V.R.C.P. 19(a) and Prescriptive Spring Easements: Nonparty Intervening Owner Not Required; Reasonable Upgrades Allowed

Introduction

In Amy Logue & Scott Bedell v. Katherine Richmond (Vt. Mar. 14, 2025) (Entry Order), the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed a trial court judgment recognizing defendant Katherine Richmond’s prescriptive easement rights to use and maintain a spring located on plaintiff Scott Bedell’s land, and to maintain the associated water line serving Richmond’s farmhouse.

The dispute arose from the historical configuration of a former 256-acre dairy farm in Kirby, Vermont, where the farmhouse (now Richmond’s property) was historically supplied by a spring located on what is now Bedell’s property. After subdivision and multiple conveyances, Richmond continued to rely on the spring as her sole water source. Bedell sued for a declaration on the scope of Richmond’s access; Richmond counterclaimed for a prescriptive easement and a declaration of associated maintenance and repair rights.

The appeal centered on two issues: (1) whether the owner of an intervening parcel (Laura Todd), over which a portion of the water line runs, was a “necessary party” under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a); and (2) whether the trial court defined the easement’s scope consistently with its historic use.

Important procedural context: the decision is a three-justice panel “Entry Order,” and the Opinion text itself notes such decisions “are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.” Nonetheless, the reasoning provides a useful roadmap for similar disputes.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed. It held that Bedell failed to carry his burden to show that Laura Todd was a necessary party under V.R.C.P. 19(a), because the central issue—Richmond’s right to use and maintain the spring and water line on Bedell’s property—could be adjudicated without affecting Todd’s interests.

The Court also upheld the trial court’s description of the easement’s scope. Although the use of a prescriptive easement depends on past use, the scope may be modified as necessary to maintain the easement’s usefulness so long as the dominant owner does not materially increase the burden on the servient estate. The evidence showed decades of reconstruction, repair, replacement, treatment, and entry onto the spring parcel; thus, rights to update and upgrade the spring box and lines, bury lines deeper to prevent freezing/contamination, and conduct reasonable maintenance were consistent with historic use and not a material increase.

The Court rejected (as irrelevant) Bedell’s argument that Richmond could drill a well, and declined to consider (as waived) a reply-brief argument that the trial court should have specified the precise location of the water line and detailed access mechanics.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Necessary-party doctrine under V.R.C.P. 19(a)

  • Grassy Brook Vill., Inc. v. Richard D. Blazej, Inc., 140 Vt. 477, 482 (1981)
    The Court relied on Grassy Brook Vill. for the allocation of burden: “The moving party bears the burden of advancing a cogent argument on why the absent party is needed to prevent inconsistent or inadequate judgments.” This framing was dispositive because Bedell’s asserted need for Todd did not connect Todd’s interests to the core adjudication (spring rights on Bedell’s land).
  • Thomas v. Olds, 150 Vt. 634, 636 (1988)
    The Court analogized to Thomas to reinforce that adjacent or nearby landowners are not automatically “interested parties” when the litigation concerns rights confined to the named parties’ parcels. Here, Todd “held no interest in plaintiff's or defendant's property,” and the Court treated her position as similarly outside the boundary of the dispute being decided.

2) Scope and evolution of prescriptive easements

  • Rowe v. Lavanway, 2006 VT 47, ¶ 25, 180 Vt. 505 (mem.)
    The Court acknowledged Rowe for the baseline principle that “the use to which a prescriptive easement may be put necessarily depends on past use.” Bedell invoked this principle to argue the trial court expanded the easement beyond its historic footprint.
  • Cmty. Feed Store, Inc. v. Ne. Culvert Corp., 151 Vt. 152, 157 (1989)
    Cmty. Feed Store supplied the countervailing rule: a prescriptive easement’s scope may vary “in some degree” from the originating use if needed for the easement to remain “practically useful,” consistent with Restatement (First) of Property § 477 (1944). The Court used this authority to validate modernization (updates/upgrades) as part of keeping a water-supply easement functional.
  • Dennis v. French, 135 Vt. 77, 79-80 (1977)
    The Court applied Dennis for the limiting principle that the easement holder “cannot materially increase the burden” on the servient estate. The trial court’s permitted activities (digging, burying deeper, upgrading) were assessed against this constraint and found not to constitute a material increase.
  • Haldiman v. Overton, 95 Vt. 478, 481 (1922)
    The Court used Haldiman to emphasize that a spring right includes not just drawing water but also doing what is “reasonably necessary” to make the right effective for its intended purpose—supporting the conclusion that maintenance and protective measures (e.g., preventing freezing/contamination) fall within the easement.
  • Arbuckle v. Ward, 29 Vt. 43, 52 (1856)
    Cited as long-standing recognition that a prescriptive easement related to spring water can include “dig[ging] in the soil for the purpose of repairing or relaying the aqueduct.” This early authority directly supports the proposition that physically accessing, excavating, and repairing conduits is part of the easement’s practical enjoyment.

3) Appellate waiver (reply-brief arguments)

  • Massucco v. Kolodziej, 2024 VT 76, ¶ 22
    The Court relied on Massucco to decline consideration of an argument raised for the first time in Bedell’s reply brief (that the trial court’s order was inadequate for failing to specify exact line placement and access procedures). This reinforces the standard appellate practice rules that structure how issues must be presented.

Legal Reasoning

A. Why Laura Todd was not a necessary party (V.R.C.P. 19(a))

V.R.C.P. 19(a) requires joinder when (1) complete relief cannot be accorded among existing parties, or (2) the absent person claims an interest such that adjudication may impair that person’s ability to protect it, or expose existing parties to inconsistent obligations. The Court focused on the “central issue”: whether Richmond had the right to use and maintain the spring and associated line on Bedell’s property.

