said Liquidator not sufficient to fasten any liability upon the Co-operative Society. He also invites attention to winding up procedures prescribed in Companies Act to state that provision like Section 445 thereof putting an end to employment does not figure in other types of winding up. He contends that termination of such relationship is implicit in every winding up including one under MCS Act and absence of express mention thereof or a provision therefor is inconsequential. The permission under S. 25-O is not required in such situation and doctrine of implied repeal has to apply. Primacy needs to be given to MCS Act and in support he relies on observations in para 6 of its judgment by the Hon. Apex Court in AIR 2004 SC 1006 - Kishorebhai Khamanchand Goyal v. State of Gujrat. He also points out that when permission granted u/S 107 MCS Act to Union is only for Rs. 4,59,84,415/-, Industrial Court could not have passed an order resulting into payment of more sum to the Union/workers. He pleads that as mentioned in para 14 of Writ Petition No. 3234/2006 Rs. 22.76/- crores to employees with additional amount of Rs. 3.40 crores towards provident fund. This total amount far exceeds the basic amount of Rs. 4,59,84,415/-- permitted to be recovered and a relief larger than the relief claimed could not have been granted by the Industrial Court. Reliance is placed on (2002) 1 SCC 90 - Rajendra Tiwary v. Basudeo Prasad, particularly para 14 in support. He also produced copy of circular no. Indl/C-P/108.Booklet/89 dated 22-8-1989 issued under S. 105(c) of MCS Act by the Co-operative Commissioner & Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Pune sanctioning order of priority to show that pay and allowances and payments of liquidation are at serial number one and payments of the workers are at serial number two.
6. Per contra, Advocate S.D Thakur for Union i.e recognised Union R.M.M.S has contended that by arguments Employer is trying to create repugnancy or inconsistency between provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and MCS Act, 1961 when in fact no such inconsistency/repugnancy exists. He invites attention to provisions of Article 254 read with Article 246 of Constitution of India and to Schedule 7, List I -- Entry 43 and Entry 97 to urge that Cooperative Society is not the subject matter within the domain of Union of India. Entry 32 in List II is pointed out to show that Cooperative Society is the subject on which State Legislature only has been given jurisdiction. List III, Entry 22 dealing with Industrial and labour disputes, Entry 24 dealing with welfare of workers and Entry 36 dealing with factories is pointed out to show that as the subjects are placed in concurrent list in Constitution, Union of India has primacy to legislate about them. Section 25-J and 25-S of IDA are pointed out to show that provisions incorporated in chapter V A and V B of IDA prevail over all other inconsistent provisions in any other law. It is stated that order of Liquidator or final order passed under MCS Act cannot supersede the statutory provisions of Section 25 S. It is further contended that Employer's stance that closure of factory takes place with effect from the date of final order under section 105 of mcs act is contrary to scheme of Section 109 and unless and until the report of Liquidator is accepted by General body and registration certificate is cancelled, the closure cannot occur. Liquidation itself is not certain till then. It is argued that while enacting MCS Act, State Legislature has taken precaution because it has excluded “Industrial Disputes” from phrase dispute as used in Section 91 thereof and attention is invited to provision as made in clause (e) thereof. Judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported at A.I.R 1979 SC 878 -- M. Karunanidhi v. Union Of India -- paragraph 8 is pressed in to service to point out tests of repugnancy. By placing reliance upon judgment of Hon Apex Court reported at 1981 (1) LLJ 1- Life insurance Corp. v. D.J Bahadur particularly paragraphs 27 to 31, 49 to 57 and 81-82 it is alternatively urged that MCS Act is not a special Act regulating the resolution of Industrial disputes and IDA is special Act for that purpose. It is urged that MCS Act regulates only working of “Society” and not “factory” run by Society. According to Advocate Thakur nature of personality of owner of factory is not relevant at all to find out application of Section 25-O of IDA and it is further stated that rigour of said Section can be understood from its clause (7) which even in case of death of Employer does not contemplate permanent exemption. Bombay Metropolitan Transport (supra), paragraphs 13 to 15 are shown to drive home the point that constitutional scheme of supremacy of High Court and legal provisions in Section 445(3) of Companies Act, 1956 were the key factors weighing with Hon Division Bench of this Court for the view that Section 25-O IDA had no application to winding up of Company. Attention is invited to section 167 of mcs act to show that Companies Act has no application to Cooperative Society. It is also urged that after passing of order of liquidation, Liquidator ought to have approached Appropriate Government seeking permission under Section 25-0 of IDA and the said Government would have definitely understood the importance of the order of winding up and could have passed appropriate order. It is stated that in present case Liquidator has not approached Appropriate Government and hence because of provisions of subsection (6) of Section 25-0 IDA the liability to pay the wages of workers continues. 2004 (1) Bom.L.C 425 - Mrs. Sadashiv K. Sutar v. Kolhapur Zilla Janta Sahkari Bank ltd. is sought to be distinguished by contending that in said judgment of Learned Single Judge of this High Court the previous permission was not obtained whereas here R.M.M.S has obtained necessary permission under Section 107 of MCS Act. 1966 (1) LLJ 533 (Kerla) - Palal Central Bank Employees Union v. Palal Central Bank Ltd. is sought to be distinguished by pointing out that it considers provisions of Section 445(3) of Companies Act.
7. Provisions of Section 107 as also 106 of MCS Act are pointed out to show that Registrar while granting permission to prosecute particular remedy is not required to adjudicate the disputed question and hence mentioning of particular amount in its application filed before that authority by R.M.M.S does not mean that for recovery of future salary or further salary again separate permission should be sought. It is pointed out that that's permission for closure has not even been applied for, liability of Employer to pay salary regularly continues and hence by granting permission on 8/8/2000, the revisional authority i.e State Government has not mentioned any amount or any period. It is further contended that liquidation proceedings cannot continue indefinitely and must be finished within ten years. Proviso to Section 109(1) is being pointed out to show that MCS Act does not confer even power to extend said period beyond 10 years and said period of 10 years has expired on 24/6/2006. The orders extending the period, if any, passed by competent authority are not produced and hence there is no proof of even such extension. The order of winding up, whether final or interim therefore has ceased to exist and Employer Society is restored to its original status prevailing before passing of such orders in the matter. It is urged that hence Society and its Factory must be deemed to have continued in existence and working for all these years and in changed circumstances, the orders of Industrial Court call for no interference. This period and the maximum limit is sought to be justified by pointing out provisions of chapter v of mcs act which contemplate aid or assistance by State Government to Societies like present employer Society. Section 63 of chapter V is being strongly relied upon to point out overriding effect given to said Chapter and it is contended that even liquidation proceedings are subordinate to the said provisions. Section 79 A is also pointed out to show that State Government has been authorised to give directions to Cooperative Society and said power can be exercised here in the interest of welfare of workers and public at large. Section 105(1)(c-ii) is pointed out to show the power given to Liquidator to act in the interest of public and workers and it is argued that order of liquidation is not an end of either the society or the factory. Neither competent authority u/s 72, 73 of MCS Act or State Government nor Employer Society by the resolution through Liquidator has taken any decision to close down the factory and there is no satisfaction recorded by any competent body that factory cannot be run profitably. It is urged that order of winding up passed under Section 102 cannot supersede provisions of Section 25 0 of IDA Act. Judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2004 (1) CLR 308 - Hindalco Industries Ltd. v. Union Of India, paras 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 and 8 is relied upon to show that “intention” as such is not relevant for the purposes of application of Section 25-O and in any case, here Employer wanted to run the factory and had no intention to close down. Bombay Metropolitan Transport Corporation Ltd v. Employees of B.M.T.C (CIDCO) is sought to be distinguished by contending that Employer there was not and “Industrial establishment” as required by Section 25 L. of IDA. It is urged that in present facts the textile mill is very much covered under Section 25 L. though Cooperative Society is not so covered. He relies upon judgment in S.M Nilajkar v. Telecom District Manager(2003) 4 SCC 27 at page 39 and Avon Services v. Industrial Tribunal Haryana(1979) 1 SCC 1 -- paragraphs 18, 22 and 23 to explain the meaning of “undertaking”.
8. In Writ Petition No. 4295/2006, argument is advanced to seek modification in impugned order of Industrial Court by pointing out that through oral and documentary evidence the exact amount of entitlement of each individual worker has been proved on record and still Learned Member of Industrial Court has not quantified that entitlement. The petitioners/workers will therefore again be required to lead same evidence to get their entitlement computed. The calculations and charts produced as Annexure F. and G i.e Exhibit 117 and 118 before Industrial Court are shown to substantiate this contention.
