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  • provisions of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1954.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 491, Criminal Procedure Code, seeks a writ of habeas corpus against the State of Uttar Pradesh, the Collector of Mathura, Senior Superintendent of Police Mathura and the Superintendent District Jail Mathura in relation to the detention of certain persons in Mathura jail.

The context was a consolidation scheme under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1954 in Mathura Tehsil. On July 8, 1957, a public meeting was announced by a section of the public to protest alleged hardships caused by the scheme. Another meeting organized by the District Congress Committee, addressed by the Labour Minister Acharya Jugul Kishore, was to be held at the same time and venue; petitioners say the Congress meeting was announced subsequently.

While the petitioners' meeting was proceeding, Sub‑Inspector Kartar Singh arrived and, alleging disturbance and threat to the Minister's meeting, arrested a group of persons (initially 40; total arrested were 48) under Section 151 Cr. P.C. The arrested were taken to the police station and later to the collectorate and kept until the evening of July 9, 1957 when they were produced before the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate (Additional Sub‑Divisional Magistrate U.S. Narain). The Magistrate drew up a notice under Section 112 Cr. P.C., purportedly read and explained it to the detainees, asked for security for appearance (two sureties of Rs.1,000 each and a personal bond of Rs.1,000), and, when some declined to furnish security, they were committed to jail custody. Warrants under Section 344 Cr. P.C. were also issued, mentioning Sections 151/107/117 Cr. P.C. Some detainees were later released on bail; several remained in jail when this petition was heard.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Magistrate had authority to remand the persons proceeded against to jail custody independently of sub‑section (3) of Section 117, Cr. P.C., or whether that sub‑section was the exclusive source of authority to commit them to custody.
  2. Whether the order sending the petitioners to jail custody was made for the purpose of enforcing their appearance at the next hearing (i.e., for failure to furnish security for appearance), as asserted by the State.
  3. Whether the requirements of Section 113 Cr. P.C. (reading and explanation of the order under Section 112) and the requirement of presentation within 24 hours of arrest were complied with.
  4. Whether provisions of Chapter XXIV (in particular Section 344, Cr. P.C.) apply to enquiries under Chapter VIII (Sections 107–118) by virtue of Section 117(2) Cr. P.C., so that an order in writing remanding persons in custody is required when a case is adjourned.
  5. Whether Section 91 Cr. P.C. authorises the Magistrate to require security for appearance of persons present in court under Chapter VIII and, if so, whether the power to commit to custody on refusal to furnish security is impliedly conferred.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • Their detention is illegal because the Magistrate did not comply with sub‑section (3) of Section 117 Cr. P.C., which they say is the only provision permitting remand to jail custody in proceedings under Chapter VIII.
  • The Magistrate lacked authority to remand persons to jail custody except under Section 117(3) Cr. P.C.; because that procedure was not followed, the detention cannot be sustained.
  • The notice under Section 112 Cr. P.C. was not read out or explained to them as required by Section 113 Cr. P.C., and therefore the proceedings and any consequent detention were vitiated.
  • The order dated 9th July, 1957 should be read as it stands and cannot be supplemented by affidavit; if the order does not show they were asked to furnish security for appearance, the court should infer they were not so asked.
  • Chapter VIII is self‑contained; no detention in relation to those proceedings is possible except under sections found in that chapter.

Opposite Parties' (State) Arguments

  • They do not accept the petitioners' account of a pre‑announced meeting by the petitioners; the petitioners went first to the Assistant Consolidation Officer and then to the temple where the Congress meeting was in progress and behaved threateningly.
  • Sub‑Inspector Kartar Singh found the petitioners in a threatening mood, appealed to them to be peaceful, and arrested them under Section 151 Cr. P.C. when they failed to comply.
  • The arrested persons were produced before the Additional Sub‑Divisional Magistrate within 24 hours (about 1 p.m. on July 9) and the notice under Section 112 was read and explained to them; signatures and thumb marks were obtained on the back of the notice to that effect.
  • The Magistrate asked them to furnish two sureties of Rs.1,000 each and a personal bond of Rs.1,000 for appearance; they declined and were committed to jail. The warrants under Section 344 Cr. P.C. show custody for securing attendance at the next hearing (10th July, 1957).
  • The State relied on the warrants and contemporaneous endorsements as confirming that custody was to secure appearance at the adjourned date rather than custody under Section 117(3) Cr. P.C.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ram Narayan Singh v. The State of Delhi, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 653 (a) In habeas corpus proceedings the court must examine the legality of detention as of the time of the return.
(b) Section 344 Cr. P.C. requires that when a Magistrate adjourns a case he must remand by warrant the accused if in custody, and every such order by a court other than the High Court must be in writing; absence of a written remand order makes subsequent detention illegal.
The court relied on this precedent to emphasise that where no written order remanding detainees to custody as required by Section 344 Cr. P.C. exists, detention after adjournment cannot be regarded as in accordance with law. This principle supported the conclusion that detainees still in custody without a proper written remand were illegally detained.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a structured way, dealing first with disputed factual contentions and then with legal questions arising under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

