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  • provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Departmental Inquiries (Enforcement of Attendance of Witnesses and Production of Document) Act, 1976."
  • Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930,
  • Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930. Rule 55
  • provisions of the Public Service Inquiries Act, 1850,
  • Section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935,
  • Section 25F of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947
  • provision of Article 311 of the Constitution.
  • Rule 55 of the aforesaid Rules
  • Rule 55, Sub-rule (1)
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  • provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Departmental Inquiries (Enforcement of Attendance of Witnesses and Production of Document) Act, 1976."
  • Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930,
  • Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930. Rule 55
  • provisions of the Public Service Inquiries Act, 1850,
  • Section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935,
  • Section 25F of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947
  • provision of Article 311 of the Constitution.
  • Rule 55 of the aforesaid Rules
  • Rule 55, Sub-rule (1)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner challenged an order dated 29.11.1997 issued by the Sub-Divisional Officer/ Appointing and Punishing Authority, Garautha (Jhansi), which terminated the petitioner's service on grounds including absence from duty, less collection of revenue, depositing revenue to the treasury without verification by a senior officer, failure to deposit revenue timely to the treasury, or not depositing to the concerned person.

Procedurally, the petitioner was suspended on 21.3.1996, served a charge-sheet on 5.9.1996 and replied to it. An Enquiry Officer served a supplementary charge-sheet; the petitioner replied again. Subsequently the impugned termination order of 29.11.1997 was passed removing the petitioner from service. The petitioner alleged violation of principles of natural justice and Article 311 of the Constitution, and contended that he was not informed of the date, place and time of the enquiry, was not supplied documents relied upon by the Enquiry Officer, and was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the disciplinary proceedings and the order of termination conformed to the principles of natural justice and the requirements of Article 311 of the Constitution.
  2. Whether the procedure laid down by Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 and the U.P. Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 (for imposing major penalties) was complied with in the enquiry leading to termination.
  3. Whether documentary evidence presented by the department required the department to produce oral witnesses to prove such documents, and under what circumstances documentary proof suffices.
  4. What relief should follow if the termination is found to be vitiated — specifically, reinstatement and the quantum of back wages (if any) to be awarded.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The impugned order of termination dated 29.11.1997 was passed in violation of principles of natural justice and Article 311 of the Constitution.
  • After the petitioner replied to charges, the Enquiry Officer did not inform him of the date, place and time of the enquiry, did not provide proper documents and material evidence relied upon, and did not give an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses; thus the enquiry violated the principles laid down in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, AIR 1991 SC 471.
  • The petitioner was awarded a major punishment without being informed of the grounds or being furnished with the enquiry report after conclusion, so he was not afforded an opportunity to defend himself and the procedure violated prevailing rules.
  • The petitioner relied on several precedents of the Supreme Court and this Court to support contentions on reasonable opportunity, cross-examination, supply of documents, and need for an enquiry in conformity with rules (cases cited in the opinion were relied upon by the petitioner to substantiate these contentions).

