Introduction

In Stollman v. Williams, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the City of New York, Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) personnel, and several school employees in a wide-ranging civil rights suit brought by parents of a severely autistic, nonverbal child, E.S. The case arises from school officials’ mandated-reporting of suspected neglect and sexual abuse to ACS, a subsequent ACS home visit and physical inspection of the child, an emergency separation of the father from the home, and the filing (and later withdrawal) of a Family Court Article 10 petition.

The parents (Suemuel and Elisa Stollman) asserted First Amendment retaliation claims against school actors, Fourth Amendment claims against ACS for an allegedly coercive search and for malicious prosecution based on the Article 10 petition, and Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due process claims premised on the removal and the handling of the investigation. The Second Circuit (Judges Walker, Carney, and Sullivan) affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on all federal claims, and the consequent dismissal of related municipal liability and state-law claims.

Although issued as a nonprecedential Summary Order (and therefore not binding precedent under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1), the decision provides practical and persuasive guidance in several recurring child-protection contexts:

• It reiterates the “unusual deference” owed to mandated reporters, limiting the circumstances in which a school’s hotline report can count as “adverse action” for First Amendment retaliation purposes.
• It underscores that parental consent can render a child’s body inspection reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, even when a caseworker references job duties or obligations during the request.
• It confirms that qualified immunity shields child-protection officials from § 1983 “malicious prosecution” claims premised on the initiation of Article 10 proceedings, because any such right is not clearly established.
• It reaffirms that emergency removal without a pre-deprivation hearing can satisfy due process when there is an objectively reasonable basis for imminent risk (including suspected sexual abuse), and that brief, court-reviewed separations ordinarily do not “shock the conscience” for substantive due process purposes.

