Introduction

In this nonprecedential opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment against Jennifer A. McLaughlin, a former assistant store manager at Walmart, on her claims of FMLA retaliation, ADA retaliation, and FMLA interference. The Court held that McLaughlin voluntarily resigned and therefore failed to show an adverse employment action—an essential element of her retaliation claims—and that her FMLA interference theory failed because no FMLA benefit was ever denied: a third-party leave administrator received her request only after her separation and makes the ultimate leave decisions, not her supervisors.

The decision underscores two recurring employment-law themes: first, voluntary resignation (absent a properly preserved constructive-discharge claim) negates the adverse-action element of retaliation claims; second, an FMLA interference claim requires proof that the employer actually denied an FMLA benefit—not merely that a supervisor made an inaccurate or discouraging comment—especially where a designated third-party administrator is undisputedly responsible for approving or denying leave requests.

Parties: Jennifer A. McLaughlin (Appellant) v. Walmart (Appellee). Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Panel: Chief Judge Chagares, Judges Roth and Rendell. Disposition: Affirmed. Date: December 3, 2024. Docket: No. 23-3201. Originating Court: E.D. Pa., Hon. John M. Younge.

Summary of the Opinion

• Retaliation (FMLA and ADA): The Court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. McLaughlin failed at the prima facie stage because she did not show an adverse employment action; she voluntarily resigned. A single ambiguous text exchange (“Was I termed for medical? Or job abandonment?” “Health.”) did not create a genuine dispute of material fact against documentary evidence of resignation and her immediate transition to a new job.
• FMLA Interference: The interference claim failed on the fifth element—denial of an FMLA benefit. The third-party leave administrator received McLaughlin’s request after her separation and never processed it; supervisors lacked authority to approve or deny FMLA leave. Her supervisor’s alleged “denied” comment was not a denial and, in any event, did not deter her from submitting a request to the administrator.
• Procedural posture mattered: Because McLaughlin did not respond to Walmart’s statement of undisputed facts, those facts were deemed admitted under Rule 56(e)(2) and the District Judge’s procedures. She also forfeited her separate ADA discrimination and constructive-discharge arguments by not briefing them on appeal.
• Result: The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Walmart on all preserved claims.

Note: The opinion is designated “not precedential” under I.O.P. 5.7 and is not binding precedent, though it provides persuasive guidance.

Background and Key Facts

• Employment: McLaughlin worked for Walmart from 2012–2019, serving as a Front-End Assistant Store Manager from 2016 through separation.
• Medical history: Pelvic injuries in August 2018; intermittent leaves of absence, including FMLA, with requests processed by Walmart’s third-party leave administrator.
• Supervisor conduct: McLaughlin testified supervisors commented on her physical limitations (e.g., “not a good look for our customers”) and allegedly indicated leave denials.
• Resignation and new employment:
  • Signed an offer with Giant Food Stores on August 31, 2019.
  • Texted Walmart on October 8: “I’d like to give a two week notice, but I can’t work it. It’s too much on my health...”
  • Started at Giant on October 10.
  • On October 21, texted her Walmart manager asking if she was “termed for medical” or “job abandonment”; manager replied “Health.”
• FMLA request timing: The third-party administrator received McLaughlin’s FMLA request on October 16—after her separation—so it was never processed.
• Litigation: EEOC charge (August 2020); right-to-sue (May 2022); district court granted summary judgment to Walmart; McLaughlin appealed.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role

• McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): Provides the burden-shifting framework for retaliation claims premised on circumstantial evidence. The Court applied it to both FMLA and ADA retaliation, requiring a prima facie showing including an adverse employment action.
• Canada v. Samuel Grossi & Sons, Inc., 49 F.4th 340, 346 (3d Cir. 2022): Confirms retaliation is actionable under both FMLA and ADA and that McDonnell Douglas governs where there is no direct evidence. It frames the elements McLaughlin had to meet.
• Ross v. Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 185, 191–92 (3d Cir. 2014): Articulates the five elements of an FMLA interference claim, emphasizing the need to prove the denial of an FMLA benefit. The Court used Gilhuly to dispose of McLaughlin’s interference claim because no benefit was denied.
• Physicians Healthsource, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 954 F.3d 615, 618 (3d Cir. 2020): States the de novo standard of review for summary judgment and the “no genuine dispute of material fact” standard.
• Stone v. Troy Constr., LLC, 935 F.3d 141, 147 n.6 (3d Cir. 2019) and Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 286 (3d Cir. 2009): Reinforce that facts and inferences are viewed favorably to the non-movant on summary judgment—important framing but not outcome-altering here, given the admitted facts.
• Ramara, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 814 F.3d 660, 666 (3d Cir. 2016); Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 414 (3d Cir. 1999): Support the proposition that a party’s subjective belief or conclusory assertions cannot, without more, create a genuine dispute of material fact to defeat summary judgment.
• M.S. ex rel. Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 969 F.3d 120, 124 n.3 (3d Cir. 2020); Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 877 F.3d 136, 145–46 (3d Cir. 2017): Explain appellate forfeiture for issues not briefed. The Court relied on these to deem McLaughlin’s ADA discrimination and constructive-discharge arguments forfeited.
• Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (e)(2): Establish summary-judgment standards and permit courts to deem facts admitted when a party fails to address the movant’s factual statements. This was pivotal because the District Court—and on appeal, the Third Circuit—treated Walmart’s statement of material facts as admitted based on the judge’s procedures and McLaughlin’s concession.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Retaliation (FMLA and ADA)

Under McDonnell Douglas, a retaliation plaintiff must first make a prima facie showing that she engaged in protected activity, suffered an adverse employment action, and that a causal connection exists between the two. The Court resolved the claims at the second element:

• No adverse employment action: The record—deemed admitted—established that McLaughlin voluntarily resigned: she texted a resignation on October 8 (“I’d like to give a two week notice, but I can’t work it. It’s too much on my health.”), then began working for Giant two days later. Walmart contemporaneously treated the separation as a voluntary health-related resignation.
• Ambiguous post hoc text insufficient: McLaughlin pointed to her October 21 text (“Was I termed for medical? Or job abandonment?”) and her manager’s one-word reply (“Health”) to suggest termination. The Court held that a plaintiff’s subjective belief, unsupported by objective record evidence, cannot create a genuine issue of material fact to avoid summary judgment. The contemporaneous resignation communication, new employment, and internal documentation outweighed the ambiguous exchange.
• Constructive discharge waived: The District Court considered and rejected constructive discharge; McLaughlin did not pursue that argument on appeal, thereby forfeiting it. Without constructive discharge, her voluntary resignation defeats the adverse-action element.

2. FMLA Interference

An interference claim requires proof that the employer denied a benefit to which the employee was entitled under the FMLA. The Court held that element five was not met:

• No denial by the decisionmaker: Walmart requires leave requests to be submitted to a third-party leave administrator, which “makes the final decision” on approvals. The administrator received McLaughlin’s request on October 16—after she had already separated—so it never processed the request. No FMLA benefit was denied.
• Supervisors lacked authority: Even assuming a supervisor told McLaughlin her request was “denied,” supervisors did not have decisionmaking authority under Walmart’s leave process; therefore, that comment was not a legal denial of FMLA benefits.
• No discouraged exercise shown: The Court also noted that the comment did not deter McLaughlin from exercising her rights, since she submitted a request to the administrator anyway. The interference claim therefore failed as a matter of law.

3. The Procedural Backbone: Admitted Facts and Forfeiture

• Deemed admissions: McLaughlin failed to respond to Walmart’s Rule 56 statement. Under Rule 56(e)(2) and the District Judge’s posted procedures, those facts were deemed admitted. This controlled much of the factual landscape, including the timing of resignation and the third-party administrator’s role and receipt of the request post-separation.
• Appellate forfeiture: By not briefing the separate ADA discrimination claim and by not pursuing constructive discharge on appeal, McLaughlin forfeited review of those issues.

