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  • provisions i.e, Section 15(1)(i) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act (11 of 1125) and Rule 33 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Rules, 1950.12.
  • Section 12(2) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act and Rule 17(I) and Rule 17(3-A) of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules, 1939,
  • Section 5(1) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as Act)
  • provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act and Kerala General Sales Tax Act.
  • provisions of the Madras General Saks Tax Act and Kerala General Sales Tax Act
  • provisions in Kerala General Sales Tax Act and Madras General Sales Tax Act
  • Rules 17(1) and 14(2) of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules, 1939
  • Section 26 of the Bihar Agricultural Income-Tax Act, 1938
  • Section 16 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959
  • Section 26 of the Bihar Agricultural Income-Tax Act
  • Secion 26 of the Bihar Agricultural Income Tax Act.
  • Section 32 of the Madras Genera] Sales Tax Act, 1959
  • Rule 17(3-A) of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules
  • Section 15(1) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act
  • provisions of Kerala General Sales Tax Act
  • Section 147(b) of the Income-Tax Act, 1961.
  • Commissioner.(5) .(6) .(7) .(8) .Section 20. Revision
  • Bihar Agricultural Income-Tax Act,
  • Madras General Sales Tax Act
  • Rule 14(2) of the said Rules
  • sub-section (2) of Section 17
  • prescribed.(4) .(5) .Rule 50. (1)
  • follows:Rule 14. (I) .(2)
  • Section 14(4)(cc).
  • Section 14(4).34.
  • Section 14(4).38.
  • Rule 14(2)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions i.e, Section 15(1)(i) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act (11 of 1125) and Rule 33 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Rules, 1950.12.
  • Section 12(2) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act and Rule 17(I) and Rule 17(3-A) of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules, 1939,
  • Section 5(1) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as Act)
  • provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act and Kerala General Sales Tax Act.
  • provisions of the Madras General Saks Tax Act and Kerala General Sales Tax Act
  • provisions in Kerala General Sales Tax Act and Madras General Sales Tax Act
  • Rules 17(1) and 14(2) of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules, 1939
  • Section 26 of the Bihar Agricultural Income-Tax Act, 1938
  • Section 16 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959
  • Section 26 of the Bihar Agricultural Income-Tax Act
  • Secion 26 of the Bihar Agricultural Income Tax Act.
  • Section 32 of the Madras Genera] Sales Tax Act, 1959
  • Rule 17(3-A) of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules
  • Section 15(1) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act
  • provisions of Kerala General Sales Tax Act
  • Section 147(b) of the Income-Tax Act, 1961.
  • Commissioner.(5) .(6) .(7) .(8) .Section 20. Revision
  • Bihar Agricultural Income-Tax Act,
  • Madras General Sales Tax Act
  • Rule 14(2) of the said Rules
  • sub-section (2) of Section 17
  • prescribed.(4) .(5) .Rule 50. (1)
  • follows:Rule 14. (I) .(2)
  • Section 14(4)(cc).
  • Section 14(4).34.
  • Section 14(4).38.
  • Rule 14(2)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Neeladri Rao, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent is a manufacturer and dealer in card board boxes. For the assessment year 1977-78 his total turnover was less than Rs. 25,000. The Assistant Commercial Tax Officer (assessing authority) initially held that card board boxes were unclassified goods and, because the total turnover of unclassified goods was less than Rs. 25,000, granted exemption for the entire turnover for 1977-78 under Section 5(1) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 ("the Act").

During an audit, the assessing authority was informed that card board boxes fell within item 19 of the First Schedule and were therefore liable to tax at 4% at the point of first sale irrespective of turnover. The assessing authority issued a notice (referring to Section 20 and Rule 50(3) but treated as issued under Section 14(4)), held a hearing, and then reopened the assessment and subjected the entire turnover to tax at 4%. The appeal to the Commercial Tax Officer, No. 1, Rajahmundry was dismissed. The Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal allowed the dealer's appeal, relying on the Division Bench decision in Fatechand and Sons v. Commercial Tax Officer (54 S.T.C. 166), holding that a mere change of opinion was not a permissible basis to reopen under Section 14(4).