  1. Factual determinations at the habeas corpus stage: the court noted it does not try disputed facts in such proceedings. Because the State filed an affidavit asserting that the notice under Section 112 Cr. P.C. had been read and explained and that the detainees had been produced within 24 hours, the court accepted those assertions for the purposes of the petition. The order sheet of July 9 also recorded that the Section 112 order was read out.
  2. Interpretation of Chapter VIII (Sections 107–118 Cr. P.C.): the court summarised the relevant provisions:
    • Section 107: subjective power to require a person to show cause why he should not be required to execute a bond for keeping the peace.
    • Section 112: objective requirement that when a Magistrate requires a person to show cause he shall make an order in writing setting out particulars.
    • Section 113: the Magistrate must read over the order and explain it.
    • Section 114: if the person is in custody a warrant may direct the officer to bring him before court.
    • Section 117(2): the enquiry shall, as far as practicable, follow the procedure for trials and recording evidence in summons cases.
    • Section 117(3): permits, if the Magistrate considers immediate measures necessary, that the person be directed pending enquiry to execute a bond for keeping the peace with reasons recorded in writing.
  3. Whether the Magistrate's power to remand arose only from Section 117(3): petitioners argued only Section 117(3) authorised remand to jail. The State contended detention arose because detainees refused to furnish security for appearance when asked. The court held that it was unnecessary to decide whether Section 117(3) had been complied with to sustain the detention if the custody could be justified on the alternative ground of securing attendance.
  4. Applicability of Section 344 Cr. P.C. to Chapter VIII proceedings: by virtue of Section 117(2) (making procedure in summons trials applicable), provisions in Chapter XXIV (including Section 344) apply to enquiries under Chapter VIII so far as practicable. The court rejected the argument that the word "accused" in Section 344 excludes persons proceeded against under Chapter VIII, and construed Section 344(1A) and related provisions as applicable to "persons proceeded against under that chapter."
  5. Power to require bond for appearance and to commit on refusal:
    • Section 91 Cr. P.C. authorises an officer presiding in court to require any person present (for whose appearance a summons or warrant could be issued) to execute a bond for appearance. The Magistrate under Section 114 is empowered to issue summons for persons proceeded against under Section 112, hence Section 91 applies to those persons when present.
    • The court held that although Section 91 contains no express provision for arrest on refusal to give bond, the power to commit for refusal is a necessary implication to give effect to the object of ensuring attendance. The court reasoned that accompanying powers essential for execution of a conferred jurisdiction are impliedly granted; securing judicial custody to enforce attendance is an accepted mode and therefore impliedly available.
    • The court rejected the submission that the absence of an express penal provision precludes implication of power to commit; Section 91 is not a penal provision and the power to commit follows as incidental to enforcement of attendance.
  6. Procedural defect fatal to continued detention: Section 344 requires that where a case is adjourned the court shall remand by warrant the accused if in custody and that every order (by a court other than the High Court) must be in writing signed by the presiding magistrate, stating reasons. The court found no properly recorded written remand order complying with Section 344 for the continued detention after July 10, 1957. Endorsements on the backs of warrants did not constitute the written remand order required (they lacked dates and a statement remanding detainees to custody). Citing Ram Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi, the court emphasised that detention after the adjournment without the required written order is illegal.
  7. Conclusion from analysis: although the Magistrate had power under Section 91 (read with Section 114 and Section 117(2)) to require security for appearance and, by necessary implication, to commit on refusal, the statutory formalities of Section 344 for remand on adjournment were not observed in writing. Consequently the detention of those detainees who remained in custody after July 10, 1957, without the required written remand order, could not be sustained.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core ruling): The court held that although the Magistrate had power to demand security for appearance (and, by necessary implication, power to commit for refusal), the continued detention of the detainees who remained in custody after July 10, 1957 could not be sustained because the requirements of Section 344 Cr. P.C. (a written remand order signed by the Magistrate stating reasons) were not complied with. As a result, the detention of those persons still in custody was illegal.

