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  • sub-sec. (1) or (2), the provisions of clause (1) of Sec. 49 of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1958,
  • Sec. 47 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1963 which introduced sub-sec. (2) in Sec. 52. Sec. 47,
  • clause..31. Clause (1) of Sec. 49 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1958
  • provisions of Section 20(a)(ii) of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act
  • provisions of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land reforms Act and Sec. 20(b)
  • Sec. 20(b) of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Sec. 20(b),
  • Sec. 20(a)(ii) of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act
  • Sec. 20(b) of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act.47.
  • provisions of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act
  • Sec. 20(b) of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act
  • Sec. 12 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,
  • sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 52 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act,
  • Sec. 20(b) of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act
  • sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 27 of the U.P Tenancy (Amendment) Act
  • Sec. 23 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act
  • Sec. 52 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act,
  • provisions of the Consolidation of Holdings Act
  • provisions of the Constitution of Holdings Act
  • provisions the Consolidation of Holdings Act
  • Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1963.
  • Sec. 23 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act
  • U.P Act XVII of 1953 and U.P Act XX of 1954.
  • Sec. 52 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act,
  • Sec. 21 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act
  • Sec. 12 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act.
  • U.P Tenancy Act or in the Land Revenue Act
  • Sec. 9 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act
  • Consolidation of Holdings Act. Sec. 48
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  • sub-sec. (1) or (2), the provisions of clause (1) of Sec. 49 of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1958,
  • Sec. 47 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1963 which introduced sub-sec. (2) in Sec. 52. Sec. 47,
  • clause..31. Clause (1) of Sec. 49 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1958
  • provisions of Section 20(a)(ii) of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act
  • provisions of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land reforms Act and Sec. 20(b)
  • Sec. 20(b) of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Sec. 20(b),
  • Sec. 20(a)(ii) of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act
  • Sec. 20(b) of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act.47.
  • provisions of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act
  • Sec. 20(b) of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act
  • Sec. 12 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,
  • sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 52 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act,
  • Sec. 20(b) of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act
  • sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 27 of the U.P Tenancy (Amendment) Act
  • Sec. 23 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act
  • Sec. 52 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act,
  • provisions of the Consolidation of Holdings Act
  • provisions of the Constitution of Holdings Act
  • provisions the Consolidation of Holdings Act
  • Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1963.
  • Sec. 23 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act
  • U.P Act XVII of 1953 and U.P Act XX of 1954.
  • Sec. 52 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act,
  • Sec. 21 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act
  • Sec. 12 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act.
  • U.P Tenancy Act or in the Land Revenue Act
  • Sec. 9 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act
  • Consolidation of Holdings Act. Sec. 48
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion (Larger Bench Reference)

Factual and Procedural Background

Two second appeals and one writ petition were referred to a larger Bench. During hearing, counsel for the parties agreed that the Bench should decide three principal questions of law arising in the matters and then return the reference to the learned Judges who had referred the cases for decision on other points. One question was common to all referred cases; the second related only to Second Appeal No. 1443 of 1961; and the third arose only in the writ petition. The Bench formulated those three questions and proceeded to answer them. The opinion emphasizes that the first question is purely one of law and is to be resolved by comparing a prior Full Bench decision of this Court with two decisions of the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in view of the law declared by the Supreme Court in The Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd v. Khalil-Ul-Rahman and Amba Prasad v. Mahboob Ali Shah, the decision of the Full Bench in Ram Dular Singh v. Babu Sukhu Ram is not good law?
  2. Whether an entry of sub-tenancy over a part of the holding in the khasra of 1356F could confer adhivasi rights under Sec. 20(b) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, and whether the plaintiff can show that such an entry was erroneous or non-binding and that he was actually sub-tenant of the whole holding?
  3. Whether this Court can interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution with orders of Consolidation authorities after confirmation of the statement of proposals under Sec. 23 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation)?

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
The Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd v. Khalil-Ul-Rahman (1961 A.L.J 27) The Supreme Court held that the word "occupant" in Sec. 20(b) is not a term of art and must be given its ordinary meaning as "a person in occupation"; the Court applied that to hold a company recorded as thekedar could nonetheless be an "occupant" for Sec. 20(b) when the theka had expired. The Bench treated this decision as contradicting the Full Bench reasoning that confined "occupant" to certain remarks-column entries; the Bench concluded that this Supreme Court decision cuts across and helps to displace the Full Bench decision.
Amba Prasad v. Mahboob Ali Shah (1964 A.L.J 805) The Supreme Court observed that "occupant" means a person holding land in possession or actual enjoyment and that the khasra may record proprietor, tenant, sub-tenant etc.; the Court explained that "recorded as occupant" is not confined to names in the remarks column as "qabiz" or "dawedar qabiz". The Bench relied on these observations to conclude that a person recorded as sub-tenant in the khasra could be an "occupant" under Sec. 20(b), and thus that Amba Prasad's reasoning impliedly overruled the Full Bench decision.
Ram Dular Singh v. Babu Sukhu Ram (Full Bench) (1963 A.L.J 667) Full Bench majority held that a person recorded in the column of sub-tenant was not an "occupant" within Sec. 20(b); reasoning relied on the Land Records Manual and confined "recorded as occupant" to entries in the remarks column such as "Dawedar Qabiz" or "Qabiz". The Bench concluded this Full Bench decision is not good law in light of the two Supreme Court decisions and the Bench explicitly overruled that aspect of Ram Dular Singh's case.
Asiatic Engineering Co. v. Achhruram (A.I.R. 1951 All. 746) Authority cited for the proposition that a statutory provision cannot take away the High Court's jurisdiction under the Constitution; a legislative declaration of "finality" cannot oust constitutional powers. The Bench cited this decision to support the view that Sec. 23(2)'s declaration of the statement of proposals being "final" cannot deprive the High Court of powers under Article 226.
Atar Singh v. Bhoop Singh (1963 A.L.J 975) Cited as an instance where a Settlement Officer dismissed an appeal because consolidation notification already published; reported judgments did not consider whether the High Court could issue writs after confirmation of the statement of proposals. The Bench observed that Atar Singh does not discuss the point whether Article 226 is ousted and thus does not decide the question whether the High Court's power is displaced by confirmation of the statement of proposals.
Smt. Natho v. Board of Revenue (1966 A.L.J 563) Another case where there was no argument that the High Court could not exercise Article 226 after confirmation of the statement of proposals. The Bench noted that this decision likewise does not settle the question of whether confirmation of the statement of proposals precludes writ jurisdiction.
Smt. Ramrati v. The Regional Deputy Director of Consolidation (1963 R.D. 165) Single Judge declined to interfere in a writ arising from Sec.12 objection and observed that even if remitted it would not affect the confirmed statement under Sec.23; decision rested on discretion. The Bench treated this as an example of the exercise of discretion (declining interference) rather than a categorical ruling that Article 226 jurisdiction is ousted after confirmation under Sec.23.
Gayatri Devi Misra v. District Deputy Director of Consolidate (1965 R.D. 31) Case where no argument was made that Sec.23 confirmation precludes Article 226; petition dismissed on merits. The Bench noted the absence of a holding that Article 226 is ousted by confirmation; the case was not relevant to the legal question of finality.
Bansidhar v. Deputy Director of Consolidation (1967 R.D. 51) Case where a writ petition was dismissed after confirmation of proposals; the judge held interference would be futile because allotment had taken place and relief could not be given. The Bench cited this to illustrate discretionary refusal to interfere (practical futility), not as authority that Article 226 jurisdiction is absent once proposals are confirmed.
Kishan Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation (1965 R.D. 298) Division Bench held that even after confirmation under Sec.23(1), revision under Sec.48 could affect finality; Sec.23(2)'s "except as otherwise provided by or under this Act" allows orders under Sec.48 to govern finality. The Bench observed this decision as supporting the position that confirmation is not absolute and that revision/other statutory provisions can impinge upon finality; it contributes to the view that the hand of courts is not frozen post-confirmation.
Raj Krushna Bose v. Binod Kanungo (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 202) The Supreme Court held that powers under Articles 136 and 226 cannot be taken away or whittled down by statute even where the statute declares decisions of a tribunal final; the Court remanded the matter with directions to reconstitute the tribunal and decide afresh. The Bench relied on this Supreme Court precedent to show that statutory finality (in other contexts) does not oust appellate or supervisory jurisdiction and to support the proposition that orders of Article 226 can lead to reopening of closed administrative proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Bench proceeded by identifying the three discrete questions it would decide. The reasoning for each question proceeds from statutory text, prior Full Bench reasoning, and the Supreme Court decisions that interpret the pivotal statutory phrase "recorded as occupant".

