Vicarious Firearm Possession and Murder Cross‑References Under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c):
A Comprehensive Commentary on United States v. Taylor (7th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

United States v. Taylor, No. 24‑1914 (7th Cir. Dec. 3, 2025), is a significant federal sentencing decision from the Seventh Circuit that addresses how far the Sentencing Guidelines allow a court, at a felon‑in‑possession sentencing, to incorporate uncharged homicide conduct and theories of vicarious liability.

The case arises from two related events in September 2022 in Chicago:

a gang‑related murder of a rival (Kadaivion Jones) on September 2, and
a September 19 police chase, during which the defendant, Andrei Taylor, fled from a stolen vehicle and tossed a loaded Glock pistol into a residential backyard.

Taylor pleaded guilty only to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Nevertheless, the government persuaded the district court that:

the same Glock had been used in the Jones homicide; and
Taylor was culpably involved in that murder as an aider and abettor / coconspirator.

Those findings allowed the district court to:

apply the homicide cross‑reference in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c) and use the Guideline for first‑degree murder (§ 2A1.1) as the base offense level, and
apply a two‑level enhancement under § 3C1.2 for reckless endangerment during flight, based on Taylor’s act of throwing a loaded gun over a backyard fence while running from police.

The resulting total offense level of 42 (criminal history category IV) yielded an advisory Guideline range of 30 years to life, constrained only by the 15‑year statutory maximum for § 922(g). The court imposed that maximum. On appeal, Taylor challenged:

the use of the § 2K2.1(c) homicide cross‑reference,
the § 3C1.2 reckless‑endangerment enhancement, and
the substantive reasonableness of the 15‑year sentence.

The Seventh Circuit (Chief Judge Brennan, joined by Judges Kolar and Maldonado) affirmed on all grounds. The opinion is important for several reasons:

It clarifies that the “defendant used or possessed” language in § 2K2.1(c)(1) does not exclude aiding‑and‑abetting and conspirator liability. Vicarious possession and use of the firearm, via relevant‑conduct principles, is enough.
It reinforces a broad conception of “relevant conduct” and “same course of conduct” for firearms offenses under § 2K2.1, even when the incidents are separated by weeks.
It confirms a relatively expansive understanding of “reckless endangerment” during flight under § 3C1.2 when a defendant discards a loaded firearm in a residential setting.
It underscores that a defendant can receive the statutory maximum for a non‑homicide conviction based largely on uncharged homicide conduct proved only by a preponderance of the evidence, without violating the Sixth Amendment or principles derived from Blakely and Booker, so long as the sentence stays within the statutory cap.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

Taylor, a member of the “Cali Boys” gang, was linked to the September 2, 2022 murder of rival gang member Kadaivion Jones through:

cell tower “pings” showing his phone near the scene with fellow gang members
video of a stolen Dodge Durango and Chrysler 300 used in the shooting
post‑murder social‑media activity (cryptic celebratory posts and targeted searches for the victim’s name and crime news accounts)
communications in a group chat after a co‑participant (Bonner) was arrested in one of the vehicles used in the shooting, urging others to start a new chat because police had Bonner’s phone

Seventeen days later, on September 19, three armed men committed a carjacking. When police stopped the car, four men, including Taylor, fled. Taylor was seen tossing a loaded 9mm Glock over a fence into a residential backyard. Police quickly recovered both Taylor and the Glock.

Taylor pleaded guilty to § 922(g)(1). The initial Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) assumed:

base offense level 20 under § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)
+2 for reckless endangerment under § 3C1.2
−3 for acceptance of responsibility

for a total offense level of 19. With criminal history category IV, that yielded a 46–57 month range (or 37–46 without the enhancement).

After the PSR, the government disclosed homicide‑related evidence and sought to apply the § 2K2.1(c) homicide cross‑reference—arguing for a base offense level of 43 under § 2A1.1 (first‑degree murder). The district court held multiple evidentiary hearings, considered expert testimony, ballistics, cell‑site data, video footage, and Facebook activity, and found by a preponderance of the evidence that:

Taylor was culpably involved in the Jones murder as an aider and abettor / coconspirator,
the Glock he possessed on September 19 was the same gun used in the Jones homicide, and
his possession of the Glock on both dates was part of the “same course of conduct” for relevant‑conduct purposes.

