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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act.5. Sec. 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • provisions of Sec. 25-F and 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act,
  • sub-clause (bb) of Sec. (oo), of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • English Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978,
  • Sec. 2 (oo).16. Sec. 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act.11.
  • provisions of sub-clause (bb) of Section 2 (oo),
  • Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Sec. 25(f) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
  • Section 25-F read with Section 25-B,
  • SOCIETIES REGISTRATION ACT
  • sub-clause (bb) of Section 2
  • sub-section 2 (bb),
  • Section 2(j).14.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act.5. Sec. 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • provisions of Sec. 25-F and 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act,
  • sub-clause (bb) of Sec. (oo), of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • English Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978,
  • Sec. 2 (oo).16. Sec. 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act.11.
  • provisions of sub-clause (bb) of Section 2 (oo),
  • Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Sec. 25(f) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
  • Section 25-F read with Section 25-B,
  • SOCIETIES REGISTRATION ACT
  • sub-clause (bb) of Section 2
  • sub-section 2 (bb),
  • Section 2(j).14.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This batch of writ petitions arises from the challenge to awards of the Labour Court which decided two preliminary points against the petitioners: first, whether M/s National Remote Sensing Agency (NRSA) qualifies as an 'industry' under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act; and second, whether the State Government was competent to make the reference to the Labour Court, or if it should have been the Central Government. The Labour Court held that NRSA was not an industry and that the State Government lacked competence to make the reference. Consequently, the Labour Court declined to consider whether the petitioners' termination amounted to retrenchment and denied relief under Section 25(F) of the Act. The petitioners, contesting these findings, filed the writ petitions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether NRSA is an 'industry' within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  2. Whether the reference made by the State Government to the Labour Court was valid under Sections 2(a)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
  3. Whether relief under Section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act can be granted to the petitioners without deciding the validity of the reference.
  4. Whether the termination of petitioners amounts to 'retrenchment' under Section 2(oo), particularly considering sub-clause (bb) relating to non-renewal of contract of employment.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The Labour Court erred in holding that NRSA is not an industry and that the State Government lacked competence to make the reference.
  • Even if the validity of the reference is not decided, relief under Section 25(F) can be granted provided NRSA is held to be an industry.
  • Reliance on Sections 25(F) and 25(B)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act to argue that despite interruptions in service, petitioners are entitled to reinstatement and benefits under Section 25(F).

