Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — B.S. Chauhan, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner filed this writ petition seeking a direction that her Scheduled Caste certificate dated 06.08.1992 be treated as valid, and that she be permitted to continue as a Scheduled Caste (Jatav) and receive all benefits belonging to that category. The petitioner's factual account is that she was born a Jain but married one Pal Singh (identified as Jatav, a Scheduled Caste). Her nomination paper in earlier (1992) elections for a reserved constituency was not accepted on the ground that she was not a Scheduled Caste by birth. The present petition challenges that decision and seeks recognition and attendant benefits.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a person can acquire the status or privileges of a particular caste/community/tribe by conversion, adoption or by being transplanted into that caste/tribe through marriage (i.e., whether marriage/adoption/conversion can confer entitlement to reservation benefits).
  2. Whether a writ court (under Article 226) is the appropriate forum to adjudicate a claim of caste-status acquired by marriage/conversion/adoption where detailed factual proof (such as community acceptance or customary practices) is required.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Petitioner's) Arguments

  • The petitioner was admittedly a Jain by birth but married a Scheduled Caste (Jatav) man; by marriage and by being accepted by the people of the Scheduled Caste, she stands transplanted into that caste.
  • Once so transplanted and accepted, she should not be deprived of benefits reserved for that community; therefore, the petition should be allowed.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The petitioner is not a Scheduled Caste by birth and therefore cannot be granted the relief sought.
  • Allowing such transplantation would amount to a fraud upon the Constitution and would deprive deserving persons (who suffered social, economic backwardness by virtue of birth in those castes) from legitimate claims to reservation.
  • Reservation is intended for those who have historically faced disadvantage; permitting a person to acquire that status merely by marriage would frustrate constitutional policy.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Judgment
V.V. Giri v. D. Suri Dora & Others, AIR 1959 SC 1318 Majority: caste status in this context depends on recognition by members of the caste/community sought to be entered; unilateral assertion is not enough. Minority: caste by birth concept. Used to show that courts have considered community recognition as relevant and that unilateral change alone is insufficient to establish entitlement to reserved benefits.
S. Rajagopal v. C.M. Arumugam & Ors., AIR 1969 SC 101 Ordinarily membership of a caste under Hindu religion is by birth; but reconversion to Hinduism might enable re-entry into caste (left open). Referred to illustrate that reconversion may lead to membership; factual proof required and other side could not disprove in that case.
N.E. Horo v. Smt. Jahanara Jaipal Singh, AIR 1972 SC 1840 Where a non-tribal woman married into a tribe and was accepted by tribal elders according to customs, she could be assimilated and claim reserved benefits; "tribes" given liberal interpretation due to customs. Referred to as an instance where community acceptance and customary sanction led to entitlement; noted that such acceptance depended on prevailing tribal custom.
Mrs. Urmila Ginda v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1975 Delhi 115 High-caste woman married to a reserved-category male could not claim reservation because she had not suffered social/educational backwardness. Cited to support the position that marriage alone (without evidence of backwardness/acceptance) does not confer entitlement to reservation.
Khazan Singh v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1980 Delhi 60 Under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, an adoptee acquires the caste of the adoptive father and thereby relevant ties for entitlement to reserved benefits. Used to demonstrate that adoption (when governed by statute) can transfer caste status and associated benefits.
Andhra Hoiwa Society v. Union of India, 1986 (2) APLJ(SN) 12 Close exodus of a forward class posing as a tribe or attempting to transplant forward class members into backward classes to claim reservation is impermissible. Cited to show courts' disapproval of attempts to manipulate status to claim reservation and to support denial of claims based on retrograde transplantation.
P. Mallikharjunadev v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (1989) 3 Andh LT 5Q (Cited alongside Andhra Pradesh decisions) supporting limitations on transplanting forward-class status into backward categories to claim reservation. Grouped with other Andhra Pradesh decisions to show consistent judicial approach refusing such claims.
A.S. Sailaja v. Principal, Kurnool Medical College, AIR 1986 AP 209 State-level authority reflecting similar approach on claims to reservation by transplanted persons. Referred to as part of a line of Andhra Pradesh cases denying such claims.
D. Neelima v. Dean of P.G. Studies, Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University, AIR 1993 AP 229 Another Andhra Pradesh decision addressing entitlement to reservation. Used to reinforce that transplanting status to claim reservation was disapproved in that jurisdiction.