The court also found Taylor’s act of throwing a loaded gun into an unknown backyard while fleeing police to be reckless under § 3C1.2. It imposed the statutory maximum of 15 years, which was well below the Guideline range that resulted from the cross‑reference.

B. The Seventh Circuit’s Holdings

The court of appeals affirmed, holding:

§ 2K2.1(c) cross‑reference to murder was proper.
- “Relevant conduct” under § 1B1.3, expressly incorporated by § 2K2.1 Application Note 14(E), includes aiding and abetting and conspiracy liability.
- The requirement that “the defendant used or possessed” the firearm does not preclude vicarious possession via agency principles; personal, physical possession at the homicide is not necessary.
- The September 2 possession and September 19 possession of the same Glock were sufficiently similar, regular, and close in time to form a single course of conduct, making the homicide “relevant conduct” to the felon‑in‑possession offense.
§ 3C1.2 reckless‑endangerment enhancement was correctly applied.
- Taylor did more than merely flee; he threw a loaded firearm over a tall, opaque fence into an occupied residential yard without knowing where it would land, whether anyone (including children) was present, or whether the weapon would discharge.
- He had no basis to rely on any safety mechanism (e.g., Glock’s “Safe Action System”), and in any event, ignorance about such features cannot erase the substantial risk his conduct created.
The 15‑year sentence was substantively reasonable.
- The sentence was within the statutory maximum and the properly calculated Guideline range (as capped by statute).
- The district court gave a detailed and balanced § 3553(a) analysis, considering both aggravating factors (participation in a planned gang murder, repeated firearm possession, risk to the public) and mitigating factors (family background, physical and mental health).
- Relying on uncharged homicide conduct proved by a preponderance for sentencing purposes is permissible under Seventh Circuit precedent and did not violate the jury trial right or any principle from Blakely v. Washington, because the sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum for § 922(g).

III. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Sentencing Guidelines Framework and Relevant Conduct

U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.1, 1B1.2, 1B1.3, 1B1.5
- § 1B1.1 outlines the three‑step process: identify the guideline for the offense of conviction; determine base offense level and specific characteristics, including cross‑references; and apply Chapter Three adjustments.
- § 1B1.3 defines “relevant conduct” to include:
  - acts “committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant” (§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(A)); and
  - certain jointly undertaken criminal activity (Application Notes 3–4, incorporating conspiracy‑like liability).
- § 1B1.5 defines and governs “cross‑references”—instructions to apply the offense level from another guideline when conditions are met, but only if doing so increases the offense level.
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 and Application Note 14(E)
- § 2K2.1 covers firearm possession offenses, including § 922(g)(1).
- Subsection (c)(1) contains the cross‑reference at issue: if the defendant “used or possessed any firearm” cited in the conviction “in connection with” another offense, courts look to the most analogous offense guideline (here, § 2A1.1 for first‑degree murder).
- Application Note 14(E) explicitly instructs courts to apply the relevant‑conduct rule of § 1B1.3 to determine whether earlier conduct with the same weapon is part of the “same course of conduct” or “common scheme or plan.”
- The Note’s example allows an eight‑month gap between two instances of possession for the relevant‑conduct bridge; the 17‑day gap in Taylor is therefore easily within that outer limit.
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 and § 2A1.4 cmt. n.1
- § 3C1.2 adds two levels when a defendant “recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer.”
- The Application Notes import the definition of “reckless” from § 2A1.4: subjective awareness of a substantial risk, coupled with a gross deviation from what a reasonable person would do.
U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2
- § 5C1.2 is the “safety valve” provision. Taylor used its commentary as a contrast, arguing that § 5C1.2(a)(2)’s language about the defendant not possessing a firearm focuses only on personal conduct, unlike the passive‑voice language of § 2D1.1(b)(1) about a weapon being present.
- The Seventh Circuit rejected his attempt to analogize § 2K2.1(c) to § 5C1.2, emphasizing that even § 5C1.2 incorporates aiding‑and‑abetting principles in its commentary.

