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  • Article 142 of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908,
  • Article 142 of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act.
  • Articles 142 and 144 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908,
  • Article 142 or Article 144 of the Limitation Act
  • Article 142 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.
  • Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908:33.
  • Article 142 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • Articles 142 and 144 of the Existing Act
  • Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908
  • Article 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908
  • Article 142 or Art, 144, Limitation Act.
  • Article 64 of the Limitation Act, 1963
  • Article 144 of the Limitation Act.24.
  • Limitation Act of 1963. Articles 64
  • Article 142 of the Limitation Act
  • Article 144 of the Limitation Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Article 142 of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908,
  • Article 142 of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act.
  • Articles 142 and 144 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908,
  • Article 142 or Article 144 of the Limitation Act
  • Article 142 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.
  • Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908:33.
  • Article 142 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • Articles 142 and 144 of the Existing Act
  • Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908
  • Article 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908
  • Article 142 or Art, 144, Limitation Act.
  • Article 64 of the Limitation Act, 1963
  • Article 144 of the Limitation Act.24.
  • Limitation Act of 1963. Articles 64
  • Article 142 of the Limitation Act
  • Article 144 of the Limitation Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs (original owners/purchasers) filed suit for possession of a house and recovery of Rs. 540 as mesne profits. The relevant property history in the plaint was: the house originally belonged to Narayan Paikaji Gurao; on his death it was inherited by his wife Gaurabai who sold it to Mannulal in 1925; Mannulal remained in possession and had the house constructed in 1936; a consent deed by Maina (sister of Narayan) dated 4-10-1925 was produced; Mannulal sold the house to the plaintiffs on 20-11-1958. At the time of that sale the defendant was in possession, either with Gaurabai's consent or as a tenant.

After purchase the plaintiffs sought the Rent Controller's permission to terminate the defendant's tenancy and obtained permission. The plaintiffs then filed Civil Suit No. 1014-A of 1959 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division; that suit was dismissed on 25-6-1960, and an appeal (Civil Appeal No. 128-A of 1960) against that order was dismissed as well. Thereafter the plaintiffs instituted the present suit on 7-12-1961 based on title (for possession and mesne profits).

At trial the defendant denied the plaintiffs' title and, while not framing limitation formally, asserted continuous possession for more than 25 years (adverse possession). The trial Court concluded that the plaintiffs had proved title and decreed their claim. The defendant appealed; the Second Extra Assistant Judge, Nagpur, allowed the appeal on limitation grounds, holding the suit governed by Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908, and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. The present second appeal was filed by the plaintiffs against that appellate judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs' suit is governed by Article 142 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (suits for possession where plaintiff, while in possession, has been dispossessed or discontinued possession) or by Article 144 (residuary article for possession not otherwise provided for).
  2. Whether the plaint contains an allegation of dispossession or discontinuance of possession such that Article 142 is attracted.
  3. Whether a prior failure to prove tenancy (in earlier proceedings) amounts to an admission or proof of discontinuance/dispossession for the purposes of limitation.
  4. Admissibility and effect of Ex. 54 (a declaration by the defendant to the Nagpur Municipal Corporation dated 26-4-1952, stating he was a tenant paying rent) for limitation and possession issues.
  5. Whether the defendant should be given a fresh opportunity (remand) to prove adverse possession if Article 144 is held to apply.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments — Shri V.R. Manohar

  • The first appellate Judge erred in holding Article 142 governs the suit; the plaintiffs' action is a suit for possession based on title, not a suit alleging dispossession or discontinuance.
  • The plaint contains no allegations of dispossession or discontinuance; therefore Article 142 does not apply and Article 144 should govern.
  • “Dispossession” and “discontinuance” are physical events (ouster or voluntary abandonment) and cannot be inferred from mere failure to prove tenancy; such facts must be alleged or proved.
  • Relied on Supreme Court and High Court authorities (including Mt. Murti Dasadhin, AIR 1965 SC 875; other SC decisions) to support the submission that Article 144 applies where no dispossession/discontinuance is pleaded.
  • Ex. 54 (defendant's municipal declaration of tenancy dated 26-4-1952) is admissible in evidence as a proved admission and establishes that the defendant was in permissive possession until at least 1952—thus, even if Article 142 were to apply, the suit would be within time.

