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  • Negotiable Instruments Act being a Central Act, the provisions of that Act
  • provisions of the Hyderabad Money Lenders Act
  • NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT
  • Hyderabad Money Lenders Act
  • Money Lenders' Act
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • Negotiable Instruments Act being a Central Act, the provisions of that Act
  • provisions of the Hyderabad Money Lenders Act
  • NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT
  • Hyderabad Money Lenders Act
  • Money Lenders' Act
Smart Summary

Opinion Summary — Manohar Pershad, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit was instituted by an endorsee of a promissory note seeking recovery on the note. The defendant raised several defences on the merits; among them was a plea that the plaintiff (the assignee/endorsee) was a "money lender" within the meaning of the Hyderabad Money Lenders Act and, not possessing a licence under that Act, the suit was liable to be dismissed. This question was raised and considered at the trial court level.

Procedural history as recorded in the opinion:

  • The trial Court relied on an earlier decision (Shamshir Ali… v. Ratnaji…., ILR 1952 Hyd 95 : AIR 1952 Hyd 58) and decreed the suit.
  • On appeal, the lower appellate Court relied on Hanmantrao v. Nalliah (ILR 1952 Hyd 17 : AIR 1952 Hyd 98) and dismissed the suit.
  • In Second Appeal, counsel for the appellant (Sri Venkatachar) argued that the Hyderabad Money Lenders Act does not apply to an endorsee of a promissory note and that provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act entitle an endorsee to recover on endorsement, creating a conflict that favoured the central Negotiable Instruments Act.
  • The Court did not decide the conflict between the Acts at this stage and instead addressed the question of burden of proof and evidence; ultimately the appeal was allowed and the matter remanded to the trial Court for further proceedings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the provisions of the Hyderabad Money Lenders Act apply to an endorsee of a promissory note.
  2. Whether the provisions of the Hyderabad Money Lenders Act conflict with the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act relating to the rights of an endorsee, and if so, whether the central Negotiable Instruments Act prevails.
  3. Who bears the burden of proof on the question whether the plaintiff is a money lender under the Hyderabad Money Lenders Act.
  4. Whether a defendant who previously declined to lead evidence in the lower court should be given further opportunity to produce evidence on the issue of money-lender status.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Sri Venkatachar)

  • The provisions of the Hyderabad Money Lenders Act do not apply to an endorsee of a promissory note.
  • Under the Negotiable Instruments Act an endorsee is entitled to recover the amount of the promissory note by virtue of the endorsement.
  • There is a conflict between the Money Lenders Act provision and the Negotiable Instruments Act; since the Negotiable Instruments Act is a Central Act, its provisions should prevail over the Hyderabad Money Lenders Act.

Defendant's/Respondent's Arguments

  • The defendant pleaded that the plaintiff was a money lender within the meaning of the Hyderabad Money Lenders Act and, not possessing the requisite licence, the suit should be dismissed. This plea was raised at trial and on appeal.
  • At the lower court the first defendant stated that he would not produce any evidence (i.e., declined to lead evidence on the matter).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shamshir Ali… v. Ratnaji…., ILR 1952 Hyd 95 : (AIR 1952 Hyd 58) The opinion records that the trial Court relied upon this decision when deciding the case at trial. Trial Court relied on this decision and decreed the suit.
Hanmantrao v. Nalliah, ILR 1952 Hyd 17 : (AIR 1952 Hyd 98) The opinion records that the lower appellate Court relied upon this decision in dismissing the suit on appeal. Appellate Court relied on this decision and dismissed the suit.
Munagala Yadgiri… v. Pittala Veeriah…. 1958-1 Andh WR 413 Held that the onus is on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff was a money lender (the decision set at rest the contrary view in ILR 1952 Hyd 17). This Bench relied on that holding to conclude that the burden of proof lies on the defendant, affecting how the present case should be proceeded with (i.e., defendant must be given opportunity to prove money-lender status).
Ram Gowd v. Ganga Reddy, F.A No. 70/1 of 1954, Dated 31-8-1959 Subsequent decision of this Court holding that the onus is on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff was a money lender. The Court treated this authority as reinforcing the position that the defendant bears the burden of proof on the money-lender issue.
Reference to the view of Qamar Hasan, J. in ILR 1952 Hyd 17 : (AIR 1952 Hyd 98) The opinion notes that this Bench (and another Bench) disagreed with the view taken by Qamar Hasan, J. in that report. The Court recorded that the earlier contrary approach (in ILR 1952 Hyd 17) has been set at rest by later Bench decisions (Munagala Yadgiri and Ram Gowd).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in the following analytical steps (as reflected in the opinion):

  1. The Court acknowledged the principal contention advanced by the appellant (that the Hyderabad Money Lenders Act does not apply to an endorsee and that the Negotiable Instruments Act confers an independent right on an endorsee), but expressly declined to decide at this stage the question of conflict between the two Acts. The Court stated: "We do not wish to go at this stage into the other point..." and left that issue open.
  2. The Court focused on the procedural posture and the allocation of the burden of proof. It observed that the appellate Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to prove that he was not a money lender (relying on ILR 1952 Hyd 17), but the Court noted subsequent Bench decisions (Munagala Yadgiri and Ram Gowd) which hold that the onus is on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff is a money lender.
  3. Applying those Bench decisions, the Court concluded that the burden of proof rests with the defendant to establish that the plaintiff was a money lender under the Hyderabad Money Lenders Act.
  4. The Court examined the record and found that the defendant had produced no evidence to discharge that burden. Although the first defendant had stated in the lower court that he was not going to produce any evidence, the Court was not prepared to bar the defendant from later adducing evidence. The Court considered it just and proper to give the defendant an opportunity to adduce evidence, given that the burden lay on the defendant.
  5. The Court therefore allowed the appeal, set aside the judgments and decrees of the trial and appellate courts, and remanded the case to the trial Court with directions to recast the issues in light of the observations made, give opportunity to the parties, record evidence, and dispose of the case according to law. The Court left all other points raised by the parties open and expressly did not deal with them in the present appeal.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED. The Court's dispositive directions were:

  • The judgments and decrees of both the appellate Court and the trial Court are set aside.
  • The case is remanded to the trial Court with directions to:
    • Recast the issues in view of the observations in this judgment;
    • Give an opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence;
    • Record the evidence produced by them; and
    • Dispose of the case according to law.
  • Costs were ordered to abide the result in the lower court.

Implications:

  • The Court adopted the position (as established by Munagala Yadgiri and Ram Gowd) that the burden of proving that a plaintiff is a money lender under the Hyderabad Money Lenders Act rests on the defendant. That allocation of burden shaped the relief granted in this appeal.
  • The defendant, who had not produced evidence at trial, must be afforded an opportunity to lead evidence to discharge that burden; the Court declined to penalize the defendant permanently for having earlier stated an intention not to produce evidence.
  • The Court did not resolve the broader legal question of whether the Hyderabad Money Lenders Act applies to endorsees or whether the Negotiable Instruments Act prevails in case of conflict; those points were expressly left open and were not decided in this opinion.
  • No new principle of general application beyond the application of the cited Bench decisions on burden was authoritatively established in this opinion; the immediate practical effect is to remand the case for fresh evidence and determination in the trial Court.

All content in this summary is taken exclusively from the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond those stated therein.

    Wangapally Latchiah v. Peddi Laxmiah

    Manohar Pershad, J.:— This appeal has come up before us on a reference made by one of us. The suit was by an endorsee of a promissory note. Besides other defences raised on the merits, one plea that was taken was that the assignee was a money lender within the meaning of the Hyderabad Money Lenders Act and not possessing a licence, the suit was liable to be dismissed. It appears that this question was raised before the trial Court also.

    2. That court relying upon an earlier decision of the Hyderabad High Court, Shamshir Ali… v. Ratnaji…., ILR 1952 Hyd 95 : (AIR 1952 Hyd 58) decreed the suit. On appeal, the lower appellate Court relying upon the case of Hanmantrao v. Nalliah, ILR 1952 Hyd 17 : (AIR 1952 Hyd 98), dismissed the suit. In Second Appeal, Sri Venkatachar, learned counsel for the appellant argued before the Single Judge that the provisions of the Hyderabad Money Lenders Act do not apply to an endorsee of a promissory note.

    3. His further contention was that under the Negotiable Instruments Act, an endorsee of a promissory note became entitled to recover the amount of the promissory note by virtue of the endorsement. The learned counsel further argued that this provision in the Money Lenders' Act was in conflict with the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act relating to the right of an endorsee and the Negotiable Instruments Act being a Central Act, the provisions of that Act alone would prevail as against the Hyderabad Money Lenders' Act.

    4. We do not wish to go at this stage into the other point raised by the learned counsel Sri Venkatachar that the provision in the Money Lenders Act was in conflict with the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act relating to the right of an endorsee, as, in our opinion, this case has to go back to the trial Court. As stated earlier, the appellate Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to prove that he was not a money lender, relying on ILR 1952 Hyd 17 : (AIR 1952 Hyd 98;, but this matter has been set at rest by a Bench of this Court in Munagala Yadgiri… v. Pittala Veeriah…., 1958-1 Andh WR 413, and a subsequent decision of this Court in Ram Gowd v. Ganga Reddy, F.A No. 70/1 of 1954, D/- 31-8-1959, holding that the onus would be on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff was a money lender; in terms this Bench as well as the other Bench disagreed with the view taken by Qamar Hasan, J. in ILR 1952 Hyd 17 : (AIR 1952 Hyd 98).

    5. In view of these Bench decisions, it is for the defendant to prove that the plaintiff was a money lender. But it appears that the defendant has not produced any evidence. On behalf of the appellant, it is contended by Sri Venkatachar, the learned counsel that the first defendant had refused to adduce any evidence in the lower court and therefore he is not entitled to any further opportunity to adduce evidence. We are not inclined to accept this contention. It is true that the first defendant had stated in the lower court that he was not going to produce any evidence.

    6. It may be, as is argued here, that since the evidence produced on behalf of the appellant was not sufficient to prove that he was not a money lender the defendant may have thought it unnecessary to produce any evidence and thus he may have stated so. As the burden of proving that the plaintiff is a money lender has been placed on the defendant, it is just and proper that he should be given an opportunity to adduce evidence. All the points sought to be raised by the parties are left open and are not dealt with in this appeal.

    7. The appeal is therefore allowed, the judgment and decree of the appellate court as well as of the trial Court are set aside and the case is remanded to the trial court with a direction that it should recast the issues in view of the observations in the judgment and after giving an opportunity to the parties and recording the evidence produced by them, dispose of the case according to law. Costs to abide the result in the lower court.

    KC/V.B.B

    8. Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Wangapally Latchiah v. Peddi Laxmiah
    (Sep 10, 1959)