Question 1 — Validity of the Full Bench Decision in Ram Dular Singh

  • The Bench treated this as a pure question of law requiring close comparison of the Full Bench decision with two Supreme Court decisions (Upper Ganges Sugar Mills and Amba Prasad).
  • The Full Bench had confined "recorded as occupant" to entries in the remarks column (e.g., "Dawedar Qabiz" or "Qabiz") and excluded entries in the sub-tenant column. This conclusion rested on interpreting the Land Records Manual and other provisions of the Zamindari Act.
  • The Supreme Court in Upper Ganges held "occupant" should receive its ordinary meaning — "a person in occupation" — and applied that to hold a company recorded as thekedar could nonetheless qualify as an occupant when the theka had expired. That reasoning undermined the Full Bench's restriction of "occupant" to certain remarks-column entries.
  • In Amba Prasad the Supreme Court explained that "occupant" should be understood as the person in actual possession/enjoyment and that the khasra may record proprietor, tenant, sub-tenant or other persons in possession; the Supreme Court expressly observed that between proprietor and tenant, tenant is the occupant, and between tenant and sub-tenant, sub-tenant is the occupant. That also contradicted the Full Bench's narrow reading.
  • The Bench rejected the submission that the Supreme Court's observations in Amba Prasad were mere obiter. It reasoned those observations were necessary to decide whether persons entered as "qabiz" were occupants, so they carry binding weight; in any event even obiter of the Supreme Court would be binding on the High Court.
  • On this basis the Bench concluded the Full Bench decision cannot be reconciled with the two Supreme Court decisions and is therefore not good law; the Supreme Court decisions impliedly overruled the Full Bench on this point.

Question 2 — Effect of Sub-tenancy Entry Over Part of a Plot

  • The Bench analysed the language of Sec. 20(b), noting it speaks of "every person who was recorded as an occupant ... of any land" in the khasra or khatauni of 1356F.
  • From the statutory language the Bench concluded that the adhivasi right conferred by Sec. 20(b) extends only to the land as to which the person is recorded — i.e., if recorded as occupant for a part of a plot, the person becomes adhivasi of that part only.
  • The Bench also reiterated the settled approach (Board of Revenue, this Court, and Supreme Court precedents) that Sec. 20(b) depends on the record in the khasra/khatauni and courts will not generally go behind that record to inquire into actual possession for purposes of Sec. 20(b).
  • Therefore a person entered as sub-tenant of a portion cannot, for the purpose of invoking Sec. 20(b), be allowed to prove that the entry was erroneous and that he was actually sub-tenant of the whole holding; he may, however, show such facts for other purposes not related to Sec. 20(b).

Question 3 — Writ Jurisdiction After Confirmation of Statement of Proposals (Sec. 23)

  • The Bench examined Sec. 23 (statement of proposals becomes "final") and Sec. 52 (consolidation operations closed; subsection introduced in 1963 providing for implementation of High Court orders even after operations are closed).
  • The Bench traced amendments to Sec. 48 (revision by Director of Consolidation) and observed that amendments in 1963 restored/reinforced a revisional mechanism capable of affecting finality.
  • The Bench held that the "final" language of Sec. 23(2) cannot oust or curtail the High Court's constitutional power under Article 226; a statutory provision cannot take away a power derived from the Constitution (citing Asiatic Engineering Co. v. Achhruram).
  • The Bench relied on Article 227 (superintendence of High Court over courts and tribunals within its jurisdiction) to show Consolidation authorities are subject to High Court superintendence and writ jurisdiction.
  • The Court acknowledged that Article 226 is discretionary: even though jurisdiction remains, the Court may decline to exercise it in particular circumstances (for example, when allotment or implementation makes relief futile), and earlier decisions show courts often declined interference on discretionary/merits grounds rather than on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
  • The Bench considered transitional/amendment provisions (Sec. 47 and Sec. 49 of the 1963 Amendment) to determine whether Sec. 52(2) would apply to proceedings begun under the pre-1958 Act; it concluded that the amended provisions could, in the view of the Bench, be read to make Sec. 52(2) applicable in many such proceedings and that, in any event, statutory finality is not a bar to Article 226 jurisdiction.
  • The Bench invoked Raj Krushna Bose v. Binod Kanungo (Supreme Court) to show that even where statutes declare finality, superior constitutional jurisdiction can remand or direct reconstitution of tribunals to carry out a fresh decision; thus practical remedies exist to implement writ orders and reopen consolidated matters where necessary.
  • Net result: confirmation under Sec. 23 does not deprive the High Court of its Article 226 power; the power remains intact but its exercise is subject to judicial discretion according to the facts of each case.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • Answer to Q. 1: In view of the Supreme Court decisions in The Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd v. Khalil-Ul-Rahman and Amba Prasad v. Mahboob Ali Shah, the Full Bench decision in Ram Dular Singh v. Babu Sukhu Ram is not good law.
  • Answer to Q. 2: (a) If a person's name is entered in the sub-tenant column in respect of a portion of a plot in the khasra of 1356F, that person becomes adhivasi of that portion only and no more under Sec. 20(b). (b) For the purpose of showing occupant-status under Sec. 20(b), that person cannot, in the consolidation of rights under Sec. 20(b), show that the entry was erroneous so as to treat him as sub-tenant of the entire holding (though he may establish such facts for other purposes).
  • Answer to Q. 3: The confirmation of the statement of proposals under Sec. 23 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act does not deprive this Court of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The jurisdiction survives; however, its exercise is discretionary and will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the referred cases: The Bench's answers dispose of the three framed questions and the cases are to be returned to the learned Judges who referred them for decision on the remaining points (the opinion states: "The cases should now go back to the learned Judges who have referred them for decision on other points").
  • On precedent: The Bench expressly held that the earlier Full Bench decision (Ram Dular Singh) is no longer good law to the extent it conflicts with the cited Supreme Court authorities; the Supreme Court authorities (Upper Ganges and Amba Prasad) govern the meaning of "recorded as occupant" under Sec. 20(b).
  • On future Article 226 petitions: The holding clarifies that confirmation under Sec. 23 does not automatically bar high court interference, but litigants should expect the High Court to exercise discretion taking into account the stage of consolidation and practical consequences (for example, futility where allotment has already taken place).
  • Broader precedent-setting: The opinion confines itself to answering the three formulated questions and bases its conclusions on the statutory text, amendments, and existing higher-court authority. If no broader implications beyond those questions were discussed in the opinion, readers should treat the decision as resolving those specific legal points as articulated above.
Questions answered. The referred matters are to be sent back to the learned Judges for decision on other points.

Prepared strictly on the basis of the provided opinion text. No information has been added beyond what appears in the opinion.

    Chobey Sunder Lal Pltff. v. Sonu Alias Sonpal And Another Defdt.

    S.N Dwivedi, J.:— These two appeals and the writ petition have been referred to a larger Bench for decision.

