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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • provisions of ss. 38, 39 and 40 of Act X of 1870,
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT
  • ss. 38 and 39. Section 40 of that Act
  • s. 31(2) of the Land Acquisition Act,
  • s. 9(3) of the Land Acquisition Act,
  • s. 9 of the Land Acquisition Act.
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT 1894
  • s. 39 of Act X of 1870
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of ss. 38, 39 and 40 of Act X of 1870,
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT
  • ss. 38 and 39. Section 40 of that Act
  • s. 31(2) of the Land Acquisition Act,
  • s. 9(3) of the Land Acquisition Act,
  • s. 9 of the Land Acquisition Act.
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT 1894
  • s. 39 of Act X of 1870
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs are successors-in-title to Appaji, who had earlier filed Darkhast No. 10 of 1891 in accordance with the directions arising from Appeal No. 71 of 1886. The central dispute concerns the plaintiffs' title to receive Rs. 417-4-0 from the revenues (vasul) of the village of Chincholi, said to arise from an earlier decision and from a Tahnama (award) of 1744.

At trial the defendants sought to tender a certified copy and a simple copy of the 1744 Tahnama on a list (exh. 46). The trial Judge admitted the document for tendering subject to admissibility but later rejected the document as inadmissible on the ground that what was produced was a copy of a copy. The defendants/appellants filed Civil Application No. 1897 of 1956 in the appeal seeking permission to produce additional evidence consisting of a certified copy of the Tahnama of 1744.

The opinion reviews earlier litigation going back to Suit No. 2 of 1883 (relators seeking removal of trustees Chintaman and Appaji), Appeal No. 71 of 1886 (removal confirmed and directions for scheme), and subsequent proceedings where Appaji filed Darkhast No. 10 of 1891 claiming certain properties as private. The District Judge in the darkhast and this Court on First Appeal No. 104 of 1896 held that Rs. 417-4-0 out of the vasul of Chincholi was not appropriated to the Sansthan and belonged to Appaji (subject to a modification in respect of village Chikhali).

The trial Court had rejected the Tahnama copy produced with exh. 46; in the present appeal the Bench concludes that that rejection was erroneous and directs that the certified copy produced with exh. 46 be admitted and marked as exh. 46A. Because of that, the Court does not pass further order on Civil Application No. 1897 of 1956.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs have title to receive Rs. 417-4-0 out of the vasul of the village of Chincholi (including whether earlier decisions bind the Sansthan as res judicata).
  2. Whether the certified copy of the Tahnama of 1744 is admissible as evidence (challenge to its exclusion as a "copy of a copy").
  3. Whether the plaintiffs' right to receive Rs. 417-4-0 constitutes an "interest in land" entitling them to a share in compensation under the Land Acquisition Act.
  4. Whether partial acquisition of the village (land of assessment Rs. 127 not acquired) affects plaintiffs' entitlement to compensation and the apportionment.
  5. Whether the plaintiffs' suit is maintainable or whether they should have sought relief under the special procedures of the Land Acquisition Act (i.e., whether a separate suit is incompetent when Land Acquisition remedies existed).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (Mr. Jahagirdar)

  • The plaintiffs are not entitled to Rs. 417-4-0 because the Tahnama of 1744 shows that the amount was allotted to the branch of Digambar Dev, not to the plaintiffs.
  • The earlier decisions (District Court in Darkhast No. 10 of 1891 and First Appeal No. 71 of 1886) are not binding on defendant No.1 Sansthan because the Sansthan was not a party to those proceedings; thus res judicata does not apply.
  • The trial Judge erred in not admitting the document (certified copy of the Tahnama); the copy tendered was said to be a copy of a copy and was excluded, causing prejudice.
  • Even if plaintiffs have the right to receive Rs. 417-4-0 annually, that right is not an interest in land and therefore does not entitle them to a share of acquisition compensation.
  • Not the entire village was acquired — land assessed at Rs. 127 was not acquired — so plaintiffs should recover Rs. 127 directly from village officers and only have a proportional claim for the remaining Rs. 290-4-0 from the compensation paid to the Sansthan.
  • The suit is incompetent because plaintiffs could have claimed their share in the Land Acquisition proceedings before the Collector; having not done so, they cannot maintain an independent civil suit.

