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  • Section 19(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947,
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  • Section 19(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition is a rule for a writ of certiorari directed to the Industrial Tribunal, Bombay (Mr. P.S. Bakhale) challenging an award made on 20 November 1948 (published 28 November 1948). The petitioners are Bombay Garage Limited, a company which commenced business on 1 April 1945 by taking over the business of Messrs. F.M. Chinoy & Co. Ltd., proprietors of the Bombay Garage. Disputes between the petitioners and their employees arose in July 1946. The provincial Government, by notification dated 20 March 1948, referred the dispute to the tribunal. The workers' demands were set out in annexure (A) to that notification; the opinion identifies as relevant (3) a demand for dearness allowance at the minimum rate of Rs. 1/8 per day with effect from 1 January 1947, and a sixth-head demand for gratuity. The petitioners challenge parts of the tribunal's award concerning (a) the grant of dearness allowance from 1 January 1947, (b) certain gratuity provisions (only sub-paragraphs (i) and 3(a) were specifically attacked), and (c) whether prior service with the predecessor employer should be counted for gratuity.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Industrial Tribunal had jurisdiction to award dearness allowance effective from 1 January 1947 (a date prior to the date of the award), notwithstanding Section 19(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the statutory operation period of awards.
  2. Whether the tribunal could lawfully award gratuity in the forms set out in the award, specifically (i) gratuity on death without a minimum qualifying period and (ii) gratuity on termination after 5 years (sub‑para 3(a)), when the demand was for gratuity after a minimum of 10 years' service.
  3. Whether service rendered to the petitioners' predecessors (Messrs. F.M. Chinoy & Co. Ltd.) should be counted when computing gratuity entitlement for employees said to have been in continuous service since before the take-over.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The tribunal could not award dearness allowance for any period prior to the date of the award because, under Section 19(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, an award is binding and remains in operation for such period not exceeding one year as fixed by the Provincial Government; conferring benefits for an earlier period would result in benefits accruing for a period in excess of the statutory limit.
  • The demand for gratuity was for a minimum of 10 years' service, so the tribunal lacked competence to award gratuity for service of less than 10 years; specifically, sub-paragraph (i) (gratuity on death irrespective of length of service) and sub-paragraph 3(a) (gratuity on termination after 5 but less than 10 years) were said to be without jurisdiction.
  • The period of service during which employees worked for the predecessor employer (Messrs. F.M. Chinoy & Co. Ltd.) should not be counted when determining gratuity payable by the petitioners, because the petitioners' employment began on 1 January 1945.

Respondent / Tribunal's Position (as reflected in the award and the court's account)

  • The tribunal awarded dearness allowance from 1 January 1947 because that specific demand was referred to it by government notification.
  • The tribunal set out a scale of gratuity for different contingencies (death, voluntary retirement/resignation after 15 years, termination by company with graduated rates for various service ranges, and exclusions for dismissal for dishonesty/misconduct) and treated certain gratuity provisions as falling within the scope of demands before it, including those for retrenched workmen.
  • The tribunal treated services rendered to the predecessor employer as part of continuous service and therefore included them when calculating gratuity entitlement.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Award in respect of Provident Fund of Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Ltd., dated 6 November 1917; published in Bombay Government Gazette, 19 November 1947, p. 4375, Part I (decision by Sir H.V. Divatia) Illustration that, on the facts of that case, services prior to the employer's takeover were held not to constitute continuity of service and therefore should not be counted for benefits. The court noted the award but distinguished it: Sir H.V. Divatia concluded there was no continuity on the facts of that case, whereas in the present case the tribunal found continuity of service. The court therefore held the cited award inapplicable to the present facts and did not treat it as persuasive to set aside the tribunal's finding of continuity.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed each challenged point in turn, applying statutory context and factual findings recorded in the award.

