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  • provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961
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  • provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This special appeal arises from a writ petition filed by the petitioner challenging an order of transfer dated 11-10-2004. The petitioner, a Class IV employee belonging to the Scheduled Tribes, was transferred mid academic session, which he alleged adversely affected the education of his children. The learned single Judge disposed of the writ petition by permitting the petitioner to remain in Varanasi until 31st May 2005, considering the children's schooling interests, based on an undertaking by the petitioner’s counsel. The petitioner filed this special appeal against that judgment and order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the transfer of the petitioner, a Class IV Scheduled Tribe employee, without his written request or promotion, violates the transfer policy or statutory provisions.
  2. Whether the transfer order issued mid academic session justifies judicial interference considering the education of the petitioner’s children.
  3. Whether allegations of mala fide against the transfer authorities, based on the petitioner’s Scheduled Tribe status, are substantiated and warrant quashing of the transfer order.
  4. Whether the petitioner’s failure to implead the Corporation as a party affects the maintainability of the writ petition.
  5. The scope of judicial interference in transfer orders issued by competent authorities in administrative or public interest.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The petitioner-appellant, a Class IV employee, cannot be transferred under the transfer policy unless he requests in writing or is promoted.
  • Being a Scheduled Tribe employee, the Government Order prohibits his transfer "as far as possible."
  • The transfer mid academic session adversely affected his children's education.
  • The transfer was mala fide, motivated by malice against the petitioner due to his Scheduled Tribe status.
  • The impugned transfer order and the learned single Judge’s judgment allowing the transfer are liable to be quashed and set aside.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The petitioner is an employee of the Corporation, which was not impleaded as a party, rendering the writ petition liable to be rejected.
  • The transfer policies relied upon by the petitioner do not create legal or justiciable rights enforceable in Court.
  • The petitioner’s daughter is not studying in Varanasi, weakening the claim of educational disruption.
  • The transfer policy for low paid employees and Scheduled Tribes only provides guidelines and does not prohibit transfer absolutely.
  • The petitioner had previously been transferred without objection and the allegations of mala fide are vague and unsubstantiated.
  • Contempt proceedings filed by the petitioner for non-compliance of the single Judge’s order show relief granted, supporting dismissal of the appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Punjab v. Okara Grain Buyers Syndicate Ltd., AIR 1964 SC 669 Requirement to implead necessary parties for maintainability of writ petitions. The Court noted the petitioner had not impleaded the Corporation but allowed impleadment at appeal stage.
Bal Niketan Nursery School v. Kesari Prasad, AIR 1987 SC 1970 Parties can be impleaded even at the appellate stage. Allowed the appellant to implead the Corporation despite omission at the writ petition stage.
B. Varadha Rao v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1986 SC 1955 Transfer is an essential condition of service and should be exercised reasonably. Reiterated that transfer is a condition of service and must be exercised with fairness.
Union of India v. H.N Kirtania, AIR 1989 SC 1774 Transfer on administrative/public interest grounds is not to be interfered with unless mala fide or violation of statutory rules. The Court applied this principle to refuse interference absent mala fide or statutory violation.
Union of India v. S.L Abbas, AIR 1993 SC 2444 Transfer policies are guidelines without statutory force; courts interfere only if mala fide or statutory violation is shown. Transfer policy relied upon was held not to create enforceable rights; no interference warranted.
Bank of India v. Jagjit Singh Mehta, AIR 1992 SC 519 Transfer policies must be balanced with administrative exigencies and rights of other employees. Confirmed employer’s discretion in transfer decisions considering administrative needs.
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shanker Lal, AIR 1980 SC 643 Transfer power over Class IV employees exists but should be sparingly exercised under compelling exigencies. Held transfer power is not barred but must be exercised in good faith and sparingly.
Dr. J.N Banavalikar v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1996 SC 326 Mala fide allegations require impleading the person against whom made; otherwise not considered. Allegations of mala fide against unnamed persons were rejected for want of impleadment.
Federation of Officers Association v. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 1344 Mala fide allegations must be specific and persons impleaded for consideration. Reiterated requirement of specificity and impleadment for mala fide claims.
Tara Chand Khatri v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1977 SC 567 Burden of proving mala fide lies heavily on the person alleging it; prima facie particulars required. Held vague mala fide allegations insufficient for inquiry.
E.P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 Established principle regarding mala fide and arbitrariness in administrative action. Applied to emphasize burden and standards for mala fide allegations.
M. Sankaranarayanan, IAS v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1993 SC 763 Inference of mala fide must be based on factual matrix, not conjecture or surmise. Court found no sufficient factual basis for mala fide inference.
N.K Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 423 Mala fide inference must consider attendant circumstances and be drawn cautiously. Reinforced the heavy burden on the petitioner to prove mala fide.
State of U.P v. Dr. V.N Prasad, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 145 Presumption of bona fide in administrative orders unless rebutted by acceptable material. Presumption favored the transfer order’s bona fide nature.
Rajender Singh v. State of U.P, 1998 All LJ 2629 “As far as possible” in transfer orders vests discretion, not compulsion, to transfer authorities. Explained that transfer policies are directory and not mandatory.
Osmania University v. V.S Muthurangam, AIR 1997 SC 2758 “As far as practicable” connotes flexibility and discretion in administrative decisions. Supported interpretation of transfer policy phrases as flexible guidelines.
Peak Trailer and Chassis Ltd. v. Jackson, (1967) 1 All ER 172 Meaning of “normally” as opposed to “exceptional” in policy interpretation. Used to explain that transfer restrictions are not absolute but subject to exceptions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first noted the procedural defect of non-impleadment of the Corporation but allowed the appellant time to implead the Corporation at the appeal stage, relying on established Supreme Court precedents. The Court then examined the settled legal position that transfer is an essential condition of service and lies within the discretion of the competent authority, subject to the absence of mala fide or violation of statutory rules.