Respondent's (Defendant's) Arguments — Shri K.G. Chendke

  • The plaint, properly construed, admits or amounts to discontinuance of possession: plaintiffs previously alleged tenancy and failed to prove it; that pleading and failure should be treated as discontinuance or dispossession.
  • Because plaintiffs had alleged tenancy and failed to prove it in earlier proceedings, discontinuance of possession must be taken to have occurred when the defendant was allegedly inducted into the house.
  • Ex. 54 is inadmissible (or should not be relied upon) because it contradicts the finding in the prior suit where it was held that the defendant was not proved to be the plaintiffs' tenant; evidence contradicting that earlier finding should not be admitted even for collateral purposes.
  • Relied on a number of High Court decisions (including the Mysore Full Bench decision in Lingamma v. Putte Gowda) supporting the position that failure to prove tenancy can amount to an admission of discontinuance and hence Article 142 can apply.
  • Sought, if Article 144 were held to apply, a remand to the trial Court to permit the defendant to prove adverse possession afresh.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mt. Murti Dasadhin v. Mohammad Mir Khan, AIR 1965 SC 875 Where plaint does not allege dispossession or discontinuance, Article 144 (not Article 142) applies. The Court relied on para 10 of this decision to support that an absence of allegations of dispossession makes Article 144 applicable rather than Article 142.
AIR 1967 SC 487 Principle (as cited): where possession was permissive originally, Article 144 applies, not Article 142. Counsel relied on observations in para 16 of this decision; the opinion treats it as supporting the view that permissive possession excludes Article 142.
Shivagonda v. Rudragonda, (1969) 3 SCC 211 : AIR 1970 SC 453 Article 142 does not apply where suit is not on ground of dispossession but against a person not entitled to possession. Used to reinforce the principle that Article 142 has no application where suit is a title suit and not a suit for dispossession.
Meherban Lalli v. Yusufkhan Kallu, AIR 1939 Nag 7 Authority relied upon to argue that failure to prove tenancy does not equal discontinuance of possession. Cited by counsel for plaintiffs; the opinion records it as supporting the proposition but does not extract further detail.
Sulaiman v. Dawood Khan Sahib, AIR 1935 Mad 754 Authority cited in support of the plaintiffs' contention regarding tenancy proof and discontinuance. Recorded as relied upon by counsel; the Court noted it among authorities supporting the plaintiffs' view.
Mt. Maluk Zadi v. Mt. Anwar Sultan, AIR 1950 Pesh 31 Cited for the proposition that failure to prove tenancy does not necessarily amount to discontinuance. Included among cases relied on by plaintiffs' counsel; the opinion records the reliance without further exposition.
Qadir Bux v. Ramchand, AIR 1970 All 289 (Full Bench) Full Bench resume: distinction between dispossession/discontinuance and adverse possession; where plaintiff pleads tenancy and fails to prove it Article 142 will not apply and Article 144 will govern. The Court treated this Full Bench decision as laying down the correct law on the subject and relied upon its reasoning (paras 10,11 and 30 quoted) to hold Article 144 applicable.
Gurbinder Singh v. Lalsingh, AIR 1965 SC 1553 Principle: owner’s possession is deemed to revive if a trespasser abandons possession before perfecting adverse possession. Quoted in the discussion to show that discontinuance cannot be assumed and that wrongful possession cannot be imputed to the true owner without proof.
Gangoobai v. Soni, 1942 Nag LJ 99 Cited by respondent as authority supporting his position. Mentioned among cases relied upon by respondent; the opinion does not elaborate a specific rule drawn from it.
Official Receiver of East Godavari v. Chava Govindaraju, AIR 1940 Mad 798 Madras Full Bench authority considered in arguments about applicability of Articles 142/144. Referred to by the Court and counsel; the Court noted distinctions in facts from some reported cases when discussing their applicability.
Beharilal v. Narain Das, AIR 1935 Lah 475 (Full Bench) Cited among earlier authorities concerning limitation and possession issues. Referred to in the judgment's survey of authority; the opinion notes its consideration but does not extract an independent rule beyond what is quoted.
Premeswar Das v. Madhab Chandra Das, AIR 1950 Assam 55 Cited by respondent. Listed among cases relied on by respondent; the opinion records the citation without detailed application.
Venkiteswara Iyer v. Chariyathu, AIR 1957 Trav Co 223 Cited by respondent as persuasive authority. Included in the list of authorities relied upon by respondent; the opinion does not separately analyze it.
Lingamma v. Putte Gowda, AIR 1963 Mys 1 (Full Bench) Mysore Full Bench view: where plaintiff pleads permissive possession and fails to prove it, that failure may amount to discontinuance and attract Article 142. The Court considered the Mysore Full Bench view (paras 3, 10, 11 quoted) but ultimately preferred the view of the Allahabad Full Bench (AIR 1970 All 289) and declined to adopt the Mysore Full Bench approach here.
Adhikarimayum v. Heikrujam Tombi Singh, AIR 1973 Gauhati 38 Cited by respondent. Listed among respondent’s authorities; the opinion records citation without detailed application.
Nam Suindu v. Krishna Shindu, AIR 1938 Bom 210 This Court's earlier exposition that Article 142 is restricted to suits based on prior possession lost by dispossession; Article 144 is residuary for title-based suits. The Court relied on this Court's earlier decision to support the distinction between Article 142 (possessory suits) and Article 144 (title suits lacking dispossession allegations).
Bharat Singh v. Mst. Bhagirathi, AIR 1966 SC 405 Admissibility of proved admissions in evidence. The Court relied on this Supreme Court authority to hold Ex. 54 admissible as a proved admission by the defendant to the Municipal Corporation.
Sher Khan v. State, AIR 1958 All 733 Principle that subsequent legislation on the same subject may be looked at to interpret an earlier ambiguous statute. Referred to in the discussion of using the Limitation Act, 1963, to inform the construction of Articles 142/144 of the 1908 Act.
Cape Brandy Syndicate v. I.R.C., (1921) 2 KB 403 English authority on using subsequent legislation to interpret earlier ambiguous legislation. Quoted in support of the methodological approach of using the 1963 Limitation Act to clarify the meaning of Articles 142/144 of the 1908 Act.
Attorney General v. Clarkson, 1900 QB 156 Referenced as part of the authority for looking to subsequent legislation to interpret earlier statutes. Used in the statutory interpretation discussion (as cited in the judgment); the opinion relied on this principle in referring to later Limitation Act provisions.
Ormond Investment Co. v. Betts, (1928) AC 143 Cited in the context of legislative interpretation principles. Referred to as part of authorities supporting the approach of consulting subsequent legislation for interpreting earlier ambiguous provisions.
Faki Abdulla v. Babaji Gangaji, (1890) ILR 14 Bom 458 Historical dictum regarding possession following title and distinction between Articles. Quoted in Nam Suindu and referenced to support the traditional distinction between possessory and title suits under limitation rules.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a structured way, confined to the facts and law in the record:

