4. Analysis: Legal Reasoning and Precedents Cited
A. Standards of review shaped the appeal
The court did not reconsider every disputed question from the beginning. Different standards required different degrees of deference, and those differences explain much of the outcome.
United States v. Jordan, 316 F.3d 1215, 1249 (11th Cir. 2003), supplied the general definition of abuse of discretion: a district court exceeds its permissible discretion when it applies an incorrect legal standard or relies on clearly erroneous factual findings. That framework governed the hearing decision and informed review of the sentence.
For sentencing procedure, United States v. Caldwell, 81 F.4th 1160, 1175, 1184 (11th Cir. 2023), established that an incorrectly calculated Guidelines range can render a sentence procedurally unreasonable. United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc), required independent review of Guidelines interpretation. By contrast, United States v. Clarke, 562 F.3d 1158, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009), required clear-error review of factual findings supporting enhancements, including sophisticated means. Under that standard, disagreement with a plausible finding is insufficient; the appellate court must have a definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.
Unpreserved claims faced a separate obstacle. United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir. 2005), required an error that was plain and affected substantial rights. Its discussion of unresolved law, reinforced by United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1239 (11th Cir. 2010), became decisive on attorneys’ fees: where neither explicit statutory language nor controlling precedent resolves the issue, a defendant ordinarily cannot establish the necessary obvious legal error.
B. Private retaliation did not establish entitlement to a vindictive-prosecution hearing
Governing precedents
United States v. Barner, 441 F.3d 1310, 1315–17 (11th Cir. 2006), supplied the central framework. Prosecutorial charging decisions generally are not subject to judicial interference when probable cause supports the prosecution. Where no presumption of vindictiveness applies, including in the pretrial setting addressed here, the defendant must establish actual vindictiveness.
United States v. Spence, 719 F.2d 358, 361 (11th Cir. 1983), identified the constitutional limit: the government may not prosecute a person in retaliation for exercising protected statutory or constitutional rights. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982), explained the underlying distinction between punishment for unlawful conduct and punishment for exercising a protected right.
On review, United States v. Barsoum, 763 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2014), governed denial of an evidentiary hearing, while United States v. Kendrick, 682 F.3d 974, 981 (11th Cir. 2012), governed refusal to dismiss an indictment for vindictive prosecution. Both required abuse-of-discretion review.
Application and limits
Kanyadan’s difficulty was not simply insufficient proof of a prosecutor’s motive. He expressly based his claim on Mohawk’s alleged animus rather than the prosecutor’s own retaliation. The Eleventh Circuit had not adopted his proposed doctrine attributing a private complainant’s motives to the prosecution.
The court therefore treated the motion as legally insufficient under existing circuit law. Because the asserted theory did not establish entitlement to dismissal, the district court was not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing to investigate it.
This reasoning should not be overstated. The opinion did not establish that a private complainant’s conduct can never matter to a constitutional challenge. It rejected this claim as framed under an unaccepted legal theory. Nor did the court decide whether Kanyadan’s guilty plea waived the hearing issue; it expressly bypassed waiver because the claim failed on the merits.
C. The plea colloquy was evaluated as a whole, not by a rigid script
Understanding the charges
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 requires the court to ensure that a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. Under United States v. Presendieu, 880 F.3d 1228, 1238–40 (11th Cir. 2018), the central concerns are freedom from coercion, understanding the charges, and understanding the plea’s consequences.
United States v. Presendieu also rejected a mechanical approach to explaining charges. The judge need not personally recite every statutory element. The controlling question is whether the defendant understood the conduct admitted and understood that it constituted the charged crimes. The defendant’s intelligence and sophistication are relevant to that contextual assessment.
Kanyadan argued that the judge improperly relied on the prosecutor to explain the offenses and did not adequately confirm his understanding. The court instead considered the complete record: consultation with counsel, identification of the counts, agreement with the factual proffer, express admissions of guilt, and an opportunity to identify any confusion. His educational qualifications and executive experience provided additional support.
Those circumstances defeated the contention that the colloquy substantially failed to address a core Rule 11 concern. Education alone would not establish a valid plea, but here it supplemented direct acknowledgments made during the hearing.