The Government Pleader challenged that Tribunal decision contending that the power to reopen under Section 14(4) arises even on a mere change of opinion as to classification. The High Court (Neeladri Rao, J.) heard the matter by reference to the Act, relevant Rules, and numerous precedents, and ultimately dismissed the tax revision petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the assessing authority may reopen an assessment under Section 14(4) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 on the basis of a mere change of opinion (specifically as to classification of goods).
  2. Whether the opinion or instructions of an internal audit party constitute "material de hors the assessment record" (i.e., material outside the assessment record) enabling exercise of power to reopen under Section 14(4).
  3. Whether a decision of the Commissioner of Sales Tax, the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, the High Court or the Supreme Court on a question of law can be treated as material de hors the assessment record and thereby constitute a valid basis for reopening under Section 14(4).

Arguments of the Parties

Government Pleader's Arguments (for reopening)

  • The power to reopen under Section 14(4) arises even on the basis of a mere change of opinion in regard to classification of goods; that is the primary point of contention.
  • Section 14(4)(cc) permits assessment of the correct amount of tax payable where any deduction or exemption has been wrongly allowed; therefore, if the assessing authority later forms the opinion that an exemption or deduction was wrongly allowed, it may reopen and reassess on that basis.
  • Various decisions (referred to in the opinion) were cited in support of a broader meaning of "escape" and the power to reopen.

Amicus Curiae / Respondent-related Arguments

  • When the revisional authority is also conferred with power to reopen, for revision it is restricted to the assessment record; whereas for reopening the revisional authority can act on material de hors the assessment record.
  • A mere change of opinion of the assessing authority cannot be treated as material de hors the assessment record and thus cannot be the basis for reopening under Section 14(4).
  • Where deduction or exemption can be shown to be wrongly granted from review of the assessment record itself, correction should be effected by revision (Section 20) rather than by reopening (Section 14(4)).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Fatechand and Sons v. Commercial Tax Officer, 54 S.T.C. 166 Held that mere change of opinion cannot be the basis for exercising power under Section 14(4) read with sub-clause (cc). The Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal relied upon this decision to allow the appeal; the High Court agreed with and endorsed this view.
State of Madras v. Louis Dreyfus and Company Ltd., 6 S.T.C. 318 (Full Bench, Madras HC) Held Rule 14(2) (revision) and Rule 17(1) (reopening escaped turnover) are mutually exclusive; Rule 14(2) relates to revisions and Rule 17(1) to escaped turnover; jurisdictional separation between revisional and assessing authorities. Cited to demonstrate the need to assign distinct jurisdictions between revision and reopening and to show that if reopening can be exercised in cases already considered, there would be no role left for revision.
State of Kerala v. M. Appukutty, 14 S.T.C. 242 (Supreme Court) When the revisional authority is vested with power to reopen, the revisional jurisdiction is restricted to the assessment record; Rule 17 confers power to assess escaped turnover that may be exercised on material de hors the assessment record. Relied upon to support the distinction that the revisional authority's revision is limited to the record while reopening may act on external material; used to justify that reopening requires material de hors the record.
Deputy Commissioner v. Dhanalakshmi Vilas Cashew Co., 24 S.T.C. 491 (Supreme Court) Similar principle as Appukutty: revision limited to record; reopening may require material outside the record. Cited together with Appukutty and K.E. Nainan to support the conclusion that where the revisional authority also has power to reopen, "escaped turnover" must be interpreted restrictively and reopening needs material de hors the record.
State of Kerala v. K.E. Nainan, 26 S.T.C. 251 (Supreme Court) Reiterated the distinction between revision (on record) and reopening (permissible on material outside the record) under analogous Kerala provisions. Used with other Supreme Court decisions to establish the necessity of material de hors the record for reopening where revisional power exists.
Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar, 37 I.T.R. 388 (Supreme Court) Construed Section 26 of the Bihar Agricultural Income-Tax Act to give "escape" a wide meaning including deliberate action; "any reason" language supports a broad interpretation of escaped assessment. Cited by Government Pleader for a broader meaning of "escape"; the Court examined and distinguished it in context because the revisional power in the other Acts affects the required interpretation.
F.K. Hasheeb & Co. v. State of Madras, 17 S.T.C. 38 Held that the power of revision is distinct from the power of reopening vested in the assessing authority; the revisional power cannot be controlled by the assessing authority's power. Noted by the Court to underscore separation of powers between revisional and assessing authorities, while also observing that in that context the revisional authority lacked reopening power.
Yercaud Coffee Curing Works Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 40 S.T.C. 531 (Madras HC) Held that an assessing authority in a reassessment proceeding can assess an item of turnover omitted earlier even though the turnover was included in the return and thought exempt at the time. Relied upon by the department to support reopening on change of opinion; the High Court observed the decision but explained why it does not support reopening where the revisional authority also has reopening power and a restrictive meaning of "escaped turnover" is required.
Andhra Steel Corporation Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, 68 S.T.C. 126 (Division Bench) Discussed that sub-clause (cc) of Section 14(4) can be exercised de hors the assessment record. Court noted the decision but held it did not support the department's contention that mere change of opinion allows reopening when exemption was originally granted after deliberation.
Eastern Ore Corporation v. Commercial Tax Officer, 33 S.T.C. 129 (Full Bench) Interpreted Section 14(4) (prior to amendment) to list events giving rise to the power to reopen (escaped turnover, under-assessment, assessed at lower rate, escapement of licence fee, etc.). Used to restate the statutory circumstances in which reopening under Section 14(4) can arise.
Sri Balaganesh Textiles v. Commercial Tax Officer, 41 S.T.C. 445 (Division Bench) Dealt with a factual situation where turnover exempted in the assessee's assessment was found to be exigible to tax because of material discovered from purchasers' assessments—an instance of material de hors the assessment record. Referred to illustrate a proper case for reopening where external material showed exemption had been wrongly granted.
Menta Narasimhaswamy & Co. v. State of A.P., 54 S.T.C. 6 Held that a revisional order based on the same material and record as the assessment could not be treated as one under Section 14(4). Supported the proposition that revision may correct errors discovered on record, but reopening under Section 14(4) requires material outside the record.
Indian & Eastern Newspaper Society v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, 119 I.T.R. 996 (Supreme Court) Held that the opinion of an internal audit party on a point of law could not be regarded as "information" enabling initiation of reassessment proceedings under Section 147(b) of the Income-Tax Act, 1961. Applied analogously by the High Court to hold that the opinion of the audit party cannot be treated as material de hors the assessment record to enable reopening under Section 14(4).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a textual and comparative analysis of the Act and relevant rules and considered precedents from the Madras High Court and the Supreme Court dealing with analogous provisions. Key steps in the Court's legal reasoning were as follows:

