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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit concerned ownership and possession of land originally belonging to one Ganoji (died 1345F). Ganoji left two widows, Santabai and Baibai. Plaintiff alleged that Santabai adopted him in 1348F with the husband's permission and executed a registered deed of adoption dated 10-8-1348F; he claimed to have been brought up by Santabai and alleged that, after her death, he was driven away by Baibai (defendant No. 1). Plaintiff sought a declaration that he was the adopted son of Ganoji and consequential possession.

The main contest was between plaintiff and Baibai. Baibai denied the adoption, denied execution of any adoption deed by Santabai, pleaded that Santabai was not competent to adopt due to a community custom, and pleaded limitation.

At trial four issues were framed substantively: (1) whether plaintiff proved adoption by Santabai pursuant to her husband's authority and necessary religious ceremonies; (2) whether the registered deed of adoption was proved; (3) whether Santabai was competent to adopt (custom); and (4) whether the suit was barred by limitation. The trial Court recorded findings only on issues Nos. 1 and 3: it held the custom preventing adoption not proved (issue 3) but found that the plaintiff failed to establish the actual giving and taking (issue 1) and dismissed the plaintiff's claim; it did not record findings on issues 2 and 4.

On appeal (first appeal No. 173/4 of 1951), the District Court reversed the trial Court on issue No. 1 and held adoption proved, remanding the suit to the trial Court on 29 July 1952 with directions to try issues Nos. 2 and 4 and dispose of the suit on the merits. Baibai did not appeal from that remand order.

After remand the trial Court considered issues Nos. 2 and 4, declined to reopen the adoption question on the basis that the appellate Court had concluded it, found the suit not barred by limitation and that the registered deed was proved, and decreed the plaintiff on 13 January 1952 A.D. Baibai then appealed to the District Court; the District Court upheld the trial Court's findings on limitation and proof of the adoption deed and dismissed Baibai's appeal, concluding that the question of adoption and the point about custom were not open to challenge because Baibai had not appealed the earlier remand/order. The present matter is Baibai's second appeal against that decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the finding recorded by the first appellate Court (in appeal No. 173/4 of 1951) that the plaintiff had proved adoption by Santabai is final and conclusive under Section 105(2) of the Civil Procedure Code (i.e., whether failure to appeal from an appealable order of remand precludes disputing its correctness, including the findings supporting that order).
  2. Whether the order of remand passed by the first appellate Court was an appealable order under Order XLI, rule 23 of the Civil Procedure Code (as opposed to being under Order XLI, rule 25 or Section 151), and thus whether Baibai's failure to appeal from it precludes challenging the appellate finding.
  3. Whether, on the merits and evidence, the adoption-deed was proved (as relevant to issue No. 2 and to the court's ultimate disposal).

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant No. 1 (Baibai) — Mr. V.S. Deshpande

  • Contended that the District Court was not entitled to decide issue No. 1 relating to proof of adoption (i.e., the trial Court should have been permitted to re-decide that issue after remand).
  • Contended that the earlier first appellate Court's finding that adoption had taken place was incorrect and could be challenged in the present proceedings.
  • Argued that the remand order was not an appealable order under Order XLI, rule 23 (suggesting it was under rule 25 or Section 151), and thus Section 105(2) did not preclude disputing the correctness of the appellate finding.
  • Argued that the trial Court had only decided one part of issue No. 1 (the physical act of giving and taking), so finality should not attach to the whole of issue No. 1.
  • Attacked the identity of Santabai as the executant of the adoption-deed, alleging a pretender had posed as Santabai before the Sub-Registrar.