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents relied on precedent (Raj Babu Agnihotri v. Labour Commissioner, U.P., Kanpur and Ors.) where similar enquiry under Rule 55 was upheld because the incumbent had been given show cause notice, responded, produced receipts and cash books, and did not seek cross-examination of witnesses — arguing that the present facts are distinguishable but that procedural compliance in other cases supports validity of departmental enquiries conducted in conformity with rules.
  • Respondents contended that, depending on circumstances, documentary evidence may be sufficient and strict rules of evidence need not apply to domestic enquiries (as supported by some authorities cited by respondents).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, AIR 1991 SC 471 Cited by the petitioner for the proposition that enquiry procedures must respect natural justice (as referenced in the petitioner's grievance). The opinion records the petitioner's reliance on this case to show procedural violations (failure to give opportunity to cross-examine and to supply documents).
Khem Chand v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1958 SC 800 Defines "reasonable opportunity" to include being told charges, cross-examination, and representation on proposed punishment; links Rule 55 protections to Article 311. Cited to support the requirement that charges be clear, defendant be allowed to cross-examine, and to reinforce constitutional protection under Article 311; the court treats this authority as foundational for the natural justice requirements.
Jagdish Prasad Saxena v. State of Madhya Bharat, AIR 1961 SC 1070 Requires proper disciplinary enquiry after supplying charge-sheet and reasonable opportunity to meet allegations. Cited as authority that proper enquiry and opportunity are required; used to reinforce the court's standard for valid enquiry.
Town Area Committee, Jalalabad v. Jagdish Prasad and others Reasonable opportunity includes cross-examination and leading of defence evidence. Used to demonstrate judicial understanding of "reasonable opportunity" and to support the court's analysis regarding cross-examination and hearings.
Kulwant Singh Gill v. State Of Punjab, 1991 SCC (L & S) 998 Holds that a pretence of enquiry without reasonable opportunity (including evidence by both sides, examination and cross-examination) is not a valid enquiry. Cited to emphasize that an enquiry without reasonable opportunity to lead or rebut evidence is invalid; court relies on this to assess whether the impugned proceedings were lawful.
Subhash Chandra Sharma v. M. D. V. P. Co-operative Spg. Mills Fed. Ltd., 1994 (4) AWC 3227 Enquiry must fix a date and intimate the petitioner; evidence must be led in petitioner's presence with opportunity to cross-examine. Quoted by the court to show that failure to fix a date and not conducting a regular enquiry violates natural justice; applied to facts where no regular enquiry was held.
Smt. Ram Pyari v. State of U. P. and Anr., 2000 (2) AWC 1711 (LB) Reiterates the necessity of evidence being led in the presence of the delinquent and opportunity to cross-examine. Used alongside other Division Bench authority to underscore requirements for a valid departmental enquiry.
Radhey Shyam v. Secretary, Minor Irrigation Dept. and Ors., (2001) 2 UPLBEC 1676 Found ex parte inquiry conducted without proper procedure to be illegal; allowed fresh inquiry in accordance with law; SLP dismissed by Supreme Court. Cited to support invalidation of ex parte enquiries conducted without fixing date/time/place, without adducing evidence in presence of accused, and without opportunity to cross-examine.
K.P. Giri v. State of U. P. and Ors., 2001 (1) UPLBEC 908 Even if no reply is submitted, Enquiry Officer must fix date and intimate the petitioner; management must confront evidence to the petitioner. Cited to show that failure to confront evidence and failure to fix inquiry date constitutes gross violation; court applied this reasoning to find procedural lapses.
Bajrang Prasad Srivastava v. U. P. Pariyojana Prabandha, U. P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd. and Ors., 2000 (3) AWC 1960 Authority on departmental enquiry procedure (as referenced by petitioner). Cited among High Court precedents supporting the requirement of fair procedure in departmental enquiries.
Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Madras v. F.X. Farnando, 1994 (2) SCC 746 Justice must be seen to be done; where apprehension of bias exists, appointment of another Enquiry Officer may be directed. Cited to support petitioner's reliance on change of Enquiry Officer where impartiality was doubted.
Indrani Bai (Smt.) v. Union of India and Ors., 1994 Supp (2) SCC 256 If delinquent officer doubts impartiality of Enquiry Officer and represents early for change, authorities should appoint another Enquiry Officer. Cited to support petitioner's argument on change of Enquiry Officer where bias was suspected.
Meenglas Tea Estate v. Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1719 Person answering a charge must know the accusation and the testimony supporting it; must be allowed cross-examination and chance to rebut. Cited to reinforce that evidence in support of charges must be made known and cross-examination allowed; used to evaluate fairness of the enquiry.
S.C. Girotra v. United Commercial Bank, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 212 Dismissal set aside where employee was not given opportunity to cross-examine. Cited as authority that failure to allow cross-examination can vitiate dismissal; court uses it to weigh procedural infirmities.
Punjab National Bank A.I.P.N.B.E. Federation, AIR 1960 SC 160 Evidence must be recorded in presence of charged employee and he must be given opportunity to rebut. Cited to support the principle that evidence must be recorded in presence of the accused and rebuttal allowed.
A.C.C. Ltd. v. Their Workmen; Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1963 decisions) Authorities on departmental enquiry procedure and issues of evidence and cross-examination. Cited collectively to show established practice that evidence should be led against delinquent in his presence in disputed cases.
State of Haryana and Anr. v. Rattan Singh, 1982 (1) LLJ 46 (SC) Strict rules of evidence need not apply in domestic enquiries; hearsay may be admissible if reasonably probative and credible; court must exclude extraneous materials and observe natural justice. Cited by the respondents and considered by the court to explain that domestic enquiries have flexible evidentiary rules, but fairness and natural justice remain essential.
Employees of Fire Stone Tyre and Rubber Co. (P.) Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1968 SC 236 Discussion on order of examining witnesses and addressing evidence; in record-based accusations it may be permissible to rely on documents and take statement first. Cited to show that in certain clear cases documentary records may justify a departure from strict sequential rules, subject to fairness.
Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Ltd. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1914 Authority cited regarding the requirement to lead evidence before questioning delinquent. Cited among authorities delineating ordinary procedure in departmental enquiries.
Orissa Mining Corporation and Anr. v. Ananda Chandra Prusty, 1998 (3) LLJ (Supp) 1207 Burden of proof in disciplinary enquiry is not absolute; it depends on nature of charges and explanation; burden may shift depending on facts. Cited by the court to explain that there is no absolute burden always on the department; burden depends on nature of charges and explanations.
Raj Babu Agnihotri v. Labour Commissioner, U.P., Kanpur and Ors., 2002 (3) AWC 2605 Upheld an enquiry under Rule 55 where show cause notice was responded to, records/receipts were produced and the incumbent did not seek cross-examination. Relied on by respondents to contend that where an accused participates, produces documents and does not seek cross-examination, enquiry may be valid; court distinguished facts of present case from this precedent.
Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, (1980) 4 SCC 443 Ordinarily reinstatement with full back wages follows setting aside of termination; court can mould relief in exceptional cases. Cited by the court when considering reinstatement and the quantum of back wages to be awarded.
A.L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corporation of India Limited, AIR 1984 SC 1361 Illustrates judicial discretion to award less than full back wages in appropriate cases (50% awarded given circumstances). Used as authority for the court's discretion to award partial back wages in cases of reinstatement where circumstances warrant reduced compensation.
Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. S.N. Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, 1999 (3) SCC 60 Probationer whose termination was set aside was entitled to back wages and reinstatement under the facts. Cited to show cases where reinstatement with back wages is appropriate; considered in the court's assessment of relief.
State Bank of India and Ors. v. T.J. Paul, 1999 (4) SCC 759 Cases involving bank officers and serious neglect; on departmental proceedings and remit for reconsideration; on award of back wages, promotions etc. Cited among authorities discussing disciplinary consequences and remedies; court referenced it when considering award of back wages and consequential orders.
Hardwari Lai v. State of U. P. and Ors., 1999 (8) SCC 582 Failure to examine material witnesses vitiated the enquiry; reinstatement ordered with 50% back wages where appropriate. Cited as a comparative instance where failure to examine material witnesses led to setting aside of enquiry and partial back wages on reinstatement; applied by analogy.
Prabhudayal Birari v. M.P Rajya Nagrik Aapurti Nigam Ltd., 2000 (7) SCC 502 Termination in contravention of appointment conditions; reinstatement with back wages awarded. Cited as authority for reinstatement and back wages where termination contravened conditions; considered by the court in shaping relief.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Prem Chand Gupta and Anr., 2000 (10) SCC 115 Where termination invalid and long delay present, courts may award partial (50%) back wages considering equities and public funds. Cited to justify a reduced quantum of back wages in appropriate circumstances; considered in awarding 50% basic wages to petitioner.
Vinod Bhanti v. State of Bihar and Ors., 2000 (10) SCC 146 When resignation is withdrawn, employee may not be entitled to back wages for period not actually worked. Cited to explain situations where continuity and back wages may not be granted; informs court's discretion on back wages when service was not actually rendered.
Ex Constable Chhote Lai v. Union of India and Ors., 2000 (10) SCC 196 Setting aside dismissal where dispensing of inquiry was unjustified even when authorities argued impracticality of inquiry. Cited to support the proposition that dispensing with inquiry must be justified; court referenced it to negate arguments dispensing inquiry was reasonable.
Director of Collegiate Education v. Sri Jagadguru Panchacharya Vishwa Dharma Vidya Peetha and Ors., 2000 (10) SCC 200 High Court's direction to pay back wages set aside where liability to pay back wages was not in issue earlier. Cited to caution that courts should not direct monetary relief beyond what the issue before the tribunal/High Court warranted; considered in shaping appropriate remedial orders.
Assistant General Manager, S.B.I. v. Thomas Jone and Anr., 2000 (10) SCC 280 Bank employee dealing with public money may be treated less leniently; tribunal's power to modify punishment and order reinstatement with or without back wages. Cited to show the latitude in shaping relief, including conditions on increments and back wages; used as comparative authority.
Scooters India Ltd. v. Labour Court, 1989 (1) SCC 31 Authority relied upon regarding tribunal powers and modification of awards in employment disciplinary matters. Cited in context of tribunal/high court modifying relief in disciplinary cases; referenced with Thomas Jone case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the statutory rules governing departmental enquiries: Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930, and relevant portions of the U.P. Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 (notably procedures for framing charges, service of charge-sheet, notice of date for enquiry, supply of documentary evidence and lists of witnesses, and enforcement of attendance of witnesses and production of documents).