  1. Statutory distinction: The Court observed that while the revisional power under Section 20 is vested in the revisional authority, Section 14(4) (power to reopen) is conferred upon the assessing authority and also, by express provision, upon revisional authorities (paragraph 5). The limitation periods for reopening (Section 14(4)) and revision (Section 20) are different.
  2. Comparative rule analysis: The Court reviewed analogous provisions (Madras Rules 14(2) and 17(1)) and Full Bench authority in State of Madras v. Louis Dreyfus to demonstrate the importance of keeping revision and reopening jurisdictions distinct (paragraphs 6–8, 41–42).
  3. Precedent synthesis: The Court relied on Supreme Court decisions (State of Kerala v. M. Appukutty, Deputy Commissioner v. Dhanalakshmi Vilas Cashew Co., State of Kerala v. K.E. Nainan) to deduce that where the revisional authority is also vested with the power to reopen, revision is confined to the assessment record while reopening may be exercised only where there is material de hors the assessment record (paragraphs 10–11, 27, 68).
  4. Distinguishing contrary authorities: The Court addressed decisions and arguments (including Maharajadhiraj and Yercaud Coffee) cited for a wide meaning of "escaped" or for reassessment on change of opinion, and explained that those authorities must be read in the factual and statutory contexts in which revisional power and reopening power were differently configured. Thus, a wider meaning of "escape" may be given in some statutory settings, but where the revisional authority also has reopening power, a restrictive meaning is required to preserve the role of revision (paragraphs 17, 21, 22, 59–62).
  5. Necessity of material de hors the record: The Court concluded that reopening under Section 14(4) can be exercised only when there is material outside the assessment record showing that turnover escaped assessment, was under-assessed, or assessed at a lower rate, or that deduction/exemption was wrongly allowed (paragraphs 28–31, 69–72). Mere wrong allowance of deduction/exemption in itself does not grant power to reopen unless supported by material outside the record.
  6. Audit opinion is insufficient: The assessing authority had reopened the assessment on instructions of the audit party. The Court held that the opinion of an internal audit party cannot be treated as material de hors the assessment record, citing Indian & Eastern Newspaper Society v. Commissioner of Income-Tax (paragraph 36). Therefore, reopening in the present case lacked jurisdiction because it was based only on the audit party's opinion/instructions (paragraphs 36, 39).
  7. Binding decisions as external material: The Court observed that a decision of the Commissioner of Sales Tax, the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, the High Court or the Supreme Court on a question of law can amount to material de hors the assessment record enabling reopening under Section 14(4) because such decisions bind subordinate authorities in the State (paragraphs 37–38).
  8. Application to facts: Since, in this case, the only basis for reopening was the audit party's instruction/opinion (not a binding external decision or other material de hors the record), the assessing authority's reopening under Section 14(4) was without jurisdiction, and the Tribunal's allowance of the appeal was correct (paragraphs 39–40).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The High Court dismissed the tax revision petition and upheld the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal's order allowing the appeal against the assessing authority's reopening. In effect, the Court held that the assessing authority's order reopening the assessment under Section 14(4) was without jurisdiction because it was based solely on the opinion/instructions of the audit party and not on material de hors the assessment record.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the assessing authority's reopening and reassessment of the respondent's turnover (subjecting the entire turnover to 4% tax) is set aside and the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal's decision stands.
  • The Court affirmed the legal principle that, where the revisional authority is also vested with power to reopen, reopening under Section 14(4) requires material outside the assessment record (material de hors the record) demonstrating escaped turnover or wrongful allowance of deduction/exemption; a mere change of opinion by the assessing authority is not a valid basis for reopening.
  • The Court held that the opinion of an internal audit party does not constitute such material de hors the record and therefore cannot validate reopening under Section 14(4).
  • No broader precedent beyond the stated principles was attempted to be created; the decision addresses the parties' dispute and upholds the Tribunal without setting out novel principles beyond those grounded in the authorities cited. (The opinion does not state that it establishes any additional new precedent beyond its holdings in the case at hand.)
  • Costs: No costs were awarded; Advocate fee fixed at Rs. 150/-. (As stated in the opinion.)

