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Judgment Summary — Delivered by Manohar Pershad, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff-appellant brought a suit for possession and mesne profits alleging that on 6th Meher, 1343-F the owners of the suit land transferred it to him by a registered sale deed. He asserted continuous possession by leasing the land on kaul to Ismail Sherif, then to Ahmed Sherif, and thereafter to Ahmed's sons Khaja (Khaka) Sherif and Maqdoom Sherif, who orally agreed to continue as lessees. The plaintiff alleged that the lessees, in collusion with the defendant-respondent, dispossessed him.

The defendant denied the plaint allegations, claimed ownership, and stated that he and his ancestors had leased the land to Gul Farosh (flower vendors). According to a local custom, eviction of gul farosh required payment; relying on that practice he said he purchased the right of ownership and possession from his kauldars Khaja Sherif and Maqdoom Sherif by a registered sale deed dated 18th March, 1351-F. The plaintiff's rejoinder admitted the permanent character of the flower garden and maintained ancestral connection and lease history.

Eight issues were framed and evidence was led. The trial Court decreed the plaintiff's suit for possession and mesne profits at Rs. 350 per year until delivery of possession, holding that the plaintiff's title and possession were proved and that the defendant had no right or title. The defendant appealed. The appellate Court retained the case but remanded it to the trial Court for further evidence. On remand the trial Court held that evidence was insufficient to award mesne profits but that the plaintiff was entitled to possession. When the matter returned to the appellate bench, the learned Judge dismissed the plaintiff's entire claim. The present appeal challenges that outcome.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant has any right and title to the suit property and whether he was in possession and has been dispossessed by the respondent.
  2. Whether the lower appellate Court was correct in holding that the unregistered lease (kaul/kabuliat) deeds were inadmissible in evidence and could not be relied upon to establish title, possession or admissions contained therein.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant relied on a registered sale deed (dated 6th Meher, 1343-F), two unregistered lease/kaul documents (Exhibits 2 and 20), pauti bahi, mursala of the Tahsil, mutation records and revenue receipts from 1337-F to 1355-F, together with oral testimony of five witnesses, to prove patta, title and possession.
  • It was contended that the appellate Court erred in holding that the unregistered lease deeds were inadmissible; the appellant argued those kabuliats are admissible at least to prove admissions by Ahmed Sherif and to show the nature of possession.
  • The appellant pointed to direct testimony (including the vendor Shankeriah and kauldar Khaja Sherif) and documentary revenue/mutation records as supporting ownership and possession.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent denied the plaintiff's pattedari and asserted ownership, explaining his alleged acquisition by purchase of the kaul/right from his kauldars and reliance on customary practice concerning the Gul Farosh.
  • The respondent contended that the unregistered lease deeds (kabuliats/kaulanamas) were inadmissible under the Registration Act (section corresponding to s.49 Indian Registration Act and s.43 Hyderabad Registration Act) and therefore could not be relied upon either to prove the nature of possession or any admissions they contained.
  • The respondent offered testimony (two witnesses, Ram Reddy and Noor Khan) suggesting long possession by a third party or possession by the respondent's side, aiming to rebut the appellant's claim.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kanuparti Subbiah v. Kurnam Muddulatiah Held that an unregistered permanent lease was inadmissible in evidence to prove the nature of the lessee's possession. The Court observed this decision did not discuss whether admissions contained in an unregistered document are admissible; therefore it did not support the respondent's contention that admissions in the kabuliats were inadmissible.
Devi Dayal v. Wazirchand, 1921 61 I.C. 328 Even if a lease (or similar document) is inadmissible as proof of title when unregistered, admissions contained in it may be taken in evidence. The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that the admission contained in the unregistered lease deed could be admitted in evidence.
Saileih Chandra Saikar v. Bireswar Chatterjee, A.I.R. 1930 Cal. 559 An unregistered agreement is not admissible as a lease, but a statement in it may be admitted as an admission; such admission remains evidence and the maker may seek to explain or rebut it. The Court cited this case to reinforce that statements in an unregistered document may be received as admissions and so used as evidence here.
Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari Co., 37 M.L.J. 525 (Privy Council) Authority concerning admissibility and the treatment of unregistered lease-type documents and related admissions (relied upon in prior decisions). The Court referenced this Privy Council decision (as relied upon in other cases) to support the view that while unregistered lease deeds may be inadmissible to prove title, admissions in such documents can be used.
Rajangam Ayyar v. Rajangam Ayyar (Madras High Court) Held that an unregistered document is admissible in evidence to prove an admission contained therein. The Court cited this case to confirm that admissions in unregistered documents are admissible and applicable to the instant leases/kabuliats.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by identifying the central factual and evidentiary points and then applied principles concerning admissibility of unregistered documents and the quality of competing evidence.