Plaintiff — Mr. S.J. Deshpande

  • Raised a preliminary point that the first appellate Court's finding (in appeal No. 173/4 of 1951) that plaintiff had proved adoption was final and conclusive under Section 105(2) CPC because Baibai did not appeal that order of remand, relying on Section 105(2) and Order XLIII, Rule 1, Clause (u) CPC.
  • Submitted that, as a result, Baibai is precluded from challenging that finding and the remand order and that the trial Court and later appellate disposal proceed accordingly.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Khadem Hossein v. Emdad Hossein, ILR 29 Cal 758 (FB) Illustrated that, absent the later amendment (sub-s. (2) of S. 105), an order of remand could be challenged subsequently; court decisions previously allowed remand orders to be impeached. The Court relied on this case to explain the historical position and to show why sub-s. (2) of S. 105 was introduced to negate that effect; it formed part of the reasoning that Section 105(2) was enacted to prevent reopening appealable remand orders.
Gokarakonda Audinarayudu v. Surapureddi Mangamma, AIR 1943 Mad 706 Held that where a case was remanded on a particular ground (e.g., application of a statutory provision) and no appeal was filed from that remand, the parties were precluded from disputing the correctness of the finding that led to remand. The Court treated this decision as directly on point and supportive of the proposition that an appealable order of remand, if not appealed, makes the finding supporting remand final and conclusive.
Karam Singh v. Vir Singh, AIR 1921 Lah. 154 Applied the same view: if an appeal is not preferred against that part of an appellate order remanding or upholding a part of the decision, the parties are precluded from disputing it and must appeal against the remand rather than raise the point later. The Court cited this case to corroborate the interpretation of Section 105(2) and to show consistent judicial treatment that failure to appeal from the remand/order results in finality of the relevant findings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise statutory and precedential analysis with fidelity to the text of Section 105 CPC. It first read sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 105 in conjunction:

  1. Interpreting S. 105(1): the Court noted that interlocutory orders made in original or appellate jurisdiction are not generally subject to independent appeal unless appeal is provided. However, where a decree is appealed, errors or irregularities in interlocutory orders that affect the decision on the merits may be set forth in the memorandum of appeal. The Court explained this provision permits challenging interlocutory orders when they affect the merits of the decision on appeal.
  2. Interpreting S. 105(2): the Court observed that sub-s. (2) is an express exception to sub-s. (1) and states that where an appealable order of remand is not appealed, the aggrieved party is precluded from disputing its correctness thereafter. The Court concluded that the Legislature intended to make appealable orders of remand final and conclusive if not appealed from, thereby overriding the broader permissive effect of sub-s. (1) in remand situations.
  3. Precedential support: the Court relied on judicial authorities (including Khadem Hossein, Gokarakonda Audinarayudu, and Karam Singh) to show that prior law permitted challenging remand findings and that the legislative insertion of sub-s. (2) was intended to reverse that effect. Gokarakonda Audinarayudu was treated as directly supporting the proposition that an unappealed remand precludes disputing the correctness of the finding that led to remand.
  4. Application to facts: the Court concluded that not only the remand order (dated 29th January/July 1952 as cited) but also the finding on which that remand was based (the first appellate Court's conclusion that plaintiff had proved adoption—issue No. 1) became final and conclusive because Baibai did not appeal that order. The Court rejected the submission that only the formal remand order (and not the reasoning/judgment) would be final, explaining that such a narrow reading would render sub-s. (2) nugatory and thwart legislative intent.
  5. On whether the remand order was appealable and thus within Section 105(2): the Court examined Order XLI, rules 23 and 25 and Section 151 CPC. It concluded the remand was under Order XLI, rule 23 (i.e., an appealable remand following a decision on a preliminary point) because the appellate order effectively reversed the trial Court's decree and directed the trial Court to dispose the suit on merits; had the remand been under rule 25 the procedure and subsequent events (fresh decree, fresh appeal) would have differed. The Court also clarified that a "preliminary point" need not be only a question of law or jurisdiction; it can be a factual point the determination of which enables a decree to be passed. Because the trial Court had decided that issue No. 1 was not established and declined to decide other issues, that decision operated as a preliminary point within rule 23.
  6. On scope of the appellate decision and finality: the Court rejected the argument that only part of issue No. 1 had been decided. The Court held that finality must be assessed with reference to what the first appellate Court decided; that Court had specifically held that issue No. 1 was proved and remanded only for remaining issues, so the appellate decision covered the whole issue No. 1 and was final.
  7. Addressing alleged inconsistency (appellate Court's reliance on the existence of a registered adoption deed while issue No. 2 remained undecided): the Court observed that this was not an inconsistency that invalidates finality; it was an anticipatory or provisional reasoning which did not prevent the remand/finality effect.
  8. On the remaining open question (issue No. 2 — execution of the adoption deed): the Court considered the evidence. Two witnesses for plaintiff testified: Maruti (plaintiff's father, an interested witness) and Kishanrao. The Court found Kishanrao's evidence definite and credible that Santabai executed and acknowledged the deed before the Sub-Registrar and that Kishanrao had identified her. The Court noted that both the trial Court and the first appellate Court believed Kishanrao, and the Court declined to reject his testimony in a second appeal.