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or holdings beyond what is expressly stated in that opinion.

    State Of Andhra Pradesh v. Ratnasree Box Makers

    Neeladri Rao, J.:— The respondent herein is a manufacturer and dealer in card board boxes. For the assessment year 1977-78, his total turnover was less than R.s 25,000/-. The assessing authority i.e, the Assistant Commercial Tax Officer held that card board boxes were unclassified goods. Daring 1977-78 if the total turnover of unclassified goods was less than Rs. 25,000/- it was not subjected to tax under Section 5(1) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as “Act”) and hence exemption was granted for the entire turnover in regard to the sales of card board boxes in 1977-78.

    2. During the course of audit conducted by the appropriate authority the assessing authority was informed that card board boxes come within the purview of item 19 of the 1st Schedule and hence they are liable to tax at the point of first sale at the rate of 4% irrespective of the turnover. Thereupon, the assessing authority issued a show cause notice to the respondent herein to show as to why the turnover in regard to card board boxes should not be subjected to tax at the rate of 4%. Though in the said notice the assessing authority referred to Section 20 of the Act and Rule 50(3) of the Rules framed under the Act, it can be held that it was a notice issued under Section 14(4) as the assessing authority is not the revisional authority who can revise under Section 20 of the Act. After giving an opportunity to the respondent of being heard the entire turnover was subjected to tax at the rate of 4% by holding that the card board boxes would come within the ambit of item 19 of I Schedule. The appeal thereon to the Commercial Tax Officer, No. 1, Rajahmundry was dismissed. In the appeal to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, it was held by relying upon the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Fatechand and Sons v. Commercial Tax Officer 54 S.T.C 166. that the mete change of opinion cannot be the basis for exercising the power vested under Section 14(4) read with sub-clause (cc) and hence the appeal was allowed.

    3. The learned Government Pleader contended that the power to reopen under Section 14(4) arises even on the basis of mere change of opinion in regard to classification of goods and that is the only point for consideration.

    4. To appreciate the respective contentions the relevant provisions in the Act have to be read:

    “Section 14. Assessment of tax: (1)………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

    (1-A)………………………………………………………………….

    (2)………………………………………………………………………

    (3)…………………………………………………………………….

    (4) In any of the following events, namely, where the whole or any part of the turnover of a business of a dealer has escaped assessment 10 tax, or has been under-assessed or assessed at a rate lower than the correct rate, or where the licence fee or registration fee has escaped levy or has been levied at a rate lower than the correct rate, the assessing authority may, after issuing a notice to the dealer, and after making such enquiry as he may consider necessary, by order, setting out the grounds therefor—

    (a) determine to the best of his judgment turnover that has escaped assessment and assess the turnover so determined;

    (b) assess the correct amount of tax payable on the turnover that has been under-assessed;

    (c) assess at the correct rate the turnover that has been assessed at a lower rate;

    (cc) assess the correct amount of tax payable, in a case where any deduction or exemption has been wrongly allowed;

    (d) …………………………………………………………

    (e) ………………………………………………………………………

    (f) ………………………………………………………

    (4-A) …………………………………………………….