Respondent (NRSA) Arguments

  • The Labour Court’s findings on preliminary points are correct: NRSA is not an industry and the State Government was not competent to make the reference.
  • No relief under Section 25(F) can be granted unless petitioners prove continuity of service.
  • Under sub-clause (bb) of Section 2(oo), non-renewal of contract does not amount to termination amounting to retrenchment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ahmadabad Textile Industry's Research Association v. State of Bombay Research organization carrying out scientific work related to industry can be an 'industry' under Section 2(j) of Industrial Disputes Act. Used to establish that research bodies can qualify as industries if they serve industrial interests.
Federal State School Teachers Association of Australia v. The State of Victoria Distinction between educational institutions and industries; regal functions exempted. Referenced in context of determining whether NRSA’s activities are purely educational or industrial.
State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610 Definition of 'industry' and employer-employee relations. Supported the view that research institutions can be industries.
Management of Sardarjung Hospital v. Kuldip Singh Sethi, 1970 II LLJ 266 Non-profit hospitals may not be industries. Contrasted with later broader definition of industry including research institutions.
Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, 1978 2 SCC 213 Comprehensive test for 'industry' including systematic activity, employer-employee cooperation, and production/distribution of goods/services. Applied extensively to hold NRSA as an industry under Section 2(j).
Richard Co-omber v. Justices of the County of Bank, 1883-84 9 A.C 61 Definition of regal (sovereign) functions of the State. Used to exclude sovereign functions from 'industry' definition; NRSA’s functions not sovereign.
Nagpur Corporation v. its employees, AIR 1960 SC 675 Exclusion of regal functions from industry definition. Supported exclusion of sovereign functions from 'industry'; NRSA’s functions not sovereign.
D.G Panchayat v. S.M.M Sangh, 1987 2 Scale 483 SC Relief under Article 226 of the Constitution for violation of Industrial Disputes Act provisions. Permitted granting relief under Article 226 even if Labour Court findings not favorable.
State Bank Of India v. Shri N. Sundara Money, 1976 1 SCC 822 Continuity of service despite interruptions for Section 25(F) applicability. Supported petitioners’ claim of continuous service despite breaks.
S.K Varma v. Industrial Tribunal, 1980 4 SCC 443 Interpretation of continuous service and retrenchment provisions. Supported view that interruptions do not necessarily break continuity.
Narender v. Central Bank, 1978 2 ALT 48 Continuity of service and retrenchment principles. Applied to uphold petitioners’ entitlement to relief under Section 25(F).
Employers In Relation To The Digwadih Colliery v. Workmen, AIR 1966 SC 75 Continuity of service and retrenchment interpretation. Reinforced principles applied to petitioners’ case.
S. Govinda Rajulu v. K.S.R.T.C.M. Interpretation of sub-clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) regarding non-renewal of contract not amounting to retrenchment. Discussed but left open the question; highlighted potential for misuse by employers.
D. Chemaiah v. Divisional Engineer, A.P.S.T Corporation, 1987 L.I.C 1259 Non-renewal clause in contract must be explicit to exclude retrenchment; unilateral termination clause not sufficient. Adopted to interpret sub-clause (bb) narrowly to protect workmen.
Workmen A.E.J.B Corpn v. Management, 1985 4 SCC 71 Interpretation of Sections 25-F and 25-B of Industrial Disputes Act in a broad and purposive manner. Supported purposive interpretation to protect workers’ rights; cited to reject narrow literal construction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by considering whether NRSA qualifies as an 'industry' under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It referred to authoritative precedents, especially the Supreme Court’s decision in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, which set out a functional test involving systematic activity, employer-employee cooperation, and production/distribution of goods or services to satisfy human wants. The Court examined NRSA’s objects and functions, including research, consultancy, surveys using remote sensing technology, and dissemination of material, concluding that these activities satisfy the criteria of an industry.

The Court rejected the argument that NRSA’s performance of sovereign functions excluded it from the definition of industry, relying on precedents defining sovereign functions narrowly as legislative, judicial, or maintenance of order functions, none of which apply to NRSA.

Regarding the validity of the reference by the State Government, the Court held it unnecessary to decide this issue since relief under Section 25(F) could be granted independently under Article 226 of the Constitution if the petitioners qualify.

On the question of retrenchment, the Court analyzed Section 2(oo) and its sub-clause (bb), which excludes non-renewal of contracts from retrenchment. The Court noted the distinction between casual daily-wage employment and contracts with stipulated termination clauses. It adopted a purposive and protective interpretation, following the reasoning in D. Chemaiah’s case, that casual daily-wage employment does not fall within the exclusion in sub-clause (bb). Therefore, termination of casual daily-wage labourers amounts to retrenchment under Section 2(oo).

The Court further observed that the petitioners had continuous service as defined under Section 25-B, and the conditions for retrenchment under Section 25(F) were not complied with. Hence, they were entitled to reinstatement with back wages from the date of the respective references. The Court limited back wages to the date of reference, considering the delay caused by preliminary objections and absence of evidence of alternate employment.

Holding and Implications

The writ petitions are allowed. The petitioners are entitled to reinstatement with back wages from the date of the respective references. There is no order as to costs.

This decision establishes that NRSA is an industry under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act and that casual daily-wage labourers terminated without compliance with Section 25(F) are deemed retrenched. The Court’s purposive interpretation protects workers engaged on casual contracts from being excluded from retrenchment protections. No new precedent beyond the direct effect on the parties is set, but the ruling clarifies the scope of ‘industry’ and retrenchment definitions in similar contexts.