N. Bhuvaneshwar Rao v. Principal Osmania Medical College, AIR 1986 AP 196 Andhra Pradesh precedent on related reservation entitlement issues. Included to show consistent state-level precedents aligning with the court's view.
K. Shantha Kumar v. State of Mysore, (1971) 1 Mys LJ 21 Karnataka High Court case reflecting similar approach on acquisition of caste status. Cited to show regional high court support for restricting reservation claims based on marriage/transplantation.
Nataraja v. Selection Committee, (1972) 1 Mys LJ 226 Karnataka High Court authority on related selection/reservation principles. Used as one of the Karnataka precedents expressing a restrictive approach.
R. Srinivasa v. Chairman, Selection Committee, AIR 1981 Kant 86 Karnataka High Court decision on reservation membership questions. Cited among Karnataka authorities supporting the court's position.
Vaishali v. Union of India, (1978) 80 Bom LR 182 Bombay High Court: a woman of upper caste married to Scheduled Caste man was not entitled to reservation benefits. Referred to as another high-court authority denying entitlement by marriage alone.
Valsamma Paul v. Kochin University & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 1011 Supreme Court denied reservation benefit to a high-caste woman married to a reserved-category man; held that a person transplanted into Dalits/Tribes/OBCs must have undergone the same disabilities to qualify; voluntary mobility to acquire status would be a fraud on the Constitution (Articles 15(4), 16(4)). Quoted at length and treated as a leading authority underpinning the court's conclusion that transplantation by marriage/adoption/conversion will not ordinarily confer entitlement to reservation absent proof of suffering the same disabilities.
Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar v. Vishwanath & Barde, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 549 Addressed the significance of State's duty to provide opportunities and reservation under Articles 15(3), 46 and 39, and related constitutional provisioning for backward classes. Cited in the quoted passage in Valsamma Paul to emphasize constitutional goals that reservation targets disadvantaged persons.
R. Chandevarappa v. State of Karnataka, (1995) 6 SCC 309 Part of the jurisprudence on State obligations for economic empowerment and reservation policy. Cited to support the constitutional rationale that reservation serves those born into disadvantage.
Kailash v. Sonkar, AIR 1984 SC 600 Earlier Supreme Court authority considered in Valsamma Paul. Referred to as part of the corpus of decisions examined in reaching the legal conclusions quoted in this judgment.
Guntur Medical College v. Y. Mohan Rao, AIR 1976 SC 1904 Case where parents initially belonging to a Scheduled Caste converted to Christianity; on re-conversion, Mohan Rao was accepted as a member of the Scheduled Caste and admission as reserved-category candidate was upheld. Referred to show that re-conversion and community acceptance have been recognized in certain factual contexts.
C.M. Arumugam v. S. Rajagopal & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 939 Held that to acquire such status the person must prove they have been duly accepted by the community. Applied to underline the evidentiary requirement of community acceptance for claiming status.
State of Kerala & Anr. v. Chandramohanan, AIR 2004 SC 1672 Held that a member of a tribe may remain a member despite change of religion if he continues to follow tribal traits and customs; determination must be made at trial. Used to illustrate that continued observance of tribal traits may preserve membership, but that determination is a trial issue requiring evidence.
Sobha Hymavathi Devi v. Setti Gangadhara Swami & Ors., (2005) 2 SCC 244 Reconsidered N.E. Horo and partly overruled it; held status for reservation purposes is conferred by birth alone and cannot be acquired merely by adoption/conversion/marriage for constitutional reservations (Articles 15(4), 16(4), 330, 332). Relied upon to support the conclusion that marriage-based recognition is not relevant for entitlement to constitutional reservation and that reservation benefits are for those born into the disadvantaged categories.
Bhoobum Moyee Debia v. Ram Kishore Acharj Chowdhry, 1865 (10) MIA 279; Lulloobhoy... Bappobhoy Cassidass Moolchand v. Kassibai, ILR 5 Bom 110 Older authorities that held a woman on marriage becomes a member of the husband's family/caste and thereby entitled to benefits of that caste. Mentioned as antecedent authorities that were considered but not followed because their application would defeat constitutional policy for reservation.
Sandhya Thakur v. Vimla Devi Kushwaha, (2005) 2 SCC 731 Held a woman born to a high caste married to a backward-class man cannot claim reservation since she was not born into the disadvantaged position. Invoked as a recent Supreme Court authority reinforcing the denial of reservation claims based solely on marriage.
Fazle Rab v. Mohd. Yakeen, (2002) 2 SCC 652 Established that the party alleging prevalence of a custom must discharge the burden of proof. Used to stress the evidentiary burden on a claimant seeking recognition based on customary acceptance or long-standing practice.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first recorded the rival submissions: the petitioner asserting transplantation into a Scheduled Caste by marriage and acceptance, and the respondents insisting that mere marriage cannot confer Scheduled Caste status and that allowing such claims would undermine the constitutional scheme of reservation.