Respondents' Arguments (Mr. Chitale)

  • The suit is competent because apportionment proceedings are distinct from proceedings to fix compensation and apportionment requires separate notice; therefore a separate suit is permissible where the Collector has not adjudicated apportionment or has directed the aggrieved party to sue.
  • The Collector did not carry out apportionment under the Land Acquisition Act and instead asked the plaintiffs to sue the Sansthan; given the third proviso to s.31(2) of the Act, a suit to recover improperly received compensation is maintainable.
  • Reliance on authority establishing that apportionment is a distinct procedure and on the proposition that where the Collector fails to adjudicate or provide proper remedy the ordinary civil courts may be approached.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chintaman Bajaji Dev v. Dhondo Ganesh Dev, 1888 I.L.R. 15 Bom. 612 Earlier litigation between parties; record indicates the Tahnama was treated as lost/not available in prior proceedings and shows the history of trusteeship disputes and the darkhast decision framework. Cited to show that the original Tahnama was previously considered lost and to set out the historical litigation leading to Darkhast No. 10 of 1891 and First Appeal No. 104 of 1896. Used as background to conclude prior adjudications had addressed related claims.
Rajah Nilmoni Singh v. Ram Bundhoo Roy, 1881 L.R. 8 I.A. 90 Proposition that provisions for settling compensation under the old Act (ss. 38–40 Act X of 1870) were intended to be final; the proviso applied only to persons whose rights had not been adjudicated under the Act. The Court observed that this decision, rather than supporting appellants' contention, actually goes against it: where a claim has been adjudicated under the Act it cannot be reopened, but the facts here differed and the Court found the decision did not assist the appellant.
Saitbesh Chandra Sarkar v. Moharajadhiraj Sir Bejoy Chand Mohatap, [1922] A.I.R. Cal. 4 Held that the proviso to s.31 applies only where a person is under a disability or not served with notice of proceedings before the Collector; and that the Land Acquisition Act provides a special (often exclusive) remedy. The Court distinguished the case on facts: in the present matter there were factual differences (e.g., plaintiffs may not have had notice and the Collector did not apportion) and therefore the cited reasoning did not support the appellants' contention that a suit was incompetent.
Shivmal v. Ramchandra Bapu, [1933] A.I.R. Nag. 322 Persons who received notice and appeared before the Collector when compensation was apportioned must, if they object, apply under s.18 of the Act and cannot thereafter file a separate suit; the proviso to s.31(2) does not avail such persons. Court distinguished the case on its facts: there the claimants had appeared and accepted compensation (with oral protest) whereas in the present case plaintiffs did not appear to have been dealt with by the Collector and the Collector apparently did not apportion the compensation.
Hurmat Jan Bibi v. Padma Lochun Das, 1885 I.L.R. 12 Cal. 33 Apportionment of compensation is a proceeding distinct from fixing the amount; separate notice of apportionment is required to bind persons not before the apportionment proceedings. The Court cited the authority for the proposition that apportionment is distinct, but noted that in the present case there were no apportionment proceedings conducted by the Collector, so it was unnecessary to decide whether separate notice would have been required.
Ramchandra Rao v. Ramchandra Rao, 1922 24 Bom. L.R. 963 (P.C.) Land Acquisition Act contemplates two distinct procedures: (1) fixing compensation (award) and (2) determining relative rights to the compensation amount; decisions under the Act operate as res judicata between same parties. The Court acknowledged the case but found it distinguishable: in the present matter the Collector had not followed the provisions for apportionment and had not adjudicated the plaintiffs' claim, having instead directed them to sue; thus the principle did not defeat the plaintiffs' suit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Admissibility of the Tahnama (exh. 46): The Court examined the record and found that a certified copy of the Tahnama of 1744 had been produced with exh. 46 and that the trial Court erred in rejecting the document as inadmissible on the ground it was a "copy of a copy." The certified copy was held to have been produced and the Court directed that it be admitted and marked exh. 46A. Given that ruling, the Civil Application for additional evidence need not be separately decided.

2. Title to Rs. 417-4-0: The Court traced the earlier litigation (Suit No. 2 of 1883, Appeal No. 71 of 1886, Darkhast No. 10 of 1891 and First Appeal No. 104 of 1896). Appaji had succeeded in the darkhast and Rs. 417-4-0 was held not appropriated to the Sansthan by the District Judge and this Court on appeal (subject to one modification). The Court rejected the submission that the Sansthan could now challenge that decision on the ground that it was not a party: the record shows that new trustees of the Sansthan were impleaded as opponents in the darkhast and the trustees' claim to Rs. 417-4-0 was negatived.