Direct consequences applied to the parties:

  • The court found that petitioners who had already furnished security for appearance and were released (specifically petitioners nos. 6, 9, 10 and 12 — Jagan Parshad, Padam Singh, Amar Singh and Gordhan — and others released on bail) were not entitled to the relief sought by this petition.
  • The court ordered that the following petitioners who remained in jail be set at liberty forthwith: Vasu Deo Ojha, Gyasi Ram, Bhimsen, Shanker Lal Pathak, Daroga Singh, Jhaman Singh, Karhroo Singh, Khushi Ram and Beni Ram.

Broader implications: The opinion applies and explains existing provisions (Sections 91, 112–117, 344 of the Cr. P.C.) and relies on existing precedent (Ram Narayan Singh). The decision's immediate effect is the release of the named detainees; the opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond the application and interaction of the cited provisions.

Order: The petition is disposed of in the terms directed above (named petitioners to be set at liberty forthwith).

    Vasu Deo Ojha And Others v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others Opposite Parties.

    Tondon, J.:— This petition, which is under Art. 226 of the Constitution and also under Sec. 491, Criminal Procedure Code, has asked a writ of habeas corpus against the opposite parties, who are the State of Uttar Pradesh, the Collector of Mathura, Senior Superintendent of Police Mathura and Superintendent District Jail Mathura, in connection with their detention in Mathura jail. The facts giving rise to it are briefly these.

    2. A scheme for the consolidation of holdings has been started in Mathura Tehsil under the provisions of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1954. A certain section of the public does not seem to be favourably disposed of towards the working of the scheme. Accordingly some of the supporters of that view announced on July 8, 1957 a public meeting to be held at two o'clock that afternoon. The purpose of the meeting was to invite the attention of the authorities and the Government to certain hardships which the petitioners alleged were being caused to the kisans, particularly in the way the scheme was being worked. Another meeting for the same date, it is further alleged, was announced by the District Congress Committee of Mathura which again was to be held at the same time in the same village. This was to be addressed by the labour Minister, Sri Acharya Jugul Kishore. According to the petitioners the meeting on behalf of the District Congress Committee was announced subsequently, i.e, after they had announced the programme of their own meeting. It is stated that while the petitioners' meeting was in progress a sub-inspector of police arrived at the scene with a number of constables and asked the persons collected there as to why they were causing disturbance near the place where the Hon'ble Minister was addressing the meeting which as we have already noticed, was arranged by the District Congress Committee. It is also alleged that soon after the Sub-Inspector arrested 40 persons, out of whom were the 13 petitioners, acting under Sec. 151, Cr. P.C After their arrest these persons were taken in the first instance, to the police station and, later, to collectorate Mathura where, it is further alleged, they were kept waiting outside the courtroom until next evening. July 9, 1957 was a public, holiday. But the Sub-Divisional Magistrate attended his court that evening at about 4-30 p.m whereupon the arrested persons were produced before him. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate then drew up an order purporting to be under Sec. 112, Cr. P.C against all the 40 persons and at the same time sent them to jail. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the procedure provided in sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 117, Cr. P.C was not complied with and that their detention is illegal. Also according to them in proceedings under chapter 8, Cr. P.C a Magistrate has no authority to remand persons proceeded against to jail custody except under and in accordance with sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 117, Cr. P.C and since no such proceeding was taken against them in this case their detention is illegal. Their contention also is that the Magistrate before he makes an order remanding the persons proceeded against to jail custody under this sub-section must previously find that immediate measures are necessary for the prevention of the breach of the peace or disturbance of public tranquility and further that he must record his reasons in writing. If he fails in this necessary step the order, if any, made under sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 117, Cr. P.C will itself be illegal and unable to sustain any detention. The petitioners have also challenged the proceedings started against them under Sec. 117, Cr. P.C alleging that though an order under Sec. 112, Cr. P.C was made by the Magistrate he neither read it out to them nor properly explained its contents which was necessary in view of Sec. 113, Cr. P.C Hence also they challenged the legality of their detention.