The Court emphasized that transfer policies, including those protecting Scheduled Tribe employees or low paid Class IV employees, are guidelines without statutory force and do not create enforceable legal rights. The phrase “as far as possible” was interpreted as vesting discretion rather than imposing an absolute bar on transfer, allowing transfers in exceptional administrative exigencies.

The Court rejected the appellant’s mala fide allegations as vague, non-specific, and unsupported by any impleaded party or material evidence. It reiterated the heavy burden on the petitioner to prove mala fide and noted the presumption of bona fide in administrative orders.

The Court also considered the appellant’s contention regarding mid academic session transfer and noted that the learned single Judge had stayed the transfer until the end of May 2005, removing the basis for that grievance.

Further, the Court held that the transfer was not to a distant location causing financial hardship, and the appellant had not raised any grievance when joining Varanasi. Thus, no grounds existed for judicial interference with the transfer order.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed.

The Court upheld the transfer order, affirming the principle that transfer is an essential service condition within the employer’s discretion, subject to good faith and absence of mala fide or statutory violation. The decision clarifies that transfer policies are directory and do not confer enforceable rights to employees, including Scheduled Tribe or low paid Class IV employees. The dismissal of the appeal means the petitioner must comply with the transfer order. No new precedent was established; the ruling reaffirms existing legal principles concerning transfers and mala fide allegations.

    Rajendra Prasad v. Union Of India And Others.

    Dr. B.S Chauhan, J.:— This special appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated 2-11-2004 of the learned Judge disposing of the Writ Petition No. 46040 of 2004 filed by the petitioner against the order of transfer dated 11-10-2004 by directing that the petitioner will be permitted to remain in Varanasi up to 31st May, 2005 considering the interest of children who are of the school going age in view of the undertaking given by the learned counsel for the petitioner on behalf of his client.