3. Even assuming res judicata did not operate, the Court analysed factual evidence: records showed possession and payments of Rs. 417-4-0 to Appaji and his successors from 1903 onwards; entries in the Record of Rights recorded plaintiffs' "other rights"; testimony (exh. 67) by Ramchandra Gajanan Dev admitted plaintiffs were receiving Rs. 417-4-0 per year. Members of the Digambar branch did not claim the amount in the present suit. On this evidence the Court held there was sufficient material to establish plaintiffs' title to Rs. 417-4-0.

4. Interest in land / entitlement to compensation: The Court construed relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition Act—s.9 (public notice and service), s.3(a) (land includes benefits to arise out of land), s.3(b) (persons interested include all claiming interest in compensation), s.11 (Collector to consider persons' interests and apportion compensation), s.30 (reference to Court where dispute arises), and s.31(1)–(2) with the third proviso to s.31(2). The Court concluded that plaintiffs, entered in the Record of Rights as having "other rights" and actually receiving the Rs. 417-4-0 from village officers, had an interest that brought them within the Act's definitions and entitled them to a share in any compensation arising from acquisition.

5. Procedural objections and points not raised at trial: The Court repeatedly noted that several points pressed by appellants (e.g., partial acquisition and the Rs.127 assessment not acquired) were not pleaded or raised in the trial Court or in issues, and therefore could not be entertained for the first time on appeal. Consequently the Court declined to rule on the legal effect of that particular partial acquisition issue.

6. Maintainability of the suit vis-à-vis the Land Acquisition Act: The Court analysed authorities cited by both sides. It distinguished cases where claimants had received notice, appeared, and accepted compensation (with or without oral protest) and so were required to seek remedies under the Act, from the present facts where the Collector did not carry out apportionment, and in fact told plaintiffs to seek a civil suit if the Sansthan refused payment. The third proviso to s.31(2) (liability of any person who receives compensation to pay the person lawfully entitled) was held to permit a suit to recover the amount from the party who received it where the Collector had not adjudicated apportionment or had not properly dealt with the plaintiffs' claim. On these grounds the Court rejected the contention that the suit was incompetent.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core rulings):

  • The certified copy of the Tahnama of 1744 produced with exh. 46 is admissible and is directed to be marked as exh. 46A.
  • The plaintiffs have established title to receive Rs. 417-4-0 out of the vasul of the village of Chincholi.
  • The plaintiffs' right to receive Rs. 417-4-0 constitutes an interest within the scope of the Land Acquisition Act and entitles them to a share in compensation where appropriate; and the suit to recover their share is maintainable under the circumstances (notably where the Collector did not apportion and directed them to sue).

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The trial Court's exclusion of the certified Tahnama was reversed; the document is to be admitted as exh. 46A for the record of this litigation.
  • On the facts before the Court there is a factual and legal basis for the plaintiffs' entitlement to Rs. 417-4-0 and to claim a share of any acquisition compensation; consequently the Sansthan cannot be permitted to retain the compensation without regard to the plaintiffs' lawful claim.
  • The Court did not decide broader unresolved questions (for example, the exact effect of partial acquisition of specific assessed land Rs.127) because those points were not properly raised or litigated in the trial Court; no new broad precedent on that particular point is laid down.

[The rest of the judgment was noted as not material to the report and is not summarized here.]