The judge’s skeptical pretrial comment
Rule 11(c)(1) prohibits judicial participation in plea-agreement discussions. In United States v. Harrell, 751 F.3d 1235, 1236–39 (11th Cir. 2014), the relevant prejudice inquiry was whether, absent the judge’s improper exhortations, the defendant probably would have exercised the right to trial. United States v. Castro, 736 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2013), required attention to the full circumstances, including later sworn statements denying coercion.
The challenged remark expressed skepticism that a jury would accept Kanyadan’s retaliation theory. But it occurred while the court addressed a motion in limine, not during plea negotiations. The appellate court therefore found no plain violation of the prohibition on judicial plea participation.
It also found no demonstrated prejudice. Kanyadan subsequently acknowledged his right to trial, denied threats or coercion, and stated that he was pleading guilty because he was guilty. Two additional comments identified on appeal occurred after acceptance of the plea and therefore could not have caused his earlier decision to plead.
The holding is contextual, not an endorsement of judicial predictions about a defense’s prospects. The timing, purpose, and demonstrated effect of a comment remain important.
D. Sophisticated means depended on the coordinated scheme, not exotic financial devices
Section 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) authorizes a two-level enhancement when the defendant intentionally engages in or causes sophisticated means. Kanyadan argued that his conduct was ordinary overbilling, without offshore accounts or complex financial transactions.
United States v. Feaster, 798 F.3d 1374, 1380–82 (11th Cir. 2015), directed courts to examine the totality of the conduct. Relevant considerations included exploiting an organizational position and taking affirmative steps to conceal the fraud or evade detection. This approach prevented the analysis from becoming a checklist of unusually elaborate financial techniques.
The evidence showed an integrated arrangement: formation and registration of a separate company, use of a website and email accounts, creation of fictitious employees, manipulation of Mohawk’s supplier system, and diversion of business through Kanyadan’s executive authority. These measures both implemented and concealed the scheme.
Under United States v. Clarke, the question was whether the district court clearly erred in characterizing this combined conduct as sophisticated. It did not. The decision does not mean that incorporating a business or using email automatically warrants an enhancement; the coordinated use of those tools to perpetrate and conceal fraud was decisive.
E. Loss credits protected genuine value, not the fraudulent intermediary’s margin
The controlling loss principles
United States v. Campbell, 765 F.3d 1291, 1301–05 (11th Cir. 2014), was the principal substantive authority. In an overbilling case, loss ordinarily reflects the difference between the amount billed and the value of legitimate services delivered. Where an enterprise is “permeated with fraud,” the court may begin with all transferred funds, but it must still credit actual legitimate value received by the victim.
The same decision limits those credits. A defendant may not deduct costs incurred to operate the fraud or claim credit for value supplied solely to conceal or perpetuate it. Ordinary business expenses do not become deductible simply because an honest enterprise might incur comparable expenses.
United States v. Horn, 129 F.4th 1275, 1298 (11th Cir. 2025), reinforced the principle that Guidelines loss uses the greater of actual or intended loss. United States v. Cavallo, 790 F.3d 1202, 1232 (11th Cir. 2015), established both clear-error review and the rule that sentencing requires a reasonable estimate, not mathematical precision.
The calculation accepted here
| Component |
Amount or treatment |
| Total invoiced |
$3,016,011.40 |
| Payments received from Mohawk |
$1,857,741.40 |
| Legitimate consultant payments credited |
$1,037,164 |
| Actual loss used in the Guidelines calculation |
$820,577.40 |
| Unpaid invoices |
$1,158,270 |
| Projected loss on unpaid invoices |
Estimated using the approximately 44.17% retained from paid invoices |
| Combined Guidelines loss estimate |
$1,332,193.38 |
The method recognized actual value by deducting payments for legitimate consultant work. It then estimated the fraudulent component of unpaid invoices using the scheme’s demonstrated retention rate. This combined completed losses with projected losses on different, unpaid transactions rather than counting the same loss twice.
Kanyadan sought a larger deduction based on what another supplier might have charged, arguing that Meta Tech deserved a legitimate commercial margin. The court rejected that claim on the facts. Mohawk already employed the individuals performing Meta Tech’s intermediary functions and could have obtained that work internally. Meta Tech’s claimed additional expenses and profits therefore did not demonstrate compensable value to Mohawk.
