Zeledon v. Zeledon: Unserved Pro Se Letters Do Not Toll CPLR 5015(a)(1) and Lengthy Delay Defeats Vacatur Even in Matrimonial Defaults

1. Introduction

Case: Zeledon v Zeledon, 2026 NY Slip Op 04022 (App Div, 3d Dept June 25, 2026).
Parties: Nicole A. Zeledon (wife, respondent) v O. Anthony Zeledon (husband, appellant).
Procedural posture: Husband appealed (i) an order denying his motion to vacate a default and (ii) the ensuing judgment of divorce.

The litigation stems from a 2017 divorce action. After a prior Third Department decision remitted the matter for a new trial limited to pension equitable distribution issues, the husband failed to appear at a May 9, 2023 court conference. Supreme Court granted the wife’s motion for a default, later issuing an October 2023 default order and, in July 2025, a judgment of divorce again applying the Majauskas formula to the husband’s pension.

The central issues on appeal were whether Supreme Court abused its discretion in denying vacatur under CPLR 5015 (a)(1) (excusable default within one year of notice of entry) and CPLR 5015 (a)(3) (fraud/misconduct within a reasonable time), and whether the court should have used its inherent authority to vacate in the interest of justice despite untimeliness—particularly given the more forgiving approach often applied in matrimonial defaults.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Department:

  • Dismissed the appeal from the June 2025 intermediate order denying vacatur because entry of the July 2025 judgment of divorce required dismissal of the intermediate-order appeal, while still reviewing the issues on the appeal from the judgment (citing the court’s prior decision in Zeledon v Zeledon, 211 AD3d 1387).
  • Affirmed the judgment of divorce and upheld denial of vacatur. The motion under CPLR 5015 (a)(1) was untimely because the husband had notice of entry of the October 2023 default order and did not formally move to vacate until April 2025 (approximately 18 months later).
  • Held Supreme Court properly declined to treat the husband’s June/July 2024 pro se letters as motions because there was no evidence they were served on the wife, as required by CPLR 2211 and consistent with CPLR 5015 (a)(1).
  • Found no abuse of discretion in refusing to use the court’s inherent interest-of-justice power to vacate after the statutory period, given the husband’s extended delay and failure to take minimal steps (requesting an adjournment or promptly contacting the court).
  • Rejected vacatur under CPLR 5015 (a)(3) because such a motion must be made within a reasonable time, and the husband’s delay was unreasonable; his asserted reliance on alleged representations by wife’s counsel was unavailing.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The decision is largely an application of established vacatur principles to a matrimonial default, with particular emphasis on timeliness, service, and the limits of judicial discretion.

1) Prior procedural framing and pension context

  • Zeledon v Zeledon (211 AD3d 1387 [3d Dept 2022]): The earlier appeal set the stage. There, the Third Department vacated a different default because the husband had a reasonable excuse (shingles) and a potentially meritorious defense concerning whether the wife could share in the portion of his pension tied to World Trade Center accidental disability benefits. It remitted for a new trial limited to pension equitable distribution issues. In 2026, the court relied on that history to underscore that the husband knew the stakes, knew the need to appear, and nevertheless defaulted again and delayed seeking relief.
  • Majauskas v Majauskas (61 NY2d 481 [1984]): The Supreme Court’s judgment again used the Majauskas formula to allocate the marital share of pension benefits. Although the 2026 decision is not primarily about pension valuation, the reference matters because it highlights the limited remittal issue and the consequence of the husband’s second default: the court reverted to the standard marital-share allocation methodology.

2) Core CPLR 5015(a)(1) standard: reasonable excuse + potentially meritorious defense

  • Matter of April V. v Jonathan U. (248 AD3d 1624 [3d Dept 2026]) and Matter of Alexis D. v Tyquazia E. (196 AD3d 770 [3d Dept 2021]): Cited for the familiar two-part requirement for vacating a default—reasonable excuse and potentially meritorious defense. In this case, the court effectively treated timeliness and delay as gating issues: even if the husband had health-related reasons for the May 2023 nonappearance, his prolonged inaction after notice of the default undermined discretionary relief.

3) Timeliness under CPLR 5015(a)(1): one-year period is strictly enforced

  • HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Grinage (244 AD3d 969 [2d Dept 2025]) and State of N.Y. Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. v Sparozic (35 AD3d 1069 [3d Dept 2006], lv dismissed 8 NY3d 958 [2007]): Used to confirm that when a movant has been served with the order with written notice of entry, a CPLR 5015(a)(1) motion made outside one year is untimely. The husband’s undisputed receipt of the October 2023 default order made his April 2025 motion late as a matter of statutory compliance.

4) Service and what counts as a motion: unserved letters are not a substitute

  • The court cited CPLR 2211 (motion practice) and CPLR 5015 (a) (1) to reject the husband’s attempt to recharacterize June/July 2024 pro se correspondence as a timely vacatur motion. The absence of proof that the correspondence was served on the wife meant it could not be treated as a proper motion that would satisfy statutory requirements.

5) Inherent authority after one year: available, but not automatic

  • Hayes v Village of Middleburgh (140 AD3d 1359 [3d Dept 2016]): Cited for the proposition that Supreme Court retains inherent power to vacate in the interest of justice even after the CPLR 5015(a)(1) period expires. The Zeledon court treated this as a narrow safety valve, not an invitation to ignore extended inaction.