B. Seventh Circuit Sentencing Methodology Cases

United States v. Brown, 732 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 2013) – Cited for the fundamental proposition that a district court must correctly calculate the Guidelines range and then impose a reasonable sentence under § 3553(a), treating the Guidelines as advisory.
United States v. Pankow, 884 F.3d 785 (7th Cir. 2018) – Emphasizes that adhering to § 1B1.1’s sequencing, while not rigidly mandatory, promotes consistency and facilitates appellate review of the sentencing court’s reasoning.
United States v. Ritsema, 31 F.3d 559 (7th Cir. 1994) – Stands for the principle that courts may consider “events before, during, and after the offense conduct” as relevant conduct, broadening the scope of information that can affect the sentence beyond the specifics of the offense of conviction.
United States v. Shehadeh, 127 F.4th 1058 (7th Cir. 2025) – Cited for the standard of review: de novo review of Guidelines interpretation, clear‑error review for factual findings.
United States v. Ford, 22 F.4th 687 (7th Cir. 2022) – Cited for the clearly erroneous standard: appellate courts will not disturb factual findings unless left with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”

C. Firearms, Relevant Conduct, and Agency Liability

United States v. Jones, 313 F.3d 1019 (7th Cir. 2002) – A key case interpreting § 2K2.1(c). It:
- approves the use of cross‑references to import higher offense levels from other guidelines when warranted, and
- emphasizes that § 1B1.3’s relevant‑conduct framework applies in deciding whether a homicide (or other serious offense) is sufficiently related to the firearm possession offense.
United States v. Harper, 766 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2014) – Holds that firearm possession during drug dealing was relevant conduct for a later firearm offense because the possession was part of a continuous, similar course of conduct. Taylor extends this notion to a murder context.
United States v. Conley, 875 F.3d 391 (7th Cir. 2017) – Affirms that a defendant can be liable for § 922(g) firearm possession by coconspirators under Pinkerton principles even when direct evidence of personal possession is “meager,” if use of firearms is within the scope of, and foreseeable in, the conspiracy.
United States v. Newman, 755 F.3d 543 (7th Cir. 2014) – Applies Rosemond aiding‑and‑abetting principles in a firearms context: a defendant who participates in a crime knowing that a gun will be used can be held liable as an aider and abettor for the firearm offense, even if he never personally holds the weapon.
Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014) – Supreme Court decision: a defendant is liable as an aider and abettor in a firearm offense if he:
- actively participates in the underlying crime, and
- has advance knowledge that a confederate will carry or use a gun during that crime.
The Seventh Circuit uses Rosemond as a conceptual model for saying Taylor had advance knowledge that the Glock would be used in the September 2 murder.
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) – Foundational conspiracy case: coconspirators are liable for substantive offenses committed by others in furtherance of the conspiracy that are reasonably foreseeable. Taylor invokes Pinkerton to reinforce co‑liability for the homicide involving the shared firearm.

D. Reckless Endangerment During Flight

United States v. Lard, 327 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2003) – Establishes that more than mere flight is required for § 3C1.2; there must be “additional conduct” that creates a substantial risk of serious injury. Also references risks from children finding discarded guns and is cited in Taylor both by the defendant (to argue no elevated risk) and the court (to reinforce that discarding loaded weapons is dangerous).
United States v. Easter, 553 F.3d 519 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Brooks, 100 F.4th 825 (7th Cir. 2024); United States v. Brown, 716 F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Ingram, 40 F.4th 791 (7th Cir. 2022) – Collectively illustrate that:
- brandishing, handling, or reaching for a gun while fleeing from police can create sufficient risk (of accidental discharge or inciting police gunfire) to warrant § 3C1.2, even if officers do not actually see the weapon; and
- tossing a loaded gun during flight into an area where others might be present poses a substantial risk of death or serious injury.
United States v. Shivers, 56 F.4th 320 (4th Cir. 2022) – Cited as an example from another circuit concerning risk of accidental discharge during flight; used in Taylor’s attempt to classify prior reckless‑endangerment scenarios.
United States v. Brown, 314 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2003) – Example of risk arising from a discarded firearm later being found by a child or non‑responsible person; referenced via Lard.

