M. Katju, A.C.J:— This Full Bench has been constituted by the order of honldle the Acting Chief Justice on a reference made by a learned single Judge dated 12-3-2004 as the learned single Judge was of the opinion that there were contradictory Division Bench judgments of this Court by Division Bench decisions in Saroj Mahanta (Mrs.) Lt. Colonel v. Union of India, 2003 (3) ESC 1419 : (2003 All LJ 2511) and in Kailash Nath Tiwari v. Union of India, Special Appeal No. 997 of 1995 decided on 9-1-2002 (reported in 2002 All LJ 279).
2. The short question in this case is whether this Court has jurisdiction to decide this petition. The petitioner/accused was serving in the Indian Army. While on duty at Kanchanpara at Calcutta in West Bengal, he was given a charge-sheet by Lt. Col. S. Ganguly of 1841 Light Regiment in which the following charge was levelled against him under Section 64(e) of the Army Act.
“Obtaining for himself a gratification as motive for procuring the enrolment of a person in that he, at Kanchaanpara, on 3-1-1999, while working as a clerk in the branch recruiting office. Kanchanpara obtained a sum of Rs. 14,500/- (rupees fourteen thousand and five hundred only) by demanding from Sri Babu Mandal son of Sri Niyta Gopal Mandal, a gratification as a motive for procuring enrolment of the said individual.”
3. True copy of the charge-sheet is Annexure 1 to the writ petition. The petitioner was also given a letter dated 4-4-1999 in which he was informed that he will have to face a summary Court martial on 8-4-1999 by the Commanding Officer, 1841-Light Regiment vide Annexure 2 to the writ peti tion. The petitioner was thereafter tried by the Summary Court Martial and he was found guilty of the charges and awarded the following punishments:
(1) To be reduced to the ranks.
(2) To suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year in civil jail, and
(3) To be dismissed from the service.
4. True copy of the verdict is Annexure 3 to the writ petition.
5. The petitioner has challenged the Court Martial Proceedings and the sentence dated 15-4-1999 Annexure 3 to the writ petition on various grounds but in our opinion this petition is liable to be dismissed on the short ground that the Allahabad High Court does not have jurisdiction in the case and only the Calcutta High Court or Delhi High Court has jurisdiction in this case.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that in view of the Supreme Court de cision in Dinesh Chandra Gahtori v. Chief of Army Staff, (2001) 2 UPLBEC 1275 a writ petition challenging the impugned sentence can be filed in any High Court in India as the Army Chief has been made a party (re spondent No. 2) in this case.
7. He has further urged that since the petitioner is a resident of district Ballia the writ petition can be filed in the Allahabad High Court as Ballia is in U.P
8. We have carefully perused the decision in Dinesh Chandra Gahtori's case ((2001) 2 UPLBEC 1275) (supra). The entire judgment of the Supreme Court Is as follows:
“By the Court — Leave granted.
The notice on the special leave petition stated that the matter might be disposed of at this stage by an order setting aside the order under challenge and restoring the writ petition to the file of the High Court to be heard and disposed of on merits.
The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court at Allahabad to quash a communication sent to his wife which stated that the appellant had been tried by a Summary Court Martial and had been found guilty of using criminal force against his superior officer and awarded the sentence of dismissal from service. The High Court dismissed the writ petition at the admission stage by holding, “In view of the fact that the Summary Court Martial proceedings were conducted in the State of Punjab and orders were also passed in Punjab by the West Command, we are of the view that this Court has got no territorial jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition.
The writ petition was filed in 1992. The impugned order was passed in 1999.
This is a fact that the High Court should have taken into consideration. More importantly, it should have taken into consideration fact that the Chief of Army Staff may be sued anywhere in the country. Placing reliance only on the cause of action, as the High Court did, was not justified.
The appeal is allowed. The order under appeal is set aside. The writ petition (CMWP No. 39209/92) is restored to the file of the High Court to be heard and disposed of on merit expeditiously.
No order as to cost.”
9. In our opinion the observation in the aforesaid decision the Chief of Army Staff may be sued in any High Court in the coun try” cannot be construed to mean that the Supreme Court has laid down any absolute proposition that it is open to the petitioner to file a writ petition in any High Court in India. Such an absolute proposition as can vassed by the learned counsel for the peti tioner may lead to conflicting decisions be cause different petitions can be filed in dif ferent High Courts by co-accused in the same case and conflicting decisions can be given.