6) Health issues as excuse—and the duty to act promptly

  • Matter of Hannah MM. v Elizabeth NN. (151 AD3d 1193 [3d Dept 2017]): Acknowledged that medical issues close in time to the appearance can constitute a reasonable excuse.
  • Youni Gems Corp. v Bassco Creations Inc. (70 AD3d 454 [1st Dept 2010], lv dismissed 15 NY3d 863 [2010]) and Rios v Skaters World Roller Rink (246 AD2d 882 [3d Dept 1998]): Supported the court’s focus on the absence of a requested adjournment and failure to promptly contact the court. Even if the initial nonappearance might be medically explainable, failure to communicate and extended delay weighs heavily against vacatur.

7) Matrimonial actions: relaxed policy, but not a cure for unreasonable delay

  • De Pass v De Pass (42 AD3d 723 [3d Dept 2007]) and Trim v Trim (21 AD3d 1203 [3d Dept 2005]): Cited for the principles that (i) New York favors decisions on the merits and (ii) vacatur rules are relaxed in matrimonial cases.
  • OneWest Bank, FSB v Singer (237 AD3d 731 [2d Dept 2025]): Provided the limiting principle: where the movant cannot reasonably explain a lengthy delay in moving to vacate, there is no basis to extend the one-year period as a discretionary matter, even if merits-based policy considerations apply.

8) Delay as dispositive; repeated nonappearance matters

  • Gootnick v Gootnick (241 AD3d 1292 [2d Dept 2025]), Kelly v Hinkley (186 AD3d 1842 [3d Dept 2020]), and Gaglio v Gaglio (63 AD2d 667 [2d Dept 1978]): Used to reinforce that extended, unexplained delay—especially against a procedural history demonstrating the litigant’s awareness of obligations—justifies denying vacatur.

9) CPLR 5015(a)(3): “reasonable time” requirement

  • Richardson v Richardson (309 AD2d 795 [2d Dept 2003]) and City of Albany Indus. Dev. Agency v Garg (250 AD2d 991 [3d Dept 1998]): Cited for the rule that CPLR 5015(a)(3) motions must be made within a reasonable time. The court used the same delay-driven analysis to reject the husband’s (a)(3) theory premised on alleged misrepresentation/misconduct and purported reliance on opposing counsel’s assurances.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Jurisdictional/procedural sequencing: The court first applied the rule that an appeal from an intermediate order is dismissed upon entry of the final judgment, but preserved review of the issues via the appeal from the judgment (as it had done in the 2022 Zeledon decision).
  2. Statutory timeliness under CPLR 5015(a)(1) controlled: The husband had notice of entry in October 2023; the formal motion was made in April 2025. That exceeded the one-year limit, rendering the motion untimely.
  3. Pro se letters were not “motions” absent service: The husband’s attempt to retroactively treat his letters as a timely motion failed because motion practice requires service on the adverse party. Without proof of service, the court would not treat informal correspondence as a CPLR 5015 motion.
  4. Interest-of-justice vacatur requires diligence: Although inherent authority exists, the court weighed (i) failure to request an adjournment, (ii) failure to promptly contact the court after missing the appearance, (iii) the husband’s awareness of the case’s posture following his earlier successful appeal, and (iv) the compounded delay even after receiving the default order. Those facts made discretionary relief inappropriate.
  5. CPLR 5015(a)(3) failed on “reasonable time” and proof: The husband’s narrative depended on alleged assurances and reliance, but he supplied no sworn allegations on key points and, in any event, waited an unreasonable time.

C. Impact

Practical rule reinforced: In the Third Department, parties cannot preserve timeliness under CPLR 5015(a)(1) by sending unserved letters to the court and later labeling them “motions.” If the adverse party is not served, the correspondence will not be treated as a motion for vacatur.

Limits on matrimonial leniency: While matrimonial cases often receive a relaxed approach to vacating defaults, Zeledon underscores that prolonged, unexplained delay—especially after notice of entry—can override the merits-preference policy.

Inherent authority is narrow in application: The decision signals that “interest of justice” vacatur is not a general equitable escape hatch from the one-year statute; diligence remains central, and repeated nonappearance or post-default inertia will weigh heavily against relief.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Default / default order: A court may rule against a party who fails to appear or otherwise participate as required. Here, the husband’s nonappearance at the conference led to a default.
  • Vacatur: A request that the court set aside (undo) an order or judgment, typically to allow the case to be decided on the merits.
  • CPLR 5015(a)(1) “excusable default”: Allows vacating a default if the motion is made within one year after service of the order/judgment with notice of entry, and if the movant shows (i) a reasonable excuse and (ii) a potentially meritorious defense.
  • Notice of entry: Formal notice that an order has been entered; it triggers important deadlines, including the one-year period in CPLR 5015(a)(1).
  • CPLR 2211 (motion practice): A motion is a formal request for relief that must be served on the opposing party. A letter to the judge is not a motion if it is not properly served and noticed.
  • CPLR 5015(a)(3) (fraud/misconduct): Allows vacatur when the adverse party’s fraud or misconduct affected the outcome, but the motion must still be made within a reasonable time.
  • Inherent authority / “interest of justice”: Courts have limited equitable power to vacate orders even outside strict statutory time limits, but they exercise that power sparingly—especially where the movant delayed without good reason.
  • Majauskas formula: The standard New York method for determining the marital share of a pension based on the portion earned during the marriage.

5. Conclusion

Zeledon v Zeledon is a delay-driven vacatur decision: even in a matrimonial action—where courts often prefer merits-based resolutions—a party who receives notice of entry of a default order must act within the CPLR 5015(a)(1) one-year window or present compelling reasons for discretionary relief. Unserved pro se letters will not be treated as timely vacatur motions, and CPLR 5015(a)(3) offers no refuge where the movant waits an unreasonable time. The case is a cautionary precedent that diligence and proper service are indispensable when seeking to undo a default.