The court reviewed a long line of authorities at both the Supreme Court and High Court level. It identified two competing strands in the case law:

  • Authorities recognizing that when a person is accepted into a caste/tribe according to community customs (including certain tribal formalities or statutory adoption) they may be treated as members of that community for certain purposes (examples in the text: V.V. Giri majority, N.E. Horo, Khazan Singh under adoption, reconversion cases such as Mohan Rao).
  • Authorities taking a restrictive approach that reservation is meant for those born into disadvantaged castes/tribes and that voluntary mobility into such categories by marriage, adoption or conversion should not be allowed to frustrate the object of reservation (examples: Valsamma Paul, Sobha Hymavathi Devi, Sandhya Thakur, and various High Court decisions).

Relying particularly on the Supreme Court precedents (notably Valsamma Paul, Sobha Hymavathi Devi and Sandhya Thakur), the court emphasized the constitutional purpose of Articles 15(4), 16(4), 330 and 332: reservation is directed at those who have historically suffered social, educational and economic disabilities. The court quoted Valsamma Paul to the effect that a person who had an advantageous start in life by birth in a forward caste, and who is later "transplanted" into a backward category by marriage/adoption/conversion, would not have undergone the same disabilities and therefore would not be eligible for reservation — permitting such claims would amount to a fraud on the Constitution.

The court also stressed the consistent requirement across authorities that where a claimant relies on community acceptance or prevailing custom (for example, assimilation by tribal custom), the claimant must adduce cogent evidence to prove such acceptance and the existence of the requisite custom (citing Fazle Rab). Several precedents were noted where statutory adoption (Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act) or established community acceptance affected the outcome, but the judgment observed that those are fact-sensitive determinations.

Applying these principles to the present case, the court found the petitioner's material before the writ court inadequate to establish the necessary factual matrix (community acceptance, customary assimilation, or proof of enduring backwardness). The court held that the writ forum is ill-equipped to decide such fact-intensive issues without detailed evidence and appropriate trial. Consequently, the petition was not an appropriate vehicle to adjudicate the claim of caste-status acquired by marriage, and the petitioner should pursue relief in an appropriate civil forum where detailed proof can be led.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The writ petition is dismissed. The court concluded that, on the material before it, the petitioner had not established entitlement to be treated as a Scheduled Caste member for reservation purposes and that the writ court was not the proper forum to adjudicate the fact-intensive claim. The court expressly found the case not fit for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The order states: "Petition dismissed. No order as to costs."

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner remains unable, by this judgment, to obtain recognition or reservation benefits as a Scheduled Caste member; she is directed to pursue appropriate proceedings in a competent civil/trial forum where she can lead evidence on community acceptance or customary practice.
  • On precedential effect: The court applied and relied upon existing Supreme Court and High Court authorities (notably Valsamma Paul, Sobha Hymavathi Devi, Sandhya Thakur and others) to reaffirm the principle that entitlement to constitutional reservation ordinarily depends on birth into the disadvantaged group and that transplantation by marriage/adoption/conversion will not be lightly accepted without clear, probative evidence. The judgment does not purport to create new law but applies established authorities to the facts and procedural posture of the petition.

No costs were ordered by the court.

    Sushma Singh v. State of U.P.& Ors.

    JUDGMENT B.S. Chauhan, J.