    3. On behalf of the opposite parties it is not admitted that the opposite parties had any information or knowledge about the alleged announcement by the petitioners of any public meeting for July 8, 1957. According to them the petitioners along with some others at first went on the date aforesaid to the office of the Assistant Consolidation Officer at Farraha with a view to commit breach of the peace and from there they proceed to the temple where the meeting on behalf of the District Congress Committee had been organised and that they wanted forcibly to prevent and disturb the peaceful conduct of the meeting which was actually in progress under the presidentship of Acharya Jugul Kishore, Minister for Labour and Social Welfare. Sri Kartar Singh, sub-inspector, who was present at the place, noticed that the petitioners were in a very threatening mood. He accordingly asked them to be peaceful and not to use force and voilence but they never paid any heed to his request. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, who also was present at the meeting, being the Settlement Officer Consolidation, similarly appealed to them but in vain. It is then stated that Sri Kartar Singh thereupon acting under Sec. 151, Cr. P.C arrested the petitioners along with other persons at 4-30 p.m Next morning all the arrested persons were taken to Mathura and there produced before Sri U.S Narain, Addl. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, at about 1 p.m, i.e, within 24 hours of their arrest. The Magistrate then drew up a notice under Sec. 112, Cr. P.C against all the arrested persons and read it out and explained to them. He also obtained their signatures and obtained thumb marks on the back of the notice in token of its having been read and explained to them.

    4. The opposite parties' allegation further is that after the notice under Sec. 112, Cr. P.C had thus been read over and explained to the petitioners the learned Magistrate asked them to furnish two sureties of Rs. 1,000/- each, as also a personal bond of the like amount for their appearance, and as these persons declined to furnish the security asked for they were sent to jail under his orders.

    5. The total number of persons arrested was 48. It is pointed out that on July 10, 1957, a day after their remand to jail custody, all the 48 persons moved an application for bail but 12 out of the 13 petitioners got their names cancelled from the application. Jagan Parshad petitioner no. 6 alone pressed it and the Magistrate granted him bail and released him. Later petitioners nos. 9, 10 and 12 again moved an application for their release on bail and they too were let off. We are told that several other persons from amongst those who were arrested have similarly been released from time to time. It is, however, not necessary for disposing of the present petition to find out details relating to them.

    6. Before we proceeded further we might refer to the warrants by which the several petitioners were remanded to jail custody. Their copies have been furnished along with the affidavit. These were under Sec. 344, Cr. P.C and required the petitioners to be produced in court on July 10, 1957 which was the date fixed for the hearing of the case when adjourning it on 9th July, 1957. In this document the sections with which the several persons were charged were mentioned at the appropriate place as Secs. 151/107/117, Cr. P.C Another fact about these warrants is that there are five endorsements on the back under the signatures of Sri U.S Narain, Addl. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, who issued the notice under Sec. 112, Cr. P.C, to the following effect:

    “Ta ko pesh hon.”

    7. In each endorsement the date next fixed for the hearing of the case is entered at the place left blank above.

    8. Having thus described the circumstances relating to the detention of the petitioners, the opposite parties pointed out that their detention was never ordered under sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 117, Cr. P.C so as to require the compliance of the provisions of that sub-section on the other hand, they were detained because they failed to furnish security for their appearance at the next date fixed for the hearing of the notice. One of the questions which will therefore arise in the present case be whether the Magistrate had authority to remand the persons proceeded against to jail custody independently of sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 117, Cr. P.C According to the petitioners that is the only provision which gave him authority to do so. It will further be necessary to see whether the order sending the petitioners to jail custody was actually an order made for the purpose of enforcing their appearance at the date of hearing or was it otherwise. This is necessary since the petitioners have not admitted that they had been sent to jail custody on that account.