E. Uncharged Conduct and Standard of Proof

United States v. Reuter, 463 F.3d 792 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Mitchell, 635 F.3d 990 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Valdez, 739 F.3d 1052 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Harper, 766 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2014) – Together establish that sentencing courts may consider uncharged (and even acquitted) conduct, including serious offenses, under the preponderance‑of‑the‑evidence standard, so long as the resulting sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum and respects substantive reasonableness.

F. Substantive Reasonableness and Review

United States v. White, 126 F.4th 1315 (7th Cir. 2025); United States v. Kowalski, 103 F.4th 1273 (7th Cir. 2024); United States v. Creek, 95 F.4th 484 (7th Cir. 2024); United States v. Taylor, 907 F.3d 1046 (7th Cir. 2018) – Emphasize:
- sentences within the properly calculated Guideline range are presumed reasonable on appeal,
- the appellate standard is abuse of discretion, and
- review asks whether the district judge acted for logical reasons consistent with § 3553(a), not whether the appellate court would have imposed the same sentence.

G. Blakely and the Jury Trial Right

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) – Taylor invokes Blakely’s hypothetical about a judge sentencing a felon‑in‑possession defendant as a murderer, which the Supreme Court there described as an “absurd result” under a mandatory guideline system that treated judicial fact‑finding as raising the “statutory maximum.”
The Seventh Circuit distinguishes Blakely, emphasizing that Taylor’s sentence:
- did not exceed the statutory maximum applicable to § 922(g) (15 years under § 924(a)(8)), and
- arose in an advisory‑Guidelines framework where judicial fact‑finding by a preponderance is still permissible.

IV. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Applying the § 2K2.1(c) Murder Cross‑Reference

1. Textual Analysis and Relevant Conduct

The court starts from the text of § 2K2.1(c)(1): if “the defendant used or possessed any firearm” cited in the offense of conviction “in connection with the commission of another offense” that resulted in death, the court must apply the base offense level for “the most analogous” homicide offense. Two textual prerequisites are key:

The firearm in the felon‑in‑possession count must be the same weapon used in the homicide. This was satisfied via ballistics and circumstantial evidence linking the Glock to the Jones murder and to Taylor’s later possession.
The homicide must be “relevant conduct” to the firearm offense, as defined by § 1B1.3, explicitly imported by Application Note 14(E).

The panel stresses that Application Note 14(E) directly cross‑references § 1B1.3, and § 1B1.3 expressly includes:

aiding and abetting,
inducing or willfully causing conduct, and
jointly undertaken criminal activity (akin to conspiracy liability).

Thus, the Guideline itself invites consideration of agency and conspiracy concepts, undermining Taylor’s textual argument that § 2K2.1(c) is limited to actual, personal possession.

2. “Same Course of Conduct” Between September 2 and September 19

The district court found that:

Taylor’s possession of the Glock on September 2 (during the Jones murder) and on September 19 (during the carjacking aftermath) constituted episodes of the same ongoing firearm possession.
The 17‑day gap falls well within the eight‑month example in Application Note 14(E), which describes how an earlier robbery using the same shotgun can be “relevant conduct” to a later shotgun possession conviction.

Focusing on similarity, regularity, and temporal proximity, the Seventh Circuit agreed that Taylor’s uncharged September 2 firearm possession was part of the same “course of conduct” as the charged September 19 possession. That connection makes the homicide “relevant conduct” for purposes of § 2K2.1(c).