    2. During the hearing the parties' counsel agreed that this Bench should decide three main questions of law arising in these cases and send back the reference to the learned Judges referring the cases for decision of the cases. Accordingly we propose to express our opinion on the three main questions arising in these cases. One of these questions is common to all these cases, the second question arises only in Second Appeal No. 1443 of 1961; while the third question arises only in the writ petition. These questions are:

    1. Whether, in view of the law declared by the Supreme Court in the cases of The Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd v. Khalil-Ul-Rahman 1961 A.L.J 27. and Amba Prasad v. Mahboob Ali Shah 1964 A.L.J 805., the decision of the Full Bench in the case of Ram Dular Singh v. Babu Sukhu Ram 1963 A.L.J 667. is not good law?

    2. Whether an entry of sub-tenancy over a part of the holding in the khasra of 1356F. could confer the adhivasi rights under Sec. 20(b) of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, and further whether it is open to the plaintiff to show that such entry was erroneous or not binding and he was actually the sub-tenant of the whole of the holding?

    3. Can this court interfere in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution with the orders of the Consolidation authorities after the confirmation of the statement of proposals under Sec. 23 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation)?

    3. The referring order in the writ petition does not formulate any specific question for decision and refers the whole case to the larger Bench. But, as already stated, it is agreed at the Bar that this Bench may formulate question and answer them only. Accordingly we have formulated the three questions in the light of the referring order.

    4. It is not necessary to state the facts of the cases referred to us for deciding the first question. It is a pure question of law and will have to be determined on a careful juxtapositional scrutiny of the Full Bench decision of this Court and two decisions of the Supreme Court. Sec. 20(b) of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act provides that a person recorded as an occupant of a certain land in the khasra or khatauni of 1356F. shall become adhivasi. The majority decision in the Full Bench case was that a person recorded in the column of sub-tenant in the khasra or khatauni of 1356F. was not an occupant within the meaning of Sec. 20(b).

    5. The judgment of the majority was delivered by Sri Chief Justice Desai, and Sri Justice Pathak agreed with him. Accordingly I shall refer to the judgment of the Chief Justice. The reasoning of the Chief Justice is this:

    (1) Having regard to the provisions of the Land Records Manual in force in 1356F. the phrase ‘recorded as occupant’ occurring in Sec. 20(b) of the Act “must mean recorded as qabiz or dawedar qabiz as provided in these provisions.”

    (2) “The entries made in columns 5 and 6 were not entries of the occupation at all and only the entries in the remarks column made with the words “Dawedar Qabiz” or “Qabiz” were entries of occupation and they are the entries referred to in Sec. 20(b).”

    6. It is now to be seen whether these two reasoning remain in tact after the decisions of the Supreme Court in The Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd v. Khalil-Ul-Rahman and Amba Prasad v. Mahboob Ali Shah. There is no reference to the first case in the Full Bench judgments. In the first case The Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd. was the thekedar of the proprietary rights of the respondent zamindar. During the term of the theka the company brought certain lands under its cultivation. The theka expired in June, 1948. The Company, however, continued in possession. Consequently, the respondent instituted a suit for its ejectment. It was resisted by the Company on various grounds but was eventually decreed. This matter was taken over in appeal to the Supreme Court. The agreement in the appeal was that the Company has become an adhivasi of the land under Sec. 20(b) of the Act. The phrase ‘recorded as occupant’ in Sec. 20(b) fell for construction by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed:

    “The word ‘occupant’ used in this part of the Act is not a term of art and has not been defined anywhere in the Act or in the U.P Tenancy Act or in the Land Revenue Act. It must therefore be given its ordinary dictionary meaning which is “a person in occupation”.

    7. It may be mentioned here that the Company was recorded as the thekedar in the khasra and khatauni of 1356F. According to the reasoning of the Chief Justice in the Full Bench case the Company could not be held to be an adhivasi in view of this entry. Nevertheless the majority of the Supreme Court has held that the Company was an adhivasi within the meaning of Sec. 20(b). Sri Justice Wanchoo said:

    “On the landlords' own showing in this case, the Company was not in possession as a thekedar as the theka had expired before 1356F. Under the circumstances we are of opinion that Company was recorded as an occupant in 1356F……..Therefore the Company would be entitled to Adhivasi rights.”

    8. The meaning given to the phrase ‘recorded as occupant’ by the Supreme Court and the holding of the Supreme Court that the Company, although recorded as a thekedar in the revenue records of 1356F., has become an adhivasi under Sec. 20(b) cut across the two reasoning in the judgment of the Chief Justice in the Full Bench case. I cannot see how it is possible to reconcile these reasonings with the view of the majority of the Supreme Court.

    9. The phrase ‘recorded as occupant’ in Sec. 20(b) again fell for construction by the Supreme Court in the second case. Sri Justice Hidayatullah observed:—

    “Before we proceed to decide whether the answering respondents satisfy the above tests we must consider what is meant by the terms ‘occupant’ and ‘recorded’. The word ‘occupant’ is not defined in the Act Since khasra records possession and enjoyment the word ‘occupant’ must mean a person holding the land in possession or actual enjoyment. The khasra, however, may mention the proprietor, the tenant, the sub-tenant and other person in actual possession, as the case may be. If by ‘occupant’ is meant the person in actual possession it is clear that between a proprietor and a tenant the tenant, and between a tenant and the sub-tenant the latter and between him and the person recorded in the remarks column as ‘Dawedar Qabiz’ the dawedar qubiz are the occupants. This is the only logical way to interpret the section which does away with all intermediaries.”

    10. It was further held that Sec. 20(b) eliminates enquiries into disputed possession by accepting the record in the khasra or khatauni of 1356F. It is clear from these observations that the phrase ‘recorded as occupant’ is not confined to a person whose name is entered as quabiz or ‘dawedar qabiz’ in the remarks column of the khasra of 1356F. According to these observations a person whose name is recorded in the column of sub-tenant is also an occupant within the meaning of Sec. 20(b). These observations also cut across the reasonings of the learned Chief Justice in the Full Bench case.

    11. It has been argued at the Bar that although the second decision of the Supreme Court expressly refers to the Full Bench case, it does not expressly over-rule it. Accordingly it cannot be said that this decision impliedly over-rules the Full Bench decision. It has also been pointed out that the observations of Sri Justice Hidayatullah, which I have quoted earlier, are abiter inasmuch as in that case the occupants were, in fact, recorded as ‘qabiz’ in the revenue records of 1356F. It is no doubt true that the occupants in that case were recorded as ‘qabiz’ in the records of 1356F. But we do not agree that the observations which we have quoted earlier are obiter. In order to decide whether a person entered as ‘qabiz’ in the records of 1356F. was an occupant it was necessary that the true meaning of the phrase ‘recorded as occupant’ should be determined. The observations, which we have quoted earlier, are accordingly not obiter dicta. It has been said that even an obiter dictum of the Supreme Court is binding on us.

    12. Sri Justice Hidayatullah has referred to the Full Bench decision in his judgment for showing that this Court and the Board of Revenue have consistently been taking the view of a mere entry of a person's name as an occupant in the khasra or khatauni of 1356F. is sufficient for holding that he has become an adhivasi and that the Courts will not go behind that entry to find out whether the person was really in possession in 1356F. The Full Bench decision was not referred to for the purpose of interpreting the meaning of the phrase ‘recorded as occupant’. I have already shown that it is not possible to reconcile the reasonings of the learned Chief Justice in the Full Bench decision with the two judgments of the Supreme Court. Accordingly I am of opinion that it should be held that the two Supreme Court decisions impliedly overrule the Full Bench decision.

    13. Various arguments have been addressed to us to show that the Full Bench decision is correct. Counsel have also relied on certain provisions of the Land Records Manual and on certain decisions. It is not necessary to refer to those arguments and to those provisions and the decided cases for I have already held that the two decisions of the Supreme Court have overruled the Full Bench decision. The matter is no more res integra and the decisions of the Supreme Court are being binding on us.