9. Advocate Kulkarni for workers in Writ Petition No. 3277/2008 states that when it was found that Representative Union was not protecting the interests of present Respondents, wanted to deprive them of their proportionate salaries and ULP Complaint 1044/2000 was not for their benefit, the Respondents were not left with any other option but to file 117 individual ULP Complaint proceedings before the Industrial Court. He further states that as the claim is for salary the individual grievance under item 9 of Schedule IV is very much maintainable under MRTU Act. The salary claim of Respondents was included in original claim for which leave of Registrar was obtained by the Union and hence, it was not necessary for Respondents to move again under section 107 of mcs act. He also invites attention to impugned order of the Industrial Court to show how admissions given by the Petitioners have helped it in reaching the conclusions about continuation of the Industry and relationship, and hence about entitlement to draw the salary. According to him as said findings of fact are not perverse, all legal issues argued herein are only of academic importance. He states that all types of winding up contemplate beneficial running of Industry sought to be wound up for the benefit of creditors including the workers and the Liquidator is only an agent of original management. All his acts and decisions bind the original management. The object of present petitioner Society was to run the Mills for economic improvement of the area and hence also for welfare of workers. He states that as Liquidator is appointed particularly or specifically for one cooperative society, he has to carry out winding up operation with the assistance of employees as elected managing committee is not necessary thereafter and its continuation in office will add to problems and therefore only there is no provision for automatic termination of employees in MCS Act. Winding up therefore has to be within four corners of all laws including the welfare legislation like IDA and Liquidator is responsible for all these compliances including procuring of permission under Section 25-O. He further points out that Petitioner Mills needed to be wound up within 10 years as per section 109 of mcs act and as that period is over, there is, in the eyes of law no Liquidator or liquidation proceedings. The Mill and its co-operative or elected management is restored and continues. He urges that the case law relied upon by Advocate Puranik is therefore not relevant at all.
10. In reply arguments, Advocate R. B. Puranik points out from 1987 (1) CLR 430 i.e judgment of learned Single Judge between B.M.T.C v. Employees of B.M.T.C (CIDCO) giving rise to appellate judgment of Hon'ble Division Bench in Bombay Metropolitan Transport Corporation Ltd v. Employees of B.M.T.C (CIDCO), supra, particularly paragraph 8 and 38 to show that employer Bombay Metropolitan Transport Corporation Ltd had a factory. He further states that after winding up order is passed, Section 25-0 has no application. He relies upon M. Karunanidhi (supra) -- paragraph 8 and (1990) 2 SCC 562 - Vijay Kumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka, para 10 to stress that IDA is referable to list III while MCS Act is referable to list II and hence Article 254 has no application. Winding up order is not due to any Industrial disputes and hence Section 25 J. or Section 25 S. of IDA are not attracted. As Cooperative Mill is liquidated, undertaking gets closed down. He also points out that before cancellation of registration of Society, Liquidator has to realize all its assets. According to him as competent authority has passed a winding up order which has become final, no separate decision of closure was/is warranted. Provisions of Section 25-0(7) IDA are relied upon to show how to nature or personality of employer is relevant. He also produces copy of government orders dated 15/1/2008 and 23/5/2008 to show that extension till 8/5/2009 has been given for winding up proceedings by State Government in view of section 157 of mcs act. He further states that in view of express language of section 109 read with Section 21 after expiry of period of 10 years because of deeming fiction the winding up proceedings come to an end and certificate of registration can be cancelled. Therefore, according to him time period for completion of liquidation proceedings in the still to expire and in any case, after expiry of maximum period stipulated therefor, the Cooperative Society is not revived or restored back to life. He relies upon (2006) 1 SCC 638 - Sarat Chandra Mishra v. State of Orissa, paragraph 15 to point out how the government orders need to be construed. Taking up Writ Petition No. 4925/2006, he invites attention to fact that all workers represented through Union did not enter witness box and Shri Dekate alone deposed about the alleged charts of calculation of individual amounts (at Annexure F & G). Cross-examination of Shri Dekate is pressed into service to show that he could not substantiate those calculations or entitlement. He further states that wage-card of individual employee in support of such calculations has not been produced. He invites attention to the Annexures F & G to show that substitutes i.e badli workers who could not have worked for all 26 days in a month are presumed to have worked accordingly while preparing the charts and because of these defects, Industrial Court has rightly left the work of quantification to appropriate forum. In W. P. 3277/2008 he relies upon provisions of Section 27 A read with Section 32 of B.I.R Act show that when Representative Union had appeared and exhausted the permission procured by it under section 107 of mcs act, ulp complaints by individuals were not maintainable. He states that learned member of Industrial Court has mechanically answered the issue in this respect.
11. Before undertaking consideration of alleged repugnancy between the provisions for winding up in MCS Act and closure in IDA, I find it convenient to consider point of the implied repeal and various judgments cited in support. Hon. Apex Court in para 17 of Vijay Kumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka -- AIR 1990 SC 2072 observes :--
“16. In Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1959 SC648), supra, this Court had pointed out that repugnancy between two statutes would arise if there was direct conflict between the two provisions and if the law made by Parliament and the law made by the State Legislature occupied the same field.
17. It has already been stated that the State Act intended to eliminate private operators from the State in regard to contract carriages acquired under the existing permits, vehicle and ancillary property and with a view to giving effect to a monopoly situation for the State undertaking made provision in S. 20 for excluding the private operators. The 1988 Act does not purport to make any provision in regard to acquisition of contract carriage permits which formed the dominant theme or the core of the State Act. Nor does it in S. 73 or S. 74 indicate as to who the applicant shall be while laying down how an application for a contract carriage permit shall be made and how such a permit shall be granted. section 80 of the 1988 act does contain a liberalised provision in the matter of grant of permits but here again it has to be pointed out that the ancillary provision contained in S. 20 of the Acquisition Act to effectuate acquisition does not directly run counter to the 1988 provision.
18. Section 20 of the State Act creates a monopoly situation in favour of the State undertaking qua contract carriages by keeping all private operators out of the field. Since Ss. 73, 74 and 80 of the 1988 Act do not contain any provision relating to who the applicants for contract carriages can or should be, and those Sections can be applied without any difficulty to the applications of the State undertaking, and there does not appear to be any repugnancy between the two Acts for invoking Art. 254 of the Constitution. A provision in the State Act excluding a particular class of people for operating contract carriages or laying down qualifications for them would not run counter to the relevant provisions of the 1988 Act. ---------”
12. In AIR 2004 SC 1006 - Kishorebhai Khamanchand Goyal v. State of Gujrat, in para 6, the Hon'ble Apex Court observes :--
“. There is presumption against a repeal by implication; and the reason of this rule is based on the theory that the Legislature while enacting a law has a complete knowledge of the existing laws on the same subject-matter, and therefore, when it does not provide a repealing provision, the intention is clear not to repeal the existing legislation. (See: Municipal Council, Palai through the Commissioner of Municipal Council, Palai v. T. J. Joseph (AIR 1963 SC 1561), Northern India Caterers (Private) Ltd. v. State of Punjab (AIR 1967 SC 1581), Municipal Corporation Of Delhi v. Shiv Shanker† (1971 (1) SCC 442) and Ratan Lal Adukia v. Union Of India. (AIR 1990 SC 104). When the new Act contains a repealing section mentioning the Acts which it expressly repeals, the presumption against implied repeal of other laws is further strengthened on the principle expressio unius (persone vel rei) est exclusio alterius (The express intention of one person or thing is the exclusion of another), as illuminatingly stated in Garnett v. Bradley, (1878) 3 AC 944 (HL). The continuance of existing legislation, in the absence of an express provision of repeal by implication lies on the party asserting the same. The presumption is, however, rebutted and a repeal is inferred by necessary implication when the provisions of the later Act are so inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of the earlier Act and that the two cannot stand together. But, if the two can be read together and some application can be made of the words in the earlier Act, a repeal will not be inferred. (See: A. G. v. Moore (1878) 3 Ex D 276, Ratanlal's case (supra) and R. S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka (AIR 1992 SC 81).
7. The necessary questions to be asked are :
(1) Whether there is direct conflict between the two provisions.
(2) Whether the Legislature intended to lay down an exhaustive Code in respect of the subject-matter replacing the earlier law;
(3) Whether the two laws occupy the same field.