    Shri Deo Sansthan Chinchwad v. Chintaman Dharnidhar Deo

    Gokhale, J.:— [His Lordship after stating the facts of the case, proceeded.] Now, the first question that has been raised in this appeal by Mr. Jahagirdar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, is the question of title. It is conceded that plaintiffs are the successors-in-title to Appaji, who filed Darkhast No. 10 of 1891 in accordance with the directions of this Court in Appeal No. 71 of 1886, by heirship and will of Annaji. What is, however, disputed is plaintiffs' title to receive Rs. 417-4-0 out of the revenue of the village of Chincholi on the basis of the earlier decision. It is contended that the decision of the District Court in Darkhast No. 10 of 1891 (exh. 48) as well as the decision of this Court in First Appeal No. 71 of 1886 are not binding on defendant No. 1 Sansthan, which was not a party to these proceedings and the same would not operate as res judicata. It is also contended that the learned trial Judge erred in not admitting a document which was a certified copy of the Tahnama (award) given by the Peshwa in 1744. It appears that on June 23, 1955, the defendants filed a list (exh. 46) with one document consisting of a certified copy as well as a simple copy of the said Tahnama, and that document was allowed to be tendered subject to the question of its admissibility. It seems, however, that when the document, was sought to be exhibited, objection was raised by the plaintiffs to its admissibility on the ground that the document produced was the copy of a copy. That objection was upheld by the learned trial Judge. The defendant-appellants have filed Civil Application No. 1897 of 1956 in this appeal praying for permission to produce additional evidence consisting of a certified copy of the Tahnama of 1744. The grievance of the appellants is that it was an error on the part of the trial Court not to exhibit the document produced along with exh. 46 on June 23, 1955, and reject it as being not admissible at the time of arguments, which has caused great prejudice to the defendants. There is considerable force in this argument. Admittedly, a certified copy of the said Tahnama was also produced along with exh. 46, as the learned trial Judge has himself remarked in para 10 of his judgment when he has somewhat criticised the plaintiffs for their vehement opposition to the production of that document. A certified copy of the said Tahnama is also produced in Civil Application No. 1897 of 1956 in this Court. Defendant No. 3, Ramchandra Gajanan Dev (exh. 67), who is one of the trustees of the Sansthan and who was the only witness on behalf of the Sansthan, has stated in his evidence that the original Tahnama could not be traced despite search. It is true that the search was arranged through the Karbhari of the Sansthan 2 or 3 years before he gave evidence in anticipation of the suit, and the Karbhari reported that the original Tahnama was not traceable. The said Karbhari, however, was not called to give evidence on this point. It appears that even at the time of the prior litigation in Suit No. 2 of 1883 and the First Appeal No. 71 of 1886 of this Court, reported in Chintaman Bajaji Dev v. Dhondo Ganesh Dev . 1888 I.L.R 15 Bom. 612., the original Tahnama was taken as lost or not available. If that be so, in our judgment, the trial Court's view in rejecting the document produced along with exh. 46 as inadmissible is erroneous. The result is that we direct that the certified copy of the Tahnama of 1744 produced along with exh. 46 should be admitted and should be marked as exh. 46A. In that view of the matter, it is not necessary to pass any order on the Civil Application for additional evidence, preferred by the appellants.

    2. Mr. Jahagirdar contends that if the Tahnama (exh. 46A) is examined, it will be found that the amount of Rs. 417-4-0 consisting of Rs. 347-12-0 (Moglai) and Rs. 69-8-0 (Sardeshmukhi) out of the vasul of Mouje Chincholi was given to the branch of Digambar Dev, one of the brothers of the original acquirer Shri Narayan Dev. That, according to Mr. Jahagirdar, would show that plaintiffs have no title to receive Rs. 417-4-0 out of the vasul of Chincholi village. It is further contended that amount went to the Sansthan by way of exchange and, therefore, plaintiffs have no title to the said amount. In order to appreciate this argument, it is necessary to refer to the earlier litigation of 1883, to which a reference has already been made. As already stated, some relators of the Deity had filed Suit No. 2 of 1883 against Chintaman and his son Appaji, who were then Vahivatdar trustees of the Sansthan, praying for removal of these trustees and the preparation of a scheme. That suit resulted in the removal of Chintaman and his son Appaji and a scheme was prepared by the District Court. Against this decision there was an appeal preferred by Chintaman to this Court, being Appeal No. 71 of 1886, which confirmed the decision of the removal of the trustees, and sent the case back to the District Court to take accounts from the said trustees and for making provision for the future management of the trust after giving notices to the parties to the suit and the residents of villages where the shrines were situated, with a view to their offering suggestions to the Court in framing the necessary scheme. This Court also reserved to defendants the rights, in execution of the decree, to show that certain of the lands mentioned in the plaint as belonging to the Sansthan were not included in the property appropriated to the Sansthan by the Peshwa's award or in subsequent grants. After this decision, reported in Chintaman Bajaji Dev v. Dhondo Ganesh Dev, Appaji filed Darkhast No. 10 of 1891 praying for a declaration that the properties mentioned in the darkhast were his own private properties and not the properties of the Sansthan, his father Chintaman having died in the meanwhile. That darkhast was decided by the District Judge in favour of Appaji and a number of properties mentioned in the darkhast including the amount of Rs. 417-4-0 from out of the vasul of the village Chincholi were held as not appropriated to the Sansthan. To that darkhast the new trustees of the Sansthan seem to have been impleaded as opponents by Appaji, the earlier trustees Chintaman and his son Appaji himself having been removed. In that darkhast, the Tahnama of 1744 was relied upon and the judgment of the learned District Judge shows that it was contended on behalf of the Sansthan that the amount of Rs. 417-4-0 out of the vasul of the village Chincholi had been allotted to the descendants of Digambar Dev, on the basis of the said document, which was exh. 86 in that darkhast. It was also the case of the trustees then that the claims allotted to Digambar under that Tahnama inclusive of Rs. 417-4-0 were subsequently exchanged for a sum of Rs. 1,000 from the revenues of the village Chinchwad, with the result that Digambar's branch appears to have lost any claim to that amount. That contention does not appear to have been upheld on the ground that there was no evidence of any such adjustment as alleged, with the result that it was held that Rs. 417-4-0 out of the vasul of the village Chincholi, which was claimed by Appaji as his own, was held as not belonging to the Sansthan. A number of other properties claimed by Appaji were also held us not being appropriated to the Sansthan, including the village of Chikhali. Against this decision of the District Judge dated March 20, 1896, there was an appeal to this Court, being First Appeal No. 104 of 1896, by the trustees, which was decided on February 22, 1897, and this Court confirmed the decision of the District Judge in the Darkhast, with the only modification that village Chikhali which was held not appropriated to the Sansthan by the learned District Judge was held to belong to the Sansthan.