3. Rejecting Taylor’s Textual Limits on Agency Liability

Taylor advanced three main textualarguments to avoid the cross‑reference:

No explicit mention of agency principles in § 2K2.1(c).
The court responded that Application Note 14(E) directs courts to § 1B1.3, which explicitly includes aiding and abetting and conspirator liability. The commentary to § 1B1.3 discusses “jointly undertaken criminal activity,” confirming that co‑liability is baked into relevant conduct analysis.
“The defendant used or possessed” precludes vicarious possession.
Taylor argued this language focuses strictly on the defendant’s own conduct, in contrast to passive‑voice formulations like § 2D1.1(b)(1) (“if a dangerous weapon was possessed”), which courts have interpreted to allow conspirator liability. The panel rejected this narrow reading, noting:
- Seventh Circuit precedent has repeatedly upheld enhancements based on conspirator or accomplice possession even when the underlying Guideline uses active voice (Jones (2018), Bey for example).
- § 2K2.1’s own commentary (Note 14(E)) instructs courts to apply § 1B1.3, which, again, expressly incorporates aiding‑and‑abetting and Pinkerton liability.
Analogy to § 5C1.2’s safety‑valve provision.
Taylor insisted that because § 5C1.2(a)(2) specifically mentions “the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm,” it illustrates how active‑voice language is defendant‑specific and non‑vicarious. The court countered that the commentary to § 5C1.2 still incorporates aiding‑and‑abetting concepts and that, in any event, § 2K2.1’s commentary explicitly directs courts to apply relevant‑conduct principles without such limiting language.

The opinion thus holds that the “defendant used or possessed” phrase is fully compatible with attributing firearm use or possession to the defendant via relevant‑conduct theories of agency and joint criminal activity.

4. No Need for Personal, Physical Possession at the Homicide

The district court found that Taylor:

was culpably involved in the Jones murder as an aider and abettor or coconspirator; and
knew in advance that the Glock would be used in that planned gang hit.

However, the judge declined to find, even by a preponderance, that Taylor himself physically fired the Glock during the murder. Taylor argued that without an explicit finding that he personally possessed the gun on September 2, § 2K2.1(c) could not be triggered.

The Seventh Circuit disagreed. Drawing on:

Conley – § 922(g) liability via Pinkerton even when personal possession is weakly supported, if gun use is central to the planned crime;
Rosemond and Newman – aiding‑and‑abetting firearm liability when the defendant has advance knowledge that a confederate will carry a gun and nevertheless actively participates; and
§ 1B1.3 – including aiding and abetting and joint conduct as relevant conduct,

the court held that Taylor’s advance knowledge and joint participation in the planned murder made him “accountable for the possession of the Glock” by his coconspirator. That sufficed to satisfy § 2K2.1(c)’s requirement that “the defendant used or possessed” the firearm, even absent a finding that he physically had it in hand at the scene.

In short: the cross‑reference can rest on vicarious possession via agency principles, not just direct possession.

B. Application of § 3C1.2: Reckless Endangerment During Flight

1. Legal Standard

To impose the § 3C1.2 enhancement, the government must show that:

the defendant was in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer, and
he recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person.

“Reckless” means:

the defendant was aware of a risk his conduct created, and
his disregard of that risk was a gross deviation from what a reasonable person would do in similar circumstances.

The Seventh Circuit has consistently held that mere flight is insufficient; there must be “additional conduct” that creates the substantial risk. Here, that “additional conduct” was the act of throwing a loaded Glock blindly into a residential backyard.

2. Taylor’s Four‑Category Argument and the Court’s Response

Taylor tried to categorize prior § 3C1.2 firearm cases into four factual patterns:

heightened risk of police firing weapons due to pursuit and visibility of a gun;
risk of accidental discharge while a fleeing defendant handles a gun;
risk from tossing a gun that might discharge upon impact; and
risk from a discarded gun being found by a child or non‑responsible party.

He argued that none of these paradigms applied: police never saw him with the gun; he briefly held the gun only by the magazine; the Glock’s safety system supposedly reduced accidental‑discharge risk; and the gun landed in a relatively obscure portion of the yard.