Summary of the Opinion

• First Amendment retaliation (School Defendants): Affirmed for defendants. Even assuming a temporal link between the parent’s complaints and the school’s ACS report, no reasonable factfinder could deem the report “adverse” or retaliatory in light of the “unusual deference” owed to mandated reporters and the absence of evidence of retaliatory intent.
• Fourth Amendment – unreasonable search (ACS Defendants): Affirmed for defendants. The parents consented to the ACS caseworker’s visual inspection of the child’s body during the home visit; the consent was voluntary and uncoerced.
• Fourth Amendment – malicious prosecution (ACS Defendants): Affirmed for defendants on qualified immunity. The Second Circuit has not recognized malicious-prosecution claims in the Article 10 (child-protection) context. Any purported right was not clearly established.
• Fourteenth Amendment due process (ACS Defendants): Affirmed for defendants. Procedural due process was satisfied because there was an objectively reasonable basis for emergency action, the brief pre-hearing separation was reasonable, and the investigation met constitutional minimums. Substantive due process was not violated because the separation was brief, supervised by Family Court, and not arbitrary or conscience-shocking; post-conference separation was consented to and approved by Family Court.
• Monell and state-law claims: Monell liability failed due to absence of a constitutional violation; the court affirmed dismissal of state claims without prejudice to refiling in state court.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Cox v. Warwick Valley Central School District, 654 F.3d 267 (2d Cir. 2011): The core source for “unusual deference” to mandated reporters. Cox holds that, absent a clear showing of retaliatory or punitive intent, a school’s protective reporting cannot be treated as adverse or retaliatory action for First Amendment purposes. Stollman leans heavily on Cox to reject the parents’ retaliation claim.
• Dole v. Huntington Union Free School District, 699 F. App’x 85 (2d Cir. 2017): Reinforces that school officials who have a sufficient basis to suspect abuse are owed unusual deference in deciding to report suspected abuse. Used in tandem with Cox.
• Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1999) and N.G. v. Connecticut, 382 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2004): Establish that body inspections of children implicate Fourth Amendment interests and generally require parental consent or judicial authorization absent exigency. Stollman applies these principles but finds valid consent.
• Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968): Consent is invalid if given only in acquiescence to a claim of official authority. Cited to frame the voluntariness analysis; the court distinguishes this case on the facts.
• United States v. Ruiz-Estella, 481 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1973), and United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1973): Examples where consent was deemed coerced (secluded stairwell search; entry with gun in hand and arrest announcement). Used to show how much more coercive circumstances look when consent is invalid; contrasted with the consensual, in-home, parent-assisted inspection here.
• Van Emrik v. Chemung County Department of Social Services, 911 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1990): No consent when parents were not consulted and believed additional x-rays were medically necessary. Stollman uses Van Emrik as a counter-example, emphasizing that here the parents were consulted, present, and assisted.
• Terebesi v. Torreso, 764 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2014): Restates qualified immunity’s test: violation of a statutory/constitutional right that was clearly established at the time. Frames the immunity analysis on the Article 10 malicious prosecution theory.
• Alexander v. City of Syracuse, 132 F.4th 129 (2d Cir. 2025): Collects the elements of malicious prosecution in the § 1983 context and refers to “criminal proceedings.” Stollman relies on Alexander’s “criminal proceeding” formulation to underscore why extending malicious prosecution to Article 10 is at best unsettled.
• Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2010): Another malicious prosecution case premised on criminal proceedings; used to highlight the criminal anchor of the claim.
• Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2010): District court opinion rejecting malicious-prosecution claims connected to neglect/abuse proceedings in the absence of arrest or detention; supports the conclusion that no clearly established right exists.
• Booker v. Graham, 974 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2020): Clarifies that qualified immunity applies where the right is not clearly established by prior case law; supports immunity on the Article 10 theory.
• Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 84 F.3d 511 (2d Cir. 1996): Permits emergency child removal preceding a hearing where there is an objectively reasonable basis to believe an imminent threat exists; undergirds the procedural due process holding.
• Southerland v. City of New York, 680 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2012): Explains that the peril of sexual abuse can constitute imminent danger for emergency removal, and that brief, pre-hearing separations to maintain safety generally do not violate substantive due process. Central to both the procedural and substantive due process analysis.
• Cecere v. City of New York, 967 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1992): A four-day delay to a post-removal hearing did not violate due process; used to show that the three-day delay here was constitutionally adequate.
• Wilkinson ex rel. Wilkinson v. Russell, 182 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 1999): Emphasizes “unusual deference” to child-welfare caseworkers and the standard that an investigation passes muster if there is a reasonable basis for findings. Applied to reject claims of investigative inadequacy and alleged evidence fabrication.
• Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and Barrett v. Orange County Human Rights Commission, 194 F.3d 341 (2d Cir. 1999): Without an underlying constitutional violation, municipal liability cannot lie; applied to dispose of Monell claims.
• Statutes: New York Family Court Act Article 10 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1011 et seq.); Family Court Act § 1028 (return-of-custody hearings); New York Social Services Law § 413(1)(a) (mandated reporter duty upon “reasonable cause to suspect” abuse).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. First Amendment Retaliation and “Unusual Deference” to Mandated Reporters

The parents alleged that, to retaliate for the mother’s complaints about E.S.’s care (bruising and wet diapers), school staff initiated an ACS report falsely suggesting neglect and sexual abuse. The court accepted that the mother’s complaints were protected speech and that at least one school psychologist knew of them. But even assuming temporal proximity (a call to ACS one day after the latest complaint) could suggest causation, the claim fails at the “adverse action” step.

Under Cox and Dole, mandated reporters such as teachers receive “unusual deference,” and their protective decisions are not “adverse” absent a clear showing of retaliatory or punitive intent. The parents offered no evidence of such intent or knowing falsity. The record instead showed:

• Persistent hygiene concerns communicated by school staff to ACS.
• Emotionally concerning behavior (E.S. returning home crying).
• Repeated, contextually troubling sequences selected by E.S. on her school-provided iPad (e.g., “sleeping bag,” “men,” “thick more men,” and “man, finger, butt,” although embedded within longer strings).
• Reports that conscientiously described observations and never asserted that sexual abuse had occurred, nor accused the father; ACS’s summary expressly noted unknown causation and actor.

The court emphasized that mandatory reporters have a statutory duty to report when they have “reasonable cause to suspect” abuse (N.Y. Soc. Serv. L. § 413(1)(a)) and are not required to rule out all alternative explanations before reporting. On this record, no reasonable juror could infer adverse or retaliatory action.