C. Likely Impact and Practical Implications

While nonprecedential, the opinion offers clear, practice-oriented guidance for FMLA/ADA litigation in the Third Circuit:

• Adverse employment action requires objective evidence: Employees who resign—especially those who immediately accept new employment—face a steep climb to show an adverse action absent a preserved and supported constructive-discharge theory.
• Interference requires an actual denial by the proper decisionmaker: Where an employer’s leave process vests approval authority in a third-party administrator, interference claims hinge on what that administrator did or did not do. Supervisor comments, without more, typically will not suffice to prove denial.
• Discouragement theory remains possible but needs proof: Although the Court did not rely on a discouragement theory, it signaled that a comment did not deter this employee from seeking leave. Future plaintiffs should be prepared to show that employer conduct actually restrained or deterred the exercise of FMLA rights and that a benefit would otherwise have been available.
• Procedural rigor matters:
  • Always file a responsive statement of material facts. Failure to do so may result in deemed admissions that are outcome-determinative.
  • Preserve and brief all theories on appeal; unbriefed issues are forfeited.
• Employer takeaways: Maintain clear documentation of resignations and enforce consistent leave-request channels through the designated administrator. Train supervisors to avoid making definitive statements about leave approvals or denials to minimize confusion and litigation risk.
• Employee takeaways: Submit leave requests promptly through the required channel and confirm receipt. If separation is contemplated, understand that requests received after separation typically cannot form the basis of an interference claim.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Adverse employment action: A significant negative change in employment (e.g., firing, demotion). Voluntarily quitting is not an adverse action unless the employer made working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel forced to quit (constructive discharge).
• Constructive discharge: A legal doctrine treating a resignation as a firing if the employer effectively forced it by creating intolerable conditions. It must be clearly argued and supported; here it was not pursued on appeal.
• FMLA interference vs. retaliation:
  • Interference focuses on whether the employer denied or interfered with FMLA rights (e.g., refused entitled leave).
  • Retaliation focuses on whether the employer punished the employee for exercising FMLA rights (e.g., firing because of taking leave).
• Third-party leave administrator: An entity designated by the employer to receive, evaluate, and decide leave requests. If only the administrator can approve/deny leave, a supervisor’s comments typically do not constitute official denials.
• McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting: A three-step framework: (1) the employee makes a prima facie case; (2) the employer articulates a legitimate reason; (3) the employee shows that reason is pretext. The case here ended at step one because there was no adverse action.
• Summary judgment and “genuine dispute of material fact”: Summary judgment is granted when no real factual dispute exists on issues that affect the outcome. A party’s speculation or subjective belief is not enough; there must be evidence that could persuade a jury.
• Deemed admissions under Rule 56(e)(2): If you do not specifically respond to the other side’s statement of facts, the court can treat those facts as admitted for summary-judgment purposes.
• “Cleaned up” parenthetical: A citation practice indicating that non-substantive alterations (internal quotation marks, citations, or brackets) have been omitted for readability.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision in McLaughlin v. Walmart reaffirms that a voluntary resignation—especially one contemporaneous with acceptance of a new job—defeats the adverse-action element of FMLA and ADA retaliation claims, absent a properly preserved constructive-discharge theory. It also clarifies that FMLA interference requires proof of an actual denial of a benefit by the proper decisionmaker; supervisor-level comments cannot substitute for the determination of a third-party administrator where that administrator alone has authority to approve or deny leave, and where the request was received only after the employee’s separation.

Procedurally, the case illustrates the decisive consequences of failing to respond to a Rule 56 statement of facts and of forfeiting arguments by not briefing them on appeal. Substantively, it provides practical guidance: employers should centralize and document leave decisions; employees should adhere to established leave procedures and timelines; and courts will require objective evidence, not speculation, to create a triable dispute on adverse action or denial of FMLA benefits.

Although nonprecedential, the opinion offers persuasive, fact-sensitive direction for litigants navigating FMLA and ADA retaliation and interference claims in the Third Circuit.