The resulting loss supported the 14-level enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H). Importantly, the decision does not categorically deny legitimate businesses credit for reasonable service value or profit. It rejects a claimed margin within this concealed, fraud-permeated enterprise where the supposed intermediary services were unnecessary to the victim.
F. Restitution: affirmance without resolving attorney-fee eligibility
The statutory framework
United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213, 1223 (11th Cir. 2020), described the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act’s requirement of restitution for identifiable victims suffering pecuniary loss from qualifying offenses. The disputed provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(4), covers specified losses and “other expenses” incurred through participation in the investigation or prosecution, or attendance at related proceedings.
Kanyadan renewed his objection to the underlying actual-loss calculation. The court rejected it for the reasons supporting the Guidelines calculation. That conclusion did not make the restitution figure identical to Guidelines loss: the two calculations serve different purposes, and the Guidelines estimate included intended loss on unpaid invoices.
The Supreme Court’s limitation in Lagos
In Lagos v. United States, 584 U.S. 577, 582, 585 (2018), the Supreme Court held that the provision does not encompass expenses from private investigations or civil proceedings. Its reasoning read “other expenses” in light of the expressly listed categories, including lost income, child care, and transportation.
That ruling constrained restitution, but it did not clearly answer the specific question presented here: whether attorneys’ fees incurred in participating in a government criminal investigation or prosecution are recoverable.
The Third Circuit’s contrary position
United States v. Abrams, 165 F.4th 784, 792, 812–16 (3d Cir. 2026), directly addressed that question and rejected recovery. Relying on Lagos v. United States and statutory-construction principles, the Third Circuit reasoned that potentially substantial legal fees were unlike the modest, incidental expenses expressly enumerated. It considered it unlikely that Congress placed such substantial liability in a residual phrase within an ancillary reimbursement provision.
The Eleventh Circuit discussed that reasoning but did not adopt or reject it. A decision from another circuit was persuasive authority, not binding authority establishing plain error.
Why preservation controlled the outcome
United States v. Utsick, 45 F.4th 1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 2022), required plain-error review of restitution challenges first raised on appeal. Although Kanyadan had disputed the claimed expenses below, he had not preserved the categorical statutory objection that attorneys’ fees were unavailable under the MVRA.
Applying United States v. Moriarty and United States v. Frank, the court held that the absence of controlling precedent or explicit statutory resolution prevented a showing of plain error. The opinion likewise rejected his challenge to the fees as unreasonable, observing that he had not supplied binding precedent supporting reversal.
The narrow holding is procedural: the fee award survived this unpreserved appeal. The court did not hold that the MVRA affirmatively authorizes attorney-fee restitution, nor did it conduct a detailed, itemized assessment establishing that every charged expense was necessary or reasonable.
The record also contains different preliminary restitution figures. The final award was $985,166.66, but the opinion does not fully reconcile its components with every amount in the presentence report. A commentary therefore should not assign a precise final attorney-fee subtotal that the court itself did not identify.
G. The above-Guidelines sentence remained within the district court’s discretion
United States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2023), required deferential abuse-of-discretion review of substantive reasonableness. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc), supplied the demanding reversal standard: the sentence must fall outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts because of a clear error in weighing the statutory factors.
The district court acknowledged Kanyadan’s favorable history but emphasized his leadership, abuse of executive authority, offense seriousness, and lack of remorse. United States v. Olson, 127 F.4th 1266, 1276 (11th Cir. 2025), supported unequal weighting of the § 3553(a) factors. A sentencing judge need not give mitigating circumstances the weight the defendant requests.
The court also relied on United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1362 (11th Cir. 2014), which treats a sentence substantially below the statutory maximum as an indicator of reasonableness. Kanyadan’s 90-month sentence was below the applicable 20-year maximum. That consideration supported, but did not independently establish, reasonableness.
The disparity argument also failed. Under United States v. Mullings, 166 F.4th 939, 957 (11th Cir. 2026), and United States v. Sotis, 89 F.4th 862, 880 (11th Cir. 2023), a disparity does not demonstrate unreasonableness when the defendants are not similarly situated. Kanyadan led the scheme and exploited his CIO position; Thiyagasamadram, who received ten months, was a subordinate acting at his direction.
Finally, the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction did not prevent the court from evaluating Kanyadan’s remorse when selecting the ultimate sentence. The opinion treated his continued portrayal of the enterprise as initially altruistic as relevant to that broader assessment.