The court analyzed the interplay between documentary and oral evidence in disciplinary enquiries. It observed that Rule 55 does not make it obligatory for the employer to produce oral evidence in all cases and that if allegations can be proved from documents, oral evidence may not be necessary. However, if genuineness or veracity of documents is denied by the delinquent, the employer may then be required to prove documents, and the disciplinary enquiry is not governed by strict rules of evidence.

The court reviewed authorities cited by the petitioner and respondents. It recognized established principles: a charged government servant must be informed of the grounds and charges in clear and precise terms, be allowed reasonable time to file a written defense, be told whether he desires to be heard in person, and if an oral enquiry is required, be given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and to produce evidence. The court noted precedents that an enquiry which is merely a pretence (de hors the rules) without opportunity for adducing evidence and cross-examination is not a valid enquiry.

Turning to facts, the court found that the Enquiry Officer did not fully provide the documents relied upon to the petitioner, and that after obtaining the petitioner's reply the termination order was passed. The norms of the 1930 Rules and the 1999 Rules were not observed: no specific date, place or time for enquiry was fixed and the documents relied upon by the Enquiry Officer were not sufficiently provided to the petitioner. Evidence relied upon against the petitioner was not provided and the petitioner was not allowed to cross-examine witnesses.

Considering the gravity of dismissal as a major punishment and the absence of a regular and proper enquiry that would constitute a reasonable opportunity to defend, the court concluded that the termination order was not legally sustainable and set it aside.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The writ petition is allowed; the impugned order of termination dated 29.11.1997 is set aside and the petitioner is directed to be reinstated in service forthwith.

The court further directed that, because the petitioner was out of job and it was unknown whether he had gainful employment during that period, and taking into account the interest of the revenue and that he had not rendered any service, the petitioner shall be given only 50% of basic wages. This amount is to be paid within six months from the date of the order, and a certified copy of the order must be presented by the petitioner to the concerned officer. No order as to costs was made.

Implications: The direct effect on the parties is reinstatement of the petitioner and payment of 50% basic wages for the period he was out of service (subject to the court's directions). The opinion applies established authorities on natural justice, departmental enquiry procedure and judicial discretion in moulding relief; it does not purport to lay down a new legal precedent beyond applying these authorities to the facts of this case.

    Chandra Bhan Singh v. State Of U.P And Another

    1. In this writ petition order dated 29.11.1997, passed by Sub-Divisional Officer/ Appointing and Punishing Authority, Garautha (Jhansi), has been challenged whereby the petitioner's service has been terminated on the ground that the petitioner was absent from duty, for less collection of revenue, depositing the revenue to the treasury without getting it verified by senior officer, not depositing the revenue timely to the treasury or for not depositing to the concerned man.

    Heard Sri Chandra Mohan Jha, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Sri S.S. Sharma, additional chief standing counsel along with Sri Raj Kumar standing counsel for the respondents.

    2. Brief fact necessary for adjudication of the present writ petition was that petitioner was suspended on 21.3.1996 and was served a charge-sheet on 5.9.1996 which was replied by the petitioner. An Enquiry Officer served a supplementary charge-sheet and the petitioner had again submitted his reply and thereafter the impugned order of termination dated 29.11.1997, had been passed removing the petitioner from his service. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the impugned order of termination was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and in violation to the provision of Article 311 of the Constitution. It has also been brought to the notice of the Court that after the reply of the charges alleged against the petitioner the Enquiry Officer had not informed him the date, place and time of enquiry and also had not provided the petitioner an opportunity of hearing and had also not supplied the proper documents and the material evidence and documents relied by him in the enquiry report and the Enquiry Officer has also not given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, as such the enquiry of the termination was in violation of the principles laid down in the case of Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, AIR 1991 SC 471.