    9. Before, however, we proceeded to decide these questions we consider it necessary to dispose of the petitioners' objection that the order made under Sec. 112, Cr. P.C was not read out or explained to them; in other words whether there was compliance of the provisions of Sec. 113, Cr. P.C The petitioners have urged that the notice was not read out or explained to them. But the affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite parties has categorically stated that the Magistrate had actually read out and explained the notice to them, and, further, that after it had been so read out and explained the petitioners were asked to put their thumb marks and signatures on the back in token thereof. It is well settled that in these proceedings we do not enter into an investigation of disputed facts. The proper stage and forum for such investigation is the trial itself. In view of the affidavit by the opposite parties, that it was read out and explained to the petitioners, it should be assumed for the purposes of the present petition that it was read out and explained to them. We might also refer to the order dated 9th July, 1957 recorded on the order sheet of the case under Sec. 107, Cr. P.C wherein also it is stated that the order under Sec. 112, Cr. P.C was read out to the persons proceeded against. In view of the above, we take it that the petitioners were presented before the Magistrate and the Magistrate had read out and explained to them the order made under Sec. 112, Cr. P.C

    10. Another fact which, too, will need to be disposed of initially is whether the petitioners were presented before the Magistrate within 24 hours of their arrest by the police. The arrest took place in the afternoon at about 4-30 p.m on July 8, 1957. According to the affidavit filed on behalf of the State they were produced before Sri U.S Narain, Additional Sub-Divisional Magistrate, who made the order under Sec. 112 at 1 p.m i.e within 24 hours of their arrest. Once again therefore it could not be said, so far as these proceedings are concerned, that the petitioners' detention was illegal on that ground.

    11. Let us next proceed to examine the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sec. 107, which is in the nature of a subjective provision, says that whenever a Magistrate authorised in that behalf is informed that any person is likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb in the public tranquility or to do any wrongful act that may probably occasion a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquility, he may, if there is, in his opinion, sufficient ground for proceeding require the person to show cause why he should not be asked to execute a bond with or without sureties for keeping the peace. It is not necessary for the present purposes to refer to the remaining portions of this section. Sec. 112, Cr. P. C, which unlike Sec. 107 is in the nature of an objective provision says that when a Magistrate acting under Sec. 107 deems it necessary to require any person to show cause under that section he shall make an order in writing setting forth the substance of the information received, the kind of the bond to be executed, the term for which it is to be in force and the particulars, character and class of sureties, if any, required. Then comes Sec. 113 which requires the Magistrate to read over the order to the person proceeded against and explain to him, if he so desires, the substance of the order. If, however, the person proceeded against is not present in court, Sec. 114 authorises the Magistrate to issue a summons requiring him to appear, or where such person is in custody, a warrant directing the officer in whose custody he is to bring him before the court. The purpose of the section evidently is that the person proceeded against should personally appear before the Magistrate who will then read out the order made under Sec. 112, Cr. P.C against him. His personal attendance is very necessary, as is further clear from Sec. 116 which gives the discretion to the Magistrate to dispense with his attendance and permit him to appear by a pleader. The Legislature does not contemplate proceedings in abstensia, but insists that the person proceeded against does actually appear and is present while the proceedings are held against him. Sec. 117 makes the position abundantly clear. According to it when the order under Sec. 112, Cr. P.C has been read out or explained, if the person is already present in court or when he is presented upon a summons or warrant issued under Sec. 114, Cr. P. C, the Magistrate shall proceed to enquire into the truth of the information upon which action has been taken. He is also to take such further evidence as may appear necessary for the purposes of the enquiry. Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 117, Cr. P.C lays down that the enquiry shall be made as nearly as may be practicable, in the manner appointed for conducting trials and recording evidence in summons cases. Through this provision, the Legislature has made applicable the procedure prescribed for conducting trials and taking down of evidence in summons case to proceedings where the order requires security for keeping the peace. The next sub-section then says that if the Magistrate considers that immediate measures are necessary for the prevention of the breach of the peace, he may, pending the completion of the enquiry, direct the person in respect of whom the order under Sec. 112, Cr. P.C has been made to execute a bond with or without sureties for keeping the peace. The sub-section however further requires the Magistrate to record his reasons in writing for the order that he makes. Sec. 118, Cr. P.C and subsequent sections lay down what order the Magistrate may pass and how it shall be carried out, but they need not be described here as they are not relevant for the decision of the present petition.

    12. We have noticed that the petitioners' complaint is that no order under sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 117, Cr. P.C was passed and that being so there was no power to commit them to prison. On behalf of the State also it is not contended that any order under sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 117, Cr. P.C was made against the petitioners in this case. They are taking their stand on the fact that when these petitioners were presented before the Magistrate and an order under Sec. 112, Cr. P.C had been made against them they were asked to furnish security for their appearance at the next date fixed for enquiry but when they failed to do so they were committed to jail custody. Their case, therefore, precisely is that the petitioners' custody is not under sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 117, Cr. P.C but at their failure to furnish security for their appearance when the case comes up for hearing. In view of this it is unnecessary in order to justify the petitioners' detention, to find out whether the requirements of sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 117, Cr. P.C were fulfilled or not. The point to be considered on the other hand, is was the Magistrate authorised to require the petitioners to furnish security for their appearance and further whether he had authority to commit them to jail custody at their refusal to do so. Incidentally it will also arise, since the petitioners do not admit it, whether it was fact that the petitioners were committed to jail custody in the circumstances urged by the State.