  1. Statutory framework: The Court reproduced Articles 142 and 144 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (text of both articles quoted). Article 142 applies to suits for possession where the plaintiff, while in possession, has been dispossessed or discontinued possession (12 years from date of dispossession/discontinuance). Article 144 is the residuary provision (12 years from when the defendant's possession becomes adverse).
  2. Counsel submissions: The Court summarized counsel for plaintiffs (Manohar) who said no dispossession/discontinuance was pleaded and that the suit is a title suit, and counsel for respondent (Chendke) who argued the plaint amounted to discontinuance given prior proceedings and failure to establish tenancy.
  3. Survey of authorities: The Court reviewed a range of Supreme Court and High Court decisions. It highlighted the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court (Qadir Bux v. Ramchand, AIR 1970 All 289) as setting out a clear résumé of the law: a distinction exists between mere dispossession/discontinuance and adverse possession; the plaintiff starts with presumption of possession with title; if plaintiff admits dispossession or it is proved, the plaintiff must prove the date of dispossession/discontinuance within 12 years (Article 142); otherwise Article 144 (adverse possession) applies. The Court considered the Mysore Full Bench (Lingamma) and other contrary authorities but concluded the Allahabad Full Bench laid down the correct law.
  4. Application to facts: The Court found that the plaint did not allege dispossession or discontinuance. The mere fact that plaintiffs had earlier alleged tenancy and failed to prove it in prior proceedings did not amount to an admission or proof that they had discontinued possession or intended to abandon title. Discontinuance implies a voluntary abandonment of possession with intention, and that cannot be assumed from a mere failure of proof.
  5. Admissibility and effect of Ex. 54: The Court accepted the trial Court's finding that Ex. 54 (defendant's declaration to Municipal Corporation dated 26-4-1952 stating he was a tenant paying Rs. 5/month) had been duly proved by the Assessment Inspector (P.W.4). Relying on Bharat Singh v. Mst. Bhagirathi (AIR 1966 SC 405), the Court held that proved admissions are admissible in evidence. The Court therefore held Ex. 54 established that the defendant admitted permissive possession until 1952.
  6. Limitation consequences: Because the defendant admitted permissive possession until 1952, even if Article 142 were to apply the starting point for limitation would not be earlier than that declaration date, and the suit was within time. Nevertheless, the Court concluded Article 144 (the residuary article) properly applied because the suit was based on title without pleaded dispossession or discontinuance.
  7. Remand/remedy on adverse possession plea: The defendant had alleged adverse possession in para 15 of the written statement but had not proved it. At the appellate stage it was conceded that if Article 144 applied the defendant had no case. The Court refused a remand for further proof of adverse possession because the defendant had ample opportunity to prove the plea earlier, and Ex. 54 showed permissive possession until 1952; on these facts a remand would not serve a useful purpose.
  8. Statutory interpretation: The Court invoked the principle that subsequent legislation may be used to interpret ambiguous earlier statutes and examined the Limitation Act, 1963 (Article 64 replacing Article 142) and its Notes. The 1963 provision (Article 64) clarified that the equivalent article covers only suits based on previous possession and not on title—supporting the Court's construction that Article 142 of the 1908 Act should not be applied to pure title suits.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL ALLOWED; the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court (Second Extra Assistant Judge, Nagpur) dated 19-2-1964 is set aside, and the judgment and decree of the trial Court (Sixth Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nagpur dated 11-1-1963 in Regular Civil Suit No. 838 of 1961) is restored.

Immediate consequences and orders (as expressly recorded in the opinion):

  • The plaintiffs' second appeal is allowed and their trial decree for possession (and related relief) is restored.
  • The cross-objection is dismissed.
  • There will be no order as to costs.
  • Leave to file LPA (orally prayed for) was refused.

Broader implications: The Court adopted the view (consistent with the Allahabad Full Bench and certain Supreme Court decisions) that a suit based on title, with no pleaded or proved dispossession/discontinuance, falls under the residuary Article (Article 144) rather than Article 142. The Court also confirmed that proved admissions (such as Ex. 54) are admissible and may affect the limitation calculation. The opinion did not purport to lay down a novel principle of law beyond its application of existing authorities to these facts.

    Madhao Pandurang And Another v. Yeshwant .

    1. This is a second appeal filed by the original plaintiffs against the judgment of the Second Extra Assistant Judge, Nagpur, in Civil Appeal No. 55 of 1963 dated 19-2-1964, allowing the appeal filed by the original defendant and dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiffs.

    2. The plaintiffs filed a suit for possession of the suit house on the basis of title and also for recovery of Rs. 540/- on account of mesne profits for use and occupation of the said house by the defendant. It was contended by the plaintiff that the house bearing number 1326/0-3 situated in Circle No. 21, Balaji Mandir Road, Itwari, Nagpur, originally belonged to one Narayan Paikaji Gurao of Nagpur. After his death it was inherited by his wife Gaurabai. She sold this house to one Mannulal in the year 1925. Since then Mannulal continued to be in possession of the said house in his own right and got the same constructed at his own costs in the year 1936. As it was thought necessary that Maina, sister of Narayan, should also give her consent to the said transfer such a consent deed was obtained on the 4th October, 1925 by which she purported to give up her right in respect of the property. Mannulal continued in possession till 20-11-1958 on which date he sold the suit house to the present plaintiffs. At that time the defendant was in possession of the suit house either with the consent of Gaurabai or as her tenant. The plaintiffs after the purchase of the house filed an application before the Rent Controller for permission to terminate the tenancy of the defendant. After getting the necessary permission, the plaintiffs filed a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, which was registered as Civil Suit No. 1014-A of 1959. This suit was dismissed on 25-6-1960. The question as to whether the defendant was a tenant of Mannulal or otherwise was the subject-matter of the decision of that suit. In that suit it was held that the plea of tenancy was not established. An appeal filed against the said decision of the Civil Judge, bearing Civil Appeal No. 128-A of 1960, was also dismissed. After the decision in that appeal the present suit was filed by the plaintiffs on the basis of their title, on 7th December, 1961 In the present suit the plaintiffs have contended that the defendant was in possession even before his vendor's sale-deed of the year 1925 and at any rate from 1942. It was thereafter contended that the defendant had paid the rent to Mannulal upto the end of June, 1958 and also for July, 1958. A reference was also made to a declaration given by the defendant to the Nagpur Municipal Corporation to the effect that he was the tenant of the house and this declaration was given on 27-4-1952.