The court rejected these arguments, relying on detailed factual findings by the district judge:

Taylor did not know:
- where officers were located at the moment he threw the gun,
- whether any adults or children were present in the backyard (a tall, opaque fence blocked his view), or
- where exactly the gun would land.
There was “no basis” to infer that Taylor knew anything about Glock safety features, or that such features would reliably prevent discharge from a thrown gun.
He was aware he was discarding a loaded firearm into a residential property.

Under the deferential clear‑error standard, the Seventh Circuit credited these factual findings and held they supported the conclusion that Taylor’s conduct was reckless within the meaning of § 3C1.2. Even if some prior cases presented more “egregious” facts, the court stressed that his conduct still materially increased the risk of serious harm, particularly given the unknown presence of bystanders and children.

C. Substantive Reasonableness of the 15‑Year Sentence

1. Guideline Range and Presumption of Reasonableness

Once the homicide cross‑reference and § 3C1.2 enhancement were properly applied, the advisory Guideline calculation was:

Base offense level: 43 (first‑degree murder, § 2A1.1)
+2: reckless endangerment (§ 3C1.2)
−3: acceptance of responsibility (§ 3E1.1)

for a total offense level of 42. With criminal history category IV, the range would ordinarily be 360 months to life, but the 15‑year statutory maximum under § 924(a)(8) capped the sentence.

A sentence at the statutory cap that is also within the (statutory‑capped) Guideline range carries a strong presumption of reasonableness. Taylor therefore bore a “heavy burden” to show abuse of discretion.

2. The District Court’s § 3553(a) Analysis

The Seventh Circuit emphasized the thoroughness of the district court’s reasoning. The judge:

considered the “nature and circumstances” of the offense, including:
- the planned, coordinated gang hit on Jones,
- the use of multiple shooters and vehicles, and
- the ongoing pattern of armed gang activity.
considered Taylor’s history and characteristics:
- multiple prior firearm convictions,
- the “enormous risk of recidivism,” and
- his family background and mental/physical health (mitigating factors).
focused on deterrence and public protection:
- finding that Taylor presented a “substantial risk” to public safety,
- concluding that a “much more serious sentence” was needed to promote respect for the law and deter further violent gang conduct.

The district court was careful not to treat Taylor as definitively the shooter, noting it was not prepared to find by a preponderance that he personally fired the Glock. Instead, it relied on his participation in the planned murder and his repeated illegal firearm possession as evidence of dangerousness, while still using the murder cross‑reference as part of the Guideline calculation.

3. Blakely’s “Absurd Result” Hypothetical

Taylor argued that Blakely v. Washington made it constitutionally suspect to sentence a felon‑in‑possession defendant “as a murderer” based on judicial findings. The Seventh Circuit distinguished:

Blakely involved a mandatory state guideline scheme where judicial fact‑finding increased the statutory maximum punishment, thereby implicating the Sixth Amendment jury‑trial right.
In the federal system post‑Booker, the Guidelines are advisory, and courts may find facts by a preponderance so long as they sentence within the statutory range authorized by the jury’s verdict or plea.
Taylor’s 15‑year sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum for § 922(g)(1), so the Sixth Amendment was not violated.

The court acknowledged the rhetorical power of Blakely’s “absurd result” hypothetical but stressed that, under current federal law, sentencing based on uncharged conduct (including homicide) is permissible so long as statutory caps are respected and the sentence is substantively reasonable under § 3553(a).

4. Notice and PSR Concerns

Taylor also complained that he lacked notice of the murder cross‑reference because it was not in the original PSR and only arose after the government later obtained and disclosed homicide evidence. The Seventh Circuit found no due‑process problem:

The plea agreement explicitly warned that “further review of the facts or applicable legal principles may lead the government to conclude that different or additional guidelines provisions apply.”
The district court alerted Taylor at his plea colloquy that the sentence could be as high as the 15‑year statutory maximum.
The court allowed additional time for discovery and briefing related to the murder evidence and held multiple hearings, so Taylor had a full opportunity to contest the cross‑reference.