Based on the statutory reading, precedent, procedural history and witness evidence, the Court concluded that Baibai is precluded from disputing the first appellate finding of adoption and that the registered deed of adoption was proved on the evidence considered.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

THE SECOND APPEAL IS DISMISSED.

The Court specifically held that the order of remand passed by the first appellate Court (appeal No. 173/4 of 1951) was an appealable order under Order XLI, rule 23 and, because Baibai did not appeal that order, she is precluded by Section 105(2) of the Civil Procedure Code from disputing the correctness of the finding by which that remand was supported — namely, the first appellate Court's finding that plaintiff had proved adoption by Santabai (issue No. 1). The Court also held on the evidence that the registered adoption deed had been proved (crediting the testimony of Kishanrao) and therefore dismissed the second appeal with costs. The Rule in Civil Application No. 937 of 1959 was discharged with costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: Baibai is precluded from contesting the first appellate finding that plaintiff was adopted by Santabai; the decree in favour of the plaintiff is upheld and Baibai's second appeal fails. Costs were awarded against the appellant.
  • On procedural law: the Court's decision confirms the operation and scope of Section 105(2) CPC as interpreted in this opinion — an unappealed appealable remand order (and the findings supporting it) are final and conclusive. The Court explained that an order of remand under Order XLI, rule 23 is appealable and that failure to appeal it bars later attack on the findings leading to remand.
  • No broader or novel factual rule about adoption was created beyond the application of established principles to the facts: the Court applied existing statutory interpretation and precedent to find finality and then, on the merits, accepted witness evidence to uphold proof of the adoption deed.

Order: Appeal dismissed with costs; Rule in Civil Application No. 937 of 1959 discharged with costs.

Judge / Order notation (as in the opinion):

JD/D.H.Z
Order accordingly.

    Bai Bai v. Mahadu Maruti

    This is a second appeal by defendant No. 1. The property in dispute in the suit from which this appeal arises originally belonged to one Ganoji, who died in 1345F, leaving behind him two widows named Santabai and Baibai. Plaintiff alleged that he was adopted by Santabai in 1348F in pursuance of the permission given to her by her husband, and that a registered deed of adoption, dated 10-8-1348F, was executed by her. He alleged that he was brought up by Santabai; that Santabai died about 3 years before he instituted the suit, and, subsequently, he was driven. away by her co-widow and his step-mother Baibai. Plaintiff claimed a declaration that he was the adopted son of Ganoji and claimed possession on that basis. Defendant No. 1 was Baibai. There were two other defendants. They were joined on the ground that they were cultivitators and in actual possession of the suit lands. Ultimately, it was decided that these two defendants were unnecessary parties. The main contest was between plaintiff and defendant No. 1, Baibai. Her defence was that plaintiff was not adopted by Santabai, and that the story about adoption was false. She denied that Santabai had executed any adoption deed. She also contended that Santabai was not competent to adopt by virtue of a custom prevailing amongst the community to which the parties belong. She also pleaded limitation. She also denied that her husband had permitted Santabai to make an adoption.