    3. Mr. Jahagirdar contends that this decision cannot operate as res judicata against defendant No. 1 Sansthan, and this contention has been accepted by the learned trial Judge. It was argued that the original suit was filed by the relators of the Deity in 1883 for the removal of the original trustees and the Sansthan as such was not a party to that suit. It appears, however, that after the removal of the trustees, fresh trustees were appointed under the scheme framed by the District Judge. In appeal No. 71 of 1886 Chintaman Bajaji Dev v. Dhondu Ganesh Dev, defendants were allowed express liberty to agitate in the course of execution proceedings as to whether certain lands alleged to belong to the defendants were not included in the property appropriated to the Sansthan by the Peshwa's award in subsequent grants. Accordingly, Darkhast No. 10 of 1891 was filed by Appaji in the District Court, his father Chintaman having died in the meanwhile, and to that darkhast the new trustees of the Sansthan were impleaded as opponents. That is clear from the record of the said darkhast as well as from the original record of First Appeal No. 104 of 1896 which was decided on February 22, 1897. The trustees of the Sansthan expressly laid claim to the amount of Rs. 417-4-0 as the property of the Sansthan, but that was negatived. In our view, it would be impossible to contend that that, decision will not bind defendant No. 1 Sansthan, and it would still be open to the Sansthan to urge that the amount of Rs. 417-4-0 out of the vasul of the village of Chincholi belongs to the Sansthan. It is true that under the Tahnama of 1744 (exh. 46A) that amount appears to have been allotted to the branch of Digambar Dev. But it was claimed by Chintaman and his son Appaji as their private property along with other properties, in Suit No. 2 of 1883, though the plaintiffs in that suit had alleged that those properties belonged to the Sansthan. In the darkhast as well as in appeal, the Sansthan's claim to that amount was rejected. It appears that after the decision of the District Court, possession of the right of recovering Rs. 417-4-0 in the vasul of Chincholi village was given to Appaji by beat of drum and relative entries were made in the Record of Rights in this connection. Appaji died in March 1907 leaving a son Annaji. The members of the joint family of Appaji treated this amount as belonging to the joint-family and by an award of the Poona Court in 1907, Rs. 150 came to the share of plaintiff No. 1 and the balance went to Annaji's share. Annaji died in December 1910, leaving no issue, and under his will his share in the vasul went to plaintiff No. 1 as a residuary legatee. There is no dispute that the amount of Rs. 417-4-0 is being paid to plaintiffs right from 1903 till the date of the acquisition proceedings. There is no dispute either that plaintiff No. 1's name was being shown in the column of ‘other rights’ in respect of Rs. 417-4-0 in the Record of Rights. Ramchandra Gajanan Dev (exh. 67) who was examined on behalf of the trustees, has admitted these facts and stated that plaintiffs' were getting Rs. 417-4-0 a year from the vasul of the Inam village of Chincholi. Though it appears that he belongs to the branch of Digambar, he has not claimed the amount as belonging to Digambar's branch. Nor have the members of Digambars branch sought, to implead themselves in the present suit claiming ownership with respect to it. In our view, even assuming that the decision in Darkhast No. 10 of 1891 and First Appeal No. 104 of 1896 does not operate as res judicata against the Sansthan there is sufficient evidence on the record to prove that plaintiffs have established their title to an amount of Rs. 417-4-0 out of the vasul of the village Chincholi.