Todd’s parcel mattered factually only because part of the water line traversed it. But the Court drew a sharp boundary around the claim actually being decided: the easement rights as to the spring parcel (Bedell) and service to the farmhouse (Richmond). Todd had no interest in either of those parcels. Further, Bedell asserted that any right over Todd’s land arose “based on a deed, rather than prescriptive use,” meaning any conflict about Todd’s land would turn on different legal sources and different evidence than the prescriptive spring use litigated here. On this view, Todd’s absence did not prevent “complete relief” between Bedell and Richmond regarding the spring parcel, nor did it practically impair Todd’s ability to protect any interest she might assert in a separate deed-based dispute.

Critically, Bedell bore the burden to articulate how Todd’s absence would produce inconsistent or inadequate judgments, and he did not do so.

B. The easement’s scope: historic use plus functional modernization

The Court treated the easement’s scope as anchored in historic use (Rowe v. Lavanway) but capable of reasonable evolution to preserve utility (Cmty. Feed Store, Inc. v. Ne. Culvert Corp.), bounded by the “no material increase in burden” rule (Dennis v. French).

On the facts, the spring system had long been actively maintained and periodically rebuilt: a deteriorating stacked-stone spring box was replaced with a concrete one in the early 1960s; hollow cedar-log segments were replaced with modern pipe; later owners continued repairs and replacements, water testing, and treatment (chlorine shocking), and regularly entered onto the spring parcel. Against this evidentiary history, the Court affirmed rights to:

  • update and upgrade the spring box and water lines;
  • bury water lines to sufficient depth to protect from freezing and contamination;
  • enter the servient estate (Bedell’s land) for maintenance, repairs, and improvements;
  • expand the water line if needed to deliver water to the farmhouse (and related typical uses described by the trial court).

The Court reasoned that deeper burial and spring-box excavation/repair are not a material increase in burden when they are reasonably necessary to keep the long-used water supply functional—an approach reinforced by Haldiman v. Overton and Arbuckle v. Ward, both recognizing that spring-water rights carry with them reasonable access and repair work needed to effectuate the right.

C. “They could drill a well” as a non-answer

Bedell’s attempt to limit the easement by pointing to alternative water supply options (a potential well) did not address the legal questions actually before the court: whether the historic use was “open, notorious, hostile and continuous for a period of fifteen years,” and, if so, the scope of that use (citing the elements as framed via Cmty. Feed Store, Inc.). The Court made clear that the prescriptive-easement inquiry is not conditioned on the easement holder proving a lack of alternatives.

D. Waiver of undeveloped remedial-detail arguments

The Court declined to consider a reply-brief argument that the trial court should have specified exactly where the water line must be placed or how access would occur, because it was not raised in the opening brief (Massucco v. Kolodziej). Practically, this signals that parties seeking “engineering-level” specificity should request it at trial and properly preserve the issue on appeal.

Impact

Although nonprecedential by the Opinion’s own terms, the decision is likely to be influential in three ways:

  1. Narrowing “necessary party” arguments in easement cases: Litigants may cite this reasoning to resist joinder of third-party landowners where the court can adjudicate the easement dispute between the dominant and servient estates without determining rights on the third party’s parcel—especially where third-party issues arise under different legal instruments (e.g., deeded rights versus prescription).
  2. Reinforcing modernization within prescriptive scope: The Court endorsed functional upgrades and protective measures (deeper burial, updated piping, spring-box work) when consistent with a history of active maintenance and when not materially increasing burdens—important for aging rural water systems facing freezing, contamination, and code-permitting realities.
  3. Clarifying irrelevance of “available alternatives”: The Court’s rejection of the “just drill a well” argument underscores that prescriptive rights are evaluated based on use and burden, not on whether the dominant owner could avoid needing the easement.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Prescriptive easement
A right to use another’s land acquired through long-term use meeting specific elements (described here as “open, notorious, hostile and continuous” for fifteen years). It is analogous to “adverse possession,” but for use rights rather than ownership.
Dominant vs. servient estate
The dominant estate benefits from the easement (Richmond’s farmhouse parcel). The servient estate bears the burden (Bedell’s spring parcel).
Scope determined by historic use
The right acquired by prescription is shaped by how the use actually occurred over time. But it may include reasonable changes needed to keep the easement usable, so long as they do not materially increase the burden on the servient land.
“Material increase in burden”
A change that significantly worsens the impact on the servient property (more intrusive, more frequent, or more damaging use than the easement historically entailed). The Court treated necessary repair and protective work as non-material where consistent with long practice.
Necessary party (V.R.C.P. 19(a))
Someone who must be joined because the court cannot fully resolve the dispute among existing parties without them, or because deciding the case would practically impair their interests or risk inconsistent obligations for existing parties.
Waiver on appeal
Appellate courts generally will not consider arguments raised too late (e.g., first appearing in a reply brief), because the opposing party lacks a fair chance to respond and the trial court lacked a fair chance to address it.

Conclusion

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed recognition and functional definition of a prescriptive spring-water easement, holding (1) a third-party intervening landowner was not a necessary party under V.R.C.P. 19(a) where the adjudication concerned rights on the named parties’ parcels and any third-party dispute would arise under different deed-based facts; and (2) the easement’s scope could include reasonable entry, repair, upgrades, and protective measures consistent with decades of historic maintenance, so long as the burden on the servient estate was not materially increased. Even as a nonprecedential entry order, the decision offers practical guidance for litigating rural water-supply easements and for distinguishing joinder problems from the merits.