    2. Shri M.D Mishra. learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that petitioner-appellant is a Class IV employee and he could not be transferred in view of the transfer policy unless he has prayed in writing for transfer or he is being promoted; petitioner-appellant belongs to the Scheduled Tribes and therefore, as per the Government Order contained in Annex.-2 A, it was not permissible to transfer him; petitioner-appellant had been transferred in the mid academic session which had adversely affected the education of his children; transfer is because of mala fide of the higher authorities because of the fact that petitioner is a Scheduled Tribe candidate and other persons are having malice against him. He. therefore, submits that the impugned order of transfer is liable to be quashed and the judgment and order of the learned single Judge deserves to be set aside. On the contrary, Shri Ramendra Pratap Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted that petitioner is an employee of the Corporation and the Corporation has not been impleaded as a party. Reliance placed by the petitioner-appellant on transfer policies is misconceived as these do not create any legal or justiciable right in Court; the certificate shows that his daughter is a student of Class X in Intermediate College, Babusarai, Sant Ravi Dass Nagar, Bhadohi and, therefore, his daughter is not studying in Varanasi, though his son is studying in Varanasi. Moreso, the said transfer policy merely provides that low paid employee should not normally be transferred, and similarly, the Government Orders in respect of the Scheduled Tribes employees provides that as far as possible they may not be transferred unless a request is made by them or they are promoted. Petitioner-appellant had earlier been transferred from Rewa to Varanasi after serving at Rewa for 12 years but he did not raise any grievance against the said order. Allegations of mala fides against the higher officers have been levelled without any sense of responsibility as no officer had been impleaded by name. In paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Affidavit accompanying Stay Application in the Special Appeal, allegations have been made of non-compliance of the order passed by the learned single Judge, for which he had filed the contempt proceedings and relief was granted to him. Thus, the appeal is liable to be dismissed.

    3. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

    4. Admittedly, petitioner-appellant is an employee of the Corporation which had not been impleaded as a respondent, and on the ground writ petition ought to have been rejected. In view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in The State of Punjab v. Okara Grain Buyers Syndicate Ltd., Okara, AIR 1964 SC 669; Ranjeet Mai v. General Manager, Northern Railway, New Delhi, (1977) 1 SCC 484 : AIR 1977 SC 1701; and Chief Conservator of Forests, Government of A.P v. Collector, ((2003) 3 SCC 472 : AIR 2003 SC 1805). However, as Shri Mishra prays that he may be given time to implead the Corporation as a party, the appeal is not to be rejected on the ground. In such an eventuality, the party can be impleaded even at the stage of the appeal as held by the Supreme Court in Bal Niketan Nursery School v. Kesari Prasad., (1987) 3 SCC 587 : AIR 1987 SC 1970.

    5. The issue of transfer and posting has been considered time and again by the Apex Court and entire law has been settled by catena of decisions. It is entirely upon the competent authority to decide when, where and at what point of time a public servant is to be transferred from his present posting. Transfer is not only an incident but an essential condition of service. (Vide B. Varadha Rao v. State of Karnataka, (1986) 4 SCC 131 : AIR 1986 SC 1955; Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atma Ram Sungomal Poshani, (1989) 2 SCC 602 : AIR 1989 SC 1433; Shilpi Bose v. State of Bihar, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 659 : AIR 1991 SC 532; Union of India v. N.P Thomas, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 704 : AIR 1993 SC 1605; Union of India v. S.L Abbas, (1993) 4 SCC 357 : AIR 1993 SC 2444; N.K Singh v. Union of India, ((1994) 6 SCC 98 : AIR 1995 SC 423); Chief Manager (Tel.), N.E Telecom Circle v. Rajendra Ch. Bhattacharjee, (1995) 2 SCC 532 : AIR 1995 SC 813; State of U.P v. Dr. R.N Prasad, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 145; Union of India v. Ganesh Dass Singh, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 214; Abani Kante Ray v. State of Orissa, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 169 : (1996 AIR SCW 797); National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. v. 1. Shri Bhagwan, ((2001) 8 SCC 574 : AIR 2001 SC 3309); State Bank of India v. Anjan Sanyal, (2001) 5 SCC 508 : AIR 2001 SC 1748; and Public Services Tribunal Bar Association v. State of U.P, (2003) 4 SCC 104 : AIR 2003 SC 1115 : (2003 All LJ 662)).