First, the Court considered the pattedari and documentary record: the appellant produced pauti bahi, the mursala of the Tahsil and mutation records showing that the patta stood in the plaintiff's name (and earlier in the plaintiff's father's name). The Court observed there was no evidence produced by the respondent to counter this documentary proof.

Second, on title and the chain of possession, the Court noted the plaintiff's evidence that he and his ancestors possessed the land for over fifty years and that the vendor Shankeriah confirmed transfer to the plaintiff. The respondent's asserted original ownership was unsupported; his remaining contention depended upon a purchase from Ahmed Sherif (a kauldar), but Ahmed was dead and his sons (Khaja and Maqdoom) were available witnesses. Khaja Sherif testified (for the appellant) that he took the land on kaul from the appellant and that any sale to the defendant was the result of duress; this supported the appellant's claim that Ahmed Sherif was the appellant's kauldar, and accordingly a kauldar could not convey a better right than he possessed.

Third, the Court addressed the contested legal question over admissibility of two unregistered kaul/lease deeds (Exhibits 2 and 20). It examined precedent and statutory provisions: while recognizing that under the local Registration Act (section 43 of the Hyderabad Registration Act, corresponding to section 49 of the Indian Registration Act) an unregistered lease deed is inadmissible to prove title or operate as a lease, the Court held that admissions contained in an unregistered document are admissible for collateral purposes. The Court relied on authorities (Devi Dayal, Saileih Chandra Saikar, Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi, Rajangam Ayyar) and distinguished Kanuparti Subbiah, observing that the latter concerned inadmissibility to prove nature of possession and did not consider the admissibility of admissions.

Fourth, the Court concluded that the admissions in the kabuliats, corroborated by oral testimony (including Khaja Sherif's admissions) and the registered sale deed and revenue records, established the appellant's ownership and possession. The respondent's evidence (Ram Reddy and Noor Khan) was found unconvincing and insufficient to rebut the appellant's documentary and oral case: one witness admitted lack of knowledge about patta and revenue, and the other gave inconsistent testimony. The Court also noted the absence of any revenue receipts or documentary evidence from the respondent's side to support an asserted long possession.

Finally, applying these conclusions to the reliefs claimed, the Court accepted the trial Court's approach to mesne profits: the trial Court had awarded mesne profits at Rs. 350 per year from the date of the suit until delivery of possession but had refused mesne profits for three years prior to the suit (that refusal having become final). The Court therefore limited mesne profits to the period from the date of suit until possession, to be quantified by the trial Court under Order 20, rule 12, Civil Procedure Code. On these bases the Court allowed the appeal and restored the trial Court's judgment.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Appeal allowed; the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court is set aside and the judgment and decree of the trial Court is restored.

Consequences for the parties (as stated in the opinion):

  • The appellant is held to be the owner of the suit property and entitled to possession.
  • The appellant is entitled to mesne profits only from the date of the suit until the date of delivery of possession (the trial Court had directed Rs. 350 per year; the precise amount and period are to be determined by the trial Court under Order 20, rule 12, Civil Procedure Code). The trial Court's refusal to award mesne profits for the three years prior to the suit stands and is final.
  • The appellant is awarded costs throughout.

The opinion applies established principles regarding admissibility of admissions in unregistered documents and resolves the appeal on the particular evidentiary record; it does not announce any novel legal rule beyond the application of cited authorities to the facts of the case.

    G. Balkishtiah v. B. Ranga Reddy .

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Manohar Pershad, J.

    The plaintiff-appellant herein filed a suit for possession and mesne profits against the defendant-respondent alleging that on 6th Meher, 1343-F. the owners of the suit land transferred the same in his favour through a registered sale deed and he has been in possession by leasing it on kaul to Ismail Sherif and after his death to Ahmed Sherif and thereafter to his two sons Khaka Sherif and Maqdoom Sherif, who agreed orally to continue as lessees on the basis of the previous agreement. He further avers that later on the lessees in collusion with the defendant dispossessed him. The defendant (respondent) has denied all the allegations contained in the plaint, claimed ownership of the land and stated that he and his ancestors had leased out the land in dispute to Gul Farosh (flower vendors) and according to the custom prevailing, if the owner of the land desired to evict the Gul Farosh, he had to pay money towards the right of ownership and possession of the lease and in pursuance of this practice, he purchased the right of ownership and possession of the Phool Bagh from his Kauldars, Khaja Sherif and Maqdoom Sherif through a registered sale deed dated 18th March, 1351-F. In the rejoinder, the appellant admitted that the flower garden had a permanent characteristic and alleged that his ancestors had erected flower garden on the disputed land which was taken on lease by the Gul Farosh from him and his father. In all 8 issues were framed. Evidence was led by the parties. On the evidence produced the lower Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff for possession and mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 350 per year till the delivery of possession holding that the title and possession of the appellant was proved. He also held that the defendant had no right and title. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the respondent herein went in appeal. The appellate Court, retaining the case on its file, remanded the case to the trial Court on the evidence of the parties. After remand, the trial Court on the evidence produced expressed the opinion that the evidence on record was not sufficient to give a decree for mesne profits, but that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for possession. When the matter came up before the learned Judge again, he dismissed the entire claim of the plaintiff. Hence this appeal.