    3. It has also been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner was awarded major punishment without informing the grounds on which the impugned order was passed and without furnishing the enquiry report to the petitioner after the conclusion of the enquiry report by the disciplinary authority, as such the petitioner was not afforded opportunity to defend himself and the entire procedure was in violation of prevailing rules.

    4. The disciplinary enquiry against the Government servant is governed by the Rules, namely, the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930. Rule 55 of the aforesaid rules lays down the procedure for conduct of the enquiry. Rule 55 of the aforesaid Rules is quoted below :

    "55. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Service Inquiries Act, 1850, an order (other than an order based on facts which had led to his conviction in a criminal court or by a court martial) of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank (which includes reduction to a lower post or time scale, or to a lower stage in a time scale but excludes the reversion to a lower post of a person who is officiating in a higher post) shall be passed on a person who is a member of a civil service, or holds a civil post under the State unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced in the form of a definite charge or charges which shall be communicated to the person charged and which be so clear and precise as to give sufficient indication to the charged Government servant of the facts and circumstances against him. He shall be required, within a reasonable time to put in a written statement of his defence and to State whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires, or if the authority concerned so directs, an oral inquiry shall be held in respect of such of the allegation as are not admitted. At that inquiry such oral evidence will be heard as the Inquiry Officer considers necessary. The person charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish, provided that the officer conducting the inquiry may for sufficient reason to be recorded in writing refuse to call a witness. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and statement of the findings and the grounds thereof. The officer conducting the inquiry may also separately from these proceedings make his own recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the charged Government servant."

    5. The U. P. Government servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999, deals with the procedure for imposing major penalties. The relevant portions is quoted below :

    "7. (iii) The charges framed shall be so precise and clear as to give sufficient indication to the charged Government servant of the facts and circumstances against him. The proposed documentary evidences and the name of witnesses proposed to prove the same along with oral evidence, if any, shall be mentioned in the charge-sheet.

    7 (iv) The charged Government servant shall be required to put in a written statement of his defence in person on a specified date, which shall not be less than 15 days from the date of issuance of charges-sheet and to state whether he desires to cross-examine any witness mentioned in the charge-sheet and whether desires to give or produce evidence in his defence.

    He shall also be informed that in case he does not appear or file the written statement on the specified date, it will be presumed that he has none to furnish and Inquiry Officer shall proceed to complete the inquiry ex parte.

    7 (v) The charge-sheet, along with the copy of documentary evidences mentioned therein and list of witnesses and their statements, if any shall be served on the charged Government servant personally or by registered post at the address mentioned in the official records in case the charge-sheet could not be served in aforesaid manner, the charge-sheet shall be served by publication in a daily newspaper having wide circulation.

    7 (viii) The Inquiry Officer may summon any witnesses to give evidence or require any person to produce documents before him in accordance with the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Departmental Inquiries (Enforcement of Attendance of Witnesses and Production of Document) Act, 1976."

    6. From perusal of the Rules, it is clear that no order of dismissal, removal of reduction in rank can be passed against a person unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. Definite charges shall be communicated to the person and he shall be required to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires, or if the authority concerned so directs, an inquiry shall be held in respect of such of the allegations as are not admitted. At that enquiry, such oral evidence will be heard as the Inquiring Officer considers necessary. The person charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and statement of the findings and the grounds thereof.

    7. The reading of Rule 55, Sub-rule (1) expressly do not provide that it is obligatory on the employer to bring oral evidence to prove the charges. The rule do not indicate that in case oral evidence is not brought by the employer, the charges must fail. There is no doubt that oral enquiry is held to enquire the veracity of the charges and to examine the allegations made against the delinquent. The words used under Rule 55 are "an oral enquiry shall be held in respect of such of the allegation as are not admitted". Thus, the enquiry has to be confined to the allegations which are not admitted. The question is that if in the charge-sheet certain documents are referred, do the employers have necessarily to bring the witnesses to prove the correctness of the documents or unless the documents are proved, they cannot be relied upon. In the oral enquiry what evidence is required to prove the charges is a fact which may differ from case to case. If the allegations in the charges are such which can be proved by oral evidence it is necessary for the employer to bring oral evidence to prove the charges but if the allegations in an enquiry are such which can be proved from the documents, it is not obligatory for the employer to bring oral evidence. Moreover, even in cases where the charges are based on documents, employer may be required to prove the documents in an event when the genuineness or veracity of the documents have been denied by the delinquent. In a case where the genuineness or veracity of the documents have not been denied by the delinquent the employer may not fail on the ground ; that no witness has come forward to prove the document. The disciplinary enquiry is not governed by strict rule of evidence.

    8. The counsel for the petitioner has cited several judgments of the Apex Court and this Court in support of his submission which are required to be considered. The first decision relied by the petitioner is Khem Chand v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1958 SC 800. In paragraph 19 of the aforesaid judgment the Apex Court laid down as under :

    "(19) To summarise the reasonable opportunity envisaged by the provision under consideration includes :

    (a) An opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, which he can only do if he is told what the charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based ;

    (b) An opportunity to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him and by examining himself or any other witnesses in support of his defence ; and finally ;

    (c) An opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him, which he can only do if the competent authority, after the enquiry is over and after applying his mind to the gravity or otherwise of the charges proved against the Government servant tentatively proposes to inflict one of the three punishments and communicates the same to the Government servant.