    2. On these pleadings, substantially, four issues were raised in the trial Court. The first was whether plaintiff proved that he was adopted by Santabai in pursuance of the authority of her husband and by performance of the necessary religious ceremonies. The third issue was whether Santabai was competent to adopt. It is common ground that this issue was raised to try the contention of Baibai that there was a custom by which Santabai was precluded from adopting. The other two issues were whether the registered deed of adoption was proved and whether the suit was in time. The trial Court did not record its findings on issues Nos. 2 and 4. It recorded its findings only on issues Nos. 1 and 3. It held that the alleged custom not to adopt was not proved. However, on the first issue relating to adoption, the trial Court held that plaintiff had failed to establish that the actual giving and taking had taken place. Consequently, it recorded a finding that issue No. 1 had not been proved. It came to the conclusion that, therefore, it was not necessary for it to record its findings on issues Nos. 2 and 4, and, on the basis of its finding on issue No. 1, it dismissed the claim of plaintiff. Plaintiff went in appeal to the District Court. That Court reversed the finding of the trial Court on issue No. 1. It held that issue in favour of plaintiff. It held that adoption had been proved and, on this basis, it passed an order on 29th July 1952 A.D remanding the suit to the trial Court with a direction that Court shall proceed to try issues Nos. 2 and 4 and dispose of the suit on merits and in accordance with law. Defendant No. 1 Baibai did not prefer any appeal from this order of remand. After the remand, the trial Court proceeded to decide the suit. It appears that Baibai again contested the adoption of plaintiff. The trial Court, however, held that it was not competent for it to decide that issue and the matter was concluded by the judgment of the District Court. The finding relating to custom, which had been recorded by the trial Court earlier, was also sought to be challenged in that Court. The contention was negatived on the ground that the matter had already been decided by that Court earlier, and, therefore, the trial Court was no longer competent to deal with that issue. On the remaining two issues, the trial Court held that the suit of plaintiff was not barred by limitation and that the registered deed of adoption had been proved. This decision was given by the trial Court on 13th January 1952 A.D, and, consistent with the aforesaid findings, the trial Court decreed the claim of plaintiff. From this decision, Baibai preferred a first appeal to the District Court. All the four issues which had been raised in the trial Court were again sought to be re-agitated by Baibai in the District Court. The District Court took the view that the issue about custom was not open to challenge as it had not been challenged in the first appeal No. 173/4 of 1951 in which the order of remand, dated 29th January 1952 was passed. As regards the question of adoption, the District Court held that the matter was no longer open, and, the finding, recorded by that Court in the earlier appeal No. 173/4 of 1951, was conclusive as it was not appealed against by Baibai. That Court concurred with the findings of the trial Court on the question of limitation and proof of adoption deed. Consistent with these findings, the District Court dismissed the appeal of Baibai and confirmed the decree of the trial Court. It is from this decree that the present second appeal is filed.

    3. Mr. V.S Deshpande, who appears on behalf of Baibai, raises two points in this appeal. His first point is that the finding of the District Court that Court was not entitled to decide issue No. 1 relating to the proof of adoption was not correct. His second point is that the finding, which had been earlier recorded by the District Court, that adoption had taken place, was not, in fact, correct.

    4. Mr. S.J Deshpande, who appears on behalf of plaintiff, however, raises a preliminary point. He submits that the finding of the District Court, recorded in Appeal No. 173/4 of 1951, that plaintiff had proved his adoption, was final and conclusive, and that finding cannot be challenged by Baibai on account of the fact that Baibai had failed to prefer an appeal from that decision of the first appellate Court, which she was competent to prefer under O. XLIII, R. 1, cl. (u) of the Code of Civil Procedure. This submission is based upon S. 105, sub-s. (2) of the Civil Procedure Code. In order to decide this point, it is necessary to read S. 105 as a whole. That section is as follows:

    “105. (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided, no appeal shall lie from any order made by a Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction; but, where a decree is appealed from, any error, defect or irregularity in any order, affecting the decision of the case, may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal.

    (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-s. (1), where any party aggrieved by an order of remand made after the commencement of this Code from which an appeal lies does not appeal therefrom, he shall thereafter be precluded from disputing its correctness”.

