1. Introduction
In Wisne v. NCAA, the Tenth Circuit rejected an attempt to treat all Division I athletics in the United States as a single labor market for an antitrust challenge to an NCAA eligibility decision. The court’s central point was that common regulation does not establish economic interchangeability: athletes ordinarily seek positions with teams in their own sports, not with any Division I athletic program.
Twelve student-athletes, including Brock Wisne, challenged the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s refusal to apply a new eligibility rule retroactively. Previously, Division I athletes generally could compete for four seasons within five years. In June 2026, the NCAA adopted a rule generally allowing five seasons within five years, but excluded athletes who had already exhausted their four seasons under the previous rule.
The plaintiffs began college in 2022 and competed for four consecutive seasons, completing their final season under the old rule in 2025–26. They sought an additional season of Division I competition and the associated financial opportunities. All but Abigail Jefferies alleged that they had already received name, image, or likeness compensation.
Their lawsuit alleged that the NCAA’s refusal to extend the new rule to them violated § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. The district court certified a class and issued a preliminary injunction requiring the NCAA to permit a fifth season. The Tenth Circuit reversed the injunction because the plaintiffs had not supported the relevant labor market on which their antitrust theory depended.
2. Summary of the Opinion
Writing for a panel consisting of Judges McHugh, Kelly, and Moritz, Judge McHugh held that the district court clearly erred in defining the relevant market as “Division I athletics in the United States.”
The court’s reasoning rested on four conclusions:
-
The NCAA’s central organization is not the relevant purchaser of athletic labor.
The economic buyers are the member schools and, more precisely, the athletic programs seeking athletes’ services.
-
Those programs are not interchangeable across sports.
A basketball player does not ordinarily regard a hockey position as a reasonable substitute, and a gymnast cannot obtain a gymnastics opportunity from a school that lacks that program.
-
Evidence concerning selected sports did not establish an all-sports market.
The plaintiffs’ expert supplied economic information principally addressing certain sports and their professional alternatives, but that information did not justify combining every Division I sport.
-
Invoking “submarkets” did not cure the problem.
Any economically relevant sport-specific market required its own supported definition and analysis.
Exercising interlocutory appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), the court reversed the order granting preliminary relief and vacated the injunction. Its decision applied to the classwide injunction as well as relief for the named plaintiffs.
The decision did not uphold the NCAA’s eligibility policy on the merits.
It did not decide whether the policy had anticompetitive effects, whether roster stability justified it, or whether less restrictive alternatives existed. Nor did it decide whether antitrust law applies to NCAA eligibility rules generally. The class-certification order and the plaintiffs’ contract and declaratory-judgment claims were not at issue in the appeal.
3. Governing Legal Framework
The agreed rule-of-reason analysis
Although § 1 of the Sherman Act broadly prohibits agreements restraining trade, courts interpret it to prohibit unreasonable restraints. The parties agreed that the challenged NCAA decision should be evaluated under the rule of reason rather than treated as automatically unlawful.
Under the framework applied here, the court first identifies the relevant market. It can then evaluate substantial anticompetitive effects, procompetitive explanations, and less anticompetitive means of achieving the asserted benefits. Market definition supplies the economic setting necessary to assess those competing considerations.
The plaintiffs described the NCAA’s conduct as a “group boycott,” but that characterization did not displace the agreed rule-of-reason framework or eliminate the need to support a relevant market.
Labor markets and buyer-side power
This case concerned alleged buyer-side market power. Athletes supply athletic services, while programs recruit those services. The relevant inquiry therefore asks which employers athletes regard as reasonably good substitutes.
That inquiry differs from asking whether the NCAA writes rules governing all Division I sports. Regulatory reach identifies who controls an eligibility requirement; it does not establish which buyers actually compete for a particular athlete’s labor.
Standard of appellate review
Market definition is a factual question. The Tenth Circuit therefore reviewed the district court’s finding for clear error. Despite that deferential standard, the court concluded that the accepted market was economically implausible and unsupported by the evidence presented.
4. Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning
A. A governing association is not necessarily the buyer of labor
The plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. David Berri, reasoned that the NCAA possessed monopsonistic control over Division I athletics. The district court accepted the proposition that the NCAA was the sole buyer across the individual sports.