    4. Mr. Jahagirdar then contends that even assuming that plaintiffs have established their right to be paid Rs. 417-4-0 out of the vasul of Chincholi, the Sansthan will pay that amount to the plaintiffs every year and the plaintiffs will not be entitled to a share in the compensation moneys. Mr. Jahagirdar argued that the right of the plaintiffs does not amount to an interest in land. All that the plaintiffs get is the amount of Rs. 417-4-0 direct from the village officers of Chincholi; but that, according to Mr. Jahagirdar, does not amount to an interest in land and does not entitle the plaintiffs to a share in the compensation amount paid to the Sansthan. In this connection, Mr. Jahagirdar relied on certain admissions of plaintiff No. 1 Chintaman (exh. 58). It is not possible to accept this contention. No such point was raised in the trial Court. Under s. 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, the Collector has to give public notice stating that claims to compensation for all interests in land to be acquired may be made to him. Under s. 3(a) of the Act, the expression ‘land’ would include benefits to arise out of land, and under s. 3(b), the expression “persons interested”, would include all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made oil account of the acquisition of land under the Act. Admittedly, in the record of rights, though the Devasthan is shown as the Kabjedar, plaintiffs are entered in the column of ‘other rights’ with regard to the amount of Rs. 417-4-0. This amount is being paid admittedly to the plaintiffs by the village officers. It would, therefore, be difficult to accept the contention that plaintiffs have no interest in the land and as such are not entitled to a share in the compensation. Besides, the Sansthan is a public trust and we are not prepared to assume that the Sansthan would be entitled to take upon itself the responsibility of paying permanently Rs. 417-4-0 to the plaintiffs every year. This point, if at all, should have been raised in the trial Court and that not having been done, we do not think that it would, be proper to allow the appellants to raise this point at the stage of appeal. In any case, the argument that plaintiffs' right to get Rs. 417-4-0 every year from the vasul of Chincholi village is not an interest in land cannot be accepted.

    5. Then it is further contended that the entire village of Chincholi is not acquired but admittedly land bearing an assessment of Rs. 127 has not been acquired by the Government. Mr. Jahagirdar, therefore, contends that plaintiffs should obtain the amount of Rs. 127 from the village officers in respect of the land that is not acquired and with regard to the balance of Rs. 290-4-0, at the most, plaintiffs would be entitled to a share in the compensation amount paid to the Sansthan. Mr. Jahagirdar contends that, if this argument were accepted, the amount of compensation payable to the plaintiffs would be reduced to about Rs. 8,800. This argument again cannot be accepted. Such a plea was not taken in the written statement. No issue was framed about it and such a ground has not been taken even in the appeal memo. The point has been argued for the first time at the stage of hearing of this appeal and, therefore, cannot be allowed to be raised. That being so, we do not express any opinion on the point as to whether the amount of Rs. 127 out of the vasul of the village of Chincholi, which has not been acquired, would belong entirely to the Sansthan or whether plaintiffs would have a share in the same.

    6. Mr. Jahagirdar then contends that the suit itself is not competent, because it was open to the plaintiffs to claim a share in the compensation amount in the land acquisition proceedings before the Collector, and they having failed to do so, an independent suit as brought by the plaintiffs is incompetent. We may observe, in the first instance, that this point was not taken in the trial Court, but this ground appears to have been raised under issue No. 11 for the purpose of disallowing plaintiffs costs of the suit. As already indicated, that contention was negatived by the trial Court. Mr. Jahagirdar says that he should be allowed to raise this point about the maintainability of the suit, as it is a pure point of law, and we have allowed Mr. Jahagirdar to argue the point. Mr. Jahagirdar argues that admittedly plaintiff No. 1, during the pendency of the land acquisition proceedings, was the chief trustee of the Sansthan and, therefore, he must be assumed to have had notice of the said proceedings. Plaintiff No. 1 in his evidence at exh. 58 has denied that he was aware of the acquisition proceedings from the beginning. But, as already indicated, before the moneys were paid to the Sansthan, plaintiff No. 1 had preferred a claim to a share in the compensation amount and ultimately the Collector appears to have asked him to recover his share by filing a suit in a Civil Court if the Sansthan did not pay his share in the compensation moneys. In these circumstances, it is difficult to hold that the present suit would not be maintainable.