    (4-B) …………………………………………………….

    (4-C) The powers conferred by sub-section (4) on the assessing autho rity may, subject to the same conditions as are applicable in the case of that authority, be exercised also by any of the authorities higher than the assessing authority including The Assistant Commissioner (Intelligence). The Deputy Commissioner and the Joint Commissioner.

    (5) …………………………………………………….

    (6) …………………………………………………….

    (7) …………………………………………………….

    (8) …………………………………………………….

    Section 20. Revision by Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and other prescribed authorities:

    (1) …………………………………………………….

    (2) …………………………………………………….

    (2-A) …………………………………………………….

    (3) In relation to an order of assessment passed under this Act, the powers conferred by sub-sections (I) and (2) shall be exercisable only within such periods not exceeding four years from the date on which the order was served on the dealer, as may be prescribed.

    (4) …………………………………………………….

    (5) …………………………………………………….

    Rule 50. (1) Any assessing, licensing, appellate or revising authority may, at any time within four years from the date of any order passed by him rectify any clerical or arithmetical mistake apparent from the record:

    Provided that no such rectification which has the effect of enhancing an assessment or any penalty or fee shall be made unless the assessing, appellate or revising authorityhas given notice to the dealer of his intention to do so and has allowed him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

    (2) Where such rectification has the effect of reducing an assessment, penalty or fee the assessing authority shall make any refund which may be due to the dealer.

    (3) Where any such rectification has the effect of enhancing an assessment, penalty or fee, the assessing authority shall serve on the dealer a revised notice in Form B-3 or B-6 as the case may be, and thereupon the provisions of the Act and these rules, shall apply as if such notice had been served in the first instance.

    (4) …………………………………………………….

    (5) …………………………………………………….”

    5. It can be seen that while the power of revision under Section 20 of the Act is with the revisional authority, the power to reopen under Section 14(4) is conferred not only upon the assessing authority but also upon the revisional authority. Further, the period of limitation prescribed for reopening under Section 14(4) is different from the period of limitation prescribed under Section 20 of the Act.

    6. Rule 17 of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules, 1939 conferred power upon the assessing authority to reopen assessment in regard to cases of escaped turnover while Rule 14(2) of the said Rules conferred power upon the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and others to revise. Those two Rules are as follows:

    “Rule 14. (I) …………………………………………………….

    (2) The Commercial Tax Officer may, in his discretion, at any time, either suo motu or on application, call for and examine the record of any order passed or any proceedings recorded under the Act by an Assistant or Deputy Commercial Tax Officer working under him, for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such order or as to the regularity of such proceedings and may pass such order in reference thereto as he thinks fit.”

    “Rule 17. (1) If for any reason the whole or any part of the turnover of business of a dealer or licensee has escaped assessment to the tax in any year or if the licence fee has escaped levy in any year, the assessing authority or licensing authority, as the case may be, may, at any time within the year or the next succeeding that to which the tax or licence fee relates, assess the tax payable on the turnover which has escaped assessment or levy the licence fee, after issuing a notice to the dealer or licensee and after making such enquiry as he considers necessary.”

    7. While dealing with the relative scope of those two provisions it was held by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in State of Madras v. Louis Dreyfus and Company Ltd. 6 S.T.C 318.. that they are mutually exclusive. It was further held therein that “Rule 14(2) deals with escaped assessment and Rule 17(1) with escaped turnovers, not withsianding that the latter also would mean that a lesser amount of tax has been levied. So understood the two provisions would be completely reconcilable and the two jurisdictions to revise assessments and to reopen them - would each be assigned to the proper authority.”

    “The language of rule 17 (i) is consistent with this construction. The “escape” that serves as the foundation of the jurisdiction to reopen an assessment is that of “turnover”, and not, be it noted, an assessment. “Turnover” escapes when it is not noticed by the officer either because it is not before him by reason of an inadvertence, omission or deliberate concealment on the part of the assessee, or because of want of care on the part of the officer the turnover though in the books has not been taken notice of This would be the natural and normal meaning of the expression “turnover which has escaped” in rule 17(1).”

    8. It may be noted that Rules 17(1) and 14(2) of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules, 1939 were so construed even when the revisional authority was not vested with the power to reopen in regard to escaped turnover.

    9. Later, Rule 17(3-A) of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules was incorporated conferring the power of reopening in regard to the escaped turnover on the revisional authority also.