    14. I shall now take up the second question referred to us. The second question may be split up into two parts:

    (1) Whether an entry of sub-tenancy over a part of the holding in the khasra of 1356F. could confer the adhivasi rights under Sec. 20(b)?

    (2) Whether it is open to the plaintiff to show that such an entry was erroneous or not binding and he was actally the sub-tenant of the whole of the holding?

    15. The answer to the first part of the question will depend on the language of Sec. 20(b) of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Sec. 20(b), in so far as it is material, reads:

    “Every person who was recorded as an occupant:

    (i) of any land other than grove land or land to which Sec. 16 applies or land referred to in the proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 27 of the U.P Tenancy (Amendment) Act in the khasra or khatauni of 1356 Fasli…., or

    (ii) of any land to which Sec. 16 applies, in the khasra or khatauni of 1356 Fasli……, shall, ………., he called adhivasi of the land ……….”.

    16. It will appear that a person who is recorded as an occupant of any land becomes an adhivasi of that land and no more. Accordingly if a person is recorded as an occupant of a part of a plot, he will become an odhivasi of only that part of the plot and no more.

    17. It has already been held by the Board of Revenue, by this Court and by the Supreme Court that for deciding whether a person has become an adhivasi we should look only to the entry in the khasra or khatauni of 1356F. and that we cannot go behind that entry to find out whether the person so entered was in actual possession in 1356F. If a person, who is entered as a subtenant of a part of the holding, wants to show that he is actually the sub-tenant of the whole of the holding for getting the rights of an adhivasi under Sec. 20(b), he cannot be permitted to do so. It will be open to him to show that he is the sub-tenant of the entire holding for purposes other than the purpose of becoming an adhivasi under Sec. 20(b).

    18. I am unable to understand how Sec. 240-B(c) is opposed to my view that a person recorded as occupant of a part of a plot will become the adhivasi of only that part and no more. Sec. 233, on the other hand, seems to contemplate a case where a person becomes an adhivasi of a part of the plot. In such a case the rent payable by the adhivasi shall be determined in a particular manner in accordance with the rent computed at hereditary rates applicable to the land.

    19. I shall now take up the third question. Sec. 52 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act, in so far as it is relevant, provides as follows:—

    “(1) As soon as may be after fresh maps and records have been prepared under Sec. 27, the State Government shall issue a notification in the official ‘Gazette’ that the consolidation operations have been closed in the unit and the village or villages forming part of the unit shall then cease to be under consolidation operations……….

    (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (1), any order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction in cases of writs filed under the provisions of the Constitution of India, or in cases or proceedings pending under this Act on the date of issue of the notification under sub-sec. (1), shall be given effect to by such authorities as may be prescribed and the consolidation operations shall, for that purpose, be deemed to have not been closed.”

    20. It may be mentioned here that the Consolidation of Holdings Act has been amended several times. Sec. 52 was amended in 1963. I have quoted Sec. 52 as it stands after its amendment in 1963. The writ petition arises out of a consolidation proceedings which was initiated in accordance with the provisions the Consolidation of Holdings Act as it stood before its amendment in 1958.

    21. Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 52, has, however, not undergone any material change. Sub-sec. (2) of section was brought into existence by the amendment in 1963.

    22. A notification under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 52 is published after the records have been prepared after possession of the allotted land has been delivered to the allottees. Possession is delivered to the allottees that the statement of proposals has been con-firmed. The statement of proposals is confirmed by the Settlement Officer under Sec. 23. The confirmed statement becomes final. In this case the writ petition was filed after the confirmation of the statement of proposals. Hence it is argued that this Court has got no power to entertain the writ petition. It is said that the finality attached to the statement of proposals after its confirmation by the Settlement Officer precludes this Court from interfering with any order of the consolidation authorities thereafter.

    23. Sec. 23 as it stood before 1958 read:

    “where no objections are filed on the statement of proposals within the time specified in Sec. 20 or where such objections are filed and have been disposed of under Sec. 21 or 22 the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) shall, after such modification or alteration as may be necessary in view of the order passed under Sec. 21 or 22, confirm the statement and thereupon the statement so confirmed shall become final and be published in the Gazette.”

    24. Sec. 23 was amended in 1958. On amendment it consisted of three sub-sections. It is not necessary to reproduce sub-secs. (1) and (3). Sub-sec. (2) is, however, material and reads as follows:

    “The Statement of Proposals so confirmed shall be published in the unit and shall, except as otherwise provided by or under this Act be final.”

    25. Sec. 23 was again amended in 1963. Sub-sec (2), however, remained unmodified in substance. Sec. 48 deals with the power of revision of orders. Before 1958 it read as follows:—

    “The Director of Consolidation may call for the record of any case if the Officer…….by whom the case was decided appears to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or to have failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested, or to have acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with substantial irregularity and may pass such order in the case as it thinks fit.”

    26. Sec. 48 was amended in 1958. On amendment it read as follows:—

    “The Director of Consolidation may call for the record of any case decided or proceedings taken, where he is of the opinion that a Deputy Director, Consolidation has:

    (i) exercised jurisdiction not vested in him in law, or

    (ii) failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him, or

    (iii) acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with substantial irregularity and as a result of which substantial injustice appears to have been caused to a tenure-holder, and he may, after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned, pass such orders in the case or proceeding as he thinks fit.”

    27. Sec. 48 was again amended in 1963. Now it consists of three sub-sections. Sub-sec. (1) is material for our purpose. It is as follows:

    “The Director of Consolidation may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings, or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by such authority in the case or proceeding and may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, makes such order in the case or proceedings as he things fit.”

    28. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) is an authority subordinate to the Director of Consolidation. Up to 1958 an order made by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was revisable by the Director of Consolidation under Sec. 48. Accordingly when Sec. 23 declared that the statement of proposals confirmed by the Settlement Officer shall become final, it made the confirmed statement of proposals immune from an attack in revision under Sec. 48. The word ‘final’ in Sec. 23 would preclude a revision under Sec. 48. Of course, no appeal lay against the order of the Settlement Officer. In 1958 the power of revision was confined to the order made by a Deputy Director of Consolidation. No revision could be filed against the order of a Settlement Officer (Consolidation). Accordingly the statement of proposals confirmed by the Settlement Officer could not be revised under Sec. 48. Consequently, the confirmed statement of proposals became final for the purposes of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. On the amendment of Sec. 48 in 1963 the Director of Consolidation could revise an order of any subordinate authority. So after 1963, the statement of proposals, even though confirmed by the Settlement Officer, became revisable under Sec. 48. Now sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 23 itself states that the statement of proposals confirmed by the Settlement Officer shall become final except as otherwise provided by or under the Consolidation of Holdings Act. Sec. 48 provides for a revision of his order by the Director of Consolidation.

    29. It cannot be held that the word ‘final’ in sub-sec. (2) deprives this Court of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. The power of this Court under Article 226 is a power derived from the paramount law of the land. Sec. 23(2) is a law made under this paramount law. It cannot take away this Court's power under the paramount law—Asiatic Engineering Co. v. Achhruram A.I.R 1951 All. 746 at page 768 126.. This view is further strengthened by Article 227 of the Constitution. Article 227 provides that all Courts and tribunals situate within the territorial jurisdiction of High Court are subject to the superintendence of the High Court. The Consolidation authorities, who act as tribunals under the Consolidation of Holdings Act, are subject to the superintendence of this Court, and this Court can issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to them in an appropriate case. I am of opinion that even if the statement of proposals has been confirmed, this Court is, speaking generally, not deprived of the power to interfere with the orders of Consolidation authorities under Article 226 of the Constitution. The power to interfere remains intact. Although this Court retains the power to interfere with the orders of the Consolidation authorities in spite of Sec. 23(2), it may decline to interfere on a consideration of the circumstances of a particular case. Power under Article 226 is discretionary, and naturally discretion will be moulded by the facts and circumstances of each case.