    13. Before we proceeded to examine the true legal position we might reproduce the order dated 9th July, 1957 on which date the petitioners were committed to jail custody:

    “Aaj yeh patrawali bad darz hokar pesh hui. Fariksaniyan ko notis hasb dafa 112 chutti me kacheri aaker sunaya gaya. Farksaniyan se 1000/- do jamante tatha ek muchalka 1000/- talab kiya gaya.

    Adesh hua ki: ki patrawali waste biyan fariksaniyan tarikh 10-7-57 ko pesh ho. Fariksaniyan hasb dafa 151 giraftar hokar aayen hain. Wey jamanete wa muchalka dene se kasir rahe. Ata jariye barant jail rawana hue. Ab fariksaniyan 10-7-1957 ko jail se baste biyanat talab hon.

    Sd. U.S Narain.”

    14. As would be noticed from the above order, after the order under Sec. 112 had been made and the petitioners had failed to furnish security asked from them they were sent to jail custody because they had so failed to furnish the security etc. and 10th July, 1957 was fixed for taking down their statements. The arrest was effected under Sec. 151, Cr. P.C and this fact too is referred to in this order: It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the above order does not bear out the claim by the opposite parties that they were asked to furnish security for appearance were committed to jail custody at their refusal to do so. On behalf of the State it is, however, contended that they were in fact so asked and their detention was ordered only at their refusal to furnish the necessary security etc. An affidavit also is filed to support this contention. Besides the affidavit, they have also referred us to the warrants whereby the petitioners were actually sent to jail custody. These warrants were prepared under Sec. 344, Cr. P.C and mentioned that the custody was in connection with the case under Sec. 151/107/117, Cr. P.C They further required the jail authorities to produce the detinues on the next date appointed for hearing which was 10th July, 1957.

    15. The learned advocate for the petitioners has contended that it is not open to the State to supplement the order dated 9th July, 1957 by any affidavit but the order must be read and construed as it is, and if there is nothing in the order itself to show that the detinues were asked to furnish security for their appearance, the inference must be that they were not so asked. It cannot be doubted that orders made publicly and effecting the liberties of the members of the public must be precisely worded and those orders cannot be allowed to be supplemented by any fresh allegations. But the question is whether it could be said in the present case that the order dated 9th July, 1957 was an order which required the appearance of the petitioners on the adjourned date and also whether the commitment made on that date to jail custody was at their refusal to furnish security for their appearance. While it appears that the order dated 9th July, 1957 is not very happily worded, still it cannot be said that it was not an order by which the Magistrate had demanded security for appearance also. The last few words, wherein there is reference to refusal to furnish security after they were produced subsequent to their arrest under Sec. 151, Cr. P.C, are open to the interpretation that the security for appearance was asked from them but they declined. This is confirmed by this also, viz. the warrants under Sec. 344, Cr. P.C whereby the petitioners were committed to jail custody. Under this section commitment to custody is made for securing the attendance of accused at the next hearing of the case. The fact therefore that the custody was continued under Sec. 344, Cr. P.C went in our opinion to support the contention for the State, viz. that the detention was ordered at the refusal by the petitioners to furnish security for their appearance at the adjourned date. Whatever ambiguity, if there was any, in the order of July 9, 1957 was if we may say so, explained by these documents which were made, immediately after and in that very connection. The petitioners also knew them and it will not be unreasonable to think that they too were aware that they were committed to custody for failing to give security for their appearance at the next date.

    16. The question that will still arise is whether Sec. 344, Cr. P.C is applicable to an enquiry started under Sec. 107, Cr. P.C The petitioners' contention in this connection is that chapter VIII of the Criminal Procedure Code is a self contained provision and no detention in relation to those proceedings is possible except under one of the sections found in that chapter itself.