    10. While dealing with Section 12(2) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act and Rule 17(I) and Rule 17(3-A) of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules, 1939, the Suoreme Court held in State Of Kerala v. M. Appukutty . 14 S.T.C 242. that in exercising the revisional jurisdiction under Section 12(2) the Deputy Commissioner would be restricted to the examination of the record for determining whether the order of assessment was according to law. Rule 17 confers power to assess escaped turnover which may normally be exercised on matters de hors the record of assessment proceedings before the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer.”

    11. The same principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Deputy Commissioner v. Dhanalakshmi Vilas Cashew Co. 24 S.T.C 491. and State Of Kerala v. K.E Nainan 26 S.T.C 251. while dealing with similar provisions i.e, Section 15(1)(i) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act (11 of 1125) and Rule 33 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Rules, 1950.

    12. Thus while referring to the above decisions of the Supreme Court, it was urged by Sri K. Raja Reddy appointed as amicus curiae that when the revisionsl authority is also conferred with the power of reopening in regard to escaped turnover then for the purpose of revision he can proceed only on the basis of assessment record, while for reopening he can exercise the power if there is material de hors the assessment record. It was further argued by him that a change of opinion of the assessing authority cannot be treated as a material de hors the assessment record, and hence assessment cannot be reopened under Section 14(4) on the basis of mere change of opinion in regard to classification of the goods.

    13. But the learned Government Pleader urged as follows:

    A reading of Section 14 shows that whenever there is escapement of turnover the power to reopen can be exercised. If the said escapement is due to grant of wrong exemption or deduction, the tax propsrly due can be assessed under Section 14(4)(cc). There is nothing in Section 14(4) to indicate that the power to reopen arises only when material de hors the assessment record is available.

    14. To support his contention various decisions were referred to:

    15. In Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar 37 I.T.R 388. the Supreme Court construed Section 26 of the Bihar Agricultural Income-Tax Act, 1938 which is as follows:

    “If for any reason any agricultural income chargeable to agricu-tural income-tax has escaped assessment for any financial year, or has been assessed at too low a rate, the Agricultural Income-Tax Officer may, at any time within one year of the end of that financial year, serve on the person liable to pay agricultural income-tax on such agricultural income or, in the case of a company, on the principal officer thereof, a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under sub-section (2) of Section 17 and may proceed to assess or reassess such income, and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice issued under that sub-section:

    ……………… ………………… …………………….”.

    16. In that case, the High Court had not accepted the contention that restricted meaning had to be given to the word “escape” i.e, only in cases where an item of income was not charged to tax due to a mistake or oversight on the part of the taxing authorities, that item could well come within the term “escaped” was not accepted. Therein it was held that in view of the words “any reason” and in view of the latter part of Section “where income, has been assessed at too low a rate” the phrase “escaped assessment” includes a case where there was a deliberate action. The said view of the High Court was approved by the Supreme Court in the above decision.

    17. But, in Bihar Agricultural Income-Tax Act, there is no provision confenirg power upon the assessing authority to reopen the assessment. Further, in State Of Kerala v. M. Appukutty . (supra), Deputy Commissioner v. Dhanalakshmi Vilas Cashew Co., 4 (supra) and State Of Kerala v. K.E Nainan (supra) the Supreme Court considered the relevant provisions of the Madras General Saks Tax Act and Kerala General Sales Tax Act wherein the revisional authority was also vested with the power to reopen. It may be further noted that even the relevant provisions in Kerala General Sales Tax Act and Madras General Sales Tax Act dealing with powers for reopening in regard to escaped turnover contain the words “for any reason” just as in Secion 26 of the Bihar Agricultural Income Tax Act. Hence it cannot be held that the Supreme Court while construing Section 26 of the Bihar Agricultural Income-Tax Act in Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar (supra) in giving wider meaning to the word “escaped” differed from its earlier view wherein the escaped turnover was given restricted meaning while considering the relevant provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act and Kerala General Sales Tax Act. By reading the decisions in State Of Kerala v. M. Appukutty . (supra), Deputy Commissioner v. Dhanalakshmi Vilas Cashew Co. (supra) and State Of Kerala v. K.E Nainan (5 supra) it has to be stated that wider meaning has to be given to the ‘escaped turnover’ if the revisional authority is also vested with the power to reopen in regard to escaped turnover, while restricted meaning has to be given to the same if the revisional authority is not conferred with the power to reopen with regard to escaped turnover.

    18. In F.K Hashecb & Co. v. State of Madias 17 S.T.C 38. while referring to Section 32 of the Madras Genera] Sales Tax Act, 1959 conferring power of revision on the Deputy Commissioner and Section 16 of the said Act which confers power upon the assessing authority to reopen which are similar to Sections 20(2) and 14(4) of the Act, it was held that the power under Section 32 is a distinct and separate power and its exercise cannot be controlled by any power which may inhere in the assessing authority under Section 16.