    R Sreenivasa Rao And Others Petitioners v. The Labour Court, Hyderabad And Another

    1. The questions that arise in this batch of writ petitions are whether M/s National Remote Sensing Agency, hereinafter described as ‘NRSA’ is an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act and whether the reference made by the State Government can be said to be valid in view of the provisions of Section 2(a)(i) and (ii) of the said Act. The question also arises whether in the event of ‘NRSA’ is to be held to be an ‘industry’ relief can be granted to the petitioners under Section 25(F) of the said Act without deciding whether the reference by the State Government through Labour Court before the Industrial Tribunal was valid. Subclause (bb) of Section 2 (oo) also falls for consideration. Each of the four writ petitions has been preferred against the awards of the Labour Court holding against the petitioners on two preliminary points. The first one related to the question whether ‘NRSA’ was an ‘industry’ and the second one was whether the State Government which made the reference was competent to make the reference. The Labour Court held on the first question that ‘NRSA’ was not an industry and on the second question it was not competent for the State Government to make the reference and that it was only the Central Government which should have made the reference. In view of the findings, the Court also held that the third point whether the termination of the petitioners amounting to retrenchment did not survive and that therefore no relief can be granted under the fourth point. In other words, the matters were decided on the first two points which were preliminary in nature. Questioning these orders the workmen preferred these writ petitions.

    2. Ia these writ petitions, the learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri Ashok Anand Kumar contended that the findings of the Labour Court on these two preliminary points are incorrect, and that, in any event, without deciding the question whether the reference is valid or not, this court could give relief under Sec. 25(f) of the Industrial Disputes Act, provided the findings of the first question, namely, whether the ‘NRSA’ is an industry is to be given in favour of the petitioners. The learned Counsel for the petitioners placed strong reliance on the provisions of Sec. 25(P) read with provisions of Section 25(B)(2) of the said Act which contain provisions that notwithstanding the interruptions in the service the petitioners are entitled to reinstatement and are entitled for the benefits of Section 25(F), of the Act. On the other hand, it has been contended by Sri M. Panduranga Rao, learned counsel for ‘NRSA’ that the findings of the Labour Court on the two preliminary points are correct and that no relief can be granted under Section 25(F) of the Act unless the petitioners prove that there was continuity in service and that in any event, in view of the provisions of sub-clause (bb) of Section 2 (oo), the writ petitioners are not entitled to treat the non-renewal of contract of employment as termination amounting to retrenchment.

    3. The four writ petitioners were employed by the ‘NRSA’ initially under orders of appointment for a period of three months. The periods so far as the petitioners in W.P No. 13104/88 are concerned started from 18-7-1983 to 18-10-1983 under one order, then from 20-10-1983 to 20-1-1984 under another order and again lrom 23-1-84 to 23-4-84 under a third order, and from 25-4-1984 to 31-7-84 under a fourth order and again from 3-8-84 on casual basis. From 3-8-84, they were continuously engaged as casual labourers on daily wages till the date of their termination on 19-12-1984.- The petitioners were being paid consolidated salary of Rs. 500/- per month during the periods when they were employed for three months each time and one of the petitioners was paid Rs. 550/- P.M Of course, from 3-8-84 they were on daily wages till the date of termination.

    4. I shall first deal with the question whether the ‘NRSA can be said to be said to be an ‘industry’ within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

    5. Sec. 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act defines ‘industry’ while S. 2(g) defines the word ‘employer’ and S. 2(a) defines ‘workman’.

    6. The definition of ‘industry’ has raised serious difficulties of interpretation. There have been several ups and downs in the matter of explaining this definition but it is not necessary to go into the matter in detail and it is sufficient here to refer to cases relating purely to ‘research’ organisations. The earliest in this behalf is the one decided by the Supreme Court in Ahmadabad Textile Industry's Research Association v. State of Bombay.1 In that case, it was noticed that the Association was established to carry on the research with respect to textile industry jointly for the benefits of its members, by discovery of processes of manufacture with a view to secure greater efficiency, rationalisation and reduction of cost. The activity was held to be an ‘industry’. It was, noticed that the said Association was founded with the object of establishing a textile research institute for the purpose of carrying on research and other scientific work in connection with the textile trade or industry and other trades and industries allied therewith as accessory thereto. The administration of the association was vested in a council in which the majority consisted of the representatives of the textile industry. The research was carried on under the supervision of a director of research The cost of maintaining the association was partly by members and partly by grants from Government and other sources. On those facts, the Supreme Court posed the question whether it could be said that the undertaking was purely of “educational character” and therefore, covered by the Australian case in Federal State School Teachers Association of Australia v. The State of Victoria . 41 C.L.R 569. The Court then held alter referring to the principles laid down in the decision in State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha . AIR 1960 S.C 610. that the textile research body was an ‘industry’ within the meaning of Sec 2(j).