8. The doctrine of implied repeal is based on the theory that the Legislature, which is presumed to know the existing law, did not intend to create any confusion by retaining conflicting provisions and, therefore, when the Court applies the doctrine, it does not more than give effect to the intention of the Legislature by examining the scope and the object of the two enactments and by a comparison of their provisions. The matter in each case is one of the construction and comparison of the two statutes. The Court leans against implying a repeal, “unless two Acts are so plainly repugnant to each other that effect cannot be given to both at the same time, a repeal will not be implied, or that there is a necessary inconsistency in the two Acts standing together”. (See Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition, page 366, with reference to Re : Berrey, (1936) Ch 274). To determine whether a later statute repeals by implication an earlier, it is necessary to scrutinize the terms and consider the true meaning and effect of the earlier Act. Until this is done, it is impossible to ascertain whether any inconsistency exists between the two enactments. The areas of operation of the act and the establishments act in question are different with wholly different aims and objects. They operate in their respective fields and there is no impediment for their existence side by side.
9. It is to be noted that there is no direct conflict between any of the provisions of the two statutes. The determinative test as noted above is whether the enactments are sharply conflicting or are inconsistent and/or repugnant. In the instant case it is not so. The operation of the Act is not restricted in its area of operation by what is provided in the Establishments Act and vice versa. Absence of some provisions in another Act does not amount to conflicting provision or inconsistent provision amounting to repugnancy of such provision.”
Paragraphs 48 to 52 of Life Insurance Corporation of India v. DJ Bahadur (AIR) also contain important observations of Hon. Apex Court in this respect & the same are as below :-
“48. The next logical question then is as to whether the ID Act is a general legislation pushed out of its province because of the LIC Act, a special legislation in relation to the Corporation employees. Immediately, we are confronted with the question as to whether the LIC Act is a special legislation or a general legislation because the legal maxim generalia specialibus non derogant is ordinarily attracted where there is a conflict between a special and a general statute and an argument of implied repeal is raised. Craise states the law correctly : (Craise on Statute Law, 1963 Edn. pp. 376-7).
The general rule, that prior statutes are held to be repealed by implication by subsequent statutes if the two are repugnant, is said not to apply if the prior enactment is special and the subsequent enactment is general, the rule of law being, as stated by Lord Selbourne in Seward v. Vera Cruz, (1884) 10 AC 59 at p. 68 “that where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subject specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to do so”. “There is a well-known rule which has application to this case, which is that a subsequent general Act does not affect a prior special Act by implication. That this is law cannot be doubted, and the cases on the subject will be found collected in the third edition of Maxwell is generalia specialibus non derogant - i. e. general provisions will not abrogate special provisions. “When the legislature has given its attention to a separate subject and made provision for it, the presumption is that a subsequent general enactment is not intended to interfere with the special provision unless it manifests that intention very clearly. Each enactment must be construed in that respect according to its own subject-matter and its own terms.
49. The crucial question which demands an answer before we settle the issue is an to whether the LIC Act is a special statute and the ID Act a general statute so that the latter pro tanto repeals or prevails over the earlier one. What do we mean by a special statute and, in the scheme of the two enactments in question, which can we regard as the special Act and which the general? An implied repeal is the last judicial refuge and unless driven to that conclusion, is rarely resorted to. The decisive point is as to whether the I. D. Act can be displaced or dismissed as a general statute. If it can be and if the LIC Act is a special statute the proposition contended for by the appellant that the settlement depending for its sustenance on the ID Act cannot hold good against Section 11 and Section 49 of the LIC Act, read with Reg. 58 thereunder. This exercise constrains me to study the scheme of the two statues in the context of the specific controversy I am dealing with.
50. There is no doubt that the LIC Act, as its long title suggests, is an Act to provide for the nationalization of life insurance business in India by transferring all such business to a Corporation established for the purpose and to provide for the regulation and control of the business of the Corporation and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Its primary purpose was to nationalise private insurance business and to establish the Life Insurance Corporation of India. Inevitably, the enactment spelt out the functions of the Corporation, provided for the transfer of existing life insurance business to the Corporation and set out in detail how the management, finance, accounts and audit of the Corporation should be conducted. Incidentally, there was provision for transfer of service of existing employees of the insurers to the Corporation and, sub-incidentally, their conditions of service also had to be provided for. The power to make regulations covering all matters of management was also vested in appropriate authorities. It is plain and beyond dispute that so far as nationalisation of insurance business is concerned, the LIC Act is a special legislation, but equally indubitably is the inference, from a bare perusal of the subject, scheme and sections, and understanding of the anatomy of the Act, that it has nothing to do with the particular problem of disputes between employer and employees, or investigation and adjudication So such disputes. It does not deal with workmen and disputes between workmen and employers or with industrial disputes. The Corporation has an army of employees who are not workmen at all. For instance, the higher echelons and other types of employees do not fall within the scope of workmen as defined in Section 2(s) of the ID Act. Nor is the Corporation's main business investigation and adjudication of labour disputes any more than a motor manufacturer's chief business is spraying paints!
51. In determining whether a statute is a special or a general one, the focus must be on the principal subject matter plus the particular perspective. For certain purposes, an Act may be general and for certain other purposes it may be special and we cannot blur distinctions when dealing with finer points of law. In law, we have a cosmos of relativity not absolutes - so too in life. The ID Act is a special statute devoted wholly to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes which provides definitionally for the nature of industrial disputes coming within its ambit. It creates an infra-structure for investigation into, solution of and adjudication upon industrial disputes. It also provides the necessary machinery for enforcement of awards and settlements. From alpha to omega the ID Act has one special mission - the resolution of industrial disputes through specialised agencies according to specialised procedures and with special reference to the weaker categories of employees coming within the definition of workmen. Therefore, with reference to industrial disputes between employers and workmen, the ID Act is a special statute, and the LIC Act does not speak at all with specific reference to workmen. On the other hand, its powers relate to the general aspects of nationalisation, of management when private businesses are nationalised and a plurality of problems which, incidentally, involve transfer of service of existing employees of insurers. The workmen qua workmen and industrial disputes between workmen and the employer as such are beyond the orbit of and have no specific or special place in the scheme of the LIC Act. And whenever there was a dispute between workmen and management the ID Act mechanism was resorted to.
52. What are we confronted with in the present case, so that I may determine as between the two enactments which is the special? The only subject which has led to this litigation and which is the bone of contention between the par ties is ‘an industrial dispute between the Corporation and its workmen’ qua workmen. If we refuse to be obfuscated by legal abracadabra and see plainly what is so obvious, the conclusion that flows, in the wake of the study I have made, is the vis-a-vis ‘industrial disputes’ at the termination of the settlement as between the workmen and the Corporation the ID Act is a special legislation and the LIC Act a general legislation. Likewise, when compensation on nationalisation is the question, the LIC Act is the special statute. An application of the generalia maxim as expounded by English text books and decisions leaves us in no doubt that the ID Act being special law, prevails over the LIC Act which is but general law. ---”
14. Contention of Employer is that once order of winding up under MCS Act is passed, no permission under Section 25-O of IDA is required and Section 25-O stands repealed impliedly. Union/workers have tried to demonstrate that there is no repugnancy or conflict between two Acts and both need to be read harmoniously and can be complied with simultaneously. In the alternative it is urged that MCS Act is not dealing with industrial dispute or closure and IDA is special enactment for that purpose which has to prevail over MCS Act. Provisions of Section 102 of MCS Act read as under: --
“102. LIQUIDATION:
(1) if the Registrar,
(a) after an inquiry has been held under section 83 or an inspection has been made under section 84 or on the report of the auditor auditing the accounts of the society, or
(b) on receipt of an application made upon a resolution carried by three fourth of the members of a society present at a special general meeting called for the purpose, or
(c) of his own motion, in the case of a society which
(i) has not commenced working, or
(ii) has ceased working or
(iii) possesses shares or members' deposit not exceeding five hundred rupees, or
(iv) has ceased to comply with any conditions as to registration and management in this Act or the rules or the bye laws.
is of the opinion that a society ought to be wound up, he may issue an interim order directing it to be wound up.
(2) A copy of such order made under sub section (1) shall be communicated in the prescribed manner, to the society calling upon it to submit its explanation to the Registrar within a month from the date of the issue of such order, and the Registrar, on giving an opportunity to the society of being heard, may issue a final order, vacating or confirming the interim order.”