    30. Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 52 also suggests that this Court may issue appropriate writs, orders for directions to the Consolidation authorities even after the statement of proposals has been confirmed. It provides that the orders of this Court made under Article 226 shall be implemented by the authorities as may be prescribed. But it has been argued that sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 52, which came into being in 1963, will not apply to the present case which arises out of the provisions of the Constitution of Holdings Act as it stood before its amendment in 1958. For this purpose our attention has been drawn to Sec. 47 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1963 which introduced sub-sec. (2) in Sec. 52. Sec. 47, in so far as it is material, reads:

    “(1) In units notified under Sec. 4 of the principal Act, prior to the date on which this Act comes into force,…….., all work in regard to or connected with Consolidation operations—

    (i) beyond the stage of publication of the Statement of proposals under Sec. 20 of the principal Act, where, on or before the said date, that statement had already been published; and

    (ii) up to and inclusive of the stage of confirmation of the Statement of Principles under Sec. 18 of the principal Act, where, on or before the said date, notices under Sec. 9 of the principal Act, as if this Act has not come into force:………..

    (2) All other work, to which the provisions of sub-sec. (1) do not apply, shall be conducted and concluded in accordance with the provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Act…………..

    (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (1) or (2), the provisions of clause (1) of Sec. 49 of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1958, shall continue to apply to proceedings covered by that clause……………..”

    31. Clause (1) of Sec. 49 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1958 reads as under:

    “Notwithstanding the amendment of the principal Act by this Act all proceedings commenced prior to, and pending on, the date on which this Act when comes into force—

    (1) relating to correction of records under Sec. 7 of the principal Act shall be completed in accordance with the provisions, contained therein, and shall be deemed to be proceedings taken under Secs. 7 and 8 of the principal Act as amended by this Act. All future proceedings thereafter shall be conducted and concluded in accordance with the provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Act.”

    32. The combined result of Secs. 47(1) and (3) and Sec. 49(1) is that the proceedings started under the provisions of the Consolidation of Holdings Act as it stood before 1958 will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of that Act as it then stood. Accordingly Sec. 52(2) will not apply to those proceedings. But this does not conclude the matter. Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 47 clearly provides that all other work to which the provisions of sub-sec. (1) do not apply shall be conducted and concluded in accordance with the provisions of the Consolidation of Holdings Act as amended by the Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1963. It seems to me that the expression “All other work” in sub-sec. (2) would include the work of implementing the orders of this Court made under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. If that is so, as I think, then sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 47 applies sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 52 to a proceeding governed by the Consolidation of Holdings Act as it stood before 1958.

    33. In Atar Singh v. Bhoop Singh 1963 A.L.J 975. the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) dismissed an appeal under Sec. 21 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act on the ground that the notification under Sec. 52 of the said Act had already been published in the Gazette. His order was impeached in a writ petition. The learned single Judge, who heard the petition, agreed with the view of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and dismissed the petition. His judgment was upheld in appeal by a Division Bench. There was no argument before the Division Bench or before the single Judge that this Court could not issue a writ, order or direction under Article 226 where statement of proposals has been confirmed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). There is no discussion on this point in either judgment.

    34. In Smt. Natho v. Board of Revenue 1966 A.L.J 563. also there was no argument that this Court could not exercise its power under Article 226 where the statement of proposals has been confirmed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation).

    35. In Smt. Ramrati v. The Regional Deputy Director of Consolidation 1963 Revenue Decisions 165. a writ petition was filed against an order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation passed in an objection under Sec. 12 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. A learned single Judge, while declining to interfere, said,

    “The writ petition arises out of an objection under Sec. 12 of the Act. Even if the writ petition were to be allowed and the objection under Sec. 12 is remitted for further hearing, all that the petitioners can hope is to get the objection under Sec. 12 dismissed. But such dismissal will have no effect on the statement under Sec. 23 of the Act. It is therefore futile to remit the objection under Sec. 12 of the Act for further hearing. In view of the developments in the case, the writ petition may be dismissed.”

    36. It would appear from this passage that the learned Judge considered that it was not a fit case where the Court should exercise discretion for interfering with the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The learned Judge did not dismiss the petition on the ground that after the confirmation of the statement of proposals this Court cannot act under Article 226 of the Constitution. It may also be noticed that the petitioner did not ask for the relief that the statement of proposals itself may be quashed.

    37. In Gayatri Devi Misra v. District Deputy Director of Consolidate 1965 R.D 31. also there was no argument that the confirmation of the statement of proposals by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) precludes the exercise of this Court's power under Article 226. The petition was dismissed on the merits.

    38. In Bansidhar v. Deputy Director of Consolidation 1967 Revenue Decisions 51. a person filed an objection under Sec. 9 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act as it stood after its amendment in 1958 before the Consolidation Officer. The Consolidation Officer held on his objection that his name should be entered as a trespasser in the revenue records. He filed an appeal. It was dismissed. Then he filed a revision which met the same fate. Then he filed a writ petition against the orders of the Consolidation authorities. During the pendency of the writ petition the statement of proposals was confirmed. Then the respondents in the petition raised a preliminary objection that the petition could not be heard. The learned Judge, who heard the petition, upheld the objection and dismissed the petition. It was argued on behalf of the petitioner that this Court could issue an appropriate writ, order or direction by virtue of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 52 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act, while not accepting this argument, the learned Judge said:

    “It does not appeal to me that Sec. 52(2) is of any assistance. The order of this Court in the writ petition will be given effect to. But that does not help in deciding the question whether the discretionary power of issuing a writ should be exercised in favour of the petitioner. Further it appears to me that as allotment of chaks had taken place the petitioner would not get any relief even if the writ petition was decided in his favour.”

    39. It would appear from this passage that the learned Judge dismissed the petition for he took the view that it would not be a proper exercise of discretion to interfere with the orders of the Consolidation authorities in the circumstances of that case. It was not held by the learned Judge that after the confirmation of the statement of proposals under Sec. 23 this Court cannot exercise power under Article 226.

    40. Kishan Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation 1965 R.D 298. is a case of the different type. In this case one of the arguments of counsel for the petitioner-appellant before the Division Bench in appeal was that the statement of proposals having been confirmed under Sec. 23 as it stood after its amendment in 1958, the Deputy Director of Consolidation could not interfere in revision with the order of the second appellate authority. In support of his argument counsel relied on Atar Singh's case. The Division Bench distinguished that case for the reason that it proceeded on the provisions of Sec. 23 as it stood before its amendment in 1958. I have already quoted the provisions of Sec. 23(2) as it stood after amendment in 1958. Relying on the words “except as otherwise provided by or under this Act” in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 23, the learned Judges held that the Deputy Director could interfere in revision even after the confirmation of the statement of proposals. The learned Judges said:

    “Therefore, it was contemplated that the statement of proposals confirmed under Sec. 23(1) would be final unless there was an order under some other provision of the Act detracting from that finality. Now an order passed under Sec. 48 of the Act would, in our opinion, be an order which would govern the finality of the statement of Proposals.”

    41. None of these cases go to the length of holding that the hand of this Court is frozen on the confirmation of the statement of proposals. It may be made clear that the correctness of none of these decisions was questioned before us and I should not be deemed to have expressed any opinion about it this way or that way.

    42. To sum up, my answers to the three questions are as follows:

    Q. 1. In the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in The Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd v. Khalil-Ul-Rahman and Amba Prasad v. Mahboob Ali Shah the decision of the Full Bench in Ram Dular Singh v. Babu Sukhu Ram is not good law.

    Q. 2.(a) If the name of a person is entered in the column of sub-tenant in respect of portion of the plot in the khasra of 1356F., he would become adhivasi of that portion only and no more under Sec. 20(b).