    7. Subsequently, in Management of Sardarjung Hospital v. Kuldip Singh Sethi . 1970 II LLJ 266. it was observed that Kurji Holy Family Hospital was not an ‘industry because it was a ‘non-profit’ making body and its work was in the nature of training, research and treatment. Whatever be the view taken in this latter case, the question came to be finally decided by a larger Bench of seven Judges in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa . 1978 2 SCC 213 In that case the leading judgment was delivered by Krishna lyar, J. (for himself, Bhagwati J. (as he then was) & Desai J.) and ‘research’ institutions were separately considered. Chandrachud J. (as he then was) and Beg J. concurred bat delivered separate opinions. Krishna Iyer, J. posed the question ‘Does research involve collaboration between employer and employee?’ After holding that it did, it was stated that the employer was the institution, the employees were the scientists, para-scientists and other personnel. On the question whether ‘the research was service’ it was again held that it was, inasmuch as its discoveries were valuable contributions to the wealth of the nation Such discoveries may be sold for a heavy price in the industrial or other markets. Technology has to be paid for and technological inventions and innovations may be patented and sold. In our scientific and technological age, nothing had more cash value, as intangible goods and invaluable services, than discoveries. Even though a research institute may be a separate entity disconnected from the many industries which founded the institute itself, it can be regarded as an organisation, propelled by systematic activity, modelled on co-operation between employer and employee and calculated to throw up discoveries, inventions and useful solutions which benefitted individual industries and the nation in terms of goods and services and wealth. It followed that research institutes, albeit run without profit-motive were industries. The learned Judge then laid down five propositions of law for deciding the question, “whether an institution would be an industry or not?” and included research institutions also as coming within the definition of ‘industry’.

    8. Bearing the above principles in mind, I shall now deal with the nature of the “NRSA”. Certain documents were filed in the lower court particularly Ex. M-1, a book relating to the Introduction, Objects, Organisation facilities etc., of the ‘NRSA’. Before me, both parties considered it necessary that reference should be made to the Bye-laws of the NRSA which is registered as a “Society’ under the Societies Registration Act. Accordingly the said document in a book form has been filed. The Certificate of Registration is granted on 2nd September, 1974, and the Memorandum of Association mentions the objects, for which the NRSA has been established. The objects are stated to be the following:— (a) to undertake, aid, promote, guide and co-ordinate research in the field of remote sensing; (b) to take over the present works and functions of the research flight facility of the Ministry of Defence of the Government of India with all their assets and liabilities and rights and obligations; (c) to provide consultancy services and airborne survey facilities to user agencies in the country: (d) to carry out surveys by using remote sensing technology for various natural resources like agriculture, hydrology, meteorology, fisheries, minerals, oils, soils, environmental monitoring, forestry, ocean resources, topography, land resources and crop disease surveillance; (e) to establish, maintain and manage data banks for acquisition, storage, retrieval, dissemination, valuation, scrutiny and interpretation of information relating to remote sensing technology; (f) to establish, maintain and manager laboratories, workshops, stores and other units for carrying out scientific and technical work in the area of remote sensing; (g) to provide support to research centres for conducting investigations in specified areas of remote sensing technology and for undertaking design, development and construction of special remote sensing instruments; (h) to conduct field experiments connected with the activities of remote sensing; (i) to organise training facilities, lectures, seminars and symposis for advanced study and research in remote sensing and for advancement of science and technology in general; (j) to co-operate and collaborate with ether national and/or foreign institutions and international organisations in the field of remote sensing and allied sciences; (k) to publish and disseminate information relating to results of research conducted in the field of remote sensing; (1) to acquire by gift, purchase, exchange, lease, hire or otherwise howsoever any property, movable and/or immovable and to construct, improve, alter, demolish or repair buildings, works and constructions as may be necessary or convenient for carrying on the activities of the Society; (m) for the purposes of the Society to draw and accept and make and endorse discount and negotiate Government of India and other promissory rofes, bills of exchange, cheques or other negotiable instruments; (n) to invest the funds of, or money entrusted to, the society upon such securities or in such manner as may from time to time be determined by the Governing Body and from time to time to sell or transpose such investments; the Governing Body is to be constituted under the rules and regulations of the Society and they are ten; that the Members of the Society consist of the Cabinet Minister for Science and Technology and the Minister of State for Science and Technology; the Secretary, Department of Science and Technology; one representative of the National Committee, Science and Technology; the Chairman of the Governing Body of NRSA; the Chairman of the I.S.R.O; three eminent scientists in the field of R.S.T nominated as members of the Governing Body of the N.R.S.A by the Government of India; Vide Chief/Deputy Chief of Air Staff, Air Headquarters, Ministry of Defence; one representative of the Ministry of Defence; Financial Adviser, Department of Science and Technology; the Director, N.R.S.A; such of the members of the Governing Body. The Cabinet Minister is to be the President of the Society and the Chairman of the Governing Body. The Governing Body is to be maintained and administered subject to rules, bye-laws and orders. Rules 31 to 38 mention the functions, powers of the Governing Body, which include the submission of objects, creation and abolition of posts: appointing various officers; entering into arrangements with Government of India on foreign agencies etc.

