Unreasonable Delay in Producing Emails Warrants Separate $1,000 Statutory-Damage Awards per Distinct Public-Records Request

Case: State ex rel. Macksyn v. Spencer, 2026-Ohio-44 Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Date: Jan. 13, 2026 Posture: Mandamus (public records)

1. Introduction

This original action arises from multiple public-records requests made by relator Delanor L. Macksyn, an inmate, to employees of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“DRC”): Kenneth Spencer, LeAnn Walker-Williams, and Kelly Rose. Macksyn submitted requests via electronic “kites,” a prison correspondence system.

After the Supreme Court of Ohio’s earlier decision in State ex rel. Macksyn v. Spencer, 2025-Ohio-2116 largely denied mandamus relief but granted a limited writ concerning specific email requests, the remaining question was statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(2): whether respondents failed to comply with their obligations under R.C. 149.43(B) by taking an unreasonable time to produce records (or to properly deny requests).

The key issues in this damages phase were:

• Whether respondents’ delay in producing emails responsive to the April 4 and April 21, 2024 requests was “unreasonable,” triggering statutory damages.
• Whether Macksyn was entitled to damages for the March 12, 2024 request when respondents ultimately certified that no responsive email existed.
• Whether multiple requests warranted multiple statutory-damage awards (i.e., whether one request was merely follow-up correspondence to another).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court (per curiam) awarded Macksyn $2,000 in statutory damages: $1,000 for the April 4 request and $1,000 for the April 21 request. The court found the more-than-one-year delay in producing those emails—until July 1, 2025, after the limited writ—was unreasonable under R.C. 149.43(B), and it applied the statutory cap of $1,000 per request under R.C. 149.43(C)(2).

The court denied damages for the March 12 request because respondents certified that no responsive email existed and because Macksyn did not clearly request the general law-library policy that was later supplied. It also denied damages for a March 15 request where the records were provided after an approximately three-week delay that the court did not deem unreasonable.

Procedurally, the court denied as moot Macksyn’s “motion to proceed to judgment on statutory damages” (not required by rule) and denied his “motion to strike” respondents’ opposition memorandum, treating it as an improper reply under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.01(B)(2).

Separate opinion: Chief Justice Kennedy concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing with $2,000 for the April requests but arguing for an additional $1,000 for March 12 because, in her view, respondents failed to properly deny that request under R.C. 149.43(B)(3) until after the court’s order.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

• State ex rel. Macksyn v. Spencer, 2025-Ohio-2116: Foundation for the damages phase. The earlier decision largely denied mandamus but issued a limited writ requiring respondents to produce specified emails or certify nonexistence. The present opinion treats compliance with that limited writ as the trigger to decide the deferred statutory-damages request, and it uses the earlier opinion’s findings (what was and was not produced by May 2024) to narrow which requests can support damages.
• State ex rel. Atakpu v. Shuler, 2023-Ohio-2266: Statement of the general statutory-damages rule. The court quoted Atakpu for the proposition that statutory damages “shall” be awarded if a requester sends a written request by specified means and the office fails to comply with R.C. 149.43(B). This framed damages as tied to noncompliance with statutory obligations, with the court then focusing on whether respondents’ delay was unreasonable.
• State ex rel. Clark v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2025-Ohio-895: Kites as “electronic submission.” The court relied on this case to treat an electronic kite as an electronic submission under R.C. 149.43(B), thereby satisfying the statutory prerequisite for damages eligibility (method of transmission).
• State ex rel. Ware v. Akron, 2021-Ohio-624: Unreasonable length of time standard. Ware supplied the key standard: damages may be awarded when a custodian takes an unreasonable time to produce records. The court used Ware as the doctrinal bridge between delay and “failure to comply” with R.C. 149.43(B).
• State ex rel. Gilreath v. Cuyahoga Job & Family Servs., 2024-Ohio-103 and State ex rel. DiFranco v. S. Euclid, 2015-Ohio-4914: Comparators for what counts as “unreasonable.” The court cited these decisions to show that even shorter production delays (five months; eight months for a long list) were deemed unreasonable—supporting the conclusion that over a year is unreasonable for Macksyn’s email requests.
• State ex rel. Clark v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2024-Ohio-770: No separate damages for mere follow-up correspondence. The court invoked this principle to test whether April 21 was just follow-up to April 4. It distinguished the two requests as seeking different categories of emails (different correspondents/offices), allowing separate $1,000 awards.
• State ex rel. Mobley v. Powers, 2024-Ohio-3315: Procedural reference. The court noted that a similar “motion to proceed to judgment on statutory damages” had been filed in another case, but emphasized that such a motion is not necessary; damages were already requested in the complaint and brief, and the court simply needed compliance with the limited writ.
• State ex rel. Griffin v. Szoke, 2023-Ohio-3096: Defines “kite.” Used only to explain prison terminology, supporting the factual understanding that the requests were electronic submissions.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Threshold eligibility for statutory damages

The court applied R.C. 149.43(C)(2), emphasizing three predicates:

• A written request transmitted by a qualifying method (here, electronic kite treated as electronic submission).
• A failure to comply with an obligation under R.C. 149.43(B).
• Calculation beginning on the mandamus filing date (June 13, 2024), at $100 per business day, capped at $1,000 per request.