2. Fourth Amendment: Consent to a Child’s Body Inspection During ACS Home Visit

A child’s body inspection implicates the Fourth Amendment, and absent exigent circumstances generally requires parental consent or a court order. Here, the court found valid consent:

• Both parents acknowledged the caseworker asked to look for “marks or bruises,” and both agreed, with the father testifying he agreed that a “body check” should be conducted.
• Alleged statements by the caseworker such as “I have to look” and “It’s my job” did not amount to coercion under Bumper, Ruiz-Estella, or Mapp. The encounter lacked the hallmarks of coercion: no display of weapons, arrest-like pronouncements, or isolating conditions. The parents remained present throughout and assisted.
• Unlike Van Emrik, the parents were consulted and did not believe they were authorizing medically necessary (non-consensual) procedures.

With voluntary consent, the inspection was reasonable and the Fourth Amendment claim failed.

3. Fourth Amendment: Qualified Immunity on “Malicious Prosecution” Based on Article 10 Petition

The parents argued that filing an Article 10 neglect/abuse petition constituted malicious prosecution under § 1983. The panel resolved the claim on qualified immunity:

• Second Circuit malicious-prosecution jurisprudence (e.g., Alexander, Manganiello) frames the tort around a criminal proceeding. The court “has never found” that initiating a child-removal proceeding gives rise to such a claim, and district authority (Emerson) rejects it absent arrest or detention.
• Because no clearly established law authorizes a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim premised on Article 10 child-protection petitions, qualified immunity applies (Booker).

4. Fourteenth Amendment: Procedural and Substantive Due Process

The parents claimed that requiring the father’s temporary removal from the home (initial three days and then extended until February 14, 2018) violated due process.

Procedural due process permits pre-hearing emergency action when officials have an objectively reasonable basis to believe an imminent threat to a child’s safety exists (Gottlieb). The mix of E.S.’s concerning iPad selections, emotional distress, and—critically—the caseworker’s personal observation of what she deemed inappropriate contact supplied such a basis, particularly given the recognized “peril of sexual abuse” as an imminent danger (Southerland). A three-day delay to the post-deprivation hearing was within acceptable bounds (Cecere).

As to the adequacy of the investigation, courts accord “unusual deference” to child-welfare determinations, and an investigation meets constitutional requirements if caseworkers have a reasonable basis for their findings (Wilkinson). Here, the caseworker’s direct observations provided significant support. The court rejected the parents’ contrary opinions from a caregiver and pediatrician as falling short of “overwhelming exculpatory information” that would constitutionally compel credit over the caseworker’s account. The court also found no viable “fabricated evidence” theory: the caseworker described her observations; there was no allegation she perjured herself or invented facts.

Substantive due process requires conduct so “shocking, arbitrary, and egregious” that due process would condemn it even with procedural safeguards (Cox). Brief pre-hearing separations to protect a child pending judicial review generally do not meet that standard (Southerland). After the child-safety conference, both Family Court approval and the father’s consent (through counsel) broke the causal chain, precluding attribution of continued separation to ACS, particularly absent fabrication or deception. Family-court-approved home visits did not produce a substantive due process violation, and, in any event, no actual loss of custody persisted to support such a claim (Cox).

5. Monell and State-Law Claims

With no underlying constitutional violation, the plaintiffs’ municipal-liability theory failed (Monell; Barrett). The court also affirmed the district court’s decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims, dismissing them without prejudice to refiling in state court.