    In short the substance of the protection provided by Rules, like Rule 55 referred to above, was bodily lifted out of the rules and together with an additional opportunity embodied in Section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, so as to give a statutory protection to the Government servants and has now been incorporated in Article 311(2) so as to convert the protection into a constitutional safeguard."

    9. The next judgment relied upon by the counsel of the petitioner in Jagdish Prasad Saxena v. State of Madhya Bharat, AIR 1961 SC 1070. In the aforesaid judgment the Apex Court held that in taking disciplinary action against the public servant ; a proper disciplinary enquiry must be held against him after supplying him with the charge-sheet, and he must be allowed reasonable opportunity to meet the allegations contained in the charge-sheet. To the same effect is the judgment of the Apex Court In Town Area Committee, Jalalabad v. Jagdish Prasad and others, in which it was held that

    "a reasonable opportunity is a term of well known legal significance and Includes an opportunity given to the employee to cross-examine the witnesses examined against him ; and to lead defence in support of his version,"

    10. Much emphasis has been given by the counsel for the petitioner on paragraph 5 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Kulwant Singh Gill v. State Of Punjab., 1991 SCC (L & S) 998. The Apex Court in paragraph 5 has held as under :

    "5. The further contention of Shri Nayar that the procedure under Rule 8 was followed by Issuance of the show cause notice and consideration of the explanation given by the appellant would meet the test of rules 8 and 9 of the rules is" devoid of any substance. Conducting an enquiry, de hors the rules is no enquiry in the eye of law. It cannot be countenanced that the pretence of an enquiry without reasonable opportunity of adducing evidence both by the department as well as by the appellant in rebuttal, examination and cross-examination of the witnesses, if examined, to be an enquiry within the meaning of rules 8 and 9 of the rules. Those rules admittedly envisage, on denial of the charge by the delinquent officer, to conduct an enquiry giving reasonable opportunity to the presenting officer as well as the delinquent officer to lead evidence in support of the charge and in rebuttal thereof, giving adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer to cross-examine the witnesses produced by the department and to examine witnesses if intended on his behalf and to place his version ; consideration thereof by the Enquiry Officer, if the Disciplinary Authority himself is not the Enquiry Officer. A report of the enquiry in that behalf to be placed before the Disciplinary Authority who then is to consider it in the manner prescribed and to pass an appropriate order as for the procedure to vogue under the Rules."

    11. In the aforesaid case, the Apex Court held that without reasonable opportunity of adducing evidence both by the department as well as by the appellant in rebuttal, examination and cross-examination of the witnesses, it cannot be said to be valid enquiry under the Rules. As observed above, there cannot be any dispute that opportunity is required to both the delinquent and the employer. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Subhash Chandra Sharma (supra), held that the dismissal is illegal since no regular enquiry was held in that case. It was held by the Division Bench that the evidence should have been led against the delinquent in his presence and he should have been given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. To the same effect is another Division Bench's judgment in the case of Smt. Ram Pyari v. State of U. P. and Anr., 2000 (2) AWC 1711 (LB).

    12. The petitioner placed reliance on the judgment dated 25.5.2001 of this Court (DB) (M. Katju and R.B. Misra, JJ.) in Writ Petition No. 7133 of 2001, Radhey Shyam v. Secretary, Minor Irrigation Department and Rural Engineering Services, U. P. and Ors., (2001) 2 UPLBEC 1676, where the writ petitioner working as Incharge Executive Engineer in the Rural Engineering Services and Minor Irrigation Department was charge-sheeted for his alleged involvement of embezzlement, financial irregularities and financial loss, however, was made handicapped to participate in the inquiry for non-payment of subsistence allowance as well as legal dues during his suspension and the request of change of Inquiry Officer was not accepted by the competent authority and the ex parte inquiry was conducted behind his back without adopting proper procedure, no specific date, time and place of inquiry was fixed, oral and documentary evidence against the writ petitioner was not adduced in his presence and he was not given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him and he was not afforded opportunity to produce his own witnesses and evidences. The ex parte inquiry was found illegal and the order of dismissal of writ petitioner was quashed while allowing the writ petition, however, keeping in view the financial loss and irregularities, it was made open to the respondents to hold a fresh inquiry in accordance with law and pass a fresh order. It is pertinent to mention that the Special Leave Petition No. 15226 of 2001. State of U. P. v. Radhey Shyam Pandey and Ors., preferred against the above order dated 25.5.2001 was dismissed on 1.2.2002 by the Supreme Court.

    13. The petitioner also placed reliance on the judgments of this High Court in K.P. Giri v. State of U. P. and Ors., 2001 (1) UPLBEC 908 paras 7 and 8 as well as on Bajrang Prasad Srivastava v. U. P. Pariyojana Prabandha, U. P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd. and Ors., 2000 (3) AWC 1960 : 2000 UPLBEC 1321. It was held in the case of K.P. Giri (supra).

    "even in the absence of any reply submitted by the petitioner to the charge-sheet, it was incumbent upon the Enquiry Officer to fix the date in the enquiry and to intimate the petitioner about the same which has not been done in the present case. Moreover, from a perusal of the order of dismissal dated 20.3.1998 it will be seen that the management had produced the evidence in support of the charges levelled against the petitioner which had been accepted by the Enquiry Officer without making any effort to confront the same to the petitioner. Thus, the entire proceedings have been conducted in gross violation of equity, fair play and is in breach of the principles of natural justice."