    1. This writ petition has been filed for a direction to the respondents the petitioner as a Scheduled Caste and her certificate dated 06.08.1992 to be valid certificate and she should be permitted to continue as a Scheduled Caste Jatav caste and she should also be permitted to have all the benefits belonging to the Scheduled Caste.

    2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that, Claims herself to be a Jain by birth. However, she got married with one Pal Singh (Jatav - Scheduled Caste) and, therefore, she should be permitted to have the benefits belonging to the Scheduled Caste. Her nomination paper was not accepted in the earlier elections in 1992 for reserved constituency being not a Scheduled Caste by birth. Hence this petition.

    3. Shri Tejpal learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was undoubtedly a Jain and got married with a Scheduled Caste. Once she had been accepted by the people of the Scheduled Caste and by marriage, she stood transplanted into that caste, she cannot be deprived of the benefits reserved for that community. Thus the petition deserves to be allowed.

    4. 0n the other hand Shri S.N. Singh learned Additional Chief has submitted that such a relief cannot be granted as she is not a scheduled caste by birth, Such transplantation may be a, fraud Upon the Constitution to derisive: the deserving persons from their legitimate claim the reservation has been provided by the Constitution only for those who have faced social economic and backwardness and remained in the disadvantageous position because of a particular caste. Thus, the petition is liable to be rejected.

    5. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

    6. The question as to whether a person can get a status or avail the privilege conferred upon a particular caste/community/tripe by conversion, adoption or getting transplanted into the said tribe or caste by marriage, is no more res integra, as it has been considered from time to time by the Courts.

    7.IN V.V Giri v. D. Suri Dora & Others, AIR 1959 SC 1318, a constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court considered a case where a member of Scheduled Caste became a Kshatriya. The question arose as to whether he was entitled for contesting the election from the reserved seat meant for Schedule Caste candidate. The majority of the Hon'ble Judges in that case held that the caste status of a person in the Said context would necessarily have to be determined in the light of the recognition received! by him from the members of the caste/community into which he seeks an entry. More so, a unilateral art of this character on "the part of the person seeking entry in any other caste cannot easily be taken to prove that his acceptance stood established. Thus, his right to avail the benefits meant for Schedule Caste was also recognized. However, the minority view had been, that birth :as the sole criteria of the caste is a much later development and caste became rigid and hereditary when vocations became hereditary. Caste was nothing but; division of labour. There was a high authority to support the view that in Hinduism caste was dependant upon actions and not on birth. Therefore, once by action, the respondent therein had become Kshatriya, he was no longer a member of Scheduled Caste or Tribe and on that ground, he was not entitled to contest the election from the reserved constituency.

    8. In S. Rajagopal v. C.M. Armugam and Ors. AIR 1969 SC 101, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the case where a person was priginaliy born as Dravida Hindu but he got himself converted as Christian, but subsequently, contested the election from the constituency reserved for scheduled caste. The Court held that ordinarily the membership of a caste under the Hindu religion is acquired by birth. Where the membership of a caste can be acquired by Conversion to Hinduism or after re-conversion to Hinduism was left open on the ground that he re-converted himself after embracing Christianity and he could become a member of the said caste after he started professing the Hindu religion. The other side could not lead evidence to prove otherwise.

    9. In N.E. N.E Horo v. Smt Jahanara Jaipal Singh ., AIR 1972 SC 1840 the reason of the petitioner a Sapinda of her husband by marriage, she could claim the benefit of being appointed to a post reserved for Backward Caste or tribe. It was contended therein that where non-tribal lady had married to a Munda tribe strictly following, the tribes customs and she had been accepted by the elders of the tribe as a member of that tribe, it was sufficient to contest for a seat reserved for Scheduled Tribes. The, Court held that once the marriage of a Munda male with a non-Munda female is approved or sanctioned by the Parana Panehayat, she became a member of the community and could contest for a reserved seat as she had been assimilated in that community.the Hon'ble Court rejected the contention that a person can be a Munda only by birth on the ground that no rigid custom of endogamy could be established. The expression "Tribes" was given a liberal interpretation holding that it included even member of the Munda tribe by marriage and not by birth alone. However, such a right was recognized because of the custom prevailing in the Tribe.