    3. The defendant denied tne title of the plaintiffs. He contended that there was no relationship of the landlords and tenant between the plaintiffs and himself. Though the defence of limitation was not takes in specific terms, it was stated that the defendant and his father have been continuously in possession of the premises since before 25 years of the date of the suit. In effect, therefore, right on the basis of adverse possession was claimed. This was also construed to be a plea on the ground of limitation. The trial Court after framing necessary issues came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs have proved their title to the suit house, and therefore, decreed the claim of the plaintiffs.

    4. Against this judgment and decree an appeal was filed which was heard and decided by the Second Extra Assistant Judge, Nagpur, in his judgment referred to above. The learned Second Extra Assistant Judge held that the present suit filed by the plaintiff is governed by Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and that neither the plaintiffs nor Mannulal were in possession of the suit house at any time 12 years next before the suit, and therefore, the suit was barred by limitation. In this view of the matter, the appeal was allowed and the plaintiffs' suit was directed to be dismissed. Against this judgment the present second appeal has been filed by the original plaintiffs.

    5. Shri V.R Manohar, who appears for the appellants plaintiffs before me, contended that the learned Judge of the first appellate Court committed an error of law in holding that the present suit was governed by Article 142 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. According to Shri Manohar, the suit was not for possession of immovable property on the ground that the plaintiffs have been dispossessed or their possession his been discontinued at any time. The suit is a pure and simple suit for possession based on title. In the suit neither dispossession or discontinuance of possession was ever alleged. In this view of the matter, the judgment of the learned Judge of the first appellate Court ??? illegal.

    6. On the other hand, it was contended by Shri K.G Chendke, who appears for the respondent defendant before me, that the allegations in the plaint if properly construed clearly amount to saying that the tenant repudiated the title of the plaintiffs in the previous suit and a finding was given that the plaintiffs have failed to prove the relationship of landlords and tenant between the plaintiffs and the defendant. Therefore, from the plaint it is quite clear that it is a case of discontinuance. As an allegation was made by the plaintiffs that the defendant was a tenant and they have failed to prove the same it will have to be held that the discontinuance of possession took place on the very day on which the defendant is alleged to have been inducted in the suit house. Shri Chendke further contended that Ex. 54, which is said to be a declaration given by the defendant before the Municipal Corporation to the effect that he was a tenant of the premises, is not admissible in evidence, because in the prior suit it was held that the present defendant was not proved to be the tenant of the plaintiffs. No evidence to contradict the said finding given in the previous suit can be admitted even for collateral purposes, nor any finding which will go contrary to the finding recorded in the previous suit can be given in the present suit. In view of this matter according to Shri Chendke, the judgment of the first appellate Court is in accordance with law.

    7. For appreciating the controversy involved in this appeal it is necessary to reproduce Articles 142 and 144 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which are as under:

    Description of suit. Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run. 142. For possession of immoveable property when the plaintiff, while in possession of the property has been dispossessed or has discontinued the possession. Twelve years The date of the dispossession or discontinuance 144. For possession of immoveable property or any interest therein not hereby otherwise specially provided for. Twelve years When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.

    8. In support of bis contentions Shri Manohar relied upon the various decisions of the Supreme Court and other High Courts. He brought to my notice a decision of the Supreme Court in Mt. Murti Dasadhin v. Mohammad Mir Khan, AIR 1965 SC 875 and particularly observations made in para 10 of the judgment which reads as under:

    “Construing the plaint as a whole, it is clear that the plaintiff never alleged dispossession or being out of possession. He asserted ownership of the suit land and claimed that he was in possession. Section 144 of the Cr PC proceedings seemed to have cast a doubt on his title and he accordingly brought a suit for a declaration. It is true that in the alternative he prayed for a decree for possession and mesne profits. He was careful even in this alternative prayer to say that he could only be deemed to be dispossessed by Section 144 proceedings. The defendants did not deny the title of the plaintiff to the suit land but asserted that they had been settled and acquired occupancy rights. On these facts it seems to us that it is Article 144 and not Article 142 that applied.”

    9. Another decision to which a reference was made by Shri Manohar is reported in the AIR 1967 SC 487. He drew my attention to the observations in para 16 of the judgment which are to the following effect:

    “………As originally the possession of the appellant and the other defendant was clearly permissive, there can be no question of the application of Article 142 in the present case and the appeliant could only succeed if he could prove adverse possession under Article 144 for over 12 years. The decision of the High Court on the question of limitation is correct.”

    10. Mr. Manohar also relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Shivagonda v. Rudragonda, (1969) 3 SCC 211 : AIR 1970 SC 453 and particularly on the observations made by the Supreme Court in para 5 of the judgment, namely:

    “Article 142 has no application because the suit is not against the defendant on the ground that he has been dispossessed by him but against a person who is not entitled to possession. The defendant did not dispossess the plaintiff, and as such Article 142 is not applicable at all.”