    19. But it may be noted that the revisional authority under the Madras General Sales Tax Act had no power to reopen.

    20. In Yercaud Cofee Curing Works Ltd. v. The State of Tamilnadu 40 S.T.C 531. the Madras High Court while construing Section 16 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 held that it is competent for the assessing aulhortty in a reassessment proceeding to assess an item of turnover which had been omitted to be taxed earlier for any reason. The authority has, therefore, power to reassess a turnover even though in the return that turnover was included and the officer then thought that it was exempt.

    21. The said decision is strongly relied upon for the department to contend that it is open to the assessing authority to reopen under Section 14(4) of the Act on the basis of mere change of opinion in regard to classification. But, the Madras High Court in the above judgment after referring to the decisions in State Of Kerala v. M. Appukutty .l (supra). Deputy Commissioner v. Dhanalakshmi Vilas Cashew Co. and State of Kerala v. K.E Nainam (supra) observed as follows:

    “The Supreme Court considered the words “escaped turnover” in the context of the power given to the same authority to revise an assessment on the ground of illegality and impropriety and, therefore, their Lordships have restricted the scope of these words “escaped turnover”. In the absence of such different provisions vesting the power on the same authority, we are of the view that a restricted meaning either for the words “escaped turnover” or for the words “illegality, impropriety or irregularity” is not warranted.”

    22. But, as under our Act also the revisional authority is also vested with the power to reopen an assessment under Section 14(4), restricted meaning has to be given to the “escaped turnover” and wider meaning cau-not be given for the said words as contended for the department.

    23. Even in Andhra Steel Corporation Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer 68 S.T.C 126. a Division Bench of this Court after referring to the decision in Deputy Commissioner v. Dhanalakshmi Vilas Cashew Co. Supra, held that the observations of the Supreme Court while referring to Section 15(1) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act show that the power under sub-clause (cc) of sub-section (4) of Section 14 of the Act can be exercised de hors the record of the assessment proceedings before the assessing authority. Hence, the said decision does not support the contention for the deoartment that even in a case where turnover was exempted after deliberation, the assessing authority by mere change of opinion can reopen under Section 14(4) of the Act.

    24. In Eastern Ore Corporation v. Commercial Tax Officer 33 S.T.C 129. a Full Bench of this Court while construing Section 14(4) before it was amended by Act 16 of 1963 held that a power to reopen under Section 14(4) arises in the events mentioned therein namely, (1) where the whole or any part of the turnover of a business of a dealer has escaped assessment to tax, (2) where a dealer has been under-assessed or (3) where he has been assessed at a rate lower than the correct rate or (4) where the licence fee or registration fee has escaped levy or (5) where fee has been levied at a rate lower than the correct rate. When any of the aforesaid events happen, the assessing authority after making such enquiry as he considers necessary can assess the correct amount of tax payable or levy a correct amount of licence fee or registration fee.

    25. Section 14(4)(cc) of the Act is as follows:

    “(cc) assess the correct amount of (ax payable in a case where any deduction or exemption has been wrongly allowed.”

    26. By relying upon the same, learned Government Pleader urged as follows: When ever it is shown that deduction or exemption has been wrongly allowed then the assessing authority can assess the correct amount of tax payable under Section 14(4)(cc). When in view of mere change of opinion, the assessing authority felt that the exemption or deduction originally allowed has been wrongly allowed then he can have the power to reopen under Saction 14(4)(cc) and there are no words in the above provision to whittle down the said power.

    27. Under the scheme of our Act the revisional authority has also been given the power to reopen under Section 14(4) as can be seen from Section 14(4) of the Act. While dealing with similar provisions of Kerala General Sales Tax Act whereunder the revisional authority was also vesled with the power to reopen in case of escaped turnover the Supreme Court held in Deputy Commissioner v. Dhcnalakshmi Vilas Cashew Co. (supra) and State Of Kerala v. K.E Nainan (supra) that while the power of revision can be exercised by looking into assessment record only, the power of reopening has to be exercised on the basis of the material de hors the record.