    14. In respect of change of Enquiry Officer, the petitioner has further placed reliance on Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Madras and Anr. v. F.X. Farnando, 1994 (2) SCC 746 para 12, where it was held that justice must not only be done must be seen to be done, therefore, the Supreme Court has directed that an another Enquiry Officer be appointed in order to remove any apprehension of bias on the part of the respondent. In Indrani Bai (Smt.) v. Union of India and Ors., 1994 Supp (2) SCC 256 para 5, the Supreme Court has held that :

    "it is seen that right through, the delinquent officer had entertained a doubt about the impartiality of the enquiry to be conducted by the Enquiry Officer. When he made a representation at the earliest, requesting to change the Enquiry Officer, the authorities should have acceded to the request and appointed another Enquiry Officer, other than the one whose objectivity was doubted."

    15. The petitioner has placed reliance on Subhash Chand Sharma v. M. D. V. P. Co-operative Spg. Mills Fed. Ltd., 1994 (4) AWC 3227 para 5. In this Judgment of this Court, it was held that :

    "In our opinion, after the petitioner replied to the charge-sheet a date should have been fixed for the enquiry and the petitioner should have been intimated the date, time and place of the enquiry and on that date the oral and documentary evidence against the petitioner should have been led in his presence and he should have been given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him and also he should have been given an opportunity to produce his own witnesses and evidence. If the petitioner in response to this intimation had failed to appear for the enquiry, then an ex parte enquiry should have been held but the petitioner's service should have not been terminated without holding an enquiry. In the present case, it appears that no regular enquiry was held at all. All that was done that after receipt of the petitioner's reply to the charge-sheet he was given a show cause notice and thereafter the dismissal order was passed. In our opinion, this was not the correct legal procedure and there was violation of the rules of natural justice. Since no date for enquiry was fixed nor any enquiry held in which evidence was led in our opinion, the impugned order is clearly violative of natural justice."

    16. In Meenglas Tea Estate v. Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1719, the Supreme Court observed :

    "It is an elementary principle that a person who is required to answer a charge must know not only the accusation but also the testimony by which the accusation is supported. He must be given a fair chance to hear the evidence in support of the charge and to put such relevant questions by way of cross-examination as he desires. Then he must be given a chance to rebut the evidence led against him. This is the barest requirement of an enquiry of this character and the requirement must be substantially fulfilled before the result of the enquiry can be accepted."

    17. In S.C. Girotra v. United Commercial Bank. 1995 Supp (3) SCC 212, the Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order which was passed without giving the employee an opportunity of cross-examination. In Punjab National Bank A.I.P.N.B.E. Federation, AIR 1960 SC 160 (vide para 66), the Supreme Court held that in such enquiries evidence must be recorded in the presence of the charge sheeted employee and he must be given an opportunity to rebut the said evidence. The same view was taken in A.C.C. Ltd, v. Their Workman, 1963 (II) LLJ 396 and in Tata Oil Mills Co, Ltd. v. Their Workmen 1963 (II) LLJ 78 (SC).

    18. Learned standing counsel has placed reliance on the Apex Court's judgment in State of Haryana and Anr. v. Rattan Singh, 1982 (1) LLJ 46 (SC). It was held in paragraph 4 by the Apex Court :

    "4. it is well-settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the indian evidence act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and creditability. It is true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what Is strictly speaking not relevant under the indian evidence act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectively, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course fairplay is basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached such finding, even though of a domestic, Tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the Tribunal before the valid finding could be recorded. The "residlum" rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain passages from the American jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the passage from the Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence not in the sense of the technical sides governing regular Court proceedings but in a fair common sense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept."

    19. Further reliance has been placed on Employees of Fire Stone Tyre and Rubber Co. (P.) Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1968 SC 236, in which it was held by the Apex Court in paragraph 9 :

    "9. This leaves over the contention that before examining the witnesses Subramaniam was subject to a cross-examination. This was said to offend the principles of natural justice and reliance was placed on, Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, 1963-2 Lab LJ 78 (SC) ; Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Ltd. v. Their Workmen, 1963-2 Lab LJ 367 ; AIR 1963 SC 1914 ; Meenglas Tea Estate v. Its Workmen, 1963 (2) Lab LJ 392 (SC) : AIR 1963 SC 1719 and Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, 1963-2 Lab LJ 396 (SC). These cases no doubt lay down that before a delinquent is asked anything all the evidence against him must be led. This cannot be an invariable rule in all cases. The situation is different where the accusation is based on a matter of record or the facts are admitted. In such a case it may be permissible to draw, the attention of the delinquent to the evidence on the record which goes against him and which if he cannot satisfactorily explain must lead to a conclusion of guilt. In certain cases it may even be fair to the delinquent to take his version first so that the enquiry may cover the point of difference and the witnesses may be questioned properly on the aspect of the case suggested by him. It is all a question of Justice and fair play. If the second procedure leads to a just decision of the disputed points and is fairer to the delinquent than the ordinary procedure of examining evidence against him first, no exception can be taken to it. It is, however, wise to ask the delinquent whether he would like to make a statement first or wait till the evidence is over but the failure to question him in this way does not ipso facto vitiate the enquiry unless prejudice is caused. It is only when the person enquired against seems to have been held at a disadvantage or has objected to such a course that the enquiry may be said to be vitiated. It must, however, be emphasised ; that in all cases in which the facts in controversy are disputed the procedure ordinarily to be followed is the one laid down by this Court in the cited cases.

    The procedure of examining the delinquent first may be adopted in a clear case only."