    11. Mr. Manohar has further contended that as to whether Article 142 or Article 144 of the Limitation Act will apply to the facts of the case will have to be decided on the basis of the averments made in the plaint. In this particular case no averments regarding possession or dispossession or discontinuance of possession have been made at all. In these circumstances the present suit is not at all governed by Article 142. He further contended that the terms “dispossession” or “discontinuance” of possession only mean a loss of possession which can be referred to somebody going into possession and driving another out of possession. The dispossession and discontinuance of possession contemplated by this Article is a physical one and not notional. In this particular case no such allegation has been made in the plaint, and therefore, the learned Judge was not right in coming to the conclusion that Article 142 of the Limitation Act will apply to such a suit. On the contrary the residue Article, namely, Article 144 of the Limitation Act will be applicable to the present suit.

    12. In para 15 of the written statement the defendant raised a plea of adverse possession. Therefore, the burden was upon the defendant to prove the same and since he has failed to prove his adverse possession the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree. He has further contended that only because the plaintiffs have alleged that the defendant was their tenant and he has failed to prove the same it cannot be said that there was discontinuance of possession. For this proposition he relied upon the following cases:

    (1) Meherban Lalli v. Yusufkhan Kallu, AIR 1939 Nag 7;

    (2) Sulaiman v. Dawood Khan Sahib, AIR 1935 Mad 754;

    (3) Mt. Maluk Zadi v. Mt. Anwar Sultan. AIR 1950 Pesh 31; and

    (4) Qadir Bux v. Ramchand, AIR 1970 All 289.

    13. The case reported in AIR 1970 All 289 of the Allahabad High Court (cit. supra) is a Full Bench decision in which the resume of the law on the subject has been taken. In paras 10 and 11 of the said judgment it is observed by the Allahabad High Court as under:

    “10. There is obviously some distinction between the mere dispossession or discontinuance of the possession of the plaintiff and the adverse possession of the defendant. Ordinarily an owner of property is presumed to be in possession of it and such presumption is in his favour where there is nothing to the contrary. It would, therefore, follow that an owner of property starts with the presumption in his favour that he is in possession of his property, but where the plaintiff himself admits or it is proved that he has been dispossessed by the defendant and, therefore, is no longer in the proprietary possession of the property in suit, at the time of the institution of the suit, the Court cannot start with the presumption in his favour that the possession of the property was with him.

    11. No doubt in many cases the distinction is very fine and the line of demarcation between dispossession and adverse possession is thin but the question in each case is one of burden of proof and it is incumbent on the plaintiff when he has been dispossessed or had discontinued his possession to establish the date of dispossession or discontinuance of possession and to show that it was within twelve years of the institution of the suit (vide Article 142 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act).”

    14. In Para 30 of the said judgment the Allahabad High Court further observed as follows:

    “30. The main point for consideration is whether in such circumstances it can be said that the plaintiff had been dispossessed or had discontinued his possession within the meaning of Article 142 of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act. The term “dispossession” applies when a person comes in and drives out others from the possession. It imports ouster a driving out of possession against the will of the person in actual possession. This driving out cannot be said to have occurred when according to the case of the plaintiff the transfer of possession was voluntary, that is to say, not against the will of the person in possession but in accordance with his wishes and active consent. The term “discontinuance” implies a voluntary act and abandonment of possession followed by the actual possession of another. It implies that the person discontinuing has given up the land and left it to be possessed by anyone choosing to come in. There must be an intention to abandon title before there can be said to be a discontinuance in possession, but this cannot be assumed. It must be either admitted or proved.

    So strong in fact is the position of the rightful owner that even when he had been dispossessed by a trespasser and that trespasser abandons possession either voluntarily or by his major for howsoever short a time before he has actually perfected his title by twelve years' adverse possession the possession of the true owner is deemed to have revived and he gets a fresh starting point of limitation vide Gurbinder Singh v. Lalsingh, AIR 1965 SC 1553. Wrongful possession cannot be assumed against the true owner when according to the facts disclosed by him he himself had voluntarily handed over possession and was not deprived of it by the other side.”

    15. Thereafter the Full Bench answered the question referred to them in the following terms:

    “Our answer to the question referred to the Full Bench is as follows:—

    If a plaintiff claims possession against a defendant alleging him to be his tenant and fails to prove the tenancy set up by him, Article 142 of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, will not apply and the only Article that can apply is Article 144 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act.”

    16. On the other hand, Shri Chendke relies upon the following decisions of the various High Courts, namely,:

    (1) Gangoobai v. Soni, 1942 Nag LJ 99

    (2) Official Receiver of East Godavari at Rajahmundry v. Chava Govindaraju. AIR 1940 Mad 798;

    (3) Beharilal v. Narain Das, AIR 1935 Lah 475 (FB);

    (4) Premeswar Das v. Madhab Chandra Das, AIR 1950 Assam 55;

    (5) Venkiteswara Iyer v. Chariyathu, AIR 1957 Trav Co 223;

    (6) Lingamma v. Putte Gowda, AIR 1963 Mys 1 (FB); and

    (7) Adhikarimayum v. Heikrujam Tombi Singh, AIR 1973 Gauhati 38.