C. Impact and Practical Implications

• Mandated reporters (schools, educators, clinicians): This decision fortifies the protective space Cox created. When reasonable cause to suspect exists, well-documented mandated reports will rarely qualify as “adverse action” in retaliation suits absent clear proof of punitive motive or knowing falsity. Careful, neutral documentation (and avoiding conclusory accusations) remains best practice.
• Child-welfare investigations (ACS and counterparts): The opinion affirms that voluntary parental consent—properly requested, without coercive trappings—validates limited body inspections during home visits. Caseworkers should phrase requests as requests (not commands), avoid claims of authority, ensure parents are present, and record voluntary agreement. This decreases litigation risk under Bumper and its progeny.
• Malicious prosecution theories in Article 10 cases: The Second Circuit confirms there is no clearly established right supporting § 1983 malicious-prosecution claims based on Article 10 filings. Plaintiffs should expect qualified immunity to bar such claims absent future clarifying precedent. Alternative theories (e.g., fabrication-of-evidence within due process frameworks) must meet high evidentiary standards.
• Due process benchmarks in emergency removals: The decision consolidates guidance that suspected sexual abuse can justify immediate, pre-hearing safety measures when supported by an objectively reasonable basis (including contemporaneous caseworker observations). Prompt post-deprivation hearings within a few days are adequate, and court-approved/consented separations break causation for continued deprivation claims.
• Special-needs contexts and AAC (iPad) communication: The court treated the child’s iPad word selections as legitimately contributing to reasonable suspicion—especially when coupled with behavioral cues and staff testimony that E.S. used the device to communicate. Schools and agencies may rely on such AAC outputs as part of the totality of circumstances; plaintiffs disputing reliability should be prepared to counter with robust, case-specific evidence.
• Nonprecedential but instructive: While this is a Summary Order without precedential effect, it will be persuasive in district courts within the Second Circuit on recurring issues involving mandated reporting, consent-based body checks, and qualified immunity for Article 10-initiated litigation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Summary Order: A decision that can be cited but does not carry precedential force. It often resolves fact-bound or settled legal issues.
• Mandated Reporter: Certain professionals (e.g., teachers, doctors) legally required to report suspected child abuse or neglect to child-protection authorities upon “reasonable cause to suspect.”
• Article 10 Proceeding: A New York Family Court case to determine whether a child has been abused or neglected and to order protective measures if necessary.
• Child-Safety Conference: A meeting quickly convened by child-protection agencies to assess risk and safety planning; often precedes or accompanies Family Court involvement.
• Qualified Immunity: A doctrine shielding government officials from civil damages unless they violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable official would know.
• Malicious Prosecution (§ 1983): A constitutional tort most commonly anchored to criminal proceedings; elements include initiation or continuation of a proceeding, favorable termination, lack of probable cause, malice, and a liberty deprivation. In Stollman, its application to Article 10 proceedings was deemed not clearly established.
• “Unusual Deference”: Judicial deference recognizing the high-stakes, quick-judgment nature of child-protection actions by mandated reporters and caseworkers, absent clear proof of bad faith.
• Imminent Risk/Emergency Removal: Officials may act without a pre-removal hearing if an objectively reasonable basis suggests immediate danger to a child’s safety (e.g., suspected sexual abuse).
• Monell Liability: Municipal liability for constitutional violations requires an underlying violation and a policy, custom, or practice causing it; no violation means no Monell liability.
• FCA § 1028 Hearing: A Family Court proceeding where a parent seeks the child’s (or parent’s) return after an emergency removal; rapid scheduling is intended to satisfy due process.
• Fabricated Evidence Claim: A due process theory alleging officials knowingly created false evidence that deprived a person of a fair proceeding. Mere disagreement with interpretations does not constitute fabrication.

Conclusion

Stollman v. Williams affirms a comprehensive defense victory across First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment fronts in a sensitive child-protection setting. The court’s reasoning reinforces several durable principles: mandated reporters receive unusual deference absent clear retaliatory motive; parental consent renders limited body inspections reasonable; qualified immunity protects officials from novel § 1983 theories tethered to Article 10 filings; and emergency removals predicated on a reasonable basis—especially for suspected sexual abuse—satisfy due process when followed by prompt judicial oversight.

Although nonprecedential, the decision provides a clear blueprint for schools and child-welfare agencies on documenting reasonable suspicion, soliciting consent without coercion, and navigating emergency safety plans with judicial involvement. For litigants, it signals the evidentiary rigor needed to overcome deference in retaliation claims, to invalidate consent to searches, to plead cognizable due process violations, and to avoid the qualified-immunity bar in family-court-linked civil rights suits.

The bottom line: the Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment for all defendants, leaving no federal claims standing and the plaintiffs’ state-law theories to potential state-court adjudication. The opinion’s careful application of settled standards to a complex special-needs context will likely be influential in future disputes at the intersection of education, child protection, and constitutional law.