    9. The question arises, whether the N.R.S.A can be treated as ‘industry’ within the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board's case? In the majority judgment, under proposition No. 1 it is stated that the institution will be an ‘industry’ if it is (i) systematic activity, (ii) organised by co-operation between employer and employee the direct and substantist element is commercial, (iii) for the production and/or distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes (not spiritual or religious but inclusive of material things or services geared to celestial bliss, i.e making, on a large scale, or prasad or (food). It has been pointed out that absence of profit or motive or gainful objective is irrelevant, be the venture in the public, joint; private or other sector. The true focus is functional and the decisive test is the nature of the activity with special emphasis on the employer-employee relations. Under proposition No. 2, it is stated that all organised activity possessing the triple elements although, not trade or business, may still be ‘industry’ provided the nature of the activity, viz, the employer-employee basis, bears resemblance to what we find in trade or business. This takes into the fold of ‘industry’ undertakings, ceilings and services adventures ‘analogous to the carrying on trade or business’. Under proposition No. 3, it was stated that the consequences of the above definition was that research institutes were entirely different from ‘industry’.

    10. I am of the view, having regard to the objects and functions of the N.R.S.A that it has a systematic activity or organisation with co-operation, between it and its employees, for the production and distribution of material services calculated to satisfy the hyman wants and wishes. Of its functions, the more important ones to be noted are those relating to consultancy services or survey facilities, carrying out of surveys by using remote sensing technology for locating various natural resources, agriculture, hydrology, meteorology, fisheries, minerals, oil, soils, environmental monitoring, forestry, ocean resources, topography, land sources and crop disease surveillance, and the distribution of the material to institutions and persons. 1 have, therefore, no hesitation to hold that the N.R.S.A satisfies the tests laid down by the Supreme Court and that it is an industry under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

    11. The learned counsel for the respondents then argued that in case ‘NRSA’ could be said to be performing ‘sovereign functions’, it could not still be brought within the definition of ‘industry’.