    17. Shri Chendke has strenuously relied upon a Full Bench decision of the Mysore High Court in Lingamma's case (cit supra) and particularly the observations made by the Mysore High Court in paras 3, 10 and 11 of the judgment which are as under:

    “(3) Before proceeding to examine the decisions on the subject, we shall first go to the language used in Article 142. Article 142 speaks of suits for possession of immovable property when the plaintiff while in possession of the property, has been either dispossessed or has discontinued his possession. Article 144 is a residuary Article. It relates to suits for possession of immovable property or any interest therein not otherwise specifically provided in the “Act”. It is quite clear, nor is it disputed, that Article 14.4 can only apply to cases which are not governed by any other article in the “Act”. In the present case the controversy centres round Articles 142 and 144. No other Article is relevant for our purpose. Therefore, we have to first see whether the question formulated could be reasonably brought within the ambit of Article 142.

    In a case where dispossession or discontinuance of possession is either admitted or proved, there is no difficulty. But difficulty arises where no specific evidence is available about dispossession of the true owner or his discontinuing his possession. What then is the position? In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the true owner of the property must be deemed to have been in possession of the property. The dictum possession follows title is well known and well recognised by Courts. Therefore, when a person establishes his title to the property, law presumes that either he or his predecessor in title was deemed to have been in possession of the property, at some point of time. If the plaintiff either admits or it is proved that he was not in possession of the suit property at the time of the institution of the suit, then necessarily he must have either been dispossessed or he must have discontinued his possession at some point of time prior to the suit. “Dispossession” occurs when the possession of the true owner is taken away by a third party. “Discontinuance” of possession relates to a case where a true owner consciously gives up his possession and some third party gets into possession. For the reasons mentioned already every suit for possession based on title attracts to itself the mischief of Article. 142 If a person having title to the property sues for possession of the suit property on the allegation that the defendant was his tenant but fails to establish the tenancy pleaded, then it follows that he must have either been dispossessed or that he had discontinued his possession prior to suit. Where a plaintiff pleads permissive possession and the defendant admits his possession but denies that he is in permissive possession (in either case the defendant's possession being admitted) if the plaintiff fails to establish his case, then it follows that the defendant's possession was without the consent of the plaintiff. From the time the defendant holds the property without the consent of the plaintiff, then the plaintiff must be deemed to have been dispossessed. In such a case, law requires the plaintiff to establish that he was in possession of the suit property within 12 years from the date of the suit. Otherwise, his rights get barred under Article 142.

    (10) Now coming to question No. 3, the general principles enunciated earlier apply with equal force to this question as well. Further, several Courts have taken the view that when the plaintiff's allegation that the defendant was in permissive possession of the suit property is not established, the allegation in question amounts to an admission of discontinuance of plaintiff's possession and therefore, his case falls under Article 142. See AIR 1946 All 389 and (1951) 29 Mys LJ 141. This appears to be the correct view both in principle and on authority.

    (11) In the result, our decision on question No. 1 is that the plaintiff has to prove not only his title to the suit property but also his possession of the same within twelve years of the suit; on question No. 2 we hold that the relevant Article is Article 142 of the “Act”; and on question No. 3 we hold that the plaintiff, who seeks to eject persons from immovable property claimed by him, on the ground that although they entered into such property as tenants, were in wrongful possession thereof but fails to prove his allegations has to establish his possession within 12 years of the suit.”

    18. Thus there are conflicting views on this subject and it has to be decided as to which of the view should be preferred in this behalf. The Mysore High Court has relied upon the decision of the Madras High Court reported in AIR 1940 Mad 798 (cit. supra). The said decision of the Madras High Court has also been referred to by the Supreme Court, AIR 1965 SC 875. The Supreme Court has also referred to another decision of the Lahore High Court in AIR 1935 Lah 475 (cit. supra) on which Shri Chendke relies.

    19. The Supreme Court in Mr. Murti Dusadhin's case, AIR 1965 SC 875 in paras 7 and 8 of its judgment has observed as under:

    “(7) The learned counsel for the appellant urged that in an action in ejectment, one of the things that the plaintiff must prove is his title to immediate possession. This is true and there is no dispute, about this proposition. He further urges that where the plaintiff does not adroit tenancy, although the defendant alleges tenancy, he must show possession within 12 years of the suit. He says that the defendants have admitted title of the plaintiff but not possession. To support his proposition, the learned counsel for the appellant, apart from Patna cases which have been overruled by the Full Bench relied on the Official Receiver of East Godavari v. Chava Govinda Raju. ILR (1940) Mad 953 : (AIR 1940 Mad 798 (FB) and ILR 16 Lah 443 : (AIR 1935 Lah 475 (FB)). In the Madras case, an auction purchaser was obstructed by a person who claimed it as his own ancestral property. The auction purchaser sued for declaration and injunction. The facts are quite different and in none of the cases discussed by the learned Chief Justice in his judgment a defendant had claimed possession under the plaintiff but had asserted right by adverse possession.

    (8) In ILR 16 Lah 443 : (AIR 1935 Lah 475 (FB)) the facts as stated in the head-note were these:

    “The plaintiffs instituted a suit for possession of a house against N.B and N.D, alleging that in 1927 they had rented the house to N.B who had sublet it to the defendant N.D The plaintiffs stated in the plaint that they were the owners of the house and that they had instituted a suit previously for recovery of rent against both the defendants, but N.D had asserted his own title to the property and the suit had been dismissed against him, but had been decreed against N.B”

    The High Court held that the plaintiffs clearly pleaded possession and dispossession, i.e possession through their tenant N.B and dispossession by the latter's sub-tenant N.D, when he set up a title of his own. This case is again distinguishable for the sub-tenant had clearly asserted his own title and denied that of the plaintiff.”

