Venue Errors Do Not Defeat Judicial Immunity: Eleventh Circuit Affirms Transfer and Dismissal in Ibhar Al Mheid v. Minchew

Introduction

In Ibhar Al Mheid v. Katy Minchew et al., No. 24-11930 (11th Cir. Oct. 30, 2025) (per curiam) (non-argument calendar) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed three key district court rulings arising from a sprawling pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state-law action:

A transfer of venue from the Northern District of Georgia to the Middle District of Georgia under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a);
A futility ruling preventing amendment to add claims against a state superior court judge because absolute judicial immunity applied; and
A dismissal with prejudice for failure to comply with court orders after repeated missed deadlines and a failure to participate in scheduling.

The litigation stemmed from the end of a relationship between plaintiff-appellant Ibhar Al Mheid, a physician from Atlanta, and Grace Wright, a student in Athens, Georgia. After criminal charges were filed in Athens-Clarke County and later dismissed nolle prosequi, Al Mheid sued four defendants: an Athens-Clarke County police officer (Katy Minchew), an assistant district attorney (Robert Schollmeyer), a superior court judge (Judge Lisa Lott), and the jail medical provider (Armor Health Inc.). He alleged improper arrest procedures, false affidavits and venue representations, unconstitutional searches, deliberate indifference to medical needs, and unlawful judicial detention decisions.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit addressed: (1) whether transfer to the Middle District of Georgia was an abuse of discretion; (2) whether amendment to sue Judge Lott would be futile given judicial immunity; and (3) whether dismissal with prejudice for noncompliance with orders was within the district court’s discretion. The Court affirmed on all points.

Summary of the Opinion

Transfer: Affirmed. The district court properly transferred the case to the Middle District of Georgia under § 1404(a) because a substantial part of the events occurred in Athens-Clarke County (Middle District), and the locus of operative facts, relevant witnesses, and proceedings were centered there. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132 (11th Cir. 2005).
Judicial Immunity/Futility: Affirmed. It would be futile to allow claims against Judge Lott because Georgia superior courts are courts of general jurisdiction, so alleged venue defects do not eliminate subject-matter jurisdiction. Absolute judicial immunity applies to judicial acts unless performed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, which was not the case. See Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2000); McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2018).
Dismissal with Prejudice: Affirmed. Given a repeated pattern of missed deadlines, failure to participate in the scheduling process, and disregard of a show-cause order (after warnings), the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing with prejudice. See Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2005); Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835 (11th Cir. 1989).

Detailed Background

After the relationship ended in December 2020, Grace Wright repeatedly reported to Athens-Clarke County police that Al Mheid had assaulted and stalked her, including while under bond conditions prohibiting contact. Officer Minchew investigated, obtained warrants, and arrested Al Mheid at his Atlanta workplace in May 2021. At an Athens-Clarke County bond hearing before Judge Lisa Lott, testimony from Wright and Minchew resulted in bond revocation. A grand jury later indicted multiple charges (false imprisonment, assault, battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, invasion of privacy, criminal trespass).

While detained, Al Mheid alleged he developed a serious leg infection from shackles and received inadequate treatment from Armor Health Inc. He was released on bond after an outside medical evaluation recommended surgery. In February 2022, a new prosecutor concluded venue was improper for some charges and evidence insufficient for others; the State sought and obtained nolle prosequi, effectively ending the case. Al Mheid later discovered his phone no longer required a passcode, prompting a suspicion of a warrantless search.