10. It may be noted that the aforesaid observation in the three Judge decision of the Supreme Court in Dinesh Chandra Gahtori's case (supra) is only a “laconic” observation and it cannot override larger Bench decisions of the Supreme Court.
11. In the present case it may be noted that the misconduct was committed at Calcutta and the Summary Court Martial was also held at Calcutta. Thus the entire cause of action arose at Calcutta. We therefore fail to understand how a writ petition can be entertained at Allahabad High Court where no part of the cause of action had arisen.
12. In our opinion merely because the petitioner is presently residing in Ballia this will not give jurisdiction to this Court in view of the Seven Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union Of India & Another, AIR 1961 SC 532. In paragraph 13 of the aforesaid decision the Supreme Court observed:
“Now it is clear that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by Article 226 does not depend upon the residence or location of the person applying to it for relief, it depends only on the person or authority against whom a writ is sought being within those territories. It seems to us therefore that it is not permissible to read in Article 226 the residence or location of the person affected by order-passed in order to determine the jurisdiction of the High Court. That jurisdiction depends on the person or authority passing the order being within those territories and the residence or location of the person affected can have no relevance on the question of the High Court's jurisdiction. Thus if a person residing or located in Bombay, for example, is aggrieved by an order passed by an authority located, say, in Calcutta, the forum in which he has to seek relief is not the Bombay High Court though the order may affect him in Bombay but the Calcutta High Court where the authority passing the order is located. It would, therefore, in our opinion be wrong to introduce in Article 226 the concept of the place where the order passed has effect in order to determine the jurisdiction of the High Court which can give relief under Article 226.”
13. The Constitution Bench decisions of the Supreme Court in K.S Rashid and Son v. Income-tax Investigation Commission, AIR 1954 SC 207 and in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Rao , AIR 1953 SC 210 have held that a writ cannot be issued beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court.
14. In Board of Trustees for the Port of Calcutta v. Bombay Flour Mills Pvt. Ltd., (1995) 2 SCC 559 : AIR 1995 SC 577 the Supreme Court examined a case which related to a claim for waiver of port charges and release of the goods seized by the Board of Trustees of the Port of Calcutta. The consignment of imported goods by the plaintiff had been unloaded at Calcutta Dock, the respondents' representations to the Port Trust Authority to waive the port charges and release the goods were refused by the Board of Trustees of the Port at Calcutta. The suit was filed for waiver of the port charges and release of goods in the District Court, Bharatpur (Rajasthan) Obviously no part of the cause of action relating to the seizure of the goods by the Port Trust of Calcutta which were unloaded at Calcutta for non-payment of port charges had arisen within the territory of Rajasthan. The Court found that the cause of action had arisen at Calcutta. The Supreme Court affirmed the principle that the place where the whole or part of the cause of action arises, gives jurisdiction to the Court within whose territory such place is situate. Whether the cause of action has arisen within the territory of the particular Court will have to be determined in each case on its own facts in the context of the subject-matter of the litigation, and relief claimed.
15. In Aligarh Muslim University v. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd., (1994) 4 SCC 710 the Apex Court noticed that the contracts in question were executed at Aligarh, the construction work was to be carried out at Aligarh, and even the contracts provided that in the event of dispute the Aligarh Court alone will have jurisdiction. The arbitrator was from Aligarh and was to function there. Merely because the respondent was a Calcutta-based firm, the High Court of Calcutta had no jurisdiction in the matter.
16. In Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711 : (1994 AIR SCW 3287), it was held by the Supreme Court:
“Under Article 226 a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. The expression “cause of action” means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the Court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. Thus, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition, the truth or otherwise of the averments made in the petition being immaterial.”
17. While deciding the said case, the Supreme Court placed reliance upon the judgment in Chand Koer v. Partab Singh, 15 Ind App 156, wherein it had been ob served as under:
“The cause of action has no relation whatsoever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the grounds set-forth in the plaint as the cause of action, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asked the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.”
18. Therefore, in determining the objec tion of laqk of territorial jurisdiction, the Court must take all the facts pleaded in sup port of the cause of action into consider ation although without embargo upon an inquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts.
19. In Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 567 : AIR 2002 SC 126 the Supreme Court held that the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in support of the cause of action that those facts do constitute a cause so as to empower the Court to decide a dispute which has at least in part, arisen within its jurisdiction. Each and every fact pleaded by the party in its application does not Ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the Court's territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts, which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the Court concerned.