    5. The first part of sub-s. (1) provides that an appeal shall not lie from any order made by a Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction, unless an appeal is provided for. Therefore, the normal rule is that an appeal does not lie from an order passed either by an original or an appellate Court. Order 43, C.P.C provides for appeals from several kinds of orders. The latter part of sub-s. (1) of S. 105 says that where a decree is appealed from, then, the order passed by the original or the appellate Court, which affects the decision of the case can be challenged in the appeal. Therefore, the effect of sub-s. (1) is that where an interlocutory order is passed in the course of a litigation, whether an appeal is provided for for the same or not, that interlocutory order can be challenged at the time of the hearing of appeal from the decree which ultimately comes to be passed in that litigation, even though appeal may not have been filed from that interlocutory order, provided the error, defect or the irregularity in the interlocutory order affects the decision of the case. It is now well-settled that it is not open to a party to challenge an interlocutory order by itself if an appeal is not provided for the same, or if an appeal is provided for and one is not preferred from that order. But, if the order, which is appealed from affects the decision of the case on the merits, then, the interlocutory order is open to challenge. Therefore, the true effect of sub-s. (1) is that an interlocutory order, which happens to be passed in the course of any litigation, is open to challenge provided that the interlocutory order has affected the decision of the case on the merits. The expression “affecting the decision of the case” used in sub-s. (1) has been construed to mean a decision on the merits of the case, and this position in law is not challenged by Mr. V.S Deshpande. Sub-section (2) of S. 105 provides that

    “notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any party aggrieved by an order of remand, from which an appeal lies, does not appeal therefrom, he shall thereafter be precluded from disputing its correctness”.

    6. Therefore, there is no doubt that, if an order of remand is made in an appeal, and if that order is appealable, and, further if an appeal does not come to be preferred, then, the order of remand becomes final and conclusive and is not impeachable in any further proceedings. Mr. V.S Deshpande does not dispute the correctness of this proposition. But he contends that the conclusiveness attaches only to the order of remand and not to the finding on which the order of remand is ultimately based. Therefore, his submission is that, in the present case, though it is not open to Baibai to challenge the order of remand which was passed in appeal No. 173/4 of 1951, which ordered the trial Court to proceed further for the determination of issues Nos. 2 and 4, it is still open to Baibai to challenge the finding of the first appellate Court in the aforesaid appeal that plaintiff had proved that he was adopted by Santabai. Mr. V.S Deshpande supports his submission by contending that there is a clear distinction between an order and a judgment. He relies upon the definitions of these two words given in S. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An “Order” has been defined in S. 2, sub-s. (14), to mean the formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree; and, a ‘Judgment’ has been defined, in sub-s. (9), to mean the statement given by a Judge of the grounds of a decree or order. Mr. V.S Deshpande contends that, when an appellate Court delivers a judgment, which results in an order of remand, then, conclusiveness attaches only to the latter order and not to the finding or statement of reasons given for making that order. He contends that sub-s. (2) of S. 105 has the effect of depriving a litigant of his right to get his matter decided by a higher Court, and takes away the jurisdiction which otherwise vests in the higher Court, and should be strictly construed. He says that, if, really the intention of the Legislature was to preclude a higher Court from determining a question, which was decided by the first appellate Court, when it passed the order of remand, then, the Legislature would have expressly stated so and provided that conclusiveness attached not merely to the order of remand, but, also to the judgment i.e the statement of the grounds on which the order of remand was based. However, there are two objections to this line of reasoning. The first is that sub-s. (2) of S. 105 has got to be read in the context of sub-s. (1). Sub-section (2) appears to have been intended as an exception to that which is provided for in sub-s. (1). As I have already indicated, the true effect and meaning of sub-s. (1) is to enable a litigant to agitate all interlocutory orders in so far as they affect the decision on the merits of the case, even though an appeal may not have been preferred from those interlocutory orders. If sub-s. (1) had stood by itself without sub-sec. (2), then, it is clear that an order of remand could have been challenged or impeached by a litigant in a higher Court at a later stage, even if he may not have preferred an appeal therefrom. In fact, this was what was held by the Calcutta High Court in Khadem Hossein v. Emdad Hossein, ILR 29 Cal 758 (FB). It was to nullify the effect of this decision that sub-s. (2) of S. 105 was introduced by the Legislature in the Civil Procedure Code of 1908. Therefore, it is quite clear that the intention of the Legislature was to make an exception in the case of an appealable order of remand, whereas other appealable orders can be challenged in appeals in so far as those orders affect the decision on the merits it cannot be so done in case of appealable orders of remand. Therefore, so far as the order of remand is concerned, the same becomes final and conclusive and cannot be challenged even though it affects the decision on the merits. Therefore, in my view whereas sub-s. (1) of S. 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure was enacted to advocate that all orders, including appealable orders, could be impeached on the merits in appeals from decrees, sub-s. (2) was added so that appealable orders of remand may not have such an effect. Secondly, if the operation of sub-s. (2) was confined only to the order of remand and not to the judgment or the finding on which the order of remand was based, then, one would not be giving effect to the legislative intention, as it can be gathered from a combined reading of sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 105. If the argument of Mr. V.S Deshpande were to be upheld that the conclusiveness attaches only to the order of remand and not to the finding on which it is based, then, the legislative provision contained in sub-s. (2) would become nugatory and nullified, and the higher Courts would be competent to interfere in appeals from all orders of remand for it is difficult to contemplate of a case in which the finding can be successfully challenged and the order of remand can be maintained. If the finding can be successfully impeached, it must necessarily follow that the order of remand must be held to be bad and unsustainable.