In June 2022, he filed suit in the Northern District of Georgia. After motions to dismiss and a substitution and withdrawal of counsel, a first amended complaint dropped claims against Judge Lott, but Al Mheid later sought to re-plead and to file multiple amended versions. The Northern District transferred the case to the Middle District, which struck an overbroad amendment and the shotgun first amended complaint, permitted a third amended complaint (excluding Judge Lott), and set scheduling deadlines. When Al Mheid failed to cooperate in the scheduling conference and ignored a show-cause order, the court dismissed with prejudice. A motion for reconsideration citing CM/ECF problems was denied.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Ross v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 980 F.2d 648 (11th Cir. 1993): Establishes abuse-of-discretion review for transfer decisions. Guided the appellate deference to the district court’s balancing under § 1404(a).
Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132 (11th Cir. 2005): Lists transfer factors (convenience of parties/witnesses, locus of operative facts, access to proof, plaintiff’s forum choice, trial efficiency). The Court relied on these to uphold transfer to the Middle District because virtually all operative events occurred there.
Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2007): Defines futility—amendment is futile if it would still be subject to dismissal. Applied here to bar amendment adding claims against a judge protected by absolute judicial immunity.
Stevens v. Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017): Confirms de novo review for absolute-immunity determinations, framing the standard for the appellate analysis of judicial immunity.
Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2000): States that judges enjoy absolute immunity from damages for judicial acts unless performed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Central to rejecting claims against Judge Lott.
Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc): Clarifies that “absence of jurisdiction” means absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, not mere error or overreach. Informs the distinction between venue error and jurisdictional defect.
McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2018): Emphasizes that finding a judge acted outside subject-matter jurisdiction is rare; judges have immunity even for erroneous or malicious acts if within judicial capacity.
Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2005): Governs dismissals for failure to comply with court orders (extreme sanction requires a clear pattern of delay or willful contempt and inadequacy of lesser sanctions). Anchored the affirmance of dismissal with prejudice.
Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835 (11th Cir. 1989): Disregard of court orders—especially after explicit warnings—supports dismissal; pro se status does not excuse noncompliance.
Wilchombe v. Teevee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949 (11th Cir. 2009): Reconsideration standards; no abuse of discretion in denying reconsideration absent compelling justification such as manifest injustice.
Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 1998): Pro se filings are liberally construed, but litigants must still follow rules and orders. Supports the court’s insistence on compliance despite pro se status.
Hunt v. Aimco Properties, L.P., 814 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2016): Pleading-stage standard: take well-pleaded allegations as true, cited in recounting background facts.
Georgia authorities on jurisdiction: Ga. Const. art. VI, § I, ¶ I and O.C.G.A. § 15-6-8 establish Georgia superior courts as courts of general jurisdiction over criminal cases—dispositive of the immunity analysis.

Legal Reasoning

1) Transfer to the Middle District of Georgia

The district court had broad discretion to transfer under § 1404(a) when “in the interest of justice” and when the case “might have been brought” in the transferee district under § 1391(b). The Eleventh Circuit noted that the “locus of operative facts” and the bulk of defendants’ challenged conduct—investigation, bond proceedings, detention, healthcare—were all in Athens-Clarke County (Middle District). Although a single arrest occurred in the Northern District, the weight of events and parties’ connections strongly favored the Middle District. Given this record, the transfer was within the district court’s “range of choice.”

2) Futility of Amendment: Absolute Judicial Immunity

Rule 15(a)(2) favors liberal amendment, but futility bars leave where the proposed claims would not survive dismissal. The panel held that any damages claim against Judge Lott for actions taken from the bench (revoking bond, denying bond, and ruling on motions) would be barred by absolute judicial immunity.

The plaintiff argued the “clear absence of all jurisdiction” exception: because the alleged conduct had no connection to Athens-Clarke County, Judge Lott supposedly lacked jurisdiction. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this as a confusion of venue with subject-matter jurisdiction. Georgia superior courts are courts of general jurisdiction empowered to hear criminal cases; even if venue was improper for some charges, that is a venue defect, not a subject-matter jurisdiction defect. As McCullough underscores, it is rare to find a judge acting outside subject-matter jurisdiction; even erroneous or overreaching judicial acts remain immunized. Thus, amendment to re-include Judge Lott would be futile.

3) Dismissal with Prejudice for Failure to Comply

Dismissal with prejudice is an extreme sanction reserved for a “clear pattern of delay or willful contempt” coupled with the insufficiency of lesser sanctions. The Middle District provided multiple warnings, struck noncompliant pleadings, extended deadlines, and issued a show-cause order explicitly warning of “immediate dismissal with prejudice.” The plaintiff then missed the show-cause deadline and did not apprise the court of any inability to comply or problems contacting opposing counsel (despite explicit instruction to contact the courtroom deputy if cooperation faltered).

Although the plaintiff later cited CM/ECF notification issues, the court found those technical problems had been resolved months before the relevant orders and, in any event, the plaintiff did not contest actual notice of the scheduling order nor explain why he failed to notify the court of any ongoing difficulties. Under Moon and Betty K, the record supported findings of willful noncompliance and the ineffectiveness of lesser sanctions, justifying dismissal with prejudice and denial of reconsideration.