The aforesaid provision requires that winding up may be initiated “on receipt of an application made upon a resolution carried by two third members of a society present at the special general meeting called for the purpose” or on his own motion in the case of a society, which has ceased working, the process of winding up can be initiated.”
Above provisions clearly show that said Section does not take into account the closure of Industrial establishment at all. In fact it is a provision which applies to all Cooperative Societies whether having Industrial establishment or not. It does not deal with closure as such of any industry. Proviso to Section 91(1)(e) of MCS Act clarifies that an industrial dispute as defined in clause (k) of section 2 of ida is not deemed to be a dispute for the purposes of Section 91.
There is no dispute between parties that MCS Act springs from legislative entry 32 of List II and IDA springs from entries 22, 24 and 36 of List III. Once it is clear that MCS Act does not deal with industrial disputes at all, the possibility of conflict between the two Acts is completely ruled out. Both the sides however have relied upon Life Insurance Corporation of India v. DJ Bahadur (supra) in support of their respective contentions. In it Hon Apex Court has held that in so far as nationalisation of insurance business is concerned, the Life Insurance Act is a special legislation but said Act has nothing to do with the particular dispute between employer and employees and of investigation and adjudication of such dispute. Life Insurance Corporation's main business is not investigation and adjudication of labour disputes. IDA i.e Industrial Disputes Act is a special statute devoted wholly to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. Therefore, in relation to industrial disputes between employers and workmen IDA is a special statute and the L.I.C Act does not contain any provisions specifically for workmen. The workmen qua workmen and industrial disputes between workmen and the employer as such are beyond the ambit of and have no specific or special place in its scheme. Thus vis a vis “industrial disputes” at the termination of the settlement as between the workmen and the Corporation the Industrial Disputes Act has been held to be a special legislation and the Life Insurance Corporation Act, a general legislation. It is also explained that when compensation on nationalisation is in question, the Life Insurance Corporation Act will be the special statute. In paragraph 29 30 and 31, Hon Apex Court has observed as under: --
“29. Interpretative insight will suffer, even as the judicial focus will blur, if the legislative target is not sharply perceived. Indeed, I lay so much stress on this facet because brother Koshal's otherwise faultless logic has, if I may say so with great deference, failed to convince me because of this fundamental mis-focus. To repeat for emphasis, the meat of the statute is industrial dispute, not conditions of employment or contract of service as such. The line of distinction may be fine but is real.
30. Be that as it may, a bird's eye view of the ID Act reveals the statutory structure and legal engineering centering round dispute settlement in industries according to the rule of law and away from fight with fists or economic blackmail. This large canvas once illumined, may illustrate the sweep, of awards and settlements by reference to the very agreement of 1974 we have before us. It goes far beyond bonus and embraces a wide range of disputes and rainbow of settlements in a spirit of give and take One may visualise the bargaining process. Give in a little on bonus and get a better deal on salary scale or promotion prospects; relent a wee-bit on hours of work but bargain better on housing facilities, and so on. The soul of the statute is not contract of employment, uniformity of service conditions or recruitment rules, but conscionable negotiations, conciliations and adjudications of disputes and differences animated by industrial justice, to avoid a collision which may spell chaos and imperil national effort at increasing the tempo of production.
31. If there is no dispute, the ID Act is out of bounds, while the LIC Act applies generally to all employees from the fattest executive to the frailest manual worker and has no concern with industrial disputes. The former is a ‘war measure’ as it were; the latter is a routine power when swords are not drawn if we may put it metaphorically. When disputes break out or are brewing, a special, sensitive situation fraught with frayed tempers and fighting postures springs into existence, calling for special rules of control, conciliatory machinery, demilitarising strategies and methods of investigation, interim arrangements and final solutions, governed by special criteria for promoting industrial peace and justice. The LIC Act is not a law for employment or disputes arising therefrom, but a nationalisation measure which incidentally, like in any general take-over legislation, provides for recruitment, transfers, promotions and the like. It is special vis-a-vis nationalisation of life insurance but general regarding contracts of employment or acquiring office buildings. Emergency measures are special, for sure. Regular nationalisation statutes are general even if they incidentally refer to conditions of service. ----”
15. The above observations of Hon'ble Apex Court show that IDA applies only when there is industrial dispute. If there is no such dispute and situation is taken care of In it, MCS Act will apply. It is important to note that this Act having Maharashtra Act number XXIV of 1961 has also received the assent of the President of India on 4th May 1961. Its preamble shows that it has been enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to Cooperative societies in State of Maharashtra, for orderly development of Cooperative movement in consonance with directive principles of State policy enunciated in Constitution of India. Its Section 2 contains various definitions while chapter II deals with registration of Cooperative Societies. Section 4 stipulates that the society which have as its object the promotion of the economic interests or general welfare of its members, or of public, in accordance with cooperative principles, or society established with the object of facilitating the operations of any such society, may be registered under MCS Act. The society likely to be economically unsound or registration of which may have adverse effect on development of cooperative movement or is contrary to policy directives of State Government cannot be registered. Section 5 provides that the society may be registered with limited or unlimited liability. Section 6 prescribes conditions of registration and it states that society cannot be ordinarily registered unless it consists of at least ten persons. Section 7 permits State government to exempt any society or class of societies from any requirements of MCS Act as to registration. Section 8 deals with application for registration which has to be accompanied by bylaws while Section 9 deals with registration itself. Section 12 permits registrar to classify societies into one or other of the classes of societies as defined in Section 2. Section 13 and 14 deal with amendment of bylaws while section 15 and 16 deal with change of name of society and change of its liability. Section 17 deals with amalgamation, transfer, Division or conversion of societies and section 18 permits registrar to direct amalgamation, Division and reorganization in public interest. Section 19 deals with reconstruction of societies because of compromise arrangement between society with its creditors or between society and its members. Section 21 deals with cancellation of registration while section 21-A deals with de-registration of societies. Chapter III deals with members, their rights and liabilities. Section 22 points out who can become member, section 23 states that membership has to be open, section 24 points out that there can be nominal, associate and sympathizer member. Section 25 prescribes cessation of membership and Section 25A provides for removal of name of member from membership register. Voting powers of member, restriction on holding of shares and on transfer or charge on share or interest are also dealt with in same chapter. Section 30 deals with transfer of interest on death of a member, section 32 gives right to member to see the books, section 33 deals with liability of past member and of estate of deceased member, section 34 deals with insolvency of members while section 35 deals with expulsion of members. Chapter IV deals with incorporation, duties and privileges of societies. Section 36 stipulates that the registration of society renders it a body corporate in the name with which it is registered with perpetual succession and the common seal. It has also power to acquire, hold and dispose of property, to enter into contracts, to institute and defend suits and other legal proceedings and to do all such things as are necessary for the purpose for which it is constituted. Section 37 states that every society shall have an address registered in accordance with rules to which all notices and communications may be sent. Chapter V deals with State aid to societies and chapter VI deals with property and funds of societies. Chapter VII deals with management of societies and its Section 72 lays down that final authority of every society is with its general body of members. Section 73(1) states that management of every society vests in the committee. Other sections in this chapter deal with elections to societies, motion of no-confidence against officers of societies, disqualifications, reservation for backward tribes/casts on managing committee, reservation for employees and women on such committee. Special provision has been made for conduct of elections of certain type of societies known as specified societies in section 73G while 73H holds committee responsible to conduct elections before expiry of term. Section 74 speaks of qualification and appointment of manager, Secretary and other officers of the society. Section 75 prescribes for annual general meeting while Section 76 prescribes for special general meeting. Section 78 gives power to Registrar to remove entire managing committee or any member thereof and to appoint an Administrator. Section 79 confers power upon registrar to enforce performance of obligations while Section 79-A enables government to give directions to society in public interest. Section 80 enables registrar to seize records of society. Chapter VIII deals with audit, inquiry, inspection and supervision of society and under section 88 enables registrar to recover the amount of damages caused to society by any misapplication or misappropriation from person concerned in accordance with principles of natural justice as prescribes therein. Chapter IX deals with settlement of disputes between society and its members or between members as prescribed in section 91 of mcs act before Cooperative Court constituted under section 91a. section 92 prescribes limitation for filing such dispute while section 94 prescribes procedure therefor. Section 97 provides for appeal before Cooperative Appellate Court. Chapter X deals with winding up of such society. Chapter X A, XI, XI A are the chapters which deal with special type of societies like insured cooperative Bank, agriculture and rural development banks, with elections of committees and officers of specified cooperative society. Chapter XII deals with offences and penalties while chapter XIII prescribes for appeals, review and revisions. Chapter XIII A deals with Maharashtra State cooperative council while chapter XV is miscellaneous chapter. This brief resume shows that MCS Act is special enactment dealing with birth i.e incorporation, life i.e regulation or conduct and death i.e dissolution or liquidation of an artificial person viz. a cooperative society.