    12. This question has also been decided by several decisions, Lord Watson in Richard Co-omber v. Justices of the. County of Bank . 1883-84 9 A.C 61., held that the regal power of the State has acquired a definite connotation and it means the functions relating to administration of justice, maintenance of order and repression of crime and that these functions are of the constitutional Government. In Federal State School Teachers’ Association of Australia v. State of Victorial, Supra Issacs, J. in his dissenting judgment held that the regal functions are inescapable and inalienable, and such are the legislative powers, the administration of laws, the exercise of the judicial powers. The Supreme Court applied the above said observations in its judgment in Nagpur Corporation v. its employees . AIR 1960 SC 675., and observed that the regal functions described as primary and inalienable functions of State, though statutorily delegated to a corporation, are necessarily excluded from the purview of the definition. Such regal functions should be confined to legislative power, administration of law and judicial power. In Bangalore Water Supply & Sewage Board v. A. Rajappa (5 supra) Krishna Iyer. J. under proposition IV, at the end of the judgment, held that sovereign functions, strictly understood, qualify for exemption, not the welfare activities or economic adventures undertaken by government or statutory bodies. Even in departments discharging sovereign functions if there are units which are industries and they are substantially severable, then they can be considered to come under the definition of ‘industry’. Chandrachud J. (as he then was) also had occasion to consider ‘whether an economic activity of the Government which is not in pursuance to sovereign functions’ of the State would amount ‘industry’, and held that the sovereign or regal functions of the State are to be confined to the inalienable functions of the State i e., exercise of legislative power, administration of justice and maintenance of order.

    13. Therefore in asmuch as the sovereign functions are to be restricted to administration of Justice and maintenance or order and representation of crime or otherwise legislative powers, administration of the laws and the exercise of judicial power’ and in asmuch as the activities of the NRSA do not come under these categories, it must be held that the NRSA is an ‘industry’ falling under Section 2(j).

    14. No doubt, the next question should be whether a reference to the Labour Court could have been validly made by the State Government. But, in my view, and in fact, it is not disputed that, if the case can be brought under Sec. 25-F as argued for by the petitioner's connsel, relief can be granted under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India as held by the Supreme Court in D.G Panchayat v. S.M.M Sangh . 1987 2 Scale 483 SC.. It is. therefore, not necessary to consider whether the reference could have been made by the State Government. Under Section 25-F read with Section 25-B, the petitioners will be entitled to relief if they have been in continuous service for not less than one year under the employer and if they have been retrenched without compliance with the conditions in sub-clauses (a) and (b) of the Act. In this case there is no dispute that the clauses (a) and (b) have not been complied with by the respondent when the petitioners’ services were terminated in December, 1984. It is true there were interruptions in the service but it is net disputed that even though there may be interruptions or gaps in the service earlier, the service could still be treated as ‘continuous’. This is clear from the Judgments of the Supreme Court in State Bank Of India v. Shri N. Sundara Money . 1976 1 SCC 822, and S.K Varma v. Industrial Tribunal . 1980 4 SCC 443, and of the Division Bench of this court in Narender v. Central Bank . 1978 2 ALT 48.. See also Employers In Relation To The Digwadih Colliery v. Workmen . AIR 1966 SC 75..

    15. The next question is whether the petitioner’ termination amounts to ‘retrenchment’ and whether the respondent can bring it under sub-clause (bb) of Sec. (oo), of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is argued that even if by December, 1984, the petitioners were being continuously engaged as casual labour on daily wages, still the ‘daily wages’ engagement is an employment on contract-basis for each day, right from 3-4-1984 and when the services of the petitioners were terminated in December, 1984, it was only a case of non-renewal of a contract of service and hence not a retrenchment under subclause (bb) of Sec. 2 (oo).

    16. Sec. 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act which defines ‘retrenchment’ as amended by Act 49/84 by way of adding clause (bb), reads thus:

    “S. 2 (oo):— ‘retrenchment’ means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason what-so-ever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include

    (a) voluntary retirement of the workman:

    (b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contain a stipulation in that behalf:

    (bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the nonrenewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or

    (c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health”.

    17. It is ture (hat for applicability of Sec. 25-(F) of the Act, there must be ‘retrenchment’ as defined in S. 2 (oo).

    18. The interpretation of sub-clause 2 (bb) of Sec. 2 (oo) raises important questions. Sub-clause 2 (bb) is in two parts. The Supreme Court had occasion to refer to the second part of sub-clause 2 (bb) in S. Govinda Rajulu v. K.S.R.T.C.M.13 There the Karnataka High Court had held that since the workman's contract contained a stipulation that his services could be terminated ‘at any time’, the termination did not amount to retrenchment in view of sub-clause (bb) newly added in Sec. 2 (oo). The Supreme Court while leaving the question open and deciding the case on another point, made the following significant observations:

    “The validity of Sec. 2(oo)(bb) was not challenged before us. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that if the view of the High Court is accepted, it would enable unscrupulous employees to provide a stipulation in the contract of service for terminating the employment of the employees to escape the rigors of Sec. 25-F of the Act. This would further confer arbitrary powers on the employers which would be destructive of the protection granted by the Act to the employees. We do rot consider it necessary to express any opinion on this question as in our opinion, the appellant is entitled to succeed on another short question i.e, termination order being violative of principles of natural justice.”