    6. In Union of India v. H.N Kirtania, (1989) 3 SCC 447 : AIR 1989 SC 1774, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:—

    “Transfer of a public servant made on administrative grounds or in public interest should not be interfered with unless there are strong and pressing grounds rendering the transfer order illegal on the ground of violation of statutory rules or on ground of mala fide.”

    7. In Union of India v. S.L Abbas, (1993) 4 SCC 357 : AIR 1998 SC 2444 (supra), the Apex Court has observed that the Government instructions on transfer are rftere guidelines without any statutory force and the Court or Tribunal cannot interfere with the order of transfer unless the said order is alleged to have been passed by malice or where it is made in violation of the statutory provisions.

    8. Similar view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court, in Bank of India v. Jagjit Singh Mehta, (1992) 1 SCC 306 : AIR 1992 SC 519. observing that the terms incorporated in the transfer policy require to be considered by the authorities “along with exigencies of administration” and “without any detriment to the administrative need and claim of other employees.”

    9. In view of the above, it is evident that transfer is an incident of service. An employee working on a transferable post cannot claim a right to be posted at a par ticular place. It is the choice of the employer to determine as on what place and for how long the services of an employee are re quired. The Court cannot interfere with the transfer order unless it is found to be in contravention of statutory rules or passed on mala fides. Transfer policy does not cre ate legal right justiciable in the Court of law. Transfer order does not affect any of his le gal rights and Court cannot interfere with a transfer/posting which is made in public interest or on administrative exigency. However, if the power of transfer is abused or transfer not made in public interest but for collateral purposes and with oblique motive, the order would stand vitiated.

    10. In Director of School Education, Madras v. O. Karuppa Thevan, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 666, the issue of transfer in mid academic session was considered-by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and it was held that “the fact that children of the employee are studying should be given due weight, if the exigencies of the service are not urgent.” Therefore, it is for the employer to examine as to whether transfer of an employee can be deferred till the end of the current academic session. The Court has no means to assess as what is the real urgency of administrative exigency. Thus, the Court is not inclined to consider this submission at all.

    11. As the learned single Judge has stayed the transfer order till the end of May, 2005, the contention that the appellant was transferred in mid academic session does not survive any more.

    12. The issue, of transfer of a low paid employee was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shanker Lal, (1980) 1 SCC 702 : AIR 1980 SC 643, and after considering the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 the Court came to the conclusion that unless the statutory rules itself puts an embargo for transfer by a Class IV or low paid employee, there can be no bar to transfer the said employee. However, such a power should be exercised sparingly. The Court observed as under (para 2):—

    “……… Theoretically, therefore, the power does exist in the State Government to transfer them. We must, however, hasten to add that in case of employees getting small emoluments the power seems to be meant to be sparingly exercised under some com pelling exigencies of a particular situation and not as a matter of routine. If it were to be liberally exercised, it will create tremen dous problems and difficulties in the way of Mpl. Employees getting small salaries ………

    13. In B. Varadha Rao ((1986) 4 SCC 131 : AIR 1986 SC 1955) (supra) while dealing with the issue of transfer, the Apex Court considered various aspects and observed as under (para 6):—

    “One cannot but deprecate that frequent, unscheduled and unreasonable transfers can uproot a family, cause irreparable harm to a Government servant and drive him to desperation. It disrupts the education of his children and leads to numerous other complications and problems and results in hardship and demoralisation. It therefore follows that the policy of transfer should be reasonable and fair and should apply to everybody equally. But, at the same time, it cannot be forgotten that so far as superior or more responsible posts are concerned, continued posting at one station or in one department of the Government is not conducive to good administration. It creates vested interest and, therefore, we find that even from the British times the general policy has been to restrict the period of posting for a definite period. We wish to add that the position of Class III and Class IV employees stand on a different footing. We trust that the Government will keep these considerations in view while making an order of transfer.