    20. It is no doubt true that the Mysore decision has not been referred to by the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1970 All 289 (cit. supra) which is also a Full Bench decision. But in my opinion, the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1970 All 289 (FB) lays down the correct law on the subject.

    21. In Nam Suindu v. Krishna Shindu, AIR 1938 Bom 210, this Court had an occasion to deal with this aspect of the matter. In this context it is observed by this Court as under:

    “The first question which arises in this case is, whether the suit falls within Article 142 or Art, 144, Limitation Act. It is clear that these two Articles apply to two different sets of circumstances. Article 142, on the face of it, is restricted to a suit based on the plaintiff's prior possession lost by dispossession, and in order to bring the suit within Article 142, the plaintiff must allege that he was originally in possession of the property which is the subject-matter, of the suit, and that he has been dispossessed by the defendant. In other words, he must, prove that he was dispossessed within 12 years. The whole question under Article 142 is, whether more than 12 years have elapsed since the plaintiff was dispossessed; and if the plaintiff fails to prove that the onus obviously being upon him the defendant is not called upon to set up his adverse possession. Article 142 makes no reference to the defendant or this possession. That is done in Article 144. Article 144 is a residuary Article, and only applies if no other Article is applicable. The Article, in my opinion, applies only when there is no allegation in the plaint that the plaintiff has been in possession and has been dispossessed. It applies when the suit is based on the ground that the plaintiff is the owner of the property and the defendant is a trespasser having no right to remains in possession. This distinction has been well put by Telang J. in (1890) ILR 14 Bom 458; Faki Abdulla v. Babaji Gangaji at p. 462 and has been accepted not only by this Court but by all other High Courts in this Country.”

    22. The very basis of a suit under Article 142 of the Limitation Act is the prior possession of a party and his subsequent dispossession or discontinuance of possession. If the suit is merely based on title, then obviously Article 142 of the Indian Limitation Act will not apply to such a suit, To the same effect are the observations of the Supreme Court in AIR 1965 SC 1553. where in para 6 of the judgment it is observed:

    “In order that Article 142 is attracted the plaintiff must initially have been in possession of the property and should have been dispossessed by the defendant or someone through whom the defendants claim or alternatively the plaintiff should have discontinued possession.”

    23. In the present case such allegations have not been made in the plaint. Only because on a previous occasion the plaintiffs had alleged that the defendant was their tenant and they had failed to prove the same, it cannot be assumed that there was discontinuance of their possession from their mere failure to prove their allegation of tenancy. Further it the present case it cannot be said that the allegations of lease made by the plaintiffs were found to be false. In the previous proceedings the plaintiffs had only failed to prove the same. Thereafter the present suit was filed by them on the basis of their title against the defendant, who was not entitled to remain in possession of the house, In these circumstances, in my opinion to the present suit Article 142 of the Indian Limitation Act will not apply. Once it is held that Article 142 will not apply to the instant ‘suit, the only other Article which could ‘apply to such a suit is Article 144 of the “Limitation Act.

    24. This aspect can be considered from another point of view. It is one of the principles of interpretation of Statute that the subsequent legislation can be looked at in order to see as to what could be the proper construction to be put upon an earlier Act where the earlier Act is ambiguous or the wording used therein has resulted in creating confusion. If both the laws are on the same subject and if the provisions of the earlier Act which are said to be construed are open to diverse meaning, then the subsequent Act can usefully be referred to for the interpretation of the earlier legislation. A reference to this principle is made at page 147 of Craies on Statute Law and it is observed:

    “In Cape Brandy Syndicate v. I.R.C, (1921) 2 KB 403 at page 414, Lord Sterndale M.R said:

    “I think it is clearly established in Att. Gen. v. Clarkson, 1900 QB 156 (supra) that subsequent legislation may be looked to in order to see what is the proper construction to be put upon an earlier Act where that earlier Act is ambiguous. I quite agree that subsequent legislation if it proceeded on an erroneous construction of previous legislation cannot alter that previous legislation, but if there be any ambiguity in the earlier legislation, then the subsequent legislation may fix the proper interpretation which is to be put upon the earlier. “This”, said Lord Buckmaster in Ormond Investment Co. v. Betts, (1928) AC 143 at page 156 is in my opinion, an accurate expression of the law if by ‘any ambiguity’ is meant a phrase fairly and equally open to divers meanings”. In the same case Lord Atkinson said: “Sargant L.J seems to hold that a legislative interpretation of the statute of 1918 is to be found in this Section 26 of the Act of 1924 and therefore the case comes within a well-recognised principle dealing with the construction of statutes, namely that where the interpretation of a statute is obscure or ambiguous or readily capable of more than one interpretation, light may be thrown upon the true view to be taken of it by the aim and provisions of a subsequent statute.”

    25. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes has also referred to the same principle, namely, “not only may the later Act be construed by the light of the earlier, but it sometimes furnishes a legislative interpretation of the earlier”. Thereafter it is observed that “subsequent legislation on the subject may be looked into in order to see what is the proper construction to be put upon an earlier Act.” A reference to this principle has also been made by the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in a case reported in Sher Khan v. State, AIR 1958 All 733 wherein it is observed:

    “Subsequent legislation on the same subject may be looked to in order to see the proper construction to be put upon an earlier Act where that earlier Act is ambiguous.”

    26. The later legislation on the subject is the Limitation Act of 1963. Articles 64 and 65 are the Articles which have been enacted in place of Articles 142 and 144 respectively of the original Act of 1908. The new Article 64 reads as under.—

    Description of suit Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run. 64. For possession of immoveable property based on previous possession and not on title, when the plaintiff while in possession of the property has been dispossessed. Tweleve years The date of dispossession.