  1. On the dearness allowance claim the petitioners' objection was that the tribunal could not award benefits for a period prior to the award because Section 19(3) limits the period an award remains in operation. The court rejected that contention:
    • The court explained that an award comes into operation only after a declaration under Section 15 by the Provincial Government, but benefits conferred by an award may relate to any prior period (for example, claims for gratuity or bonus necessarily relate to prior service).
    • The demand for dearness allowance commencing 1 January 1947 was specifically referred to the tribunal; therefore the tribunal had jurisdiction to grant it for that prior period.
    • The court reasoned that denying such jurisdiction would produce unjust results, namely that workers would necessarily lose claims for allowances accruing before the award date, an outcome the law does not require.
    The court concluded the first objection to the award failed.
  2. On gratuity the tribunal's award provided a detailed scale. The petitioners challenged sub-paragraph (i) (gratuity on death without a minimum qualifying service) and sub-paragraph 3(a) (gratuity on termination after 5 but less than 10 years). The court analysed both:
    • Sub-paragraph (i): The demand as framed was for gratuity after a minimum of 10 years, and the tribunal had awarded gratuity on death irrespective of any minimum period. The court held that the tribunal lacked competence to award gratuity for less than the minimum period sought in the demand; accordingly this part of the award was without jurisdiction.
    • Sub-paragraph 3(a): Although this provision appears under the "sixth head" (gratuity), the court found it to be within the scope of the "ninth head" of demands, which concerned gratuity payable to retrenched workmen, and specifically noted the respondent had made provision for gratuity for more than six months' service under head 9(f). Because the tribunal's award under 3(a) corresponded to demands properly before it (including a minimum starting point of six months in head 9(f)), that portion was within jurisdiction and valid.
  3. On the question whether service with the predecessor employer should count for gratuity, the court held:
    • An employer cannot defeat benefits accruing to employees by transferring the business; where there is continuity of service, a new employer is bound to take into account service rendered to predecessors for purposes such as gratuity.
    • The tribunal had found continuity of service in the present case. The court distinguished the Imperial Chemical Industries award (where the tribunal found no continuity on the facts) and held that that award did not apply to the present facts. Accordingly, the petitioners' objection on this ground failed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court made the rule absolute only to the limited extent identified: it set aside that portion of the tribunal's award which, under the sixth head, granted gratuity on death irrespective of any minimum qualifying period (i.e., sub-paragraph (i) of the gratuity scale). The court left the rest of the award intact, including the grant under sub-paragraph 3(a), and upheld the tribunal's conclusion that antecedent service with the predecessor employer counted as continuous service for gratuity purposes.

DISPOSITION: To the extent of sub-paragraph (i) of the award relating to the sixth head (gratuity on death without a minimum qualifying period), the award is without jurisdiction and is set aside; the rule is made absolute to that extent. No order as to costs of the petition.

Implications: The decision directly affects only the parties by invalidating the specific portion of the tribunal's gratuity award described above. The court did not purport to lay down a broader binding precedent beyond its application to the facts before it; it affirmed the tribunal's jurisdiction to award benefits relating to periods prior to the award date when those matters were properly referred, and it upheld the tribunal's factual finding of continuity of service in this case.

    The Bombay Garage Ltd. v. The Industrial Tribunal

    1. This is a rule for a writ of certiorari against the industrial tribunal, Bombay, consisting of Mr. P.S. Bakhale in respect of an award made by the tribunal on 20 November, 1948. The petitioners are the Bombay Garage Limited. They commenced business as a limited company on 1 April, 1945 and took over the business of Messrs. F.M. Chinoy and Co. Ltd., who are the proprietors of a concern known as the Bombay Garage. In July, 1946, certain disputes arose between the petitioners and their employees, and by a notification dated 20 March 1948 the provincial Government referred the dispute to the respondent. The demands of the workers were set out in annexure (A) to the said notification and the 3 relevant demands for the purpose of the present petition are as follows:

    (3) Dearness allowance at the minimum rate of Rupees 1/8 per day should be paid to every workman with effect from 1 January, 1947.

    3. In respect of the dearness allowance, the award is being challenged on the ground that the dearness allowance has been granted to the workers from 1 January, 1947, although the award was published on 28 November, 1948. It is contended by the petitioners that it is not competent to the respondent to award any dearness allowance for a period prior to the date of the award, in as much as under Section 19(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, an award is binding and remains in operation for such period not exceeding one year as may be fixed by the Provincial Government. The contention is that if a benefit is conferred on the workers by the award which related to some period prior to the date of the award, such benefit would accrue to the workers for a period in excess of the statutory period of one year. In my opinion, there is no substance whatever in this contention. The award comes into operation after a declaration by the provincial Government under Section 15 that it shall come into operation; but the benefits conferred by the award may well relate to any period prior to the award e.g., it is quite obvious that in respect of claims or disputes relating to gratuity or bonus, it must of necessity relate to prior service. I have no doubt, therefore, the respondent had ample jurisdiction to confer any benefits on the workmen for a period prior to the award provided such disputes are referred to the respondent's adjudication, In the present case, dearness allowance as from 1 January, 1947, was specifically referred to the respondent; and in my opinion the respondent had jurisdiction to grant such dearness allowance. Were the law otherwise, it would lead to very startling results. A claim for dearness allowance must of necessity take some time before it is adjudicated upon and if the respondent had no jurisdiction to grant the claim as on the date when it was made, the workers would of necessity lose all their claim to dearness allowance prior to the date on which the award is made. In my opinion such is not the law. The first objection to the award, therefore, fails,