    14. Therefore in view of the above, the law stands summarised that in a case of Class IV or low paid employees, the power of transfer should be used sparingly when required in administrative exigency, and not in a routine manner. Moreso, the power is to be exercised in good faith, not arbitrary, and the employer should try to accommo date at a hereby place as his transfer at a far distance may cause him great financial hardship and may make his survival diffi cult.

    15. The issue of mala fide has been raised contending thai: petitioner is being harassed being a Scheduled Tribe candidate. The allegations are vague and not specific and precise. Not a single person has been named in the array of parties, therefore, the ground of mala fide cannot be considered for want of necessary party.

    16. It is settled legal proposition that in case allegations of mala fide are made against any person he is to be impleaded by name, otherwise the allegations cannot be considered. (Vide Dr. J.N Banavalikar v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 89 : AIR 1996 SC 326; State of Bihar v. P.P Sharma, I.A.S, (1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : AIR 1991 SC 1260): I.K Mtshra v. Union of India, ((1997) 6 SCC 228 : AIR 1997 SC 3740) and All India State Bank Officers Federation v. Union of India, (1996) 8 JT (SC) 550).

    17. In Federation of Officers Association v. Union of India, 2003 AIR SCW 1764 : ((2003) 4 SCC 289 : AIR 2003 SC 1344) the Apex Court has held that the allegation of mala fide has to be specifi cally made and the person against whom such allegations are made has to be im pleaded and in his absence such allegations cannot be taken into consideration.

    18. Allegations made by the petitioners against the Director General are of such a nature that it does not warrant any inquiry on the issue for the reason that the same are not specific and fall short of making any inquiry in this regard. The issue of “malus animus” was considered in Tara Chand Khatri v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1977) 1 SCC 472 : AIR 1977 SC 567, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court would be justified in refusing to carry on investigation into the allegation of mala fides, if necessary particulars of the charge making out a prima facie case are not given in the writ petition and burden of establishing mala fide lies very heavily on the person who alleges it and there must be sufficient material to establish malus animus.

    19. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in E.P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3 : AIR 1974 SC 555; Sukhwinder Pal Bipin Kumar v. State of Punjab, (1982) 1 SCC 31 : AIR 1982 SC 65; and Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v. Dr. Mahesh MadhavGosavi, (1987) 1 SCC 227 : AIR 1987 SC 294 reiterated the same view.

    20. In M. Sankaranarayanan, IAS v. State of Karnataka, (1993) 1 SCC 54 : AIR 1993 SC 763, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the Court may “draw a reasonable inference of mala fide from the facts pleaded and established. But such inference must be based on factual matrix and such factual matrix cannot remain in the realm of institution, surmise or conjecture.”

    21. In N.K Singh v. Union of India, ((1994) 6 SCC 98 : AIR 1995 SC 423) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that “the inference of mala fides should be drawn by reading in between the lines and taking into account the attendant circumstances,”

    22. There has to be very strong and con vincing evidence to establish the allegations of mala fides specifically alleged in the peti tion as the same cannot mere be presumed. The presumption is in favour of the bona fides of the order unless contradicted by acceptable material. (Vide State of U.P v. Dr. V.N Prasad, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 145; Arvind Dattatraya Dhande v. State of Maharashtra, ((1997) 6 SCC 169 : AIR 1997 SC 3067); Utkal University v. Dr. Nrusingha Charan Sarangi, ((1999) 2 SCC 193 : AIR 1999 SC 943); Kiran Gupta v. State of U.P, (2000) 7 SCC 719 : (2000 All LJ 2660); Netai Bag v. State of W.B, ((2000) 8 SCC 262 : AIR 2000 SC 3313) and State of Punjab v. V.K Khanna, (2001) 2 SCC 330 : AIR 2001 SC 343; and Samant v. Bombay Stock Exchange, (2001) 5 SCC 323 : AIR 2001 SC 2117).