    2. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the lower appellate Court has erred in holding that unregistered lease deeds were not admissible in evidence and that the other evidence on record was not sufficient to establish title and possession of the plaintiff.

    3. The sole question that has to be determined in this appeal is whether the appellant has any right and title to the suit property and whether he was in possession and has been dispossessed by the respondent. In order to prove title and possession, the appellant relies on the registered sale deed, two lease deeds, pauti bahi, the revenue receipts from 1337-F. to 1355F, and the oral testimony of five witnesses. So far as the pattedari of the plaintiff is concerned, the defendant has denied that he is a pattedar. The appellant has filed the pauti bahi, mursala of the Tahsil and the mutation record. All these go to prove that the patta of the suit land stands in the name of the plaintiff. It is also evident that previous to this, the patta stood in the name of the plaintiff's father. As against this there is no evidence on behalf of the respondent. The next question is who is the owner of the suit property. The plaintiff's case is that he and his ancestors had been in possession of the suit land for over 50 years and admitting their possession, the owners of the land transferred the same in his possession. The vendor Shankeriah has been examined and he states that he transferred the suit property in favour of the plaintiff. As against this, the case of the respondent is that he was the owner and he had leased out the suit land to Ahmed Sherif and according to the prevailing custom, he purchased the same from him. There is absolutely no evidence in the case to show that the respondent was originally the owner of the suit land. Now, the only case of his that remains is the purchase by him from Ahmed Sherif. This Ahmed Sherif, according to the plaintiff was his kauldar. The respondent also states that he (Ahmed Sherif) was his kauldar. Ahmed Sherif is dead. His sons Khaja Sherif and Maqdoom Sherif are alive. Out of these, Khaja Sheriff has been examined on behalf of the appellant. He admits that he had taken the suit land on kaul from the appellant and as regards the defendant's claim that he sold the property to him, he says that was done by duress and undue influence. It is therefore clear from the statement of Khaja Sherif that he was a kauldar of the appellant. A kauldar cannot transfer any better right to any person than what he himself has. The plaintiff-appellant in order to prove that Ahmed Sherif was his kauldar, apart from the oral evidence, relies on two lease deeds, Exhibits 2 and 20. Exhibit 2 is a kaulanama executed by Ahmed Sherif on 4th Dai, 1350-F. for a period of 5 years. Exhibit 20 is another kaul dated 26th Khurdad, 1336-F. by Sherif Sab, son of Ismail Sab. It may be noted here that Ahmed Sherif is the son of Ismail Sab and Khaja Sherif and Maqdoom Sherif are the sons of Ahmed Sheriff. Yousuf Ali, P.W 2 and Khaja Mia, P.W 5 have spoken to the fact of these kabuliats. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that though these kabuliats are unregistered, still they are admissible to prove the nature of possession and also the admission by Ahmed Sheriff that the plaintiff is the owner, whereas the contention of the other side is chat these kabuliats being unregistered are inadmissible in evidence and they cannot be relied upon even to prove the nature of possession or admission. It this connection, the learned counsel placed his reliance on Kanuparti Subbiah v. Kurnam Muddulatiah.1 We do not find sufficient force in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent. There is sufficient authority for the proposition that a document which is unregistered is admissible for collateral purposes. In the instant case, the appellant relies on this document for the purpose of proving the admission of Ahmed Sherif contained therein. There is also sufficient authority for the proposition that an unregistered document can be admitted in evidence for the purpose of proving the admission contained therein. We may in this connection refer to a few cases.

    4. Devi Dayal v. Wazirchand . 1921 61 I.C 328. was also a case where reliance was placed on the admission in a lease deed. The contention was that it being not registered was inadmissible in evidence under section 49 of the Registration Act. This contention was repelled and it was held:

    “We agree that, as a lease or as a document to prove title, it is not admissible. But we see no reason why the aamissson of Devi Dayal contained therein cannot be taken in evidence.”