    (b) For the purpose of showing that he is an occupant within the meaning of Sec. 20(b) of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act it will not be open to the person mentioned in question No. 2(a) to show that he was actually the sub-tenant of the entire holding. It will be open to him to show that he was the subtenant of the entire holding for any other purpose.

    Q. 3. The confirmation of the statement of proposals under Sec. 23 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act does not deprive the court of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution. The power remains intact but the exercise of the power being discretionary, the Court may could its discretion according to the facts and circumstances of each case.

    43. The cases should now go back to the learned Judges who have referred them for decision on other points.

    44. Oak, J.:— I have read the judgment prepared by my learned brother Dwivedi, J. I agree that the three questions of law framed by him should be answered in the manner indicated by him.

    45. Gangeshwar Prasad, J.:— I have had the benefit of reading the judgment of my learned brother Dwivedi, and I concur with him on all the three questions formulated by him. I, however, wish to make some observations of my own.

    Question 1.

    46. In the Full Bench case of Ram Dular Singh v. Babu Sukhu Ram the appellants claimed that they became Adhivasi of the disputed land under the provisions of Section 20(a)(ii) of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and then became Sirdars under Chapter IX-A of the Act. Alternatively, they claimed that they became Adhivasis under Sec. 20(b) of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and thereafter became Sirdars under Chapter IX-A of the Act. Question 2 before that Full Bench related to the first claim of the appellants and question 3 to the second claim made by them in the alternative. Desai, C.J, who delivered the majority judgment, proceeded to answer question 3 after answering question 2 in the affirmative and holding that the appellants became Adhivasis under Sec. 20(a)(ii) of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and subsequently Sirdars under Chapter IX-A of the Act. Obviously, if the appellants became Adhivasis under one provision of Sec. 20, it was wholly unnecessary for them to invoke the and of any other provision of the section in support of their claim. The learned Chief Justice, however, examined the alternative claim also, and expressed his opinion on the question whether the appellants who were recorded as subtenants in the Khasra and Khatauni of 1356 Fasli could be said to have been recorded as ‘occupants’ within the contemplation of Sec. 20(b) of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act.

    47. In arriving at his conclusion on the above question the learned Chief Justice adopted two methods of approach. Firstly, he determined the meaning of the word ‘occupant’ in Sec. 20(b) with reference to the land Records Manual. Secondly, he confirmed the result of the first and the primary approach by an examination of other provisions of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act for ascertaining whether the benefit of Sec. 20(b) was intended to be conferred upon persons who were recorded as tenants or subtenants in the relevant records.

    48. The first approach was based on the ground that “in order to understand what is meant by recorded as ‘occupant’ in Sec. 20(b) one must necessarily refer to the provisions of the Land Records Manual in force in 1356 Fasli because entries in Khasra and Khataunis were to be made in accordance with its provision.” In the Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Khalil-id-Rahman the Supreme Court has, however, held that the word ‘occupant’ as used in Sec. 20(b) of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act “is not a term of art and has not been defined anywhere in the Act or in the U.P Tenancy Act or in the Land Revenue Act” and that “it must, therefore, be given its ordinary dictionary meaning which is ‘a person in cultivation”. This pronouncement of the Supreme Court precludes the determination of the meaning of the word ‘occupant’ with reference to the provisions of the Land Records Manual and lays down in clear terms what the word means. In view of the above pronouncement and in view of the scope of the first question which this Bench is answering it is not necessary to discuss how far the provisions of the Land Records Manual support the interpretation put upon the word ‘occupant’ in the majority judgment in Ram Dnlar Singh's case. But, I may briefly draw attention to certain matters in that connection. Firstly, paragraphs 82, 83, 84 and 86 of the Land Records Manual which have been referred to in the said judgment did not use the word ‘occupant’ in relation to the persons with whom they dealt and described such persons in a different manner. Secondly, the entries of ‘Davedar Qabiz’ and ‘Qabiz’ which, according to the majority judgment, were the entries contemplated by Sec. 20(b), were two distinct kinds of entries required to be made in two different situations; indeed, paragraphs 84(c) and (d) and 85 provided for three types of entries, viz. ‘Ghair Qabiz Dawedar Qabiz’, ‘Qabiz Dawedar’ and ‘Qabiz’ for three different situations, and it does not seem to be possible to say that the word ‘occupant’ was used in Sec. 20(b) to denote only persons in respect of whom any entry of any of these three types was made and to denote no others. Thirdly, if the persons in respect of whom any of the above types of entries were made in the relevant records were the only persons intended to be treated as being recorded as ‘occupants’ for the purpose of Sec. 20(b) the legislature could have easily made its intention known by using the above-mentioned words or, if that was inconvenient, by referring to the relevant paragraphs of the Land Records Manual. Fourthly, column 6 of the Khasra was meant not only for sub-tenants and certain kinds of tenants but also for “occupiers of land without consent of the person entitled to admit as sub-tenant”, and the three types of entries mentioned above which were to be made in certain situations only did not cover all kinds of trespassers.

    49. Now as to what I have described as the second approach adopted by Desai, C.J His Lordship observed that the rights of tenants and sub-tenants were dealt with by other provisions of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and Sec. 20(b) must, therefore, be regarded as not meant to confer Adhivasi rights on tenants and sub-tenants, and as excluding them from the category of persons ‘recorded as occupants’, even though they were recorded in the records spoken of in that provision and were also in occupation. A somewhat similar method of approach appeals to have been adopted in the argument on behalf of the landlords in the The Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd v. Khalil-Ul-Rahman and not to have found favour with the Supreme Court. In that case, if the Company concerned had in fact been a thekedar it would have been entitled to the benefit of Sec. 12 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, but the benefit of that section was not available to the Company as the theka in its favour had expired and the Company was not a thekedar although it was recorded as such. The question was whether the Company was entitled to the benefit of Sec. 20(b). Dealing with the argument on behalf of the landlords Wanchoo, J. (as his Lordship) then was, who delivered the majority judgment of the Supreme Court, observed:

    “What is contended on behalf of the landlords is that as the Company was recorded as a thekedar in 1356F. it is not open to the court to go behind that entry and therefore it must be held that the Company was in occupation as a Thekedar in that year and thus was in occupation on behalf of the landlords and not on its own behalf. In this connection we may point out that the Company claimed that it was entitled to possession not only as an Adhivasi under Sec. 20 but also as a hereditary tenant under Sec. 12, which provides that a thekedar under certain circumstances becomes a hereditary tenant. To meet the Company's case under Sec. 12 the landlords contended that the Company was not a thekedar in 1356F. because the theka expired on June 30, 1948. The Landlords were thus taking contradictory positions for the purposes of Secs. 12 and 20; in opposition to the claim under Sec. 12 they said that the Company was not their thekedar in 1356F. while in opposition to the claim under Sec. 20, they said that the Company was not in possession on its own behalf but as their thekedar.”