The appellate court distinguished the NCAA’s administrative role from the programs’ economic role. The NCAA does not recruit athletes to compete for its own team. Member institutions, through particular athletic programs, seek and compensate athletic services.
Indeed, the plaintiffs’ allegation of coordinated conduct among universities presupposed multiple institutional buyers. The district court likewise described the arrangement as “a monopsony of colluding employers,” implicitly recognizing that the NCAA’s members, rather than the central organization, were the relevant employers.
This distinction does not establish immunity for collectively imposed rules. Rather, it requires the alleged restraint to be analyzed within the labor markets in which the participating buyers operate. The opinion’s references to “employers” serve that economic analysis; they do not decide athletes’ employment status under other bodies of law.
B. Sport-specific opportunities undermine the undifferentiated market
The court illustrated the problem through program availability. Of the 366 Division I universities identified in the allegations, 265 fielded football teams. A football player would not regard the remaining 101 institutions as substitutes for obtaining a football position. Similarly, the 63 institutions offering women’s gymnastics could not be treated as interchangeable with the 303 institutions lacking that program.
Even where a university sponsors multiple sports, the relevant opportunities remain distinct. A men’s basketball player does not ordinarily sell his basketball services to a hockey program. A women’s volleyball player does not ordinarily regard a lacrosse position as an alternative.
The court therefore focused on particular athletic programs as the operative buyers. Although some athletes compete successfully in multiple sports, that possibility did not support treating every athlete as interchangeable across all men’s and women’s Division I sports.
The court did not prescribe the final boundaries of any particular market. It indicated that a supported market would likely encompass multiple programs in an athlete’s sport, while leaving unresolved whether professional leagues or other opportunities should also be included.
C. Economic evidence must support the market actually proposed
Dr. Berri supplied more economic material than the athletes had offered in several earlier eligibility cases. His evidence addressed whether Division I competition differed from other collegiate divisions and professional sports.
-
For men’s basketball, he emphasized the G-League’s lower visibility and comparatively limited NIL opportunities, along with the tendency of certain NBA-ineligible high-school graduates to choose college basketball.
-
He interpreted NBA and Major League Baseball draft information as showing that professional opportunities remained distinct from college participation despite the availability of NIL compensation.
-
For women’s basketball, he emphasized the WNBA’s minimum entry age of twenty-two.
-
For other sports, he pointed to small or nonexistent professional leagues.
The NCAA’s expert, Dr. Matthew Backus, challenged both the aggregation of sports and the interpretation of the data. He identified substantial variation in NIL earnings, a mathematical error in the basketball analysis, rising NBA compensation, and declining proportions of underclassmen entering professional drafts. In his view, those developments could indicate competition between college programs and professional leagues.
The appellate court did not resolve every empirical disagreement. Its decisive objection preceded those disputes: evidence distinguishing certain college sports from their professional counterparts did not establish that all Division I sports formed one labor market.
The methodological lesson is therefore not simply to submit more statistics. The evidence must answer the relevant substitution question and support the boundaries of the market being asserted.
D. “Submarket” is not a substitute for analysis
When confronted with differences among sports, Dr. Berri maintained that those sports could be treated as submarkets because all were controlled by the NCAA. The court rejected that reasoning.
A submarket can itself be the relevant antitrust market. But it does not inherit proof of market power, competitive harm, or justification merely because it sits within a broader category. Each relevant economic unit must be supported and analyzed.
The plaintiffs had neither pleaded nor developed alternative sport-specific markets in their preliminary-injunction presentation. Dr. Backus introduced the submarket terminology while criticizing their aggregation; Dr. Berri responded by defending the collective market rather than defining supported alternatives.
Consequently, the court could not preserve the injunction by reconstructing a series of markets that the plaintiffs had not established.
E. Failure at the market-definition stage defeated preliminary relief
The district court had found irreparable harm, favorable equities, and consistency with the public interest. But its finding of likely success on the antitrust claim depended on the unsupported market.
Once that foundation failed, preliminary relief could not stand. The court therefore had no need to evaluate the remaining stages of the rule of reason or determine whether a heightened injunction standard applied.