    19. On the facts, it was found that the order passed attached a stigma to the petitioner and was bad as no notice was given.

    20. The second part of sub-clause (bb) of Sec. 2 (oo) again came up for consideration before Jeevan Reddi, J. in D. Chemaiah v. Divisional Engineer, A.P.S.T Corporation . 1987 L.I.C 1259.. The learned Judge took a view contrary to the view that the Karnataka High Court took in the last mentioned case and held that a stipulation in a contract of service that the services of the workman could be terminated ‘at any time and without assigning any reasons therefor’ was not the kind of stipulation contemplated by the second part of sub-clause (bb). According to the learned Judge, the second part of subclause (bb) of Sec. 2 (oo) contemplated ‘‘a contract which expressly provides for certain circumstances or situation (or situations) in which the contract can be terminated.” The second part of the sub-clause ‘does not take in the unilateral right reserved by the employer to terminate at any time that too without any notice and without any reason’. According to the learned Judge:

    “Giving effect to the said contention would practically render the protection sought to be extended by the Act to workmen nugatory and it would make it easy for an employer to insert or introduce such a clause in the contract of employment and on that basis defeat the right of workman conferred by the statute. A literal or liberal interpretation of clause (bb) may well result in depriving the workman of the protection provided by the Act. The said clause has to be read and understood having regard to and in the light of the scheme and object of the Act.”

    21. The learned Judge also pointed out that the objects and reasons appended to the Bill also “do not disclose that the said cluase was intended to provide for or save such unilateral clauses imposed by the employer” and held that in the present day realities, such a clause cannot be given too great a sanctity.

    22. In the present case before me, it is the first part of sub-clause (bb) of Section 2 (oo) that falls for consideration. The argument for the respondent-employer is that discontinuance of the engagement as casual labour on daily wage basis falls within the first part of sub-clause (bb) and that it amounts to ‘non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry’.

    23. The interpretation of the first part of sub-clause (bb) of Sec. 2 (oo) is, in my opinion, to be based bearing in mind the same principles which have been applied by Jeevan Reddi, J. to the second part of the sub-section. In fact, the Supreme Court of India has indicated the principles to be applied while construing the provisions of Sec. 25-F and 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, in Workmen A.E.J.B Corpn v. Management . 1985 4 SCC 71 That case refers to the counting of Sundays (and other paid holidays) for purpose of the said sections. The Supreme Court quoted the observations of Lord Wilberforce in Prenn Simmond16 and stated that words occurring in such social welfare legislations and those relating to Human Rights cannot be put in “procrustean beds or shrunk to Lilliputian diamensions. In construing these legislations, the imposture of literal construction must be avoided.” The law is not left behind as stated by Lord Wilberforce, in some island of literal interal interpretation.

    24. The main part of Section 2 (oo) treats as ‘retrenchment’ a termination ‘for any reason what-so-ever’ and the exclusionary clauses have necessarily to be strictly construed having regard to the benefits given by that Act in Sec. 25(F) for those sought to be retrenched. If sub-clause (bb) is to be literally construed and a meaning other than the one given by Jeevan Reddy, J. is to be given for the latter part of the sub-clause and if the meaning contended for by the respondents is to be given to the first part of the sub-clause then the main part of Sec. 2 (oo) will be practically rendered nugatory. It will not only cut down the wide amplitude of the plain words of the main part of Section 2 (oo) an amplitude which presumably is to be pseserved and maintained by the courts,-but will indeed reduce the main part to such a narrow or Lilliputian state that, having regard to to-day's widespread practice of contract-labour on daily wages in public sector, private sector and Government-departments falling under the definition of ‘industry’, the very purpose of Sec. 25(F) and of other beneficial provisions of the Act will become otiose. In my view, therefore, Parliament, per se, did not intend to include casual-labour on daily-wages within the first part of sub-clause 2 (bb) of Sec. 2 (oo).