16. An industrial dispute as defined in Section 2(k) of IDA is not a dispute for the purposes of section 91 of mcs act. Chapter X dealing with liquidation is a provision made in MCS Act for putting an end to existence of all Cooperative Societies in certain contingencies. It is not even argued that those contingencies are not satisfied in case of present Cooperative Mill in liquidation. Section 104 permits the managing committee or any member of society ordered to be wound up to file appeal to the State Government against a final order of winding up passed under Section 102. Thus right to file appeal is not provided for anybody else including workers. Section 152 providing for a general remedy of appeal against certain orders does not contemplate an appeal against order passed under section 102. section 152a provides an appeal against rejection of nomination paper at election. Section 154 confers revisional powers on State Government and a worker or Union could have availed of this remedy if they were aggrieved by winding up order. These provisions show that an industrial dispute is not even within contemplation while undertaking liquidation proceedings under chapter X of MCS Act. Both the Acts are on entries in different constitutional lists and occupy separate field. It is therefore obvious that there cannot be repugnancy between these provisions and Section 25-O of IDA. Liquidation here is putting an end to the existence of an artificial person i.e Cooperative Mill and not its closure as contemplated by IDA. Liquidation atleast here is not voluntary act of Cooperative Mill. I find it beneficial here to quote paragraphs 32 and 17 of judgment of Hon Apex Court in Vijay Kumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka. Para 17 is already extracted above and paragraph 32 from majority judgments delivered separately is self-explanatory. Paragraph is as under: --
“32. Referring to the case in hand, the Court then stated that there was no question of any inconsistency in the actual terms of the two Acts. The only questions that arose there were whether the Parliament and the State Legislature sought to exercise their powers over the same subject matter or whether the laws enacted by Parliament were intended to be a complete exhaustive code, or in other words, expressly or impliedly evinced an intention to cover the whole field. The Court then, compared the provisions of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, as amended by Act XXVI of 1953, the Essential Commodities Act X of 1955 and the Sugar Control Order 1955 issued thereunder with the U.P Act and Order of 1954 issued by the State Government thereunder. By comparing the impugned State Act with the Central Act of 1951 as amended by the Act, 1953, the Court held that the Central Act related to sugar as a finished product while the State legislation covered the field of sugar cane. Thus the fields of operation of the two legislations were different and hence there was no repugnancy between the central act and the state act. It was also further pointed out there that even assuming that sugar cane was an article or class of articles relatable to the sugar industry within the meaning of Section 18(g) of the Central Act, no order was issued by the Central Government in exercise of the powers vested in it under that Section, and hence no question of repugnancy could ever arise because repugnancy must exist in fact and not depend merely on a possibility. The possibility of an Order under Section 18(g) being issued by the Central Government would not be enough. The existence of such an Order would be the essential prerequisite before any repugnancy could ever arise. ---”.
Employer here is a cooperative society registered under the provisions of MCS Act established with object of running a Spinning Mill in cooperative sector. It is therefore not in dispute that it owes its birth to MCS Act only. Employer Society had only one spinning Mill and Society is under winding up orders as per chapter X of MCS Act. It has been born/created for running a spinning Mill and it is obvious that it cannot continue to live if there is no spinning Mill. It is obvious that when life of employer/society is at peril and jeopardized, Mill which does not have an independent existence, cannot continue. Perusal of interim order of winding up under section 102(1) of mcs act dated 9/5/1996 reveals that the cooperative Mill had lost its share capital completely and was not possessing any funds to meet even day-to-day expenditure. Its loss had accumulated to Rs. 1035 Lakhs plus it had to pay Rs. 600 Lakhs to market. Its machinery was more than 30 years old and had lost its efficiency. This order mentions that Mill was given for being run on conversion basis and because of conversion activity, it was earning Rs. 26 to 27 lakhs per month but expenditure was Rs. 44 to 45 lakhs every month. Thus it was suffering loss of Rs. 21 lakhs per month and was not in position to pay salary of employees every month or to pay their provident fund contribution or ESI contribution. The creditors had filed 56 cases and Co-operative Mill had no funds left to spend on litigation and matters were likely to be decided ex party. The Administrator of the Mill had on 6/5/1996 recommended winding up of the co-operative mill. By this order objections were called for from members of said Mill. Final order of winding up has been passed on 24/6/1996 after noticing all above facts and after noticing that the borrowing capacity of cooperative mill was reduced to zero. There is no challenge to this order either by any of the committee members or then by Union or by workers. The order has thus attained finality. Thus, it cannot be said that circumstances not relevant for consideration in terms of section 102 of mcs act have been taken into account while ordering winding up. Even before this court neither Union nor Workers have assailed this order. Thus competent authority functioning under a valid law has found that artificial person brought into existence is unable to survive and therefore steps were initiated and taken to put an end to that personality. This aspect is to be governed only by MCS Act. There is no provision in IDA which deals with this aspect. ID Act can deal with closure when employer is still available and hence relationship of employer and employee can continue. Where the employer is already dead or incapacitated and hence law is unable to impose any obligations or duties upon him, it is obvious that Section 25-0 of IDA cannot bring back to life such employer and relationship. Perusal of section 25-0(7) of ida shows that in such circumstances, law contemplates grant of exemption by the appropriate government. The legislature has limited such exemption for specific period implying thereby that despite unfortunate event contemplated in said provision, the undertaking or industry is either to be or being continued by some person. In other words, substitute for employer is available to shoulder the responsibility and relationship of master and servant therefore subsists. Section 25-0 of IDA does not regulate dissolution or total elimination of artificial Employer as per law creating it. Hence Section 25 J. or Section 25 S. of IDA are also not applicable here.
17. Permission under Section 25-0 of IDA is contemplated from appropriate government i.e State government. Here, the delegate of State Government has passed the order of winding up. Not only this Asst. Secretary of State Govt. Has already communicated to Director of Textiles that Mill can not be revived. In present circumstances it cannot be said that order of winding up of cooperative mill in any way militates with Section 25-0 of IDA. Similarly, Section 25-0 of IDA cannot be construed at least here as amending the provisions relating to winding up as contained in chapter X of MCS Act. It is apparent that winding up has been ordered not on account of Industrial disputes but as the artificial person was found incapacitated and disabled. This opinion and conclusion of competent authority reached in accordance with law cannot be reopened and an artificial person found unable to survive cannot be directed to be revived as Section 25-0 of IDA does not and cannot deal with aspect of incorporation and end of such artificial person but deals only with closure of industry where, in spite of such closure, employer remains available to answer the legal obligations. Entry No 43 in list I of 7 schedule to the Constitution of India deals with incorporation, regulation and winding up of trading corporations including banking, insurance and financial corporations but not including cooperative societies. Entry 32 in list II i.e State list provides for incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations other than those specified in List I, and universities: unincorporated trading, literacy, scientific, religious and other societies and associations, cooperative societies. Thus employer Cooperative Mill is incorporated under MCS Act which owes its birth to this Entry 32. Entry No 43 in Union List or entry No 97 i.e residuary entry therein therefore cannot be construed to include cooperative societies and hence, question is whether because of any entry in List III, such right to legislate about cooperative society becomes available to Parliament. Entry 22 in list III-- Concurrent List is about Trade unions: industrial and labour disputes. Entry 24 is about welfare of labour including conditions of work, provident funds, employer's liability, workmen's compensation, invalidity and old age pensions and maternity benefits. Entry 36 is about factories. Entry 23 of this list III deals with social security and social insurance: employment and unemployment. Thus, these entries in list III also cannot be stretched to include aspect of incorporation, regulation and winding up of cooperative societies in List III. Reliance upon provisions of Article 254 is therefore misconceived. It is already mentioned above that MCS Act has also received the assent of the President of India on 4 May 1961. The entries in 7 schedule are pointed out by Advocate Thakur while urging that there is no repugnancy and he relied upon M. Karunanidhi v. Union Of India (supra). Advocate Puranik relied upon paragraph 10 of Vijay Kumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka, (supra) to show situations to which Article 254 applies. The necessary reference to the law on the point has already been made earlier.