    7. Under s. 9(3) of the Land Acquisition Act, apart from the public notice contemplated under subs. (1), the Collector has also to serve notice to the occupier, (if any), of such land and on all such persons known or believed to be interested therein. Under s. 11, the Collector is to proceed to enquire into the objections (if any) of any person interested and into the respective interests of persons claiming compensation and then he shall make an award of the true area of the land, the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land and the apportionment of the said compensation among all the persons interested in the land, of whom, or whose claims, the Collector has information, whether or not they have respectively appeared before him. Under s. 30, when the amount of compensation has been settled under s. 11, if any dispute arises as to apportionment of the same or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof, is payable, the Collector may refer such dispute to the decision of the Court, which under s. 3(d) means the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, unless the Local Government has appointed a special judicial officer within specified local limits to perform the functions of the Court under the Act. Under sub-s. (1) of s. 31, on making an award under s. 11, the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award and shall pay it to them unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in sub-s. (2). Under sub-s. (2), if the persons interested shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the Court to which a reference under s. 18 would be submitted: Provided, firstly, that any person admitted to be interested may receive such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount; secondly, that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any application under s. 18; and, thirdly, that nothing contained in sub-s. (2) shall affect the liability of any person, who may receive the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto. All these relevant provisions and especially the third proviso to sub-s. (2) of s. 31, would go clearly against Mr. Jahagirdar's contention. But Mr. Jahagirdar argues that this proviso has been judicially interpreted and that the decisions on this point would support his contention that the present suit is not maintainable. In this connection, reliance is placed, in the first instance, on the case of Rajah Nilmoni Singh v. Ram Bundhoo Roy . 1881 L.R 8 I.A 90., in which it was held that the provisions of ss. 38, 39 and 40 of Act X of 1870, for the settling of compensation for land taken for public purposes, are intended to be final; and where its amount and distribution have been settled by a competent Court, the decision not having been appealed against, the settlement is final, and cannot be questioned in a suit brought by a person whose claim has been so adjudicated upon; and that the proviso in s. 40 applies only to persons whose rights have not been adjudicated upon under ss. 38 and 39. Section 40 of that Act provided that

    “Payment of the compensation shall be made by the Collector according to the award to the persons named therein, or, in the case of an appeal under section thirty-nine, according to the decision on such appeal:

    Provided that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person who may receive the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto.”

    8. It seems that the proviso to s. 40 of the old act was similar to the third proviso to s. 31(2) of the present Act. It appears that in that case, there was a dispute between the Rajah of Pachete and his tenants as to the apportionment of the amount of compensation awarded and the Rajah was awarded an amount of Rs. 84 by the Court under the Land Acquisition Act and the tenants were awarded the rest of the compensation amount. The Rajah did not appeal under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and then filed a suit for the purpose of setting aside the decision as to apportionment of the amount of compensation given by the Court under the Land Acquisition Act. On these facts, the Privy Council confirmed the decision of the Courts in India that the proviso to s. 40 applied only to persons whose rights had not been adjudicated upon in pursuance of ss. 38 and 39 and that the said proviso had not the effect of permitting a person whose claim has been adjudicated upon in the manner pointed out by the Act, to have that claim reopened and again heard in another suit. In bur view, this case, instead of favouring Mr. Jahagirdar's contention, goes against that contention. Then Mr. Jahagirdar relied on a ruling of the Calcutta High Court in Saitbesh Chandra Sarkar v. Moharajadhiraj Sir Bejoy Chand Mohatap . [1922] A.I.R Cal. 4., where it was held that the proviso to s. 31, cl. (2), applies only to cases where the person is under, a disability or is not served with notice of the proceedings before the Collector. In that case, the lands in question were acquired for a Railway and the Zamindar and the defendant (the Putnidar) were served with notices under s. 9 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Collector apportioned the compensation half and half between the Zamindar and the Putnidar. Neither party applied for any reference under s. 18. The Zamindar thereupon brought a suit for recovery of the amount which had been withdrawn by the defendant, on the ground that under the Putni Kabuliyat the Putnidar was not entitled to any portion of the compensation money. One of the defences raised to the suit was that plaintiff ought to have, applied for a reference under s. 18 of the Act and that no separate suit could lie. It was under these circumstances that the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court held that the suit of the Zamindar was not competent. Mr. Jahagirdar laid stress on a passage in the judgment in that case that the Land Acquisition Act created a special jurisdiction and provided a special remedy and ordinarily when jurisdiction had been conferred upon a special Court for the investigation of matters which may possibly be in controversy, such jurisdiction was exclusive. No exception can be taken to this principle. But the facts of that case, are distinguishable from the facts of the present case, because in that case the Collector had actually passed an order of apportionment against which no reference was sought, under s. 18 of the Act. It is true that plaintiff No. 1 in the present suit was the chief trustee of the Sansthan at the relevant time. But he disowned knowledge of the acquisition proceedings. Even assuming that he had knowledge of the proceedings, it is not shown that plaintiff No. 2, who is equally interested in a share in the compensation amount, had notice of the said acquisition proceedings. In spite of the provisions of s. 11, the Collector does not appear to have considered the question of apportionment at all. Besides, plaintiffs applied, though somewhat late, to the Collector for a share in the compensation amount and the Collector; instead of adjudicating upon that claim, appears to have asked the plaintiffs to file a suit to recover his share in case the Sansthan refused to pay them their share. We do not, therefore, think that the ruling of the Calcutta High Court relied upon by Mr. Jahagirdar will support the contention raised by him in this appeal. Mr. Jahagirdar then relied on a ruling of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Nagpur reported in Shivmal v. Ramchandra Bapu . [1933] A.I.R Nag. 322., where it was held that persons who have received notice and who have appeared before the Collector at the time of the apportionment of the compensation money must, if they object to that, apportionment, make application under s. 18 of the Act and are not able to avail themselves of proviso 3 to s. 31(2) of the Act and are, therefore, debarred from filing a suit. That decision again is distinguishable on facts, because there the claimants had not only received notice to receive the compensation amount but had appeared before the Collector at the time, the compensation money was paid and accepted their share under oral protest.