B. Request-by-request application

• March 12 request: The court denied damages because respondents ultimately certified no responsive email existed and Macksyn did not prove that respondents failed to produce responsive records or otherwise violated R.C. 149.43(B). The court also rejected damages tied to a “policy” because the request did not clearly seek the general law-library policy; it sought an “alleged local policy” requiring written inmate contracts.
• March 15 request: No damages because the evidence supported that the kites were provided on April 8, 2024, and the approximately three-week delay was not shown to be unreasonable.
• April 4 request: Damages awarded. Emails were produced only on July 1, 2025—after the limited writ—making the delay unreasonable under Ware, supported by Gilreath and DiFranco as comparators.
• April 21 request: Damages awarded for the same reason: unreasonable delay until July 1, 2025.

C. Separate awards for April 4 and April 21

The court confronted a recurring public-records damages issue: whether multiple communications are separate requests (separate caps) or follow-ups (one cap). Relying on State ex rel. Clark v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2024-Ohio-770, it held Macksyn’s April 4 and April 21 requests were not follow-ups because they sought different categories of emails (different participants/offices), even though they concerned Macksyn and overlapping time frames.

D. The dissent’s statutory-focus critique (Kennedy, C.J.)

Chief Justice Kennedy agreed that the year-plus delay supported damages for the April requests, but she read R.C. 149.43(B) and (C)(2) to impose damages eligibility not only for delayed production (R.C. 149.43(B)(1)) but also for failure to properly deny a request (R.C. 149.43(B)(2)–(3)). In her view, respondents’ earlier litigation position that the March 12 email had been provided—followed by a later certification that no email existed—showed that respondents did not properly deny the request until compelled by the court. That, she argued, is itself a compensable failure to comply with an obligation under R.C. 149.43(B)(3), warranting another $1,000.

The majority did not expressly engage that statutory-interpretation argument in depth; instead, it treated March 12 as resolved by certification of nonexistence and by the relator’s failure to show nonproduction of responsive records.

3.3 Impact

• Reinforces “unreasonable delay” as actionable noncompliance: By using Gilreath and DiFranco as benchmarks, the court signals that multi-month delays—especially exceeding a year—will readily support statutory damages, particularly when production occurs only after a writ.
• Encourages precise request drafting—and careful custodian reading: The refusal to award damages for the “policy” underscores that damages hinge on what was actually requested. Ambiguity or imprecision can limit remedies, even where related policies exist.
• Clarifies multi-request damages in the email context: Overlapping date ranges do not automatically make requests “follow-up correspondence.” Distinct custodians, correspondents, or offices can convert requests into separate “categories,” supporting separate caps.
• Foreshadows a live interpretive dispute: The dissent highlights a potentially significant issue for future litigation: whether failure to properly deny (as opposed to delay in producing) independently triggers damages. If adopted in later cases, that approach would increase exposure for agencies that do not promptly issue statutorily compliant denial explanations.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Mandamus: A lawsuit asking the court to order a public official to perform a clear legal duty. Here, Macksyn used mandamus to enforce the duty to provide public records.
• “Kite” (prison context): Written correspondence between an inmate and prison staff. An “electronic kite” functions like an electronic message; the court treated it as “electronic submission” under the Public Records Act.
• Statutory damages (R.C. 149.43(C)(2)): A preset monetary remedy—$100 per business day—starting when the requester files the mandamus case, capped at $1,000. It is designed to incentivize compliance, not to measure actual harm.
• “Unreasonable length of time”: The Public Records Act requires production within a “reasonable period of time.” Courts assess reasonableness by context (scope, complexity, and comparators from prior cases). Here, more than a year was clearly unreasonable.
• Certification that records do not exist: Instead of producing records, an office can state (often via affidavit) that no responsive records exist. If accepted, this can defeat a production claim—but the dissent argues an office still must comply with denial obligations in a timely, statutorily proper way.
• Follow-up correspondence vs. new request: A follow-up is essentially a continuation or clarification of the same request (generally not generating a separate damages cap). A new request seeks a different set/category of records and can support a separate $1,000 cap.

5. Conclusion

State ex rel. Macksyn v. Spencer, 2026-Ohio-44 reinforces a practical rule in Ohio public-records enforcement: when a public office produces responsive records only after prolonged delay and court compulsion, that delay can constitute noncompliance with R.C. 149.43(B) supporting statutory damages to the statutory cap. The court also clarified that separate, distinct email requests—distinguished by different correspondents/offices—may yield separate $1,000 awards, while unclear or not-actually-made requests will not.

The concurrence/dissent spotlights an important fault line for future cases: whether damages should also attach when an office fails to timely issue a proper denial under R.C. 149.43(B)(2)–(3), even if it later certifies nonexistence. That question may shape how strictly agencies must formalize denials, not merely how quickly they produce records.