18. Bombay Metropolitan Transport Corporation Ltd v. Employees of B.M.T.C (CIDCO) (supra) is the judgment of learned Single Judge and petitioner Company therein was having some Labour problems and in February 1984 workers commenced indefinite strike. Hon'ble Chief Ministers then decided in the meeting that petitioner Company should be closed down. Notice of lockout was issued on 3 March 1984 and petitioner applied under Section 25-0 of IDA on 27/3/1984. On 24/5/1984 permission to close was granted and on 21/11/1984. Appellate Industrial Tribunal, after trial allowed appeals against it filed by workers and their union. Writ petition filed against appellate order was dismissed by Division Bench. Company then applied on 30/1/1985 to state government for permission to close down its undertaking, a factory at Turbhe and it pointed out that its liabilities exceeded 4.37 crores and its liquidity was only Rs. 2000/. The factory at Turbhe needs to be noticed because it dispels submission of Advocate Thakur advanced to distinguish the Division Bench judgment in this matter by submitting that the establishment considered by the Hon'ble Division Bench was not industrial establishment under Section 25L of IDA. On 29/3/1985 this permission was rejected by observing that financial incapacity could not be the reason and said reason was in existence even earlier. On 14 March 1986 petition under Section 433(a), (e) and (f) of Companies Act decided by reported judgment came to be filed. Observations therein relevant for controversy before this Court are contained in paragraph 37 and 38 of the report. Contention of interventionist union before Court was that winding up of the Company resulted in closure of Company and under Section 445(3) of Companies Act services of employees were deemed to have been terminated on the passing of winding up order, and as such; there was conflict between provisions of Companies Act and provisions of Section 25-0 of IDA. Said union therefore contended that provisions of IDA would prevail as it was beneficial legislation and it dealt specifically with employer-employee relationship while Companies Act was general law in this respect. Counsel for Transport Company contended that there was no such conflict and in support gave various propositions. The learned Single Judge has in paragraph 38 observed that one of the effects of winding up was closure of an undertaking and if such undertaking is covered by Section 25-L of IDA, there would be conflict between provisions of companies act and IDA. However it has been emphatically observed thereafter that: -
“There is in my mind not the slightest doubt that in such cases the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act will have to prevail. This is not only because the Industrial Disputes Act is a beneficial legislation but also because in respect of relationship between employees and employer it is the legislation which is more special legislation whereas in this respect the Companies Act is merely a general legislation. There is also another reason and that is that in all such cases where the provisions of two acts or two provisions of same act cannot stand together and are in conflict, then the provision which has been legislated latter must always prevail. Section 25-0 of the Industrial Disputes Act as it now stands were introduced in 1976 and it is therefore the latter legislation and for that reason also it must prevail.”
In Appeal from this judgment, Division Bench in case of Bombay Metropolitan Transport Corporation Ltd v. Employees of B.M.T.C (CIDCO) reported at 1991 (II) LLJ 443 took a different view. In paragraph 13, Division Bench noticed that in case of such conflict between provisions of companies act and IDA, if permission to close down the undertaking of Company was required to be taken under provisions of section 25-0 before or after a winding up order is passed, “there would seem to be a subordination of the order of the High Court to the order of the appropriate Government or to make the operation of the former conditional upon the latter.” In paragraph 14, Division Bench accepted the arguments of Company that there was need for harmonious construction and so construed, there was no conflict between the provisions of two statutes and they operated in distinct and separate fields. In paragraph 15 provisions of Section 433, 445, 449 and 481 of Companies Act are considered and in paragraph 16 of report provisions of Section 25-0(1) of IDA are reproduced. Thereafter in paragraph 17 it has been observed by Division Bench as under: --
“17. It will be seen that permission under Section 25-0 is required to be taken when an Employer intends to close down an undertaking of his Industrial establishment. The provision, therefore, applies when the Industrial establishment, excluding the undertaking which is sought to be closed down, is intended to be operated by the employer. It, therefore, contemplates the continued existence of the employer and of the industrial establishment, less the undertaking which is intended to be closed down.”
With this background, Division Bench has made following observations in paragraph 18: -
“18. On the other hand, an order for winding up a company commences the process of winding it up at the hands of the Official Liquidator and it operates eventually to dissolve the Company. As and from the date of the order, the company ceases to do business. Where the company is an industrial establishment that establishment ceases to function upon the passing of the winding up order. The winding up order is deemed to be a notice of discharge of the officers and employees of the company. The services of the employees, therefore, come to an end by operation of law.”
In present matter, Liquidator appointed under section 102 of mcs act has continued manufacturing activity of Employer Mills for some time as per Section 105(1)(b). The Division Bench has made following observations about such continuation in paragraph 19: --
“19. It is true, as Mr Ganguly pointed out, that the Liquidator is empowered to carry on business of the company, but this is only as Section 457(1)(b) states, so far as may be necessary for the beneficial winding up of the company. If it is found by the Liquidator and by the High Court under whose supervision he functions that to carry on the business would be beneficial to the winding up of the company, then the Liquidator maybe authorised to carry on the business for this purpose and until it is achieved. Such carrying on of the business of the company is subsequent to the order of winding up and subject to it. Even in such circumstances, there would be no question of permission under Section 25 0 being required to close down.”
The appeal was therefore allowed by Division Bench and judgment and order of learned Single Judge has been set aside. Thus the view of Hon. D.B also shows that dissolution of artificial employer i.e Company is separate field in which Section 25-0(1) of the IDA does not operate.
19. AIR 2004 S.C 989=2004 (1) CLR 308 - “Hindalco Industries Ltd v. Union of India” is relied upon by Advocate Thakur to stress that “intention” is not the requirement of section 25-0(1) of ida. The observations of Hon'ble Apex Court reveal the following situation:--
“5. Section 25-O states that if an employer intends to close down an undertaking of an industrial establishment, he shall seek permission at least ninety days before the date of intended closure is to become effective. The reason for the intended closure also should be given in detail and the copy of such application shall be served on the representatives of the workmen in the prescribed manner. The contention of the appellant that S. 25-O would apply only to a voluntary and intended closure of an undertaking is without any force. If the undertaking of an industrial establishment is to be closed for reasons beyond the control of the employer, provisions have been made under sub-section (7) of S. 25-O of the I.D Act. In the present case, the appellant was asked to stop the mining activities in the forest land by the Divisional Forest Officer by letter dated 24 July, 1993. This letter does not say that the mining activity shall be closed immediately or with effect from any particular date. The appellant was asked to produce map and other relevant records within a period of 5 days and it is important to note that the appellant declared lay off on 31st July, 1993 itself and according to the appellant, the mines were closed on 19 August, 1993. In the letter dated 24 July, 1993, it is stated that the decision would be taken after the receipt of the records from the appellant. No order has been produced by the appellant to show from which date the mining operations were directed to be stopped by the forest authorities. The appellant has also not produced any other documents. From these facts also it is not very clear whether the appellant was disabled from obtaining prior permission of the first respondent at least ninety days before the date of closure of the mining operations.
8. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, the plea of the appellant that S. 25-O of the I.D Act applies to only planned and intended closure by the employer is devoid of merits and S. 25-O of the I.D Act will govern the situation. We find no error of jurisdiction or illegality in the impugned judgment. The appeal is without any merits and is dismissed. If the workers are not so far paid their due compensation, the appellant shall pay the same within a period of two months.”
The Hon'ble Apex Court therefore on facts found that the employer before it could not justify his stand. In present facts the order of winding up has reached finality in terms of MCS Act and it has been found that there is no scope to apply section 25-0(1) of ida which does not regulate said liquidation. The ruling therefore has no application here.
20. In Mrs. Sadashiv K. Sutar v. Kolhapur Zilla Janta Sahkari Bank ltd. (supra), the learned Single Judge has observed :--
“7. The learned Single Judge in Amravati Growers Cooperative Spinning Mills Ltd. v. Sheshrao K. Ingle (supra), after taking into consideration the ruling of Federal Court in Governor General in Council v. Shriomani Sugar Mills Limited, reported in A.I.R 1946 (33) Federal Court 16, and after taking note of the provisions of section 171 of the Companies Act, 1913, wherein similar provision is to be found with the expression “other legal proceedings” and which was the subject matter of interpretation in the said Shriomani Sugar Mills's case (supra), and relying upon the same, has interpreted the expression “other legal proceedings” in section 107 of the Co-operative Societies Act to include the proceedings under MRTU & PULP Act. The contention of the learned Advocate for the employee that the I.D Act is a special law and, therefore, will have overriding effect in relation to the provisions of section 107 of the Cooperative Societies Act cannot be accepted, and I do not find any justification to take the view different from the one taken by the learned Single Judge in Amravati Grower's case (supra). Infact, the finding about the non-exclusion of the proceedings under the MRTU & PULP Act from the expression “other legal proceedings” under section 107 of the Co-operative Societies Act has been arrived at after detail analysis of the provisions of law contained in both the statutes and there is no justification to take a different view in the matter. Being so, the learned Advocate for the bank is justified in contending that in the absence of leave of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, the Industrial Court or for that matter even the Labour Court could not have proceeded with the proceedings in the complaint initiated by Sutar. Apparently, the exercise of the Industrial Court is without jurisdiction for the reasons stated above. This itself is infact sufficient to dispose of the petitions by setting aside the impugned orders.