20. Similarly in Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Association v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 294 : AIR 2001 SC 416 the Supreme Court held that Clauses (1) and (2) of Art. 226 of the Constitution provide how territorial jurisdiction shall be exercised by any High Court and one of the tests may be as to whether the cause of action partly or fully has arisen within its territorial jurisdiction. While deciding the said case reliance was placed upon the Court's earlier judgment in U.P Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad v. State of U.P, (1995) 4 SCC 738 : (1995 All LJ 1599 : AIR 1995 SC 2148), wherein it had been held that the expression “cause of action” has acquired a judicially-settled meaning. In the restricted sense, cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction of the right, but the infraction coupled with the right, itself. Compendiously the expression means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Every fact which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, comprises the “cause of action”. It has to be left to be determined in each individual case as to where the cause of action arises.
21. In Manju Bhatia v. New Delhi Municipal Council, (1997) 6 SCC 370 : AIR 1998 SC 223, the Supreme Court considered a case for damages, under which a “cause of action” in a definite form may not be relevant except when necessary to comply with the laws relating to procedure, limitation etc. The Supreme Court observed that “a cause of action” in modern law is merely a factual situation, the existence of which enables the plaintiff to obtain a remedy from the Court and he is not required to head his statement of claim with a description of the breach of the law on which he relies.
22. In C.B.I, C.B.I Anti-Corruption Branch, Mumbai v. Narayan Diwakar, (1999) 4 SCC 656 : AIR 1999 SC 2362, the Supreme Court considered a case where the respondent was the Incharge/Collector in Daman within the territorial jurisdiction of Bombay High Court and an FIR had been lodged against him in Daman for hatching a conspiracy. He stood transferred to Arunachal Pradesh within the territorial jurisdiction of Gauhati High Court. The CBI gave him a wireless message from Bombay advising him to appear before its officers, in respect of investigation of the said case in Bombay. The respondent filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Gauhati High Court. The Supreme Court did not decide the case on merits, but observed (Para 8):
“Suffice it to say that on the facts and circumstances of the”case and the material on record, we have no hesitation to hold that the Gauhati High Court was clearly in error in deciding the question of jurisdiction in favour of the respondent. In our considered view, the writ petition filed by the respondent in the Gauhati High Court was not maintainable.”
23. The entire argument in the case had been that the Gauhati High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition as no cause of action had arisen, even partly, within its territorial jurisdiction and receiving the message in Arunachal Pradesh to appear before the CBI Authority at Bombay did not give rise to the cause of action, even partly.
24. In Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 7 SCC 640 : AIR 2000 SC 2966, the Supreme Court while considering the provi sions of Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Con stitution, observed (Paras 34, 35 and 36):
“In legal parlance, the expression ‘cause of action’ is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a Court or a Tribu nal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more basis for suing; a factual situa tion that entitles one person to obtain a rem edy in Court from another person ‘Cause of action’ is stated to be the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact, which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment………… the meaning attributed to the phrase ‘cause of action’ in common legal parlance is existence of those facts which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf.”
25. The Apex Court held that the Court must examine as to whether institution of a complaint/plaint is a mala fide move on the part of a party to harass and pressurise the other party for one reason or the other or to achieve an ulterior goal. For that consideration, the relief clause may be a relevant criterion for consideration but cannot be the sole consideration in the matter.
26. In H.V Jayaram v. Industrial Credit and Investment Corpn. of India Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 202 : AIR 2000 SC 579, the Supreme Court examined the issue of territorial jurisdiction of a Court in respect of the offence under Section 113(2) of the Indian Companies Act, 1956. Taking note of Sections 113 and 207 of the said Act, the Court held that the cause of action for default of not sending the share certificates within the stipulated period would arise only at a place where the registered office of the company was satisfied as from that place the share certificates could be posted and are usually posted.
27. In Muhammad Hafiz v. Muhammad Zakariya, AIR 1922 PC 23, the expression “cause of action” was explained as under:—
“………… cause of action is the cause of action which gives occasion for and forms the foundation of the suit ………”
28. Similarly, in Read v. Brown, (1889) 22 QBD 128, cause of action was explained as under:—
“Every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court.”
29. The same view has been reiterated by the Privy Council in Mohammed Khalil Khan v. Mehbul Ali Mian, AIR 1949 PC 78 and by the Supreme Court in State of Madras v. C.P Agencies, AIR 1960 SC 1309; and A.B.C Laminart Pvt. Ltd. v. A.P Agencies, Salem, (1989) 2 SCC 163 : AIR 1989 SC 1239.
