Victim Willingness Is Irrelevant to 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) Enticement; Chat Logs Alone Can Prove § 2251(a) Production Causation

I. Introduction

In United States v. Justin Carroll (6th Cir. July 28, 2026) (unpublished), the Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury’s convictions of Justin D. Carroll—an adult FBI electronics technician—for, among other offenses, (1) sexual exploitation of a child under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (production of child sexual abuse material) and (2) coercion and enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).

The prosecution centered on Carroll’s months-long online communications with a 14-year-old girl (“Jane Doe”), including sexually explicit messages, photos, and video calls. After Jane’s mother discovered the exchanges and directly informed Carroll that Jane was 14, Carroll nonetheless continued sexually explicit communications until the day of his FBI interview and arrest.

On appeal, Carroll challenged: (a) the sufficiency of the evidence on the § 2251(a) production count; (b) whether the § 2251(a) count was duplicitous because the government pointed to more than one image at trial; (c) a jury instruction on § 2422(b) stating the minor’s “will or mental state” was irrelevant; and (d) sufficiency of the evidence on § 2422(b), largely repackaging the instruction argument.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed. It held:

  • The evidence was sufficient under § 2251(a) because the chat logs permitted a rational juror to infer that Jane created and sent sexually explicit images in response to Carroll’s prompts; no additional victim testimony or forensic proof of timing was required.
  • Carroll’s duplicity challenge to the § 2251(a) count failed under plain-error review because he identified no binding Sixth Circuit precedent clearly establishing that a single § 2251(a) count becomes duplicitous when the government relies on multiple images at trial.
  • The jury instruction for § 2422(b) was correct: a minor’s apparent willingness is no defense, and the statute does not require proof that the defendant changed the minor’s mental state from reluctance to agreement.
  • The evidence was sufficient under § 2422(b) because Carroll’s “changed her mind” theory misstates the elements; once he knew she was a minor, his interstate communications urging unlawful sexual activity supported conviction regardless of the child’s “consent” or predisposition.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Sufficiency-of-the-evidence framework

  • United States v. Deakins, 152 F.4th 693 (6th Cir. 2025): Provided the Sixth Circuit’s operative sufficiency standard: review de novo, view evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and draw reasonable inferences for the government. The panel used Deakins as the immediate doctrinal bridge to the constitutional baseline in Jackson v. Virginia.
  • Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979): The constitutional minimum for affirming a conviction—whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. This is the “high deference” lens through which the court evaluated Carroll’s competing explanations (e.g., preexisting photo “collection”).
  • Johnson v. Coyle, 200 F.3d 987 (6th Cir. 2000): Invoked to reject the argument that the prosecution must negate every alternative hypothesis. The panel used it to underscore that speculative alternatives (e.g., an unsupported “cache” theory) do not defeat a conviction under Jackson.

2. § 2251(a) “production” and inference of causation from communications

  • United States v. Ogden, 685 F.3d 600 (6th Cir. 2012): Central to the court’s § 2251(a) analysis. Ogden recognized that a factfinder may infer from the “log of [the] conversation” that the minor produced and transmitted images during the exchange rather than sending previously created content. The Carroll panel treated Ogden as validating reliance on chat context and sequencing to establish the production element (and any assumed “causation” component).
  • United States v. Deutsch, 2024 WL 2972810 (2d Cir. June 13, 2024): Cited as persuasive authority that § 2251(a) convictions can be upheld without the additional categories of proof Carroll demanded (like victim testimony or forensic timestamping).
  • United States v. Sykes, 65 F.4th 867 (6th Cir. 2023): Cited to show that even where a victim denies sending photos at some point, messages may still support a § 2251(a) conviction. The panel used Sykes to reinforce that juries may credit the documentary communications over later testimonial uncertainty or inconsistency.