    23. In First Land Acquisition Collector v. Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli, (2002) 4 SCC 160 : AIR 2002 SC 1314; and Jasvinder Singh v. State of J. & K., (2003) 2 SCC 132, the Apex Court held that burden of proving mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. Mere allegation is not enough. Party making such allegations is under the legal obligation to place specific materials before the Court to substantiate the said allegations.

    24. Petitioner miserably failed to plead and prove the allegations of mala fide. Therefore, the issue does not require any further consideration.

    25. The transfer policy which does not even have any statutory force merely provides that normally low paid employee should not be transferred. The word ‘normally’ has to be understood in proper prospective and It does not put an embargo on transfer of Class IV employees. The word ‘normally’ has a perfectly ordinary meaning which would be given to it by ordinary people in everyday use. In using the word ‘normally,’ one is referring to something which is in contradiction to abnormal or exceptional. Peak Trailer and Chassis Ltd. v. Jackson, (1967) 1 All ER 172. It means that in exceptional circumstances, transfer order can be passed if so required in administrative exigency. Similarly, the order for not transferring the employee belonging to Scheduled Tribe contains the expression ‘as far as possible.’ That has to be understood in the same sense, and it cannot override the power of the employer to transfer the employees for the reason that it is the employer who has to decide as the servant of a particular employee is required at which place and for what period. In Jagit Singh Mehta ((1992) 1 SCC 306 : AIR 1992 SC 519) (supra), the Apex Court while considering similar issue of posting of both the spouses at the same place if they were in service and held that as the transfer policy provided ‘as far as possible,’ it does not take away the right of the employer to transfer on any administrative exigency or even on administrative ground. This phrase really means that the principles are to be observed unless it is not possible to follow them in the particular circumstances of a case. By use of this phraseology the rule etc. is made directory instead of mandatory. (Vide Rani v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, AIR 1959 All 525; and Gopalpur Tea Co. Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1966 Cal 51).

    26. In Rajender Singh v. State of U.P, (1998) 7 SCC 654 : (1998 All LJ 2629), the Hon'ble Apex Court explained the meaning of words ‘as far as possible’ as under:

    “…… These words are not prohibitory in nature. They rather connote a dis cretion vested in the prescribed authority which can exercise that discretion …… It is thus “discretion” and not “compulsion” which contributes the core of this statutory provision ………”

    27. The expression ‘as far as possible’ inheres in it an inbuilt flexibility. (Vide Osmania University v. V.S Muthurangam, (1997) 10 SCC 741 : AIR 1997 SC 2758). The expression “as far as practicable” mean, practicable, feasible, possible, perforrnable. It means, not inter fering with the ratio prescribed under any rule, which fulfils the interest of adminis tration, but flexible provision clothing Government with powers to meet special situa tions where the normal process of the Government resolution cannot flow smooth. (Vide N.K Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, (1977) 1 SCC 308 : AIR 1977 SC 251). Therefore, as far as possible means, so long it remains practicable and feasible. Thus, it is a discretion to the au thority to carve out an exception and it is not necessary for him to give strict adher ence to the statutory provisions.

    28. An undertaking had been given before the learned single Judge on behalf of appellant-petitioner to join after the end of the academic session, and therefore, no interference can be made in the appeal filed by him.

    29. Appellant is an employee of the Corporation which has offices throughout the country and unless any statutory rule specifically prohibits a Class IV employees can be transferred. However, the transfer order should not be issued in an arbitrary or passed on mala fides, or at such a far distance that it may become difficult for the employee to survive on such a meagre salary of a Class IV employee. The petitioner did not raise any grievance whatsoever while joining at Varanasi. He has been transferred in the close vicinity of his present posting. Therefore, it is not a case where he has been transferred at a very far distance causing him great financial hardship which may warrant interference by a writ Court.

    30. We do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned judgment and order. The appeal accordingly stands dismissed.

    31. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Rajendra Prasad v. Union Of India And Others.
    (Mar 16, 2005)