Against that backdrop, the court saw nothing unreasonable in the district judge considering new, credible information that emerged after the PSR and recalculating the Guidelines accordingly.

V. Impact and Significance

A. Expansion and Clarification of § 2K2.1(c) in the Seventh Circuit

Taylor solidifies and arguably extends prior Seventh Circuit precedent on the homicide cross‑reference in § 2K2.1(c) in three ways:

Affirming that vicarious firearm possession is enough.
The opinion makes explicit that the phrase “the defendant used or possessed any firearm” in § 2K2.1(c) does not require proof that the defendant personally held or fired the gun in the predicate homicide. It is sufficient that:
- the same firearm is involved in both the homicide and the § 922(g) count, and
- the defendant is accountable for its use via aiding‑and‑abetting, conspiracy, or relevant‑conduct principles.
Broadening the practical reach of “relevant conduct.”
By approving a 17‑day “bridge” between two firearm‑possession episodes linked by the same gun and a gang‑activity context, the court reinforces that relevant conduct can encompass temporally separated but substantively related events, particularly where a shared weapon and common criminal scheme are present.
Confirming that uncharged homicide can dominate the Guideline calculation.
The case illustrates that, in practice, the cross‑reference can transform a § 922(g) case from a 3–5 year Guideline range into a de facto homicide sentencing (30 years to life, here limited by statute), all on a preponderance standard. That significantly raises the stakes in felon‑in‑possession prosecutions that are factually tied to homicides.

B. Practical Consequences for Defendants and Counsel

Risk analysis in plea bargaining.
Defense counsel in § 922(g) cases must carefully investigate any possible connection between the firearm and uncharged violent conduct. A plea that appears to limit exposure to a 10‑ or 15‑year statutory maximum may still expose the client to being sentenced “as a murderer” if the cross‑reference is triggered.
Litigation focus on relevant conduct and agency theories.
Challenges to the cross‑reference in future cases will likely target:
- whether the same gun is actually involved (forensic and circumstantial proof),
- whether the defendant genuinely had advance knowledge or joint participation sufficient for Rosemond/Pinkerton liability, and
- whether the prior incident is truly part of the same “course of conduct” as the felon‑in‑possession offense.
State‑federal overlap.
Taylor argued it was unfair to hold him effectively accountable for murder in federal court while still exposed to potential state murder charges. The Seventh Circuit rejected that fairness argument, but it underscores a practical reality: defendants can face substantial federal punishment for uncharged state‑law homicides without the procedural protections of a homicide trial.

C. Clarification of § 3C1.2 Standards in Firearm Flight Cases

The decision contributes to a line of cases that treat discarding loaded firearms during flight as prototypical § 3C1.2 conduct:

It confirms that “additional conduct” need not be as extreme as a high‑speed chase or firing at officers; tossing a loaded gun into an unknown, potentially occupied yard suffices.
It rejects attempts to minimize risk by pointing to supposed firearm safety features or by post hoc descriptions of where the gun landed; what matters is the real‑time uncertainty and danger the defendant knowingly created.

Future defendants who discard loaded guns while fleeing in residential or public areas will face an uphill battle resisting § 3C1.2 in the Seventh Circuit.

D. Endorsement of Robust Use of Uncharged Conduct at Sentencing

Finally, Taylor reinforces the Seventh Circuit’s long‑standing view that:

uncharged and even acquitted conduct (including homicides) may be used to drive a sentence,
the standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence, and
the main constraints are:
- the statutory maximum, and
- the requirement that the final sentence be substantively reasonable in light of § 3553(a).

The opinion thus stands as a strong reaffirmation—despite Blakely’s rhetoric—of the broad discretion sentencing judges enjoy to use uncharged violent conduct in federal sentencing.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Cross‑References vs. Enhancements

Cross‑reference (e.g., § 2K2.1(c)): tells the judge to temporarily step out of the guideline for the crime of conviction and import the base offense level from another guideline (here, the homicide guideline) when certain conditions are met. Used only if it increases the offense level.
Enhancement (e.g., § 3C1.2): increases the offense level within the same guideline to reflect aggravating features of the offense (like endangering others during flight).