    10. In Mrs. Urmila Ginda v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1975 Delhi 115, the Delhi High Court rejected the claim of the petitioner therein that she was entitled, to benefit and privilege conferred upon the reserved, category because of her to a rnale member of the said category on the ground that she was a high caste Hindu and had not been subject to any social or educational backwardness, therefore, she could not take the benefit of the caste of! her husband merely because of heir marriage Permitting such a person to compete for a reserved post would defeat the very provisions made by the State for such socially, economically and educationally Backward Classes.

    11. However, In Khazan Singh v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1980 Delhi 60, the Delhi High Court considered a case where a boy of a Jat community was adopted by a Schedule Caste. The Court held that by virtue of the provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, such an adoptee ipso factor acquired caste of adoptive father and for all other purpose got all the ties with such parents and he was entitled for all benefits of the reserved category. In Andhra Hoiwa Society v. Union of India 1986 (2) APLJ(SN) 12, the Pradesh High Court held that the close exodus of one class of citizens as a tribe by names of synonymity was impermissible and they were, riot entided to social status as there had been an attempt of transplant tiph of forward Class to Backward Class. Instead of integrated forward marriage, it was a retrograde marriage from forward to backward status to claim reservation. Similar view has been taken in P. Mallikharjunadev v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (1989) 3 Andh LT 5Q A.S. Sailaja v. Principal, Kurnool Medical College, Kurnool and Ors., AIR 1986, AP 209; D. Neelima v. Dean of P.G. Studies, Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University and Ors.,AlR 1993) AP 229; and N. Bhuvaneshwar Rao v. Principal Osmania Medical College, Hyderabad, AIR 1986 AP 196.

    12. The Karnataka High Court has reiterated the similar view in K. Shantha Kumar v. State of Mysore, (1971) 1 Mys LJ 21; Nataraja v. Selection Committee, (1972) 1 Mys LJ 226 and R. Srinivasa v. Chairman, Selection Committee, AIR 1981 Kant 86 The Bombay High Court had taken the same view in Vaishali v. Union of India, (1978) 80 Bom LR 182 wherein it. was categorically held that an Woman belonging to upper caste married to Scheduled Caste man was not entitled to the reservation.benefit.

    13. In Valsamma Paul v. Kochin University and Ors., AIR 1996 SC 1011, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the issue at length and denied the benefit of reservation to a woman of a high caste married to the man of reserved category observing, as Under:-

    "In Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar v. Vishwanath andu Barde, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 549 aria R. Chandevarappa v. State of Karnataka, (1995) 6 SCC 309, this Court held that economic empowerment is a fundamental right to the poor and the State is enjoined under Articles 15(3), 46 and 39 to provide, them opportunities. Thus, education, employment and economic empowerment are some of the programmes the State has Devolved and also provided reservation in admission into educational institutions, or in case of other; economic benefits under Article 15(4) and 46, or in appointment to an office or a post under the State under Article 16(4) Therefore, when a member is transplanted into the Dalits, Tribes and O.B.Cs., he/she must of necessity: also! have had undergone the same handicaps, and must have been subjected to the same disabilities, disadvantages indignities or sufferings so as to entitle the candidate to avail the facility of reservation. A candidate who had the advantageous start in life being born in Forward Caste and had march of advantageous life but it is transplanted in Backward Caste by adoption or marriage or conversion does not become eligible to the benefit of reservation, either under Article 15(4) or 16(4), as the, case may be Acquisition of the status of Scheduled Caste etc. by voluntary mobility into these categories would play fraud on the Constitution, and would frustrate the benign constitutional policy under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution."

    14. While deciding the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court also considered number of its earlier judgments including Kailash v. Sonkar, AIR 1984 SC 600 Principal, Guntur Medical College v. Y. Mohan Rao, AIR . 1976 SC 1904. In later case, the parent of Mohan Rao initially belonging to Scheduled Caste but later on converted into Christianity. On re-conversior, Mohan Rao was accepted to be a member of the" Scheduled Caste:and, therefore, his admission as a reserved'"category candidate-was upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

    15. In C.M. Arumugarn v. S. Rajgopal and. Ors., AIR 1976 SC 939 the Hon'ble 600 Supreme Court held that for attaining/acquiring such a status the person has to prove that he/she has been duly accepted by the said community,

    16. In State of Kerala and Anr. v. Chandramohanan, AIR 2004 SC 1672 the question arosce as to whether a person on Conversion to another religion Continues to remain a member pf his tribe, the Apex Court held that a member of tribe: despite his change In religion may remain a member of the tribe if he continues to follow the tribal traits and customs, and the question whether the person remained a member of a tribe after conversion and continued to follow the customs and traditions of the tribe must: be determined at trial.