    9. As against Mr. Jahagirdar's contention, it was urged by Mr. Chitale, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents, that the suit would be competent because apportionment proceedings are entirely separate proceedings and would require a separate notice to persons interested in the compensation, money.

    10. In this connection, he relied on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Hurmat Jan Bibi v. Padma Lochun Das . 1885 I.L.R 12 Cal. 33., where it was held that the apportionment of the compensation under s. 39 of Act X of 1870 is intended to be a proceeding distinct from that of settling the amount of compensation under the previous provisions of the Act, and any dispute as to the apportionment is only decided as between those persons who are actually before the Court. A separate notice, therefore, of the apportionment proceedings is requisite to bind any person by those proceedings, and where such a notice, has not been served, any party interested; although served with the notice of the proceedings for settling the amount of the compensation, cannot be considered a party to the proceedings for apportioning it, and is not barred, by the decision of the latter proceedings, from bringing a suit under the proviso to s. 40, to recover a share of the money so apportioned. We do not think it is necessary to decide whether a separate notice of the apportionment proceedings would be required because admittedly in the present case there have been no apportionment proceedings. Mr. Chitale further contended that even assuming that plaintiff No. 1 had notice of the acquisition proceedings in his capacity as a chief trustee, a separate notice should have been given to him since it must have been known to the Revenue authorities that he had an interest in a private capacity in the village vasul to the extent of Rs. 417-4-0. We do not think it is necessary to decide this question either, for the purpose of the present appeal. Mr. Chitale has also invited our attention, to the Privy Council decision, in Ramchandra Rao v. Ramchandra Rao . 1922 24 Bom. L.R 963, P.C, where it was held that the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 contemplated two separate and distinct forms of procedure, one for fixing the amount of compensation described as the award, and the other, for determining in case of dispute the relative rights of the persons entitled to the compensation money. Any dispute as to relative rights of persons entitled to receive compensation money is settled by litigation in the ordinary way. It was further held in that case that the decision of a competent Court even in proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act would operate as res judicata and the same question cannot be reopened in a subsequent litigation between the same parties. That case is also distinguishable on facts. In the present case, the question of apportionment of the compensation amount appears to have been altogether lost sight of by the Land Acquisition authorities despite entries in the record of rights. When, the plaintiffs applied to the Collector for their share, in the compensation money, the amount had been already paid to the Sansthan and the Collector does not appear to have acted under any of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. He merely asked the plaintiffs to apply to the Sansthan for their share, in the compensation amount and, in case of refusal, to file a suit to recover the same. Mr. Chitale contends that in these circumstances, in view of the third proviso to s. 31(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, the suit filed by the plaintiffs would be maintainable. In our judgment, there is considerable force in this argument. Under the third proviso to s. 31(2) of the Act, nothing contained in sub-s. (2) shall affect the liability of any person who may receive the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under the Act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto. Unless, therefore, the claim of such a person, who is lawfully entitled to a share in the compensation money, is already adjudicated upon under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act or such person having had notice of such proceedings, appears therein and fails to assert and prosecute his claim to a share in accordance with the provisions of that Act, he would be entitled to file a suit to recover his share from the person who may have received the whole or any part of the compensation amount awarded under the Act. We must, therefore, reject Mr. Jahagirdar's contention that the suit is not maintainable as plaintiffs did not get their claim adjudicated upon under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.

    [The rest of the judgment is not material to this report.]

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    Shri Deo Sansthan Chinchwad v. Chintaman Dharnidhar Deo
    (Apr 13, 1961)