    17. We have already referred to sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 117 wherein it is said that in an enquiry under that section, the procedure prescribed for conducting trials and recording evidence in summons cases shall be followed. In view of this the procedure prescribed for conducting trials in summons cases becomes applicable to enquiries under this chapter. The simple question therefore is does Sec. 344, Cr. P.C form part of the manner in which trials in summons cases shall be conducted. Because if it is so, i.e is part of the procedure prescribed for such trials, Sec. 344, Cr. P.C will atone become applicable to these proceedings also not merely because it applies to summons trials, but principally by reason of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 117, Cr. P.C Sec. 344, Cr. P.C appears in chapter XXIV which bears the heading “General provisions as to enquiries in trials.” A summons trial is as much a trial as any other trial under the Code. Accordingly the provisions of this chapter are applicable to summons cases as well. It was urged that sub-sec. (1A), which gave the power to adjourn cases, authorised the court to remand an accused person only to custody; and inasmuch as a person pro ceeded against under chapter VIII is not an accused person he is not accused of any offence, sub-sec. (1A) cannot apply to these proceedings. We do not agree with this reasoning. Sec. 344, Cr. P.C including sub-sec. (1A) does not apply to proceedings under chapter VIII on its own account, on the other hand, it applies to those proceedings by virtue of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 117, Cr. P.C which says that such enquiry shall be made as far as may be practicable in the manner prescribed for conducting the trials and recording evidence in summons cases. Read with this provision, sub-sec. (1A) of Sec. 344 has, in our opinion to be construed in its application to proceedings under chapter VII as though for the words “accused” the words “persons proceeded against under that chapter” had existed. We do not think the mere presence of the word “accused” in the section made it inapplicable to proceedings under chapter VIII. We are, on the other hand, of the view that it is applicable to those proceedings as well.

    18. It was next contended that a Magistrate has no power under chapter VIII to commit a person to jail custody where he refuses to furnish security for his appearance. In the first place it may not be wholly necessary for deciding the present petition to go into that question as the petitioners had not been arrested under any process issued by the Magistrate under chapter VIII. They had, on the other hand, been arrested by the police in exercise of their powers under Sec. 151, Cr. P.C and were already in custody when they were produced before the Magistrate on July 9, 1957. And it was in those circumstances that they were committed to jail custody. Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 344 to which we have already referred does not require that the person in custody should have been brought before the court in pursuance of any summons, or warrant issued by that court; all that the section requires is that when the case is postponed the person is already in custody. The petitioners were admittedly in custody on the 9th of July 1957 when the case was adjourned to the next date while their commitment to jail was made under Sec. 344, Cr. P.C

    19. But apart from what we have said above we find that Sec. 91 of the Criminal Procedure Code authorised an officer presiding in a court to require any person present in court to execute a bond with or without sureties for his appearance in such court. When therefore the petitioners were present before the Magistrate on 9th July, 1957 the Magistrate could under Sec. 91 ask them to execute a bond for their appearance. It was contended once again that this section was inapplicable to proceedings under chapter VIII. The section says when any person, for whose appearance or arrest the officer presiding in any court is empowered to issue any summons or warrant, is present in court such officer may require such person to execute a bond with or without sureties for his appearance in such court. What is necessary therefore for the exercise of the power under this section is that the officer should be empowered to issue a summons or warrant. It is not necessary that a summons or warrant is in fact issued, much less that the person is present in court in pursuance of any such summons or warrant. It is sufficient if the officer is empowered or in other words has the power, to issue a summons or warrant for his appearance. Whenever this condition exists and the person is present in court the officer can ask him to execute a bond with or without sureties for his presence. There is nothing in this section to restrict its application to any particular class of Officers or court; on the other hand it is a general provision relating to compelling the appearance in court.

    20. Turning now to Sec. 114, Cr. P.C one finds that the Magistrate who makes an order under Sec. 112, Cr. P.C has the power to issue a summons requiring the person proceeded against to appear. The Magistrate is therefore an officer who is empowered to issue a summons for the appearance of the person proceeded against within the meaning of Sec. 91. That being so, he is, in our view, authorised to ask the person proceeded against to furnish security also for appearance before him.