    17. In Sobha Hymavathi Devi v. Setti Gangadhara Swami and Ors., (2005) 2 SCC 244. the Hon'ble Supreme Court reconsidered the judgment of N.E. Hero's case (supra) and partly overruled it observing that the same had been a case of acceptance by the tribes and for fulfilment of required formalities such a tribal marriage. More so, marriage had been performed by obtaining approval of the elders of the tribe. The Court held that non tribal person under the cover of marriage can not be permitted to contest a seat reserved for tribes as it would the very object of such a reservation. Status is conferred by birth alone a by adoption,' conversion or marriage. Any reservation provided under Article 15(4), 16(4) 330 and 332, being ;Constitutional reservation, cannot be permitted to be availed I by a person changing his status by adoption, conversion or marriage etc. Thus, the Hon'ble Apex Court categorically held that the recognition or an woman as a member of a backward community merely in view of her marriage would not be relevant for the purpose of entitlement to reservation under any of the provisions of the Constitution. The Apex Court not only considered, the earlier judgment in Valasiwami Paul (supra) but also the judgments in Bhoobum Moyee Debia v. Ram Kishore Acharj Chowdhry, 1865 (10) MIA 279 and Lulloobhoy, Bappobhoy Cassidass Moolchand v. Kassibai, ILR 5 Bom' 110 wherein it had been held that a woman on marriage becomes a member of the family of her husband and there by she becomes a member of the caste to which she had moved, therefore, she was i entitled to the benefits conferred upon the caste to which she gets herself transplanted. The Apex Court: did not accept the law laid down therein as it would defeat the provisions providing for the benefits for members of the weaker section of the, Society. The Hon'ble Court held as under:-

    even otherwise, in the absence of evidence on the relevant aspects regarding marriage in tribal form and acceptance by the community, the decision in Horo (Supra) cannot come to the rescue of the appellant. On a consideration of the relevant aspects, we are of the view that whether it be a reservation under Article 15(4) or 16(4) or 330 and 332, the said reservation would benefit only those who belong to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe end not those who claim to acquire the, status by marriage, Hike the appellant in this case. Thus, in our view, the High Court was fully justified in coming to the conclusion that the appellant could not claim the right to content a seat reserved for a Scheduled Tribe in terms of Article 332 of the Constitution of India merely by virtue of he marriage to a person belonging to a Scheduled Tribe,"

    18. In Sandhya Thakur v. Vimla Devi Kushwaha, (2005); 2 SCC 731 a similar view has been taken by the Hon'ble Apex Court holding that the claim of a woman born to a high caste married to a man of Backward Class cannot be apceptecd as she was not born in a disadvantageous position i.e. Backward Class/ community and she would not be entitled, to contest a seat reserved for a Backward Class merely on the basis of her marriage to a male of that community.

    19. One has to prove regarding the prevalence of a custom for a long time and recognised by the Courts and has to discharge the burden of proof (Fazle Rab v. Mohd. Yakeen., (2002) 2 SCC 652).

    20. Thus in view of the above, the law as it stands today can be summarised that a woman of a high caste cannot acquire the status of the castle of her husband merely by marriage. In the event such a woman seeks such a declaration of status, the same can only be done by adducing evidence on such question of facts, that are required to be proved for establishing the clam. Since the writ Court is ill equipped, to entertain such claims, and since the material disclosed by the petitioner in the present proceedings would require further supportive proof to establish their probative! value, I therefore the present writ petition would not be adjudging the, claim of the petitioner. Thus, in our done by approaching the civil court! or Such appropriate forum, which the law permits, Accordingly, we do not find the present petition worth entertaining hold the same to be not a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

    21. Petition dismissed. No order as to costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Sushma Singh v. State of U.P.& Ors.
    (May 16, 2005)