    50. The fact that Sec. 12 deals with the results of a thekedar was not regarded by his Lordships as a reason for holding that a person recorded as a thekedar is not covered by Sec. 20(b). The conclusion that seems to follow from the above decision is that the fact that certain kinds of tenants and subtenants have been dealt with under Sec. 20(a) does not lead to the result that Sec. 20(b) does not apply to persons recorded as tenants or sub-tenants. Just as Sec. 12 deal with persons who were in fact thekedars. Sec. 20(a) deals with persons who were in fact tenants or sub-tenants or would be deemed to have been tenants or sub-tenants, irrespective of entries and possession. Sec. 20(b), on the other hand, deals with those who were recorded as occupants in the Khasra and khatauni of 1356 Fasli and there is nodding in it to show that it does not include also those persons who could have claimed Adhivasi rights under Sec. 20(a). It will be noticed that sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (a) of Sec. 20 open with the words ‘except as provided in sub-clause (i) of clause (b)’. Clauses (a) and (b) confer the same kind of right, and if the persons dealt with by them belonged to mutually exclusive categories the words ‘except as provided in sub-clause (i) of clause (b)’ were unnecessary. I may here mention that Sec. 20 as originally enacted contained no such words that they were introduced with retrospective effect as a combined result of U.P Act XVII of 1953 and U.P Act XX of 1954. These words give Sec. 20(b) a priority over and an overriding effect on Sec. 20(a), and the natural consequence is that Sec. 20(a) cannot be read as limiting the scope of Sec. 20(b) and the latter provision cannot be so interpreted as to exclude from its ambit persons recorded as tenants or sub-tenants. In fact the process of application of Sec. 20 would, in my opinion, be that it has first to be ascertained whether a person became an Adhivasi under Sec. 20(b) by virtue of being recorded as an occupant in the relevant records, and it is only when he does not satisfy this simple requirement that the question will arise whether he became an Adhivasi under Sec. 20(a). It is another matter that a person who acquired higher rights than those of an Adhivasi may dispense with the benefit of Sec. 20(b) and that if Sec. 20(b) is not read as being prior to Sec. 20(a) a person who became an Adhivasi under Sec. 20(a) does not need the help of Sec. 20(b) for the same purpose. But, if a person was not a tenant or sub-tenant, it cannot be said that he loses the benefit of both Secs. 20(a) and 20(b); of the former by not having in reality been a tenant or a sub-tenant on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting, and of the latter on account of the fact that although he was recorded as in occupation in the Khasra, or Khatauni of 1356 Fasli he was recorded as a tenant or a sub-tenant. As I have said above, an argument on this line was advanced before the Supreme Court on behalf of the landlords in the case of the Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd. but was not accepted, and in spite of the fact that the Company concerned was recorded as a thekedar it was held to have acquired thekedar rights under Sec. 20(b). The position is not different in the case of a person recorded in the revenue records of 1356 Fasli as a tenant or a sub-tenant, and on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court it must be held that he did acquire Adhivasi rights under Sec. 20(b).

    51. It was urged in the course of argument before this Bench that if the entry in 1356 Fasli relating to the Company had been regarded as amounting to the Company having been recorded as an ‘occupant’ it would have been unnecessary for the Supreme Court to enquire into the question whether the Company was in fact a thekedar, and it was suggested that if the Company had really been a thekedar the Supreme Court would not have held that it was recorded as an ‘occupant’. The enquiry was, however, necessary, because if the Company had in fact been a thekedar two consequences would have followed. Firstly, the Company would have been deemed to have become a hereditary tenant under Sec. 12 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act as claimed by it in the first instance. Secondly, it would then have been in 1356F. an intermediary as defined in Sec. 3(12) of the Act and could not have therefore been regarded as an ‘occupant’ on account of Explanation IV to Sec. 20(b).

    52. In the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd. that portion of the majority judgment in Ram Dular Singh's case which deals with question 3 of that case cannot be said to be good law. The later decision of the Supreme Court in Amba Prasad v. Mahboob Ali Shah, however, deals in explicit terms with the position of persons recorded as tenants or sub-tenants in the Khasra or Khataunis of 1356 Fasli for the purpose of Sec. 20(b) and it has the effect of over-ruling Ram Dular Singh's case in so far as it was held in that case that a person recorded as tenant or a sub-tenant was not recorded as an ‘occupant’ for the above purpose.

    53. The submissions that were made with regard to Amba Prasad's case were two. First; as, in that case, the persons concerned were recorded as Qabiz the observations of the Supreme Court were in the nature of obiter and are, therefore, not binding. Second; an observation made in that case too indicates that persons recorded as tenants or sub-tenant cannot be treated as having been recorded as ‘occupants’. Neither of these submissions, however, has any force.

    54. The persons concerned in the above case were entered as Qabiz and for deciding the question whether they could be treated as having been recorded as ‘occupant’ the Supreme Court elaborately discussed the meaning of the expression ‘occupant’ in Sec. 20(b). The observations made by the Supreme Court in that connection cannot, therefore, be said to be in the nature of obiter. Even if, however, they are in the nature of obiter they amount to a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution and have a binding force.

    55. The second submission is based on the following observation of the Supreme Court:

    “The word ‘occupant’ thus signifies occupancy and enjoyment. Mediate possession, (except where the immediate possessor holds on behalf of the Mediate possessor), is of no consequence.”

    56. It has been contended on the basis of the above observation that a tenant held on behalf of a proprietor and a sub-tenant on behalf of a tenant and neither of them could consequently be an ‘occupant’. The contention appeals to me to be misconceived. The observation quoted above necessarily implies that two persons may stand in relation to each other as Mediate possessor and immediate possessor in a variety of situations, and that holding of a land by the immediate possessor on behalf of the Mediate possessor is only one of such situations. For instances of various types of Mediate and immediate possession and their distinguishing features reference may be made to Salmond on Jurisprudence (Twelfth Edition) page 282, Roscoepound's Jurisprudence Vol. V page 110 and Paton's Text Book of Jurisprudence 1916 Edition page 437. The types, it would appear, represent not a rigidly fixed demarcation but only a round and a frequently overlapping classification. To which type the relationship between the Mediate and the immediate possessor in a particular case belongs has to be determined in the light of the distinctive features of that relationship. Whether an immediate possessor holds on behalf the Mediate possessor depends upon the nature and extent of their respective interests, enjoyment, control and power of exclusion etc. in respect of the object of possession. The possession of a person having a derivative interest is not necessarily on behalf of the person from whom the interest is derived. A tenant and a subtenant derived their interest from a proprietor and a tenant respectively, but they remained in possession in their own right and for their own benefit. Their rights arose both under contract and under statute. So long as their interest subsisted they could exclude the person from whom they derived their interest. They were not liable to ejectment except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and the person from whom they derived their interest could not put an end to their possession without recourse to prescribed legal proceedings. It thus, appears to be clear that even though the proprietor and the tenant remained respectively in Mediate possession of what was held by a tenant and a sub-tenant in immediate possession, the latter did not hold on behalf of the former. The observation of the Supreme Court quoted above does not, therefore, lend support to the proposition that tenants and subtenants in immediate possession were not ‘occupant’, and the real occupants were the Mediate possessors, i.e the proprietor and the tenant respectively. Such an interpretation is in fact ruled out by the earlier observations that “it is clear that between a proprietor and a tenant the tenant, and between a tenant and the sub-tenant the latter and between him and a person recorded in the remarks column as Dawedar Qabiz the Dawedar Qabiz are the occupants”.

    57. The position, therefore, is that the decision in Ram Dular Singh's case on the question whether a person recorded as a tenant or a sub-tenant in Khasra or Khatauni of 1356 Fash is to be treated as an occupant for the purpose of Sec. 20(b) of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is not good law in view of the two Supreme Court decisions.

    Question 2.

    58. It is well settled now that Sec. 20(b) is not concerned with the interest or actual possession of the person spoken of in that provision and its sole concern is with the existence of a particular kind of record relating to him in the Khasra or Khatauni of a particular year. The record alone and by itself constitutes the basis of acquisition of the right conferred by the said provision. It naturally follows that the right depending upon the record extends as far as the record goes and that it extends no further. A person who claims that he became an Adhivasi of the land although he was not recorded as an occupant in respect of it in the Khasra or Khatauni of 1356 Fasli may base his claim on Sec. 20(a) but he cannot rely on Sec. 20(b).

    59. It will be seen that Sec. 20(b) speaks of ‘any land’ and not of ‘any holding’ any plot of land. A holding was a unit created by an ‘engagement’ and a plot of land was a unit created by revenue records. But Sec. 20(b) has no reference to and does not contemplate either of such units. It seems, therefore, obvious that a person recorded as an occupant over a part of a plot of land would be entitled to the benefit of Sec. 20(b) in respect of that part, and would not be entitled to the benefit of the said provision in respect of any other part of that plot.