8. The learned Advocate for the bank is also justified in contending that once the proceedings for winding up had commenced, the question of retrenchment of the employee could not arise and it would be a case of closure of the undertaking. He is justified in that connection in drawing the attention to the decision of the Division Bench of Kerala High Court wherein, it was observed thus:
“The second objection is that the learned Judge should not have confined the compensation for termination of employment to a maximum of average pay for three months under the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act. The contention is that the winding up of the bank was not due to unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the directors, because the winding up order itself shows that there was mismanagement which necessitated the winding up. As pointed out by our learned brother, the argument has no force whatsoever. The closing down of the bank was something imposed on it by the order of the High Court and was, therefore, on account of unavoidable circumstances beyond its control. It was, in fact, in spite of and overruling objections against winding up. The question that it was misconduct or mismanagement that brought about the winding up is not relevant to the consideration whether the closing down was imposed on it by the Court. We agree with Raman Nair, J., that unless the order of the Court was obtained by collusion or fraud, every case of closure following an adjudication in insolvency or a compulsory winding up must necessarily come within the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 25-FFF. There is thus no substance in this objection either.”
This judgment shows that the provisions of MCS Act pertaining to winding up have been recognised as special law qua M.R.T.U & P.U.L.P Act or IDA. It also relies upon Division Bench judgment of Hon'ble Kerala High Court. I do not find any reason to differ with said view as law giving birth or life and death to artificial personality will have to be treated at least here as Special law. Effort of Advocate Thakur to point out provisions of companies act or constitutional status of High Court qua the matter of winding up of a company, impossibility of State sitting over such High Court order under the scheme of Section 25-O IDA and reliance upon Section 167 MCS Act to demonstrate that Companies Act is not applicable to cooperative societies are without any substance.
21. Advocate Thakur has contended that winding up or liquidation of Cooperative Mills is not complete till its certificate of registration is cancelled under section 21 of mcs act. He also harps on the fact that maximum possible period of 10 years has already expired. According to him as liquidation is not over, it can not now continue and the Cooperative Mills stands restored back. As such, challenge by liquidator has become infructuous. section 102 of mcs act is already reproduced above and other relevant provisions are as under:--
“103. (1) When an interim order is passed under the last preceding section or a final order is passed under that Section, for the winding up of a society, the Registrar may, in accordance with the rules, appoint a person to be Liquidator of the society, and fix his remuneration.
(2) On issue of the interim order, the officers of the society shall hand over to the Liquidator the custody and control of all the property, effects and actionable claims to which the society is or appears to be entitled, and of all books records and other documents pertaining to the business of the society and, shall have no access to any of them.
(3) * * * * * * * * * * * * *
(4) * * * * * * * * * * * * *
(5) The whole of the assets of the society shall on the appointment of Liquidator under section vest in such Liquidator, and notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if any immovable property is held by a Liquidator on behalf of the society, the title over the land shall be complete as soon as the mutation of the name of his office is effected, and no Court shall question the title on the ground of dispossession, want of possession or physical delivery of possession.
(6) In the event of the interim order vacated, the person appointed as Liquidator shall hand over the property, effects and actionable claims and books, records and other documents of the society to the officers who had delivered the same to him. The acts done, and the proceedings taken by Liquidator, shall be binding on the society, and such proceedings shall, after the interim order has been cancelled under the preceding section, be continued by the officers of the society.”
(104). (1) The committee or any member of the society ordered to be wound up, may, within two months from the date of the issue of the order made under Section 102, appeal to the State Government.
Provided that no appeal shall lie against an order issued under sub-clause (i), (ii) and (iii) of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 102.
(2) * * * * * * * * * * * * *
S.105 Powers of Liquidator
(1) The Liquidator appointed under section 103 shall have power, subject to the rules and the general supervision, control and direction of the Registrar. -
(a) to institute and defend any suit and other legal proceedings, Civil or criminal, on behalf of the society, in the name of his office;
(b) to carry on the business of society, so far as may be necessary for the beneficial winding up of the same;
(c) to sell the immovable and movable property and actionable claims of the society by public auction or private contract, with power to transfer the whole or part thereof to any person or body corporate, or sell the same in parcels;
(c-i) to transfer by sale assets valued at market price to society registered with similar objects or to Government undertaking which carries on the same business as of the society under liquidation:
(c-ii) to lease to other societies or to Government undertaking with prior approval of the Registrar, the property of the society to run the same business as that of the society under liquidation:
(d) to raise, on the security of the assets of the society, any money required
(e) to investigate all claims against the society and, subject to the provisions of the Act, to decide questions of, priority arising out of such claims, and to pay any class or classes of creditors in full or rateable according to the amount of such debts, the surplus being applied in payment of interest from the date of liquidation at a rate to be approved by the Registrar, but not exceeding the contract rates;
(f) to make any compromise or arrangement with creditors or persons claiming to be creditors or having or alleging themselves to have any claims, present or future, whereby the society may be rendered liable;
(g) to compromise all calls or liabilities to calls and debts and liabilities capable or resulting in debts, and all claims present or future, certain or contingent, subsisting or supposed to subsist between the society and a contributory or alleged contributory or other debtor or person apprehending liability to the society, and all questions in any way relating to or affecting the assets or the winding up of the society, on such terms as may be agreed, and take any security for the discharge of any such call, liability, debt, or claim, and give a complete discharge in respect thereof;
(h) to determine, from time to time, after giving an opportunity to answer the claim, the contribution to be made or remaining to be made by the members or past members or by the estates, nominees, heir or legal representatives or deceased members, or by any officer, past officer or the assets of the society, such contribution being inclusive of debts due from such members or officers;
(l) to fix the time or times within which the creditors shall prove their debts and claims or be included for the benefit of any distribution made before those debts or claims are proved;
(m) to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and to compel the production of any books, accounts, documents, securities, cash or other properties belonging to or in the custody of the society by the same means and in the same manner as is provided in the case of a Civil Court under Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908.
106. After expiry of the period for appeal against the order made under sub-section (1) of Section 102 or where the appeal has been dismissed, the order for winding up shall be effective and shall operate in favour of all the creditors and of all the contributories of the society, as if it had been made on the joint petition of creditors land contributories. When a winding up order becomes effective, the Liquidator shall proceed to realise the assets of the society by sale or otherwise, and no dispute shall be commenced or, if pending at the date of the winding up order, shall be proceeded with, against the society, except by leave of the Registrar and subject to such terms as the Registrar may impose. The Registrar, may of his opinion, however, entertain or dispose of any dispute by or against the society.”
Section 109 deals with the termination of liquidation proceedings.
Section 110 as also Rule 90 deals with disposal of surplus assets as shown in his final report by the Liquidator. Rule 91 is the provision for grant of interest to the creditor on amounts due from a society under liquidation.
22. Section 103 therefore provides for automatic vacation of their elective offices by the Office bearers and handing over of entire records of the Cooperative Society to the liquidator. It also provides for vesting of all property of Society in liquidator. Thus liquidator whose only duty is to realise the assets of the Society is placed at the helm of the affairs by the legislature and if he finds continuation of manufacturing activity of Society beneficial to achieve this obligation, he can continue it. But then that does not mean continuation of Society as such because the beneficial running is with same object and after winding up order is passed only work left is to attempt to recover the assets of the Society and desire to revive Society can not be read into these provisions. Provisions like section 78 exist in mcs act which enable Registrar to appoint an Administrator where there are charges of malfeasance or misfeasance against the elected management. Once order of winding up is passed and it has become final, Liquidator appointed thereunder is not authorised to and is not expected by legislature to discharge the role of Administrator. Reliance upon chapter V dealing with State aid to Societies of MCS Act is therefore misconceived here. The consequences contemplated by Section 103(2) and (3) ensue and powers of Liquidator specified in Section 105 can be exercised by Liquidator. It is to be noted that general body of the society ceases to exercise any powers. The order operates in favour of all creditors and all contributories of Cooperative Society and it is presumed to have been made on joint petition of the creditors and contributories. The termination of liquidation proceedings is contemplated in section 109. Cancellation of registration of Cooperative society is prescribed in Section 21. Both these provisions are as under: --
Section 109. Termination of liquidation proceedings.