    5. In Saileih Chandra Saikar v. Bireswar Chatterjee . A.I.R 1930 Cal. 559., the Calcutta High Court has taken a similar view. In this case, there was a compromise agreement operating as a lease. This was also unregistered. Question was raised that it was inadmissible. It was held:

    “An agreement, if unregistered, will not be admissible as a lease although a statement in it may be admitted as an admission. When such a statement is admitted as an admission it is only a piece of evidence and it is open to the party who has made the admission to show that it was made in circumstances which did not make the admission binding on him or on her as the case may be”.

    6. In this case, Mr. Justice Mitter has relied upon the Privy Council decision in Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari Co. . 37 M.L.J 525 We are also of the opinion that though the lease deeds in question being unregistered are inadmissible in evidence under section 43 of the Hyderabad Registration Act, corresponding to section 49 of the Indian Registration Act, but so far as the admission of title in those lease deeds is concerned there is nothing why the same should not be so used.

    7. The case relied upon viz., Kanuparti Subbayya v. Kurnam Muddulatiah, does not help the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent. In this case, their Lordships have held that an unregistered permanent lease was inadmissible in evidence to prove the nature of possession, which the lessee had. There is no discussion in this case whether the admission in the document was admissible or not. As stated earlier, we are using the lease-deeds only to prove the admission. We need not therefore go into the question whether this document is admissible to prove the nature of the possession.

    8. The Madras High Court in a subsequent case Rajangam Ayyar v. Rajangam Ayyar has considered the question of the admissibility of the admission in an unregistered document and has held:

    “That document is, no doubt, admissible in evidence to prove the admission and there is no doubt, such an admission in it.”

    9. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is that even if the admission in the lease deed is admissible, the same cannot be used against Khaja Sherif, because that is not his admission. There is no force in this contention. Khaja Sherif, as stated earlier, is the son of Ahmed Sherif. He derives title through his father. He cannot therefore say that he is not bound by the admission of his father. Of course, it was open to him to rebut the admission by producing evidence or giving some satisfactory explanation, but this is not so; on the other hand, Khaja Sherif has clearly admitted that he and his ancestors were kauldars of the appellant. Taking this document and reading it along with the sale-deed and the oral evidence, there does not remain any doubt, that the plaintiff-appellant is the owner of the suit property. As against this evidence, there is only the deposition of two witnesses, Ram Reddy and Noor Khan. Ram Reddy says that he has been seeing the possession of B. Ranga Reddy for the last 40 years, that he had leased out the suit land to Khaja Mia and Maqdoom Mia. In cross-examination, he says he does not know who was the lessee before the father of Khaja Mia. Noor Khan states that after the sale-deed B. Ranga Reddy is in possession. He admits he is the watchman kept for purposes of watching on the land by Ranga Reddy, but admits that he does not know in whose name the patta is and what revenue is paid. This evidence in our opinion does not rebut the appellant's evidence. The best evidence in the case would have been that of B. Ranga Reddy himself but he has not chosen to give his statement. Apart from the discrepancy in the deposition of the statements of Ram Reddy and Noor Khan, their statements are most untrustworthy. The trial Court before whom the evidence was led has believed the evidence of the appellant and has not relied on the evidence, of the defendant. We agree with the view of the trial Court and hold that the evidence produced on behalf of the appellant is sufficient to prove that he is the owner and was in possession. The evidence of the defendant does not rebut this evidence. If as is alleged by the respondent, he has been in possession for over 50 years, we fail to understand why not a single revenue receipt has been filed on his behalf; on the other hand, there are a number of such receipts from 1337 to 1353-F. filed by the appellant. The lower appellate Court has disagreed with the view of the trial Court holding that the lease deeds were inadmissible in evidence. In view of the above discussion, this view of the appellate court cannot be upheld. The appellant has filed a suit for possession, mesne profits and for damages. The trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff for possession and as regards the mesne profits the direction of the trial Court was that the plaintiff would be entitled to mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 350 per year from the date of the suit till the date of possession and dismissed the claim for damages. Against the order of the trial Court refusing to give a decree to the plaintiff for mesne profits for three years prior to the suit, the plaintiff did not take any action. That order has become final. As per the directions of the trial Court, the plaintiff, therefore, would only be ??? to mesne profits from the date of the suit till the date of possession. This will be determined by the trial Court under Order 20 rule 12, Civil Procedure Code.

    10. The appeal is therefore allowed, the judgment and decree of the lower Court is set aside and that of the trial Court restored as indicated above. The appellant would be entitled to costs throughout. The mesne profits will be determined by the trial Court under Order 20, rule 12, Civil Procedure Code.

    Ch. R.

    Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    G. Balkishtiah v. B. Ranga Reddy .
    (Mar 13, 1959)