5. Precedents Cited and Their Influence
A. NCAA antitrust exposure and changing market conditions
- NCAA v. Alston, 594 U.S. 69 (2021)
-
NCAA v. Alston supplied the legal and historical background. Its rejection of special antitrust immunity for the NCAA established that an asserted commitment to amateurism does not itself exempt NCAA restraints from Sherman Act scrutiny. Its requirement of a careful examination of market realities also supported the demand for current evidence.
The important qualification is that NCAA v. Alston did not permanently establish market boundaries for every later NCAA dispute. NIL compensation and revenue-sharing arrangements may change the competitive relationships among college programs and professional alternatives.
- Fourqurean v. NCAA, 143 F.4th 859 (7th Cir. 2025)
-
This eligibility challenge concerned the former four-in-five rule. The Seventh Circuit rejected reliance on NCAA v. Alston as sufficient proof of a relevant Division I football market, emphasizing changed conditions following NIL compensation. It also supplied the labor-market formulation used throughout the opinion: relevant employers are those workers regard as reasonably good substitutes.
Its influence was both evidentiary and conceptual. Plaintiffs needed current market support, and that support had to address actual employment alternatives.
- Elad v. NCAA, 160 F.4th 407 (3d Cir. 2025)
-
A football player challenged the counting of junior-college seasons against NCAA eligibility. The Third Circuit vacated preliminary relief because the district court accepted an expert’s market definition without the necessary fact-specific analysis, even though the expert supplied no market evidence or economic data.
The Tenth Circuit treated this decision as a warning that an expert’s conclusion cannot replace evidentiary support. It also used the case to illustrate how substantial NIL opportunities have changed collegiate recruiting.
- Robinson v. NCAA, 172 F.4th 271 (4th Cir. 2026)
-
Four football players brought a similar challenge involving junior-college participation. The Fourth Circuit vacated an injunction for inadequate fact-specific findings concerning the asserted nationwide Division I football labor market. Together with Elad v. NCAA, it reinforced the need for judicial analysis rather than uncritical acceptance of a proposed market.
- Blythe v. NCAA, 2026 WL 2653349 (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 2026)
-
The Ninth Circuit rejected reliance on judicial statements about football and basketball markets to establish a collegiate baseball labor market. The Tenth Circuit used that reasoning to expose the larger problem here: if evidence about one sport does not automatically establish another sport’s market, evidence about a few sports cannot establish an undifferentiated market embracing all Division I athletics.
B. Market definition and appellate review
- Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 585 U.S. 529 (2018)
-
This decision supplied the rule-of-reason framework and explained why market definition matters: without identifying the competitive arena, a court cannot measure the defendant’s ability to lessen competition. It supported the court’s decision to stop once the proposed market failed, rather than assess competitive effects and justifications in an undefined economic setting.
- Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001)
-
This case supplied the buyer-side substitution principle. In a monopsony inquiry, the market concerns competing buyers whom sellers regard as reasonably good alternatives. Applied to athletic labor, the question is which programs are realistic purchasers of the athlete’s services—not simply which programs share an NCAA rulebook.
- Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1990)
-
This binding circuit precedent established that market definition is a factual question. It provided the basis for reviewing the district court’s market finding under the clear-error standard.
- Colo. Motor Carriers Ass'n v. Town of Vail, 153 F.4th 1052 (10th Cir. 2025)
-
This case confirmed that factual findings made at the preliminary-injunction stage receive clear-error review. Read with Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., it explains the appellate court’s reviewing posture without making the district court’s acceptance of an implausible market unreviewable.
C. Submarkets and the correct economic unit
- Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962)
-
In this merger case, the Supreme Court recognized that economically meaningful submarkets can themselves constitute antitrust markets. Men’s, women’s, and children’s shoes were treated separately because of their distinct characteristics, production arrangements, public recognition, and customer groups.
The Tenth Circuit drew a structural lesson: identifying a broad category does not eliminate the need to examine economically distinct components. A relevant submarket requires its own competitive analysis; it is not merely a label attached to an already-proven larger market.
- Black v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 69 F.4th 1161 (10th Cir. 2023)
-
This circuit decision recognized distinct groupings in a mineral-rights dispute based on differing competitive conditions associated with royalty arrangements. It reinforced that economic conditions, rather than broad labels, determine market boundaries. It also supported the proposition that market power must be assessed in the context of a properly defined market.