    20. From the aforesaid two decisions, it is clear that the strict proof of evidence is not attracted in the disciplinary enquiry. Further, in certain cases, the charges can be based only on the documents. It was held by the Apex Court where the question is based on the matter of record, in such cases it may be permissible to draw attention of the delinquent to evidence on record. Learned counsel has also submitted that the burden of proof in disciplinary enquiry depends on nature of charges and nature of explanation. It was held in paragraph 5 by the Apex Court in the case of Orissa Mining Corporation and Anr. v. Ananda Chandra Prusty, 1998 (3) LLJ (Supp) 1207 :

    "5. On a consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case including the nature of charges we are not inclined to interfere in the matter. The position with respect to burden of proof is as clarified by us herein above viz. that there is no such thing as an absolute burden of proof, always lying upon the department in a disciplinary enquiry. The burden of proof depends upon the nature of explanation and the nature of charges. In a given case the burden may be shifted to the delinquent officer, depending upon his explanation. For example take the first charge in this case. The charge was that he made certain false notings on account of which loans were disbursed to certain ineligible persons. The respondent's case was that those notings were based upon certain documents produced and certain records maintained by other employee in the office. In such a situation it is for the respondent to establish his case. The department is not expected to examine those other employees in the office to show that their acts or records could not have formed the basis of wrong notings made by the respondents."

    21. It has been argued on behalf of the respondents relying on the judgment of Raj Babu Agnihotri v. Labour Commissioner. U. P., Kanpur and Ors., 2002 (3) AWC 2605 : 2002 (3) UPLBEC 2336, where the enquiry was conducted in reference to Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930, for the alleged charges of irregularity, embezzlement and misappropriation and in the enquiry the petitioner was given show cause notice which was responded by the incumbent and therefore, after affording full opportunity of hearing the incumbent produced certain receipts and cash books which were duly considered with and noted that the incumbent did not ask for cross-examination of the witnesses produced in the matter and after perusing the entire record produced before the Court the High Court found that there was no irregularity in the enquiry, in those circumstances, the removal was treated to be proper. The facts of the present case is different and distinguishable from the facts involved in the case of Raj Babu Agnihotri (supra).

    22. Now the question arises whether the petitioner after the dismissal/removal has been set aside, has been allowed to reinstate in service and what should be the amount of back wages is to be paid to him. Withdrawal of resignation of the appellant was considered and appellant was entitled to remain in continuity in service was not allowed any back wages if the employee did not actually worked.

    23. In Surendra Kumar Verma and Ors. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi and Anr., (1980) 4 SCC 443, the Supreme Court has held that reinstatement with full back wages is common principle, however, the Court has power to mould the relief in exceptional cases. In para 6 of Surendra Kumar Verma (supra) it was held :

    "Plain common sense dictates that the removal of an order terminating the services of workmen must ordinarily lead to the reinstatement of the services of workmen. It is as if the order has never been, and so it must ordinarily lead to back wages too. But there may be exceptional circumstances which make it impossible or wholly inequitable vis-a-vis the employer and workmen to direct reinstatement with full back wages. For instance, the Industry might have closed down or might be in severe financial doldrums ; the workmen concerned might have secured better or other employment elsewhere and so on. In such situations, there is a vestige of discretion left in the Court to make appropriate consequential orders. The Court may deny the relief of reinstatement where reinstatement is impossible because the industry has closed down. The Court may deny the relief of award of full back wages where that would place an impossible burden on the employer. In such and other exceptional cases the Court may mould the relief, but, ordinarily the relief to be awarded must be reinstatement with full back wages. That relief must be awarded where no special impediment in the way of awarding the relief is clearly shown. True, occasional hardship may be caused to an employer but we must remember that, more often than not, comparatively far greater hardship is certain to be caused to the workmen if the relief is denied than to the employer if the relief is granted."

    24. In A.L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corporation of India Limited, AIR 1984 SC 1361, it was held that when the delinquent highly placed officer in public sector though not guilty of misconduct found to have committed lapses in not returning House Building Advance and Vehicle Purchase Advance was reinstated after dismissal from service, then having regard to all the aspect of the case, the appellant was paid 50% of the back wages for the period since his removal from service up to his reinstatement excluding the period for which he had procured an alternative employment.

    25. In Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and Ors., 1999 (2) AWC 1184 (SC) : 1999 (3) SCC 60, it was held that the employee was entitled to back wages when the termination of probationer was set aside and under the facts and circumstance of the case the reinstatement was allowed with back wages and continuity in service.

    26. In State Bank of India and Ors. v. T.J. Paul 1999 (4) SCC 759, when the respondent, employee, in doing act prejudicial to the Interests of the bank, or gross negligence involving or likely to involve the bank in serious loss even if the actual loss was not necessary to attract this clause ahead enough to hold such employee, respondent, guilty when such bank officer charges to have sanctioned loans without adequate security and without prior approval/ ratification from superior authorities.

    This was contrary to the departmental instructions but in the departmental proceedings the penalty of removal Imposed on respondent employee was found ultra vires and case remitted to the appellant for fresh consideration of penalty in accordance with rules then the order of High Court directing payment of back wages, promotions, increments, etc. was allowed to sustain.

    27. In Hardwari Lai v. State of U. P. and Ors., 2000 (1) AWC 96 (SC) :

    1999 (8) SCC 582, wherein the appellant, a police constable, charged of having abused his colleague while he (appellant) was under the influence of liquor and neither complainant nor the other employee who accompanied the appellant to hospital for medical examination, examined as witnesses, inquiry was held to be vitiated being in violation of principle of natural justice and plea rejected that there was other material sufficient to come to conclusion one way or the other on the failure of the respondents to examine material witnesses. The finding of departmental enquiry was set aside and the appellant was reinstated, however, considering that long time had elapsed between dismissal and reinstatement for which no blame could be made on respondent, 50% of back wages was allowed.

    28. In Prabhudayal Birari v. M.P Rajya Nagrik Aapurti Nigam Ltd.., 2000 (4) AWC 2951 (SC) : 2000 (7) SCC 502, the Supreme Court observed that termination being in contravention of the specific conditions mentioned In the appointment order, the appellant was reinstated in service with back wages.