3. Duplicity, forfeiture, and plain error

  • United States v. Ramamoorthy, 949 F.3d 955 (6th Cir. 2020): Supplied the definition of duplicity and the plain-error framework (obvious error; effect on substantial rights; effect on fairness/integrity/public reputation). The court measured Carroll’s late-raised duplicity claim against Ramamoorthy’s demanding standard.
  • United States v. Kakos, 483 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 2007): Key procedural anchor. Kakos explains that duplicity objections should be raised pretrial and that any potential prejudice is often curable with unanimity instructions—something Carroll did not request. This supported applying plain-error review and highlighted why late objections are disfavored.
  • United States v. Soto, 794 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2015): Noted (in a footnote) for the distinction between waiver and forfeiture for indictment defects; it supported treating Carroll’s failure as forfeiture triggering plain-error review.
  • United States v. Baskerville, 164 F.4th 459 (6th Cir. 2026): Used for the principle that out-of-circuit decisions cannot establish “plain” error in the Sixth Circuit.
  • United States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2015): Cited for the proposition that the absence of binding precedent answering the issue typically precludes a finding of plain error.
  • United States v. Thomas, 2025 WL 40368 (7th Cir. Jan. 7, 2025): Cited by analogy (possession under § 2252A) to show that, at minimum, it is not “plain” that presenting multiple storage devices/images for a single count is erroneous.
  • Prewett v. Weems, 749 F.3d 454 (6th Cir. 2014): Carroll’s primary Sixth Circuit authority, but the court discounted it as a civil case and not a controlling criminal duplicity rule for § 2251(a).
  • United States v. Esch, 832 F.2d 531 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Smith, 919 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2019); United States v. Fee, 491 F. App'x 151 (11th Cir. 2012): The court characterized these as addressing multiplicity (multiple counts for the same offense) rather than duplicity (multiple offenses within a single count), and thus not clearly supporting Carroll’s “obvious error” argument.

4. § 2422(b) enticement and the irrelevance of “willingness”

  • United States v. Lawrence, 735 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 2013): Provided the standard of review for jury-instruction challenges (de novo).
  • United States v. Harmon, 593 F. App'x 455 (6th Cir. 2014): The decisive Sixth Circuit authority for the proposition that a defendant can “persuade, induce, entice, or coerce” even if the minor is predisposed; thus, willingness is no defense. Carroll relies on a mental-state-change theory (hesitation to agreement), but Harmon undercut that framing within the circuit.
  • United States v. Pulido, 133 F.4th 1256 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 396 (2025): Carroll’s main supporting case for the “hesitation-to-agreement” concept. The Sixth Circuit rejected importing that requirement into § 2422(b), emphasizing its own approach (Harmon) and aligned out-of-circuit authority.
  • United States v. Harcrow, 135 F.4th 636 (8th Cir. 2025) (per curiam); United States v. Dhingra, 371 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Greaux-Gomez, 52 F.4th 426 (1st Cir. 2022); United States v. York, 48 F.4th 494 (7th Cir. 2022); United States v. Lundy, 676 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2012): These cases formed a broad consensus point: the victim’s willingness/consent is irrelevant to § 2422(b), much like consent does not negate statutory rape principles.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. § 2251(a): Production “for the purpose of producing” can be proven through conversational sequencing

Carroll’s principal sufficiency argument was framed as a causation challenge: the government supposedly had to prove Jane created images because of Carroll’s communications (and he suggested this required extra proof like victim testimony or metadata). The court assumed arguendo that some causal connection was required and held the government still met its burden.

The reasoning was evidentiary and inferential. The panel emphasized the “call-and-response” nature of the chats: Carroll asked Jane to “spread,” instructed “Do it” and “Let me see you,” and then Jane sent a depiction matching the request; similarly, Carroll asked “Can I see,” and Jane sent an image with a dildo inserted.

Under United States v. Ogden, such logs permit a rational juror to infer contemporaneous creation during the exchange rather than transmission from an older “collection.” The court treated Carroll’s alternative story as speculation: without evidence that Jane kept a cache, that she reused the October images, or that she exchanged explicit images with others, the hypothesis did not become “reasonable” enough to defeat the verdict under Jackson v. Virginia.

2. Duplicity: late-raised, no unanimity request, and no “plain” Sixth Circuit rule barring multiple images as proof of one count

Carroll’s duplicity argument faced compounding procedural problems. Duplicity challenges should be raised pretrial under Rule 12, and if the concern is jury unanimity, defendants typically request a specific unanimity instruction. Carroll did neither, so review was for plain error.