- United States v. Phillipsburg National Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970)
-
The plaintiffs relied on this decision’s warning against using submarkets to disregard a broader, economically significant line of commerce. The Tenth Circuit explained that the case required attention to the broader market because that was the appropriate economic focus there—not because aggregation is always permissible.
Together, this decision and Brown Shoe Co. v. United States establish that neither broad nor narrow framing is inherently controlling. The evidence must identify the economically relevant unit.
D. The unresolved injunction standard
- Fish v. Kobach, 840 F.3d 710 (10th Cir. 2016)
-
This case explains that an injunction altering the status quo requires a stronger showing of likely success. The parties disputed whether granting another eligibility season would trigger that heightened standard. The court did not resolve the dispute because the plaintiffs failed to establish likely success even under the ordinary standard.
6. Potential Impact
More tailored NCAA antitrust litigation
Future plaintiffs will need to connect their proposed markets to the actual recruitment and compensation opportunities available to the affected athletes. Evidence may need to address differences among sports, professional alternatives, compensation levels, eligibility restrictions, and other competitive conditions.
The decision does not establish that each sport necessarily constitutes a single nationwide market, or that professional leagues must always be excluded. Nor does it conclusively require divisions by conference, gender, or skill level. Those boundaries remain matters for supported economic analysis.
Closer scrutiny of expert evidence
The opinion makes clear that expert credentials and substantial data are insufficient if the analysis does not support the market actually asserted. Courts must examine the connection between the evidence and the proposed boundaries, rather than equating the presence of statistics with a sound market definition.
Greater difficulty obtaining broad emergency relief
Athletic seasons create urgent and potentially irreversible consequences. Nevertheless, urgency does not excuse a missing foundation for likely success. Plaintiffs seeking eligibility injunctions must develop their economic theory early enough to support preliminary relief.
Possible implications for classwide theories
A single eligibility policy may affect athletes across many sports, but common exposure to that policy does not necessarily establish a common labor market. Different market conditions may complicate proof of competitive harm and the suitability of uniform relief.
Those are potential consequences, not holdings on class certification. The Tenth Circuit expressly left the certification order outside this appeal.
No substantive approval of the NCAA’s justification
The NCAA argued that retroactive eligibility would disrupt settled expectations concerning roster positions and playing time. The court did not endorse that explanation or decide whether it outweighed competitive harm. A properly supported future challenge would still require examination of that justification and any less restrictive alternatives.
7. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Relevant market
-
The economic arena in which meaningful alternatives compete. Here, it concerns which programs or other employers are realistic alternatives for purchasing an athlete’s services.
- Monopsony
-
Buyer-side market dominance—the counterpart of monopoly on the seller side. In a labor setting, it concerns power held by purchasers of workers’ services.
- Reasonable substitutes
-
Alternatives that can realistically serve a similar economic function. A basketball position ordinarily is not interchangeable with a gymnastics position.
- Submarket
-
A distinct economic segment that may itself be the relevant antitrust market. Calling it a submarket does not remove the need to prove its boundaries and competitive conditions.
- Rule of reason
-
A method for evaluating a restraint’s competitive effects, asserted benefits, and less restrictive alternatives within the relevant market.
- Preliminary injunction
-
Temporary relief issued before final judgment. It requires, among other things, a sufficient showing that the applicant is likely to succeed on the merits.
- Clear error
-
A deferential standard for reviewing factual findings. Deference does not require an appellate court to accept a finding it concludes is clearly mistaken.
- NIL compensation and revenue sharing
-
NIL compensation pays for authorized uses of an athlete’s name, image, or likeness. Revenue sharing permits direct payments from schools under the arrangements described in the opinion. These opportunities may affect athletes’ choices, but their existence does not itself establish market boundaries.
8. Conclusion
Wisne v. NCAA establishes a focused evidentiary principle: a common NCAA eligibility restriction does not, without supporting economic analysis, turn all Division I athletics into one labor market.
By vacating the preliminary injunction, the Tenth Circuit required plaintiffs to identify the actual purchasers of athletic services and the alternatives reasonably available to athletes. The ruling strengthens market-definition requirements without immunizing NCAA eligibility rules or resolving the legality of the challenged transition policy.