Impact and Significance

Judicial Immunity Clarified vis-à-vis Venue: The decision underscores that alleged venue defects do not defeat absolute judicial immunity. For § 1983 plaintiffs challenging judicial rulings, the relevant inquiry is whether the judge acted in a judicial capacity with subject-matter jurisdiction—not whether venue was arguably wrong. This distinction is pivotal in Georgia, where superior courts have broad criminal jurisdiction.
Case-Management Enforcement for Pro Se Litigants: The opinion reaffirms that pro se litigants must comply with federal and local rules and court orders. Persistent noncompliance, especially after explicit warnings and opportunities to cure, can and will result in dismissal with prejudice. Courts may strike shotgun pleadings, enforce scheduling mandates, and demand cooperation with opposing counsel.
Transfer Practice in § 1983 Litigation: In multi-district fact patterns, courts will gravitate to the district with the “locus of operative facts.” Arrest in one district alone rarely overrides the weight of investigation, prosecution, detention, and care occurring elsewhere.
Pleading Strategy and Futility: Where absolute immunity is apparent from the face of the claim (judicial acts within subject-matter jurisdiction), courts may deny leave to amend at the outset as futile, conserving judicial resources and limiting avoidable litigation.
Non-Precedential but Persuasive: Though labeled “Not for Publication,” the reasoning is consistent with published Eleventh Circuit doctrine and will be persuasive in future district court practice within the circuit.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 1983: A federal statute allowing individuals to sue state actors for constitutional violations.
Absolute Judicial Immunity: Judges are immune from damages liability for acts taken in their judicial role unless they act without subject-matter jurisdiction. Errors, even serious ones, do not remove immunity.
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction vs. Venue: Subject-matter jurisdiction is a court’s power to hear a type of case (e.g., criminal cases). Venue is the proper geographic location for trial. A venue mistake does not mean the court lacked power over the case.
Futility of Amendment: Courts may refuse amendments that would immediately be dismissed (e.g., because of immunity), avoiding needless litigation steps.
Shotgun Pleading: A complaint that lumps facts and claims together without specifying which facts support which claims. Such pleadings can be struck and must be re-pleaded properly.
Show-Cause Order: A directive requiring a party to explain why a particular sanction (such as dismissal) should not be imposed.
nolle prosequi: A prosecutor’s decision to discontinue criminal charges, typically due to lack of evidence or other reasons.
Per curiam: An opinion issued by the court as a whole rather than authored by a single judge.

Practice Pointers

When suing judges: Distinguish between judicial acts (immunized) and nonjudicial acts, and between lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (possible exception) and venue or procedural errors (not an exception).
Venue and transfer: Anticipate transfer to the district where most operative facts, witnesses, and records are located; a single event in the chosen forum may not carry the day.
Pro se compliance: Heed all deadlines, orders, and local rules. If cooperation issues arise during scheduling, promptly notify the court as instructed.
Amendment strategy: Before seeking leave, assess immunity defenses. Courts may deny leave as futile if the amendment cannot survive a motion to dismiss.
Technical issues: Document and promptly report CM/ECF or notification problems, and confirm receipt of critical orders. Silence after a show-cause order is perilous.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Ibhar Al Mheid v. Minchew reinforces three well-settled but often misunderstood principles. First, transfer under § 1404(a) hinges on the locus of operative facts and the interests of justice, not merely on where one discrete event occurred. Second—and most significantly for § 1983 litigation—venue errors do not defeat absolute judicial immunity; a judge who acts in a judicial capacity within a court of subject-matter jurisdiction remains immune from damages, even if venue is debatable or decisions are erroneous. Third, persistent noncompliance with court orders, after explicit warnings, can justify the extreme sanction of dismissal with prejudice, even for pro se litigants.

As a practical matter, the opinion counsels careful forum selection, precise pleading, respect for case-management directives, and realism about immunity barriers when contemplating damages claims against judicial officers. While unpublished, the ruling coheres with binding Eleventh Circuit doctrine and will resonate in future § 1983 and court-management disputes across the circuit.