    21. Another interesting question raised in this connection was that Sec. 91 did not make any express provision for the arrest of the person upon his refusal to furnish a bond asked for from him. No doubt, no such express provision exists in the section but the very purpose of the power given by Sec. 91 is to ensure the physical presence of the person in the court on the date appointed for his appearance. In this view of the section we are inclined to think that the power to commit him to custody in the event of his refusing to execute a bond as required must be read by necessary implication, as otherwise the very power to ask security for appearance and even the purpose for which the power is conferred will be entirely defeated. Where a power or jurisdiction is conferred it impliedly also grants the power to commit all such acts or employ such means as are essentially necessary for the execution of that power and jurisdiction. Sec. 91 is intended for the purposes of enforcing personal attendance of a person who is asked to appear. And if it is with this end in view that he is asked to furnish security, the Legislature will be deemed thereby to have conferred jurisdiction on the officer to do all such acts as are essential for enforcing the attendance of such person. There can be no doubt that the commitment of the person to judicial custody is an accepted mode ensuring presence where the person concerned otherwise refuses to furnish security. That being so, it followed that Sec. 91 in conferring power to demand security for appearance also granted by necessary implication the power to commit the person to custody where he failed to give security for his attendance.

    22. It was urged that in the absence of any express provision to commit to Custody, since the power to commit to custody is a penal provision the power cannot be implied. We do not think any such difficulty actually arises in the present case. Sec. 91 has conferred jurisdiction to require security for attendance so that attendance is ensured thereby. It does not in itself prescribe any penalty. It cannot, in our opinion be said to be a penal provision, such as may give rise to considerations concerning penal provisions. It is, on the other hand, by virtue of the power to enforce attendance which clearly is not a penal provision that the power to commit is derived. In our view the above contention too cannot prevail.

    23. We however find that the petitioners' detention in jail cannot be sustained in this case in view of what we shall presently point out. Sec. 344, Cr. P.C requires that where a case is adjourned or postponed the court shall do so by written orders and state reasons also and shall by a warrant remand the accused if in custody. Sub-sec. (2) says that every order made under this section by a court other than a High Court shall be in writing signed by the presiding judge or the Magistrate. We were informed by learned Government advocate that in this case although there were orders at different dates adjourning the case no order was recorded by the Magistrate remanding the petitioners to custody. We have been referred to the endorsements already mentioned earlier by us in this order on the back of the warrants issued on 9th July, 1957. According to these endorsements the date next fixed in the case was alone entered. These endorsements neither bear any date nor state that the detinues concerned are remanded to jail custody. In its absence it is difficult to read these endorsements either to be orders of remand such as are contemplated by Sec. 344, Cr. P.C In Ram Narayan Singh v. The State of Delhi A.I.R 1953 S.C 653. their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed:

    “In habeas corpus proceedings the court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of the return and not with reference to the institution of the proceedings.”

    “Sec. 344 of the Criminal Procedure Code requires a Magistrate, if he wishes to adjourn a case, ‘to remand by warrant the accused if in custody’ and provides further that every order made under this section by a court other than a High Court shall be in writing. Where a trying Magistrate adjourns a case by an order in writing but there was nothing in writing on the record to show that he made an order remanding the accused to custody, the detention of the accused after the order of adjournment was illegal.”

    24. Their Lordships further observed:

    “Those who feel called upon to deprive other persons of their personal liberty in the discharge of what they conceive to be their duty, must strictly and scrupulously observe the forms and rules of law.”

    25. In the present case what therefore appears is that while there was an order initially remanding the petitioners to custody there is no order as contemplated by Sec. 344, Cr. P.C remanding them to custody. The detention therefore of the petitioners could not be said to be in accordance with the procedure established by law subsequent to July 10, 1957. We are informed that petitioners nos. 6, 9, 10 and 12 namely Jagan Parshad, Padam Singh, Amar Singh and Gordhan, were subsequently released on bail, they having furnished bonds for their appearance. There are however other petitioners who are still in jail. In their case since no proper order remanding them to custody exists in accordance with Sec. 344, Cr. P.C their detention is illegal. We have found, that the Magistrate had the necessary power to demand bail for appearance. The petitioners who have therefore furnished security for their appearance and have thereupon been released are not entitled to the relief asked but those who are in jail custody are entitled to be released. We accordingly direct that Vasu Deo Ojha, Gyasi Ram, Bhimsen, Shanker Lal Pathak, Daroga Singh, Jhaman Singh, Karhroo Singh, Khushi Ram and Beni Ram petitioners shall be set at liberty forthwith.

    26. Order accordingly.

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    Vasu Deo Ojha And Others v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others Opposite Parties.
    (Sep 25, 1957)