    29. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi (M.C.D.) v. Prem Chand Gupta and Anr. 2000 (10) SCC 115, the Supreme Court has held that where termination of respondent's services declared invalid being violative of Section 25F of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 and keeping in view that the case dragged on for 33 years but neither of the contesting parties were at fault. The delay was due to pendency of the case in Courts and the employer was a Municipal Corporation whose funds were primarily meant for public benefit. In the facts and circumstances of the case, only 50% back wages was allowed with all other consequential benefits.

    30. In Vinod Bhanti v. State of Bihar and Ors., 2000 (10) SCC 146, the Supreme Court has held that the appellant a confirmed employee of Artificial Limb Centre, absented from duty, submitted his resignation but before acceptance of the resignation letter, he withdrew the same. It was held after that having withdrawn the resignation, the appellant could not be deemed to have been relieved from service. The centre remaining nonfunctional for said period and the appellant was allowed to resume work at later stage when centre became non-functional. It was found that the appellant was not in service, therefore, he would be deemed to have been relieved from service. He was entitled to continue In service after the resignation having been withdrawn but he was not entitled for back wages for the period the appellant did not actually worked.

    31. In Ex Constable Chhote Lai v. Union of India and Ors., 2000 (10) SCC 196, the Supreme Court has held that such an opinion of departmental authority that it was not reasonably practical to hold inquiry, was not justified and argument advanced by the respondents that the appellant being a police constable could have influenced witnesses and therefore, dispensing of inquiry was done, such argument rejected. Dispensing of inquiry was not found according to law, therefore, the liberty was given to respondents to proceed against appellant by holding inquiry. This was observed while setting aside the order of dismissal that in view of the nature of the charges against the appellant.

    32. In Director of Collegiate Education and Anr. v. Sri Jagadguru Panchacharya Vishwa Dharma Vidya Peetha and Ors., 2000 (10) SCC 200, where the direction of the High Court to the Government to pay the back wages and other monetary benefits to respondent No. 3 was set aside as the question of liability of Government to pay the back wages and other benefits was not in issue either before the Tribunal or before the High Court and, therefore, the High Court was justified to pass such a direction.

    33. In Assistant General Manager, S.B.I. v. Thomas Jone and Anr., 2000 (10) SCC 280. In that case Bank employee was dismissed from service on account of his admitting of misconduct of withdrawing money unauthorisedly from customer's account. The Industrial Tribunal has power to modify punishment of discharge/ dismissal imposed by employer. The Industrial Tribunal ordered reinstatement without back wages and the writ petition filed by the Bank against the award of the Tribunal was dismissed by High Court relying upon Scooters India Ltd. v. Labour Court, 1989 (1) SCC 31. It was held that the bank employee deals with public money and therefore, cannot be treated leniently as has been done by the Tribunal in the case in question and the award of the Tribunal, therefore, modified by inserting an additional condition that the employee would not get any increment for ten years with cumulative effect. However, the reinstatement of the appellant was allowed with back wages without any increment for period of ten years.

    34. In Hardwari Lal v. State of U. P. and Ors., 2000 (1) AWC 96 (SC) : 1999 (8) SCC 582 : (2000) 1 VPLBEC 331 (SC), where the Supreme Court has held that failure to examine material witness, appellant a police constable, charged of having abused his colleague while he (appellant) was under the influence of liquor, however, neither complainant nor the other employee accompanied the appellant to hospital for medical examination, examined as witnesses. The inquiry was held to be vitiated being in violation of natural justice and the plea rejected that there was other material sufficient to come to conclusion one way or the other, observing that impact of complainant's testimony could not be visualised and also evidence of the employee who accompanied the appellant in apprehension and the applicant was reinstated and the applicant's dismissal order was set aside with a reinstatement with 50% of back wages.

    35. In reference to the alleged charges made against the incumbent at an early stage consequent enquiry on the similar charges and on the same facts were initiated, therefore, the second inquiry was not treated to be legally permissible in absence of any specific rule which empowers the Employer/State Government to make a second inquiry. In those circumstances, the order of dismissal of the incumbent employee of the State Government was set aside on the ground that since the petitioner has not rendered any work during the period of his dismissal order was effective. In the facts and circumstances, this Court while allowing the writ petition with all consequential benefits had only given 50% of the wages for the past.

    36. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents.

    37. 1 find that the documents relied upon by the Enquiry Officer has not been fully given to the petitioner and only after obtaining the reply, the order of termination has been passed. The norms of Rules 1930 and 1999 have not been observed. No specific date, place or time was fixed or documents relied upon by the Enquiry Officer was sufficiently provided to the petitioner. Evidence relied upon against the petitioner should have been provided to the petitioner and the petitioner should have been allowed to cross-examine the witnesses. A dismissal order is a major punishment having serious consequences and hence, should be passed only after complying with the rules of natural justice. Since in the present case, no regular and proper inquiry was held, hence in these circumstances, for lack of providing proper opportunity much less a reasonable opportunity to defend the petitioner himself, the order of termination is not legally sustainable, as such it is set aside.

    38. In view of the facts and circumstances and the observations made above, the writ petition is allowed and the petitioner is directed to be reinstated in service forthwith. It is indicated that since the petitioner was out of Job and he has not rendered any service. It is also not known whether he was in any kind of gainful employment during the period in which he was out of job. However, keeping in view the interest of the revenue and specifically that he has not rendered any service, the petitioner shall be given only 50% of the basic wages within six months from today. A certified copy of this order shall be presented by the petitioner himself to the Concerned Officer.

    39. No order as to costs.

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