    7. Sub-section (2) of S. 105 was introduced for the first time in the Code of 1908 as also S. 97. By S. 97, the Legislature provided that, in case a party did not prefer an appeal from a preliminary decree, then he shall be precluded from disputing its correctness in an appeal which may be preferred from the final decree. The language which has been used by the Legislature in section 97 is identical with the language which has been used in sub-section (2) of section 105 of the Civil Procedure Code. There are decisions of several High Courts which have interpreted the expression “precluded from disputing its correctness”, and it is now well-settled that, when an appeal is not preferred from the preliminary decree, then all the findings which have been recorded by the trial Court which led to the passing of the preliminary decree become conclusive and cannot be challenged in an appeal from the final decree. It is only if this construction is given to section 97 that finality will be attached to the preliminary decree which is not appealed from. If another construction is given which leaves it open to any party to challenge the findings upon which the preliminary decree was passed, then, section 97 of the Civil Procedure Code would be rendered nugatory.

    8. The question about the interpretation of sub-section (2) of section 105 arose directly in Gokarakonda Audinarayudu v. Surapureddi Mangamma, AIR 1943 Mad 706. In that case, the first Appellate Court had decided that section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code applied to the facts of the case, and grounded its order of remand on that decision. No appeal was preferred from this order of remand, and, in a second appeal, which was preferred after the decision was given by the executing Court after the order of remand, the question about the finality of the finding recorded by the first appellate Court that section 47 applied to the facts of the case was raised. In dealing with this contention, King J. held that

    “where a case was remanded on the ground that section 47 applied to the facts of the case and no appeal was filed from that order of remand, the parties were precluded from disputing the correctness of the finding that section 47 applied to the facts of the case.”

    9. In the case reported in Karam Singh v. Vir Singh, AIR 1921 Lah. 154, the same view was taken, although the question did not directly arise for decision in that case. The question which was raised in that case was whether an appeal lay from that part of the order of the first appellate Court which upheld a part of the decision arrived at by the trial Court. In that case, the trial Court had dismissed the claim of the plaintiff on the ground that the suit was not maintainable as the plaintiff had not prayed for a decree for possession. The appellate Court upheld this view in so far as the plaintiff had prayed for a decree for an injunction, and reversed it in so far as the plaintiff claimed for a specific amount of compensation. Plaintiff went in appeal against the decision of the first appellate Court that the suit of the plaintiff was not maintainable in so far as he claimed for a decree for an injunction. The appeal was resisted on the preliminary ground that an appeal did not lie from the order of the first appellate Court which was appealed from. In repelling this argument, Wilberforce J. observed as follows:

    “With respect, moreover, to the portion in which the plaintiff has been unsuccessful it must be noticed that he is precluded from questioning the decision in any way other than by an appeal against the order of remand. This is clear from the provision of section 105(2).”

    10. Therefore, the learned Judge held, in that case, that it was necessary for the plaintiff to prefer an appeal from that part of the decision of the learned appellate Judge, which had upheld the decision of the trial Court, because, if he did not do so, then, the decision would become conclusive and final.