    25. If therefore, causal labour on daily wages in per se outside sub-clause 2 (bb) of Sec. 2 (oo), it is not necessary for me to consider whether, even cases of non-renewal of contracts of employment, could fall within the first part of sub-clause 2 (bb) where there may be evidence of a ‘global’ or ‘umbrella’ contract in favour of a workman successively employed in a series of periodical contracts of employment. Such contracts have been held under the English Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, to be ‘global’ or ‘umbrella’ contracts giving rise to cases of ‘dismissal’ for rendun-dancy under Sec 83(2) of that Act.

    26. The law in our country does not yet appear to have noticed these new principles which have been assimilated into the industrial law in England. But if causal labour on daily wages is per se outside sub-section 2 (bb), it is not necessary to go into the last question.

    27. That causal labour on daily wages fall within the definition of ‘workman’ under Sec. 2(s) admits of no doubt and is settled by several rul ings of this and other High Courts. Again causal labour on daily wages in continuous service with the required number of working days certainly come under Sec. 25-(F). The computation of the service is to be made in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 25-B. There is nothing in the statement of Objects and Reasons of the amending Act of 1984 intending to include termination of such daily-wage casual labour from the purview of ‘retrenchment’ in Sec. 2 (oo). The main part of Sec. 2 (oo) speaks of termination ‘for any reason’ as amounting to-retrenchment. In the absence of clear intention, the first part of sub-clause (bb) cannot be interpreted to take in the termination of the services of the casual labour on daily wages. In my view, per se termination of casual labour on daily wages is clearly outside the first part of sub-clause (bb) of Sec. 2 (oo) and was never intended to be excluded from the definition of ‘retrenchment’. The ‘Contract of employment’ contemplated therein is, in my view, referable to contracts other than engagement as casual labour on daily wages. Any other view would reduce the content of the main part of Sec. 2 (oo) to such. a. state of shrjkage which, in my opinion, the legislature would never have contemplated. Which in common parlance, ‘retrenchment’ given as impression of termination for want of work, the Act has given a very wide definition of retrenchment by including terminations “for any reason what-so-ever”, (except the limited categories falling under sub-clauses (a), (b) which are not attributable to acts of the employer). But if the sub-clause (bb) is not restricted as stated by me in th's case or by Jeevan Reddy, J. in D. Chenniah's case (14 supra) there will be little scope for preserving and maintaining a substantial part of the width of the main part of Sec. 2 (oo). I am, therefore, of the view that the discontinuance of the petitioners who were casual labour on daily wages from 3-8-84 till December, 1984 amounts to ‘retrenchment’ under Sec. 2 (oo). As there is no dispute that they have the required number of days of service continuous as defined in Sec. 25-B, and that the provisions of Sec. 25-F are not complied with, the petitioners will be entitled (o reinstatement. Such a relief can be granted under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India when there is violation of statute, even though the matter has come from the labour Court,—in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in D.G Panchayat v. S.M.M Sangh (8 supra) referred to above. That was also a case arising out of proceedings of the Labour Court and without going into the findings given by the Labour Court, relief of reinstatement was granted on independent grounds under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. In that case, the backwages were restricted to the period after 1-9-87 in as much as the reference was of 1967 and there was evidence of the parties being otherwise gainfully employed. But in this case, the reference is not that far and it is not the respondents’ case that petitioners were otherwise gainfully employed. Further, it is because of the technical preliminary objections raised by the respondent that the Labour Court did not go into other points in detail and there has been delay. I am, therefore, awarding backwages only from date of reference.

    28. In the result, the writ petitions are allowed and the petitioners will be reinstated with back wages from the date of the respective references. There will be no order as to costs.

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    R Sreenivasa Rao And Others Petitioners v. The Labour Court, Hyderabad And Another
    (Jul 25, 1989)