    27. The new Article covers the suit for possession of immovable property which is based on previous possession only and not on title when the plaintiff while in possession of the property has been dispossessed.

    28. What were the aims and objects behind the enactment of this new Article 64 has been explained in the Notes of Clauses attached to the Bill of the Act wherein it is stated as under:

    “The aim behind the enactment has been thus explained. Articles 142 and 144 of the Existing Act have given rise to a good deal of confusion with respect to the suits for possession by owners of the property. Article 64 as proposed replaces Article 142, but it restricted to the suit based on possessory title so that an owner of the property does not lose unless the defendant in possession is able to prove adverse possession.”

    29. In my opinion, therefore, Article 64 of the Limitation Act, 1963 thrown considerable light upon the meaning and the expression used in Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and a suit based on title will not be covered by the said Article. Even otherwise the term “discontinuance” used in the said Article will imply a voluntary act and abandonment of possession followed by the actual possession of another. It necessarily implies that a person who has discontinued the possession has given up the property and has left it to be possessed by anyone who chooses to come in. For this there must be an intention to abandon title before there can be said to be discontinuance in possession. Such a discontinuance cannot be assumed, but it must either be admitted or proved. In this particular case it is neither admitted nor it is proved. But the argument of Shri Chendke is that it should be assumed from the fact that the plaintiffs have failed to prove the allegations of tenancy. In my opinion, from the mere fact of failure of the plaintiff to prove the allegation of tenancy it cannot be assumed that there was discontinuance of possession in a sense that the plaintiffs had intention to abandon their title and had given up the house property or had left it to be possessed by the defendant.

    30. As an alternate argument Shri Manohar had also relied upon Ex. 54 a declaration made by the defendant before the Municipal Corporation authority to the effect that he is living in the said house as a tenant on rent at Rs. 5/- per month. The date of this declaration is 26-4-1952. Ex. 54 is the certified copy of the declaration given by the defendant to the Nagpur Municipal Corporation. As observed by the trial Court in para 13 of its judgment it has been duly proved by the Assessment Inspector Madhukar (P.W 4). The contents of this declaration are admissible in evidence though its original is not brought because the original is reported to be lost. Shri Manohar was relying upon this declaration not for the purpose of establishing the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and the defendant, but as an admission of the defendant to prove that the defendant was in permissive possession of the house property. It was further contended by Shri Manohar that even if it is held that Article 142 of the Limitation Act applies to the present case this declaration clearly establishes the fact that till 1952 the defendant was admitting that he was in the permissive possession of the property, and therefore, a question of discontinuance of possession will not arise till that date. If the date of the declaration is taken to be the starting point of limitation, then according to Shri Manohar, the suit filed by the plaintiffs was within limitation.

    31. In my opinion, there is considerable force in this contention of Shri Manohar. Shri Chendke has objected to the admissibility of Ex. 54 the declaration on the ground that it is a piece of evidence which will contradict the findings given in the previous suit wherein it was held that the plaintiffs have failed to prove that the defendant was their tenant. It is further submitted by Shri Chendke that no evidence to contradict that finding can be tendered even for a collateral purpose.

    32. In my opinion it is not correct to say that Ex, 54 the declaration given by the defendant cannot be used for any purpose. The plaintiffs in this suit are not claiming any finding in this behalf. This admission incorporated in Ex. 54, the declaration gives by the defendant is being relied upon by the plaintiffs to show that the defeoiant was in permissive possession of the property. As held by the Supreme Court in Bharat Singh v. Mst. Bhagirathi, AIR 1966 SC 405 the admissions duly proved are admissible in evidence. In the present case the said admission has been duly proved and the evidence in this behalf adduced by the plaintiffs has been rightly accepted by the trial Court. This being the position, in my opinion, it will have to be held that till the date of this declaration in the year 1952, the defendant himself had admitted that he was in the permissive possession of the suit house. Therefore, even if discontinuance of possession is assumed, it will be after that date only and on this count also suit will be within limitation even under Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908:

    33. In the view which I have taken it is quite clear that it is the Article 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908 which will apply to the present case. In para 15 of the written statement the defendant had alleged that he is in possession of the suit house in his own right as an owner thereof exclusively without interruption by Gaurabai and Maina, peacefully and adversely to them all. However at the appellate stage, as observed by the learned Judge in para 9 of his judgment, it was conceded before him that if Article 144 were to apply to this suit, then the defendant has no case. No issue was also framed with regard to the plea of adverse possession of the defendant. However, it was contended by Shri Chendke that the defendant should be given a fresh opportunity to prove his case of adverse possession and for this purpose the suit should be remanded back to the trial Court for a fresh trial.

    34. In my opinion it will net be in the interest of justice to allow the defendant a fresh opportunity in this behalf. The defendant had an ample opportunity to prove his case. As mentioned in para 9 of the appellate judgment it was conceded before the learned Judge that if Article 144 were to apply to this suit, then the defendant has no case.

    35. It is further clear from Ex. 54, the declaration given by the defendant before the Municipal Corporation, that he was in permissive possession of the house till then and therefore no useful purpose will be served by remanding the case. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and for the reasons stated hereinbefore it is not possible for me to accept the request made by Shri Chendke in this behalf.

    36. In the view which I have taken therefore, the appeal filed by the plaintiff is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the Second Extra Assistant Judge in Civil Appeal No. 55 of 1963 decided on 19-2-1964 is set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the Sixth Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division Nagpur dt. 11-1-1963 in Regular Civil Suit No. 838 of 1961 is restored. In view of this the cross-objection is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Leave to file LPA orally prayed for refused.

    37. Order accordingly.

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