(1) The winding up proceedings of a society shall be closed as soon as practicable within six years from the date the Liquidator takes over the custody or control of all property, effects and actionable claims to which the society is or appears to be entitled and of all books, records and other documents pertaining to the business of society under sub section (2) of Section 103 unless the period in extended by the Registrar:
Provided that, the Registrar shall not grant any extension for a period exceeding one-year at a time and 4 years in aggregate and shall, immediately after the expiry of 10 years from the date aforesaid, deem that liquidation proceedings have been terminated, and pass an order terminating the liquidation proceedings.
Explanation -- -- In the case of society which is under liquidation at the commencement of the Maharashtra Cooperative Society is (Second Amendment) Act, 1985 the period of six years shall be deemed to have commenced from the date on which the Liquidator took over the custody or control as aforesaid.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-section, the Registrar shall terminate the liquidation proceedings on receipt of the final report from the Liquidator. The final report of the Liquidator shall state that the liquidation proceedings of the society have been closed, and how the winding up has been conducted and the property of and the claims of the society have been disposed of, and shall include a statement showing a summary of the account of the winding up including the cost of liquidation, the amount (if any), standing to the credit of the society in liquidation, after paying of its liabilities including the share or interest of members, and suggest how the surplus should be utilised.
(3) The Registrar, on receipt of the final report from the Liquidator, shall direct the Liquidator to convene a general meeting of the members of the society for recording his final report.
Section 21: -- Cancellation of registration.
The Registrar shall make an order cancelling registration of a society if it transfers the whole of its assets and liabilities to another society, or amalgamates with another society, or divides itself into two or more societies or if it's affairs are wound up or it is de-registered under the provisions of sub section (1) of Section 21 A or winding up proceedings in respect of the society are closed or terminated under section 109.
The society shall, from the date of such order of cancellation, the deemed to be dissolved and shall cease to exist as a corporate body.”
Sections above clearly show that legislature has after expiry of period of 10 years created deeming fiction and winding up proceedings must come to an end and terminate after 10 years. Obligation has been cast upon Registrar to pass order terminating the proceedings by proviso to sub section (1) of Section 109. On receipt of final report from Liquidator at any time before said period, Registrar has to pass an order terminating the liquidation proceedings and sub section (2) for that purpose opens with non-obstante Clause. Section 21 orders cancellation of registration after termination of winding up as per section 109. Said termination may be under sub section (1) or (2) of Section 109. The legislature therefore has not made provision for reinstatement of Society after expiry of period of 10 years. It is obvious that after unseating the elected body, taking custody of records and documents of society and vesting the property in Liquidator, when Liquidator proceeds to realise the assets; the situation becomes irreversible. The legislature therefore has provided a deeming fiction when within period of 10 years the affairs of society cannot be wound up. There is no challenge to these provisions in present matter and it is therefore clear that after winding up is ordered and Liquidator proceeds to realise the assets of society, the society is incapable of incurring any fresh liabilities. In present Writ Petitions, Advocate Puranik has pointed out that in exercise of its powers under Section 157, Government has given time till 8/5/2009 to Liquidator to complete the proceedings by exempting him from operation of section 109(1) of mcs act. He has produced that order on record. There is no challenge even to this exemption or extension. The contention of Union about continuation of Society till the actual cancellation of its registration is therefore misconceived in law and, in any case also on facts because of the extension to Liquidator till 8/5/2009. Liquidator's act of issuing employees certificates about their continuation in or retirement from employment does not create any relationship of employer and employee between him and such employee as legal provisions do not contemplate it at all.
23. The permission under Section 107 was declined by Registrar and it has been granted in Revision in exercise of powers under section 154 by State Government on 8/8/2000. The revisional order grants permission to institute proceedings against Liquidator about wages and other dues of workers. It does not qualify wage claim by mentioning any period for which such claim could be made. The permission is given to Representative Union and Employer/management or then Liquidator have not challenged this permission. The provision for permission under Section 107 is made for administrative reasons and not to defeat the legal rights of anybody. The permission granted therefore is also for individual claims which form subject matter of Writ Petition No. 3277/2008. No restriction on limitation of any time period can be read into this order of government and challenge thereto either on the ground that permission was for limited period or was for employees represented by Union and not for individuals is therefore misconceived. Reliance upon (2006) 1 SCC 638 - Sarat Chandra Mishra v. State of Orissa, is unnecessary because here it cannot be said that State Government has acted contrary to law while granting such permission. It also cannot be said that the Industrial Court has granted more or larger relief than claimed and reliance upon Rajendra Tiwary v. Basudeo Prasad (supra) for that purpose is uncalled for. Similarly it is not the case of anybody that Union had filed proceedings for Respondents in Writ Petition No. 3277/2008 and therefore, it cannot be said that Representative Union had appeared and acted for said Respondents also. Respondents filed more than 117 individual U.L.P complaints for demanding their monthly wage under item 9 of Schedule IV of M.R.T.U & P.U.L.P Act, 1971 (Act No I of 1972). Such individual approach is not prohibited by Section 21 thereof. Objection of Liquidator on these lines therefore deserves to be rejected.
24. In Writ Petition No. 4295/2006, through oral and documentary evidence the quantum or exact entitlement of each individual worker has not been proved by the Union on record and the Learned Member of Industrial Court could not have quantified that entitlement. The correctness of calculations and charts produced as Annexure F. & G i.e Exhibits 117 and 118 before Industrial Court has not been established as required. None of the workers or person actually calculating their dues or representative of Union having personal knowledge in this respect was examined before Industrial Court. Shri Dekate who deposed about the alleged charts or calculation (at Annexure F & G) had no knowledge of individual claims or facts. Cross-examination of Shri Dekate shows that he could not explain said calculations or entitlement. He did not produce wage-cards of individual employees in support of calculations shown in chart. He therefore could not prove contents of these charts. Annexures F & G shows that substitutes i.e badli workers who could not have worked for all 26 days in a month are shown to have worked accordingly for entire month. Merely marking these documents as exhibit is not sufficient to read its contents. The person who prepared the document or did the calculation work, the basis for such calculations ought to have been produced by Union. Hence, Industrial Court had rightly not relied upon these documents.
25. In conclusion I find that the learned member of the Industrial Court did not consider the legal issues involved in the matter. Thus there is error apparent in the matter which has resulted in exercise of jurisdiction not otherwise available to it. The relationship as employer and employee ceased to exist after passing of order of winding up and in any case after 8/10/1996 when beneficial running of Mills was rendered impossible. The direction to pay salary and claims for period subsequent to 8/10/1996 is therefore unsustainable. Writ Petitions filed by the Liquidator vide Writ Petition No. 3234/2006 and Writ Petition No. 3277/2008 are hereby partly allowed. Impugned order of Industrial Court dated 23/3/2006 in ULP Compl. 1044/2000, in so far as it grants wages and other benefits for period subsequent to 8/10/1996, is hereby quashed and said ULP Complaint is dismissed. Judgment dated 19/4/2008 delivered by Member, Industrial Court, Nagpur in Complaint (ULP) Nos. 242, 244, 245, 247, 248, 250, 251, 253, 255, 257, 258, 260, 261, 262, 286, 287, 289, 293, 294, 295, 296, 298, 300, 302, 304, 305, 306, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 316, 318, 319, 321, 322, 323, 328, 331, 333, 336, 340, 341, 342, 344, 349, 351, 353, 355, 356, 357, 358, 367, 369, 370, 371, 375, 377, 379, 382, 383, 384, 386, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 399, 401, 408, 409, 410, 411, 414, 415, 416, 429, 432, 433, 436, 437, 438, 444, 445, 448, 451, 453, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 465, 469, 486, 488, 490, 505, 510, 511, 512, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 525 and 526 of 2005, in so far as it grants wages and other benefits for period subsequent to 8/10/1996, is hereby quashed and said ULP Complaints are also dismissed. Writ Petition No. 4295 of 2006 filed by Union is dismissed.
However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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