    28. If the contention for the department that the power of reopening can be exercised even in regard to turnover which was already considered at the time of assessment then there will not be any conceivable case which can be considered under Section 20 as observed in State of Madras v. Louis Dreyfus and Company Ltd. (supra). Hence on the basis of the decisions of the Supreme Court in State Of Kerala v. M. Appukutty . tsupra), Deputy Commissioner v. Dhanalakshmi Vilas Cashew Co.(supra) and State Of Kerala v. K.E Nainan (supra) wherein the Supreme Court considered the relevant scope of provisions in regard to the revision and reopening where the revisional authority is also vested with the power to reopen just as in our Act, it has to be held that the power of reopening under Section 14(4) can be exercised if and when there is a material de hors the assessment record to show that any turnover of (he business of a dealer escaped assessment to tax or that it is under-assessed or that it is assessed at a rate lower than the correct rate.

    29. So in order to exercise the power under Section 14(4) the concerned authority has to come across material de hors the assessment record. The said material has to show that the whole or any part of the turnover of the business of a dealer has escaped assessment to tax or has been underassessed or assessed at a rate lower than the correct rate or there is escapement of levy in regard to licence fee or registration fee or that it has been levied at a rate lower than the correct rate. Then the assessing authority may determine to the best of the judgment the turnover that has escaped assessment and assess the turnover so determined or assess the correct amount of tax leviable on the turnover that has been under assessed or assess at a correct rate the turnover that has been assessed at a lower rate or assess the correct amount of tax payable in a case where any deduction or exemption has been wrongly allowed.

    30. Thus, it can be seen that mere fact of wrong allowance of deduction or exemption does not give power to reopen the assessment. Only when material de hors the assessment record is available disclosing escaped turnover referred to in Section 14(4) the power of reopening can be exercised under Section 14(4) of the Act. In this context, the situation dealt with by a Division Bench of this Court in Sri Balaganesh Textiles v. Commercial Tax Officer 41 S.T.C 445. can be referred to.

    31. In that case, during the assessment proceedings of the purchasers from the assessee it was noticed that the sales of cotton yarn by the assessee were last sales within the State and hence the said turnover was exigible to tax in his hands in view of the relevant provision and so it was held that the exemption was wrongly granted in regard to the said turnover. So it is a case of escapement of turnover due to the erroneous grant of exemption of turnover, which had come to the notice of the assessing authority on the basis of the material de hors the assessment record.

    32. Thus it can be stated that if it can be held by a perusal of the assessment record itself that deduction or exemption has been wrongly granted then it is for the revisional authority to correct it by exercising the power under Section 20 of the Act. But, if it is a case where it is found on the basis of the material de hors the assessment record that the exemption or deduction has been wrongly granted, the same has to be corrected under Section 14(4) by reopening the assessment.

    33. In Menta Narasimhaswamy & Company v. The State Of A.P 54. S.T.C 6. one of us, (Jeevan Reddy, J) held that the order of the Deputy Commissioner, which was not only one passed avowedly under Section 20 of the Act, but was also based on the same material and record upon which the assessment order was based, could not be treated as one under Section 14(4).

    34. Thus, the said judgment is also to the effect that the revisional authority can exercise the power by basing only on the material in the assessment record while the power to reopen under Section 14(4) cannot be exercised merely on the basis of the material in the assessment record.

    35. Hence, we agree with the view expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in” Falechand and Sons v. Commercial Tax Officer(supra) wherein it was held that mere change of opinion cannot be a basis for reopening under Section 14(4) of the Act.

    36. In this case, the assessing authority reopened the assessment on the basis of instructions of the audit party. In Indian & Eastern Newspaper Society v. Commissioner of Income-Tax 119 I.T.R 996. the Supreme Court held that the opinion of an internal audit party on a point of law could not be regarded as “information” enabling the I.T.O to initiate reassessment proceedings under Section 147(b) of the Income-Tax Act, 1961. Hence the opinion of the audit party cannot be treated as a material de hors the assessment record to enable reopening under Section 14(4) of the Act.

    37. But, a question arises as to whether any decision of Commissioner of Sales Tax, A.P Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, our High Court or Supreme Court on a question of law can be held as a material de hors the assessment record whereby the power of reopening can be exercised under Section 14(4).

    38. We feel that the same can be treated as a material de hors the assessment record which can be held as a basis for reopening under Section 14(4) for such a decision is binding upon all the lower authorities in this State.

    39. But, as in this case, the assessing authority reopened the assessment as per instructions of the audit party which cannot be held as a material de hors the assessment record it has to be held that the order of the assessing authority in reopening under Section 14(4) is without jurisdiction.

    40. So, We find that the Appellate Tribunal rightly allowed the appeal and it does not warrant interference.

    41. In the result, the tax revision petition is dismissed. No costs, Advocate fee is Rs. 150/-

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