On the merits, the panel drew a crucial distinction: even if each production could be charged as a separate violation (a concept more often discussed in multiplicity cases), it does not follow that referencing multiple images to prove one charged “production” makes the count “obviously” duplicitous. With no binding Sixth Circuit authority squarely establishing Carroll’s theory—and with out-of-circuit cases not directly on point—the court held the error was not “obvious or clear” under United States v. Ramamoorthy and United States v. Al-Maliki.

3. § 2422(b): “Willing victim” is not a defense; no requirement to prove the defendant changed the minor’s mind

Carroll tried to convert § 2422(b) into a “conversion” offense—requiring proof he moved Jane from reluctance to assent. The Sixth Circuit rejected that premise. Citing United States v. Harmon and aligned sister-circuit authority, the court held that a defendant may “persuade, induce, entice, or coerce” even if the minor appears willing or predisposed. The minor’s “consent” or willingness is “irrelevant,” analogous to statutory rape doctrines where a minor cannot legally consent.

That holding disposed of both the instruction challenge and the sufficiency challenge: if the government need not prove a mental-state shift, then Carroll’s “she was willing anyway” argument does not negate an element.

C. Impact

1. Practical evidentiary impact in online-exploitation prosecutions

The opinion reinforces that chat logs can carry the government’s burden for § 2251(a) production when the messages show requests, directives, and prompt compliance. This matters in cases where:

  • victims are unavailable or unable to testify consistently;
  • metadata is missing due to platform limitations, deletions, or encryption;
  • defendants argue images were “preexisting” without supporting evidence.

While unpublished, the reasoning signals the Sixth Circuit’s continued receptiveness to inferential proof of contemporaneous production from conversational context (building on United States v. Ogden and consistent with United States v. Sykes).

2. Doctrinal clarity for § 2422(b) defenses

The decision fortifies a recurring principle in enticement cases: defendants cannot avoid liability by portraying the minor as an eager participant. The court’s treatment makes clear that, in the Sixth Circuit, litigation energy spent on “she already wanted to” will rarely help unless it connects to a genuine element dispute (e.g., knowledge of age, use of interstate commerce, or lack of persuasion/inducement conduct altogether).

3. Charging and appellate strategy: duplicity claims must be raised early

The duplicity portion is a cautionary note: defendants should raise Rule 12 indictment objections pretrial and request a tailored unanimity instruction if they claim a single count covers multiple distinct acts. On appeal, absent a clear Sixth Circuit rule, “plain error” will be difficult to establish—especially where the asserted defect is conceptually entangled with multiplicity rather than duplicity.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Sufficiency of the evidence: The appellate court does not decide whether it believes the defendant is guilty; it asks only whether a rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing evidence in the government’s favor.
  • 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (sexual exploitation / production): Criminalizes using/persuading/inducing/enticing/coercing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction. In online contexts, a “visual depiction” can be a photo or video sent electronically.
  • 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (enticement): Criminalizes using interstate communications (internet, phone, apps) to persuade/induce/ entice/coerce a minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity. The focus is on the defendant’s conduct and intent, not on the minor’s “consent.”
  • Duplicity vs. multiplicity:
    • Duplicity = multiple separate offenses charged in a single count (can risk a non-unanimous verdict).
    • Multiplicity = the same offense charged in multiple counts (can risk multiple punishments for one crime).
    The court viewed Carroll’s authorities as largely multiplicity-oriented and thus not clearly establishing a duplicity defect.
  • Plain error: A demanding standard used when a defendant failed to properly preserve an issue. The error must be clear under existing law and must have affected the outcome and the fairness/integrity of proceedings.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Justin Carroll affirms two core principles with practical force in internet-based child-exploitation cases: (1) for § 2251(a), juries may infer production and responsive creation of images from the structure and sequence of chat logs without requiring victim testimony or forensic timestamp evidence; and (2) for § 2422(b), a minor’s apparent willingness or predisposition is irrelevant, and the government need not prove the defendant “changed” the minor’s mind.

The opinion also underscores a procedural takeaway: indictment-structure objections like duplicity should be raised early and coupled with unanimity-instruction requests, because on appeal the absence of binding precedent will often defeat “plain error” relief.