    Question 3.

    60. It is indisputable that the extent of finality provided by Sec. 23 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act cannot exceed the powers of the legislature which enacted the section. The section cannot, therefore, either exclude or control the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is another matter altogether that the High Court may in a particular situation decline after the Consolidation proceedings have gone beyond Sec. 23 stage to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article 226, but that would be not because of any limitation placed upon the exercise of that jurisdiction by Sec. 23 but because of the inherent nature of that jurisdiction and the considerations which have to be taken into account in exercising it.

    61. Since, unlike Sec. 52 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act, as it now stands, Sec. 23 does not lay down what effect an order of the High Court passed in a writ petition under Article 226 will have upon the Consolidation operations, it seems necessary to say a few words about Sec. 52. For the reasons which have been exhaustively dealt with by my learned brother Dwivedi, I too think that the said provision applies also to proceedings governed by the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act as it stood before 1958. But even if it were not, so, Sec. 52 as it stood before the amendment could not have operated as a bar to the exercise of the jurisdiction vested in the High Court under Article 226 or to the implementation of the orders passed by it under that Article. It is true that the Act in its old form did not provide for carrying such orders into effect, but that could neither prevent the High Court from exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 nor render the exercise of the jurisdiction ineffective and nugatory. Even if Sec. 52 had stood in its unamended form the result, in my opinion, would not have been different from what it is now under the amended form of the section. It may be that it would then have been necessary for the High Court to pass some other directions or orders calling upon the appropriate authority to take suitable steps for implementing the orders, but it appears to be undeniable that if the jurisdiction of the High Court could not be taken away or curtailed directly by any provision in the Act, it could not be taken away or curtailed by reason of the fact that the Consolidation operations had closed. The implementation of the orders of the High Court would have required the reopening of certain matters which were regarded as settled, and what will be done now under Sec. 52(2) would have been done even then I may here refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Raj Krushna Bose v. Binod Kanungo A.I.R 1954 S.C 202. which furnishes a complete answer to the argument based on the difficulty of reopening closed proceedings and also a solution of the difficulty. The decision dealt with a case under the Representation of the People Act. Sec. 105 of the Act provides that every order of the Tribunal under that Act shall be final and conclusive. Dealing with the effect of that provision on the powers of the Supreme Court under Article 136 and those of the High Courts under Article 226 the Supreme Court observed:

    “Our power to make such an order was not questioned but it was said that when the legislature states that the orders of a Tribunal under an Act like the one here shall be conclusive and final (Sec. 105), then we should not interfere. It is sufficient to say that the powers conferred on us by Article 136 of the Constitution and on the High Courts under Article 226 cannot be taken away or whittled down by the legislature. So long as these powers remains, our discretion and that of the High Courts is unfettered.”

    62. The Supreme Court did observe that Tribunals constituted under the Act were ‘ad hoc’ bodies and remand could not easily be made as in ordinary course of law, but it passed an order to the following effect:

    “We set aside the order of the Tribunal and remit the case to the Election Commission with directions to it to reconstitute the Tribunal which tried this case and to direct the Tribunal to give its findings on all the issues raised and to make a fresh order.”

    63. In the light of this decision it must, I think, be held that Sec. 52, even as it stood before the amendment, could not stand in the way of the exercise of the power given to the High Court under Article 226 or make the exercise of the power ineffective. What the amendment in Sec. 52 has done is only this that it has embodied in a statutory form the result which would have followed even without the amendment. If consolidation operations could have been reopened after they had closed under Sec. 52 of the Act, they can certainly be reopened after they have crossed the stage of Sec. 23. It is immaterial that Sec. 23 does not make provision for affectuating orders passed by the High Court under Article 226 as Sec. 52(2) does.

    64. There is another consideration in support of this view. Orders passed under the provisions of the Act are subject to appeal, by special leave, to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, and no provision in the Act, by conferring finality upon any of them, can take away the power vested in the Supreme Court under the said Article. The Consolidation authorities are bound to give effect to the orders passed by the Supreme Court in appeal and yet, it will be noticed, even the amended Sec. 52 has not provided as to how the orders of the Supreme Court passed in appeal would affect Consolidation operations. It is not possible to urge that while an order passed in cases of writs filed under the provisions of the Constitution will have the effect of reopening Consolidation operations an order passed by the Supreme Court in appeal under Article 136 against an order passed in Consolidation proceedings would have the Consolidation operations unaffected and would not have the effect of reopening them in order to give effect to the order. The fact that Sec. 23, unlike Sec. 52, does not provide for the reopening of matters which have been confirmed under that section is not, therefore, a matter of any consequence in determining the power of the High Court to interfere, under Article 226, with the orders of the Consolidation authorities even after Consolidation operations have crossed the stage of Sec. 23.

    65. Further, even when Consolidation operations have proceeded beyond the stage of Sec. 23 they are liable to be reopened or disturbed, under the terms of the section itself, as a result of an appeal or a revision before the Consolidation authorities. It cannot, therefore, be said that an interference by the High Court upon a writ petition filed before it under Article 226 would unsettle what has become settled and immune from being disturbed.

    66. The powers exerciseable by the High Court under Article 226 are certainly of a different kind from those exerciseable by the Supreme Court in appeal under Article 136 or by the Consolidation authorities in appeal or revision under the provisions of the Act itself, but the existence of that power cannot be disputed. It cannot also, in my opinion, be disputed that if the High Court does exercise that power the orders passed by it in the exercise of the power have to be carried into effect and implemented, because a power that remains ineffective is no power at all. The answer to question 3 must, therefore, be in the affirmative.

    67. By the Court—These three cases were referred to this Bench for decision. The Bench formulated three main questions which arose for decision. One of these questions is common to all these cases; the second question arises only in Second Appeal No. 1443 of 1961; while the third question arises only in the writ petition. The questions formulated by this Bench are:

    (1) Whether, in view of the law declared by the Supreme Court in the cases of The Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd v. Khalil-Ul-Rahman and Amba Prasad v. Mahboob Ali Shah, the decision of the Full Bench in the case of Ram Dular Singh v. Babu Sukhu Ram is not good law?

    (2) Whether an entry of sub-tenancy over a part of the holding in the khasra of 1356F. could confer the adhivasi rights under Sec. 20(b) of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, and further whether it is open to the plaintiff to show that such entry was erroneous or not binding and he was actually the sub-tenant of the whole of the holding?

    (3) Can this Court interfere in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution with the orders of the Consolidation authorities after the confirmation of the statement of proposals under Sec. 23 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation)?

    68. Our answers to these questions are as follows:

    69. Answer to Q. 1. In the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in The Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Khalil-id-Rahman and Amba Prasad v. Mahboob Ali Shah the decision of the Full Bench in Ram Dular Singh v. Babu Sukhu Ram is not good law.

    70. Answer to Q. 2.(a) If the name of a person is entered in the column of subtenant in respect of a portion of the plot in the khasra of 1356F. he would become adhivasi of that portion only and no more under Sec. 20(b).

    (b). For the purpose of showing that he is an occupant within the meaning of Sec. 20(b) of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act it will not be open to the person mentioned in question No. 2(a) to show that he was actually the sub-tenant of the entire holding. It will be open to him to show that he was the sub-tenant of the entire holding for any other purpose.

    71. Answer to Q. 3. The confirmation of the statement of proposals under Sec. 23 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act does not deprive the Court of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution. The power remains intact, but the exercise of the power being discretionary, the Court may could its discretion according to the facts and circumstances of each case.

    72. The cases should now go back to the learned Judges who have referred them for decision on other points.

    Questions answered.

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