    11. For the aforesaid reasons, I have come to the conclusion that, on a correct construction of sub-section (2) of section 105, not only the order of remand, which was passed on 29th January 1952, is final and conclusive, but, even the finding, which the first appellate Court gave in support of that order of remand, is also final and conclusive.

    12. Mr. V.S Deshpande, however, submitted that the order of remand, which was passed in appeal No. 173/4 of 1951, was not an appealable order. He submitted that it was not an order which was passed under Order XLI, rule 23, Civil Procedure Code. His contention was that this was an order either under Order XLI, rule 25, or under section 151 Civil Procedure Code. I do not think I can uphold this contention. Mr. V.S Deshpande's contention was that, in order that an order may be under Order XLI, rule 23, it was necessary that the decree of the trial Court should have been reversed, and, his contention was that there were no such words used in the order of remand. It is true that the order of remand does not say in terms that the decree of the trial Court is reversed, but, at the same time, if the order of remand is read as a whole, there is no doubt whatsoever that the decree was reversed. The final portion of the order stated that the trial Court was directed to dispose of the suit on the merits in accordance with law. The actual events which have happened after the order of remand also corroborate the view that the decree of the trial court was reversed. If really the order had been under Order XLI, rule 25, then, the trial Court would not have passed a fresh decree. In that contingency, the trial Court would have only certified findings to the appellate Court. Moreover, there would not have been a fresh appeal. The old appeal would have been continued on the file, and the fresh findings of the trial Court would have been dealt with in that first appeal. There is no doubt that nothing of this sort has happened in the present case. The appeal was disposed of. The trial Court passed a fresh decree, and the trial Court was competent to do this under the order of the appellate Court, which directed it to dispose of the suit in accordance with law. Therefore, there is no doubt whatsoever that the order of remand was not passed under Order XLI, rule 25 Civil Procedure Code. As regards section 151, Civil Procedure Code, if the order is sustainable under Order XLI, rule 23, then, that section will have no application. In order that rule 23 may apply, it is necessary that there should be a decision by the trial Court on a preliminary point. The expression ‘preliminary point’ does not mean the same thing as a ‘preliminary issue’. A ‘preliminary point’ means a point, the determination of which enables the trial Court to pass a decree and relieves it from the necessity of determining the other points, involved in the suits. Mr. V.S Deshpande further contended that the expression ‘preliminary point’ should be confined only to points of law and points of jurisdiction, and not to points of fact. There is nothing in rule 23 which goes to support this contention. Even if the point decided by the trial Court happens to be a point of fact, but if the test is satisfied that the point was such that a decree could have been granted by the trial Court on the basis of its decision on that point, then, it would be a preliminary point within the meaning of Order XLI, rule 23, Civil Procedure Code. Applying this test, there is no doubt whatsoever that the present suit was decided by the trial Court on the preliminary point that issue No. 1 had not been established by the plaintiff. It is quite clear that, in order to succeed, it was necessary for the plaintiff to establish that he was adopted by Santabai, and, if the trial Court was able to record a finding that this point was not established, then, the trial Court could take the view that it was not necessary for it to determine the other issue involved in the case. Therefore, in my opinion, the order, which was passed on 29th July 1952 was an order which was passed under Order XLI, rule 23, and, therefore, that order was appealable, and, as Baibai did not prefer an appeal from that order, then, she is precluded from challenging the finding on which that order of remand was based.