B. “Relevant Conduct” and “Same Course of Conduct”

“Relevant conduct” is a sentencing concept that allows the judge to consider more than just the precise act in the conviction. For example:

if someone is convicted of possessing a gun on one date, and proof shows he used the same gun in a robbery months earlier, that earlier robbery can be “relevant conduct” if it is part of the same pattern of illegal firearm activity.

Courts look at:

similarity of the acts,
regularity (how often they occurred), and
time interval between them.

If those factors point to a continuing pattern rather than isolated episodes, earlier conduct can be treated as part of the same course of conduct for sentencing.

C. Aiding and Abetting, Pinkerton, and Rosemond Liability

Aiding and Abetting: You are treated as if you committed the crime yourself if you intentionally help or encourage someone else to do it, knowing what they plan to do.
Pinkerton Conspiracy Liability: If you join a criminal agreement, you may be held responsible for crimes your partners commit to further that agreement, so long as those crimes are reasonably foreseeable.
Rosemond Aiding‑and‑Abetting for Firearms: If you join a robbery and know beforehand that a partner will carry a gun, you can be convicted of the firearm offense even if you never touch the gun, because you chose to continue participating with that knowledge.

At sentencing, these theories mean that someone who plans a crime involving a gun can be treated as having “used or possessed” that gun, even if only an accomplice physically handled it.

D. Reckless Endangerment During Flight (§ 3C1.2)

To be “reckless” in this context means:

you know your actions during flight could seriously hurt someone; and
you ignore that risk in a way that a reasonable person would not.

Examples include:

driving at high speed through crowded streets while fleeing police,
pointing or firing a gun while running from officers, or
tossing a loaded gun into a public or residential area where someone could be hit or could later find and misuse it.

E. Substantive Reasonableness and Standard of Review

A sentence is “substantively reasonable” if:

it fits the seriousness of the crime and the defendant’s background,
it reasonably promotes the goals of sentencing (punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, rehabilitation), and
the judge’s explanation makes clear why that specific length of sentence was chosen.

Appellate courts do not re‑sentence the defendant; they only ask whether the district judge abused his discretion—i.e., whether the sentence was obviously irrational or based on legal error. When a sentence falls within the properly calculated Guideline range, it is presumed reasonable.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Taylor is a powerful demonstration of how the federal sentencing system can—and often does—transform a seemingly “simple” felon‑in‑possession case into a de facto homicide sentencing when the underlying facts support such a conclusion.

Doctrinally, the case:

confirms that § 2K2.1(c)’s homicide cross‑reference can rest on vicarious firearm possession via aiding‑and‑abetting and conspiracy theories, not just on proof that the defendant personally held or fired the weapon;
clarifies that a murder involving the same gun can be “relevant conduct” for a later § 922(g) conviction when the incidents form part of a continuous course of conduct;
solidifies an expansive interpretation of § 3C1.2, holding that blindly tossing a loaded firearm into a residential backyard during flight constitutes reckless endangerment; and
reaffirms that uncharged homicide conduct, proved only by a preponderance, may permissibly drive a sentence up to the statutory maximum, so long as the resulting sentence is substantively reasonable under § 3553(a).

Practically, Taylor serves as a cautionary precedent for defendants and counsel in firearm cases: the factual history of a gun—particularly its involvement in violent offenses—can radically transform federal sentencing exposure, even when the formal conviction is only for § 922(g). For prosecutors and district courts, the decision provides a well‑reasoned roadmap for applying cross‑references and relevant‑conduct principles in complex, multi‑incident firearm cases.

In the broader landscape of federal sentencing law, Taylor sits squarely within a line of cases endorsing robust judicial fact‑finding and extensive use of uncharged conduct, while highlighting the extraordinary leverage the Sentencing Guidelines afford when violent, lethal conduct is tied to a firearm offense.

Vicarious Firearm Possession and Murder Cross‑References Under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c): A Comprehensive Commentary on United States v. Taylor (7th Cir. 2025)