30. In our opinion the judgment of the three Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Dinesh Chandra Gahtori's case ((2001) 2 UPLBEC 1275) (supra) cannot prevail over the Constitution Bench decisions of the Supreme Court in K.S Rashid v. Income-tax Investigation Commission (AIR 1954 SC 207) (supra) and Election Commission v. S. Venkata Rao (AIR 1953 SC 210) (supra). It is well settled that if there is a conflict between a larger Bench decision of the Supreme Court and a smaller Bench decision then the view of the larger Bench will prevail.
31. In Union of India v. K.S Subramanian, (1976) 3 SCC 677 : AIR 1976 SC 2433 the Supreme Court observed (Para 12):
“The proper course for a High Court, in such a case, is to try to find out and follow the opinions expressed by larger benches of this Court in preference to those expressed by smaller benches of the Court. That is the practice followed by this Court itself. The practice has now crystallized into a rule of law declared by this Court.”
32. A similar view was taken by a Division Bench decision of this Court in Rapti Commission Agency v. State of U.P, 2003 UPTC 780.
33. In Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Mumbai Shramik, Sangh, (2001) 4 SCC 448 : (2001 AIR SCW 1846) a five Judge constitution Bench of the Supreme Court observed (Para 2):
“We are of the view that a decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court binds a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court and that judicial discipline obliges them to follow it regardless of their doubts about its correctness. At the most, they could have ordered that the matter be heard by a Bench of three learned Judges.”
34. Moreover, as observed by the Supreme Court in Amar Nath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab, (1985) 1 SCC 345 : AIR 1985 SC 218 (vide Para 11), the observations of a Judge are not to be read as Euclid's Theorem, nor as provisions of a statute. In State of Punjab v. Baldeo Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172 : AIR 1999 SC 2378 (para 43) the Supreme Court observed that everything in a decision is not a precedent. In Divisional Controller v. Mahadeva Shetty, ((2003) 7 SCC 197 : AIR 2003 SC 4172) (vide para 23) the Supreme Court observed:
“The scope and authority of a precedent should never be expanded unnecessarily beyond the needs of a given situation — Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment. Mere casual expression carry no weight at all, nor every passing expression of a Judge, however, eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement having the weight of authority.”
35. In Amar Nath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab ((1985) 1 SCC 345 : AIR 1985 SC 218) (supra) the Supreme Court observed that judg ments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. Judges interpret words of statutes, but their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton, 1951 AC 737 at p. 761. Lord macdermot observed (Para 11 of AIR):
“The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsisslma verba of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge.”
36. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., (1970) 2 All ER 294, Lord Reid said, “Lord Atkin's ………… speech is not to be treated as if it was a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances.” Megarry, J. in (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed : “One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell L.J as if it were an Act of Parliament.” And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board, (1972) 2 WLR 537 Lord Morris said:
“There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that Judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case:”
37. In Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, (1996) 6 SCC 44 : (1996 AIR SCW 4020) the Supreme Court observed (Para 9):
“It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case Is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates:— (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there, is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It would, therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject-matter of the decision which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution. A deliberate judicial decision arrived at after hearing an argument on a question which arises in the case or is put in issue may constitute a precedent, no matter for what reason, and the precedent by long recognition may mature into a rule of stare decisis. It is the rule de-ducible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi.
38. Therefore, in order to understand and appreciate the binding force of a decision it is always necessary to see what were the facts in the case in which the decision was given and what was the point which had to be decided. No judgment can be read as if it is a statute. A word or a clause or a sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded as a full exposition of law.
39. For the reasons given above we are of the opinion that the Chief of Army Staff can only be sued either at Delhi where he is located or at a place where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.
40. We may mention that a “cause of action” Is the bundle of facts which, taken with the-law applicable, gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant: ‘ffdw-ever, it must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of aft act, no cause of action can possibly occur “(Vide Radhakrishnamurthy v. Chandrasekhara Rao, AIR 1966 AP 334; Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shankar, AIR 1969 All 526 (FB); and Salik Ram Adya Prasad v. Ram Lakhan, AIR 1973 All 107). In the present case no part of the cause of action has arisen in U.P Hence in our opinion the writ petition is not maintainable in this Court. It is accordingly dismissed. The decision of the Division Bench in Kailash Nath Tiwari v. Union of India (2002 All LJ 279) (supra) in our opinion does not lay down the correct law and Is over: ruled.
41. Petition dismissed.