    13. The second contention of Mr. V.S Deshpande was that the preliminary point, which was decided by the trial Court, did not cover all that was contained in issue No. 1, but that it covered only one part thereof. He contended that the trial Court had only decided that the actual physical act of giving and taking had not taken place, and the suit of the plaintiff had been dismissed only on that ground; and that the other points involved for deciding the question of adoption, had not been determined by that Court. He, therefore, contended that the decision of the first appellate Court in appeal No. 173/4 of 1951 could have the effect of only reversing this decision and no more. He contended that finality should be given only to this limited finding and should not be given to the whole of issue No. 1 relating to the proof of adoption. I do not think I can uphold this contention. In order to determine the question of finality, it is not the decision of the trial Court which is material. Finality does not attach to that decision, but the finality attaches to the decision of the first appellate Court, and, it is to the decision of that Court that one must turn for the purpose of determining the question as to what part thereof is final and conclusive. On this subject, there is no doubt whatsoever that the first appellate Court has decided the whole of the issue No. 1 and it definitely held that the plaintiff was adopted by Santabai. Mr. V.S Deshpande contended that this finding was erroneous inasmuch as the first appellate Court had assumed that the question about the religious ceremonies had been decided in favour of plaintiff, whereas, in fact, no such decision was given by the trial Court. The fact that the first appellate Court has made a wrong assumption, and that issue No. 1 has been wrongly decided on that ground, does not, in any way, affect the question of finality. The question is not whether a finding is erroneous, but whether a finding, in fact, has been given; and if, in fact, it has been given, it becomes conclusive. Now, on this subject, there is no doubt, as I have already stated that the first appellate Court has decided in specific terms that issue No. 1 has been proved by plaintiff. This is also clear from the fact that the first appellate Court has, in specific terms directed that the trial Court should decide only issues Nos. 2 and 4. Therefore in my opinion, the order of remand was based upon the finding on the whole of issue No. 1, and that being so, finality attaches to the decision on the first issue, and Baibai is now precluded from contending that the plaintiff was not the adopted son of Santabai.

    14. Mr. V.S Deshpande further contended that there was an inconsistency in the finding which had been recorded by the first appellate Court. He stated that, in arriving at a decision on issue No. 1, the first appellate Court had taken into consideration the fact that a registered deed of adoption had been made; whereas, this point was the subject-matter of issue No. 2 which was undecided. However, this does not necessarily mean an inconsistency. It means that if issue No. 2 is found in favour of Baibai, then, the suit of the plaintiff would come to be dismissed. On the other hand, if that issue is found in favour of plaintiff then, in that case, it would strengthen the evidence which the plaintiff had led on the subject of adoption. All that the appellate Court has done is to give an anticipatory and provisional reasoning in support of its finding on the first issue and no more.

    15. Mr. V.S Deshpande contended that although he may be precluded from disputing the correctness of the finding recorded on issue No. 1, he was entitled to dispute the correctness of the finding on issue No. 2, which related to the execution of an adoption-deed by Santabai. There is no doubt that he could do so. Mr. S.J Deshpande did not dispute this proposition. Therefore, the next question for consideration is whether Santabai had executed an adoption-deed. On this subject, plaintiff has examined two witnesses—Maruti and Kishanrao. Both of these witnesses have deposed that Santabai had executed the adoption-deed in their presence. It is true that Maruti is the father of plaintiff, and, as such, is highly interested. If the evidence of Maruti alone had been there, in view of the fact that the deed is in a spoiled condition, one may not have attached much importance to his evidence. But, so far as Kishanrao is concerned, I do not think his evidence can be rejected on any legitimate ground. He is quite definite that when Santabai executed the deed, he was present and that he was also present when Santabai acknowledged her execution before the Sub-Registrar, and that he identified Santabai before that Officer. The main ground of attack of Mr. V.S Deshpande appears to be that the identity of Santabai as the executant of the adoption-deed has not been established. The case of Baibai was that another lady was made to pose as Santabai before the Sub-Registrar, and the deed had been got executed by the pretender. Kishanrao's evidence definitely overrules this contention. It is true that Kishanrao does not belong to the village to which Santabai did. It is also true that he had not much connection with Santabai. But, at the same time, his evidence is quite definite that he knew Santabai, and that it was she who had taken plaintiff in adoption; that it was she who had put the thumb impression on the document; and that it was she whom he had identified before the Sub-Registrar. This witness has been believed by the trial Court as well as by the first appellate Court, and I do not think it would be proper to reject his testimony in second appeal.

    16. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs.

    17. Rule in Civil Application No. 937 of 1959 is discharged with costs.

    JD/D.H.Z
    Order accordingly.
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    Bai Bai v. Mahadu Maruti
    (Nov 4, 1959)