    4. Regarding the claim under the sixth head (gratuity) the award is as follows:

    I, therefore, direct that gratuity should be paid to all the employees covered by the adjudication on the scale given below :

    (i) On the death of an employee while in the service of the company one month's salary for each completed year of service subject to maximum of 15 months' salary to his heirs or executors or nominees.

    (ii) On voluntary retirement or resignation of an employee after 15 years' continuous service of the company--15 months' salary.

    (iii) On termination of his service by the company:

    (a) After completion of service of 5 years but less than 10 years 1/2 month's salary for every completed year of service.

    (b) After 10 years' continuous service in the company 3/4 of one month's salary . for each completed year of service.

    (c) After 15 years' continuous service in the company 15 months' salary.

    4. Gratuity shall not be paid to an employee who is dismissed for dishonesty or misconduct.

    Only sub-paras 1 and 3(a) of this award are challenged as being without jurisdiction.

    5. The demand was for gratuity after a minimum period of service of 10 years and it seems to me that it was not competent to the respondent to award any gratuity for service of less than 10 years. This point appears to me to have escaped the notice of the respondent who has by sub-paragraph (i) awarded gratuity on the death for any period of service without fixing a minimum period which would qualify a workman for such gratuity. To that extent, therefore, the award is in my opinion without any jurisdiction. With regard to sub-paragraph (3), that relates to gratuity on termination of service by the company and although it appears under the sixth head, it seems to me that it is an award under the ninth head which relates to gratuity' payable to retrenched workmen both in the past and in the future. This is apparent when one turns to the award under head 9(f) in which it is stated by the respondent that the matter has been dealt with in making provision for gratuity for more than 6 years' service, So far as the a ward under 3(a) is concerned therefore, although it awards gratuity after a service of 5 years, that is fully within the scope; of the demand under head 9(f) which is a demand for gratuity for services starting with a minimum service of six months. That portion of the award is, therefore, in my opinion, perfectly within the jurisdiction of the respondent.

    6. With regard to the grant of gratuity, another question has been raised by the petitioners and that is that the workers had been in the service of the petitioners only from 1 January, 1945, and the period during which they were in the service of the petitioner's predecessors, Messrs. F.M. Chinoy and Co. Ltd., ought not to have in law been taken into account in determining the gratuity payable to the workers. That contention is, in my opinion, not well founded. An employer cannot deprive his employees of the benefits that have accrued to them by reason of past services merely by transferring his business to another person or to another limited company. The work done by the employees primarily benefit the concern, although, of course, the owner also receives benefits therefrom. In any case, therefore where there is a continuity of service, a new employer is bound to take into account the services rendered by the workers 'to his predecessors in title, and it was open to the respondent to award that, for the purposes of calculating gratuity, service rendered to the former employers should also be taken into account. My attention has been drawn to an award in respect of provident fund of the Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Ltd. dated 6 November, 1917, published in the Bombay Government Gazette on 19 November, 1947, at page 4375 in Part I. In that award Sir H.V. Divatia came to the conclusion that the services of the workmen were terminated before Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Ltd. took over the concern and there was no continuity of service. On this ground he held that the period during which the workers were in service prior to the time when Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Ltd. took over the concern should not be taken into account. It is not necessary for my present purpose to consider whither that decision was correct, but even assuming that it was, that was a case in which on the facts the tribunal came to the conclusion that there was no continuity of service, and it has no application to the present case where the respondent has, in my opinion, rightly come to the conclusion that there was continuity of service. This objection of the petitioners to the award, therefore, fails.

    7. The result, therefore, is that to the extent of sub-para (1) of the award relating to the demand under the sixth head, the award is without jurisdiction and to that extent the rule is made absolute and the award is set aside. No order as to the costs of the petition.

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    The Bombay Garage Ltd. v. The Industrial Tribunal
    (Feb 15, 1949)