Threat-Based “Forcible Assault,” Tractor-as-Weapon “Aggravated Assault,” But-For Race Selection Enhancement, and Keene-Based Sentencing Affirmance

I. Introduction

In United States v. William Charles Franklin (11th Cir. Aug. 17, 2026) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed William Charles Franklin’s convictions and 66-month sentence arising from two encounters with Devon Wilson, a Black USPS rural mail carrier. The first (June 2024) involved a roadside confrontation on a narrow rural road where Franklin, driving a tractor, issued profane and racially derogatory threats. The second (December 2024) involved Franklin’s tractor (with a rear “harrow” attachment) striking and damaging Wilson’s USPS vehicle.

On appeal, Franklin challenged: (1) sufficiency of the evidence for forcible assault (June), aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon (December), and retaliation against a witness (December); (2) sufficiency of evidence supporting a jury finding that the felonies were committed “because of” the victim’s race for purposes of a Guidelines enhancement; and (3) procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence, including an objection to an eight-level obstruction-related enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(1)(B).

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Forcible assault (June): Affirmed. The court held that threats of serious harm, coupled with proximity and apparent ability to carry them out, supported a conviction even without physical contact.
  • Aggravated assault (December): Affirmed. A tractor can be a “deadly or dangerous weapon,” and evidence supported that Franklin intentionally struck the USPS vehicle.
  • Indictment variance claim: Rejected. Any difference between “tractor” and “harrow,” or “ram” and “scrape,” was not material and caused no prejudice.
  • Retaliation (December): Affirmed under “manifest miscarriage of justice” review because Franklin failed to move for acquittal; circumstantial evidence supported retaliatory intent.
  • Race-based selection enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(a)): Affirmed. The court applied a but-for causation understanding of “because of” and held the evidence supported the jury’s finding.
  • Sentencing: Affirmed. The district court made a Keene finding that it would impose the same sentence regardless of the Guidelines dispute; the upward variance was substantively reasonable.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Sufficiency-of-the-evidence framework

  • United States v. Bryan, 159 F.4th 1274 (11th Cir. 2025): Provided the de novo standard and cautioned against verdicts resting on “mere speculation”; also supplied the court’s but-for interpretation of “because of.”
  • United States v. Smith, 22 F.4th 1236 (11th Cir. 2022): Reinforced that a verdict stands if any reasonable construction of the evidence supports guilt.
  • United States v. Tampas, 493 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2007): Supported the principle that the government need not negate every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

2. Defining forcible and aggravated assault under 18 U.S.C. § 111

  • United States v. Siler, 734 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2013): Supplied the three-tier structure of § 111 (simple, forcible, aggravated) and confirmed no physical contact is required.
  • United States v. Fallen, 256 F.3d 1082 (11th Cir. 2001): Anchored the “forcible assault” definition used here—threats or attempts to inflict serious bodily injury with apparent present ability causing reasonable apprehension of immediate serious harm.
  • United States v. Gumbs, 964 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2020): Supported treating motor vehicles as “deadly or dangerous weapons” under § 111(b), enabling the tractor/harrow theory.

3. Variance between indictment and proof

  • United States v. Lander, 668 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam): Provided the material-variance test (unfair surprise and inability to prepare a defense) and the court’s framework for rejecting Franklin’s “tractor vs. harrow” and “ram vs. scrape” arguments.

4. Retaliation and heightened review due to lack of acquittal motion

  • United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 568 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam): Supplied the “manifest miscarriage of justice” standard applied because Franklin did not move for acquittal on the retaliation count.
  • United States v. Tapia, 59 F.3d 1137 (11th Cir. 1995): Supported inferring specific retaliatory intent from circumstantial evidence showing awareness of a victim’s cooperation with authorities.

5. Sentencing review and the Keene shortcut

  • United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006): Central to the holding; permitted affirmance without resolving the disputed Guidelines issue because the district court stated it would impose the same sentence regardless.
  • United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2013): Summarized § 3553(a) purposes and factors, framing the district court’s explanation.
  • United States v. Sotelo, 130 F.4th 1229 (11th Cir. 2025): Provided the abuse-of-discretion standard for substantive reasonableness.
  • United States v. Olson, 127 F.4th 1266 (11th Cir. 2025): Supported the principle that district courts need not weigh all sentencing factors equally.
  • United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2009): Addressed the explanation needed for an upward variance—compelling enough for the degree of variance, but not “extraordinary.”
  • United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2020): Treated a sentence well below the statutory maximum as an indicator of reasonableness.
  • United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007): Supported that a court need not expressly discuss every piece of mitigating evidence on the record.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. June incident: threat-based “forcible assault” without contact

Applying United States v. Fallen and United States v. Siler, the court treated Franklin’s conduct as “forcible assault” based on threatening statements (e.g., a threat to punch the mail carrier) and the physical setup (tractor “mere inches” from the USPS vehicle). The proximity and positioning allowed the jury to infer “apparent present ability” and reasonable apprehension of immediate serious bodily harm, satisfying § 111(a) without physical contact.

2. December incident: aggravated assault and the “dangerous weapon” element

For § 111(b), the panel relied on United States v. Gumbs to treat a vehicle as a dangerous weapon and held that a tractor with a harrow attachment could qualify. The opinion emphasized circumstantial evidence of intent: prior knowledge of Wilson and his vehicle, damage patterns suggesting deliberate maneuvering, immediate departure and concealment of the tractor, and texts referencing the “mailman.” That evidence allowed the jury to find intentional use of the tractor/attachment as the means of assault.

3. Indictment variance: “tractor” vs. “harrow” and “ram” vs. “scrape”

Using United States v. Lander, the court framed Franklin’s argument as a sufficiency/variance hybrid and found no material variance. It characterized the tractor/harrow distinction as immaterial “common sense” parsing and found the proof consistent with the indictment’s gist: Franklin used the tractor apparatus to strike the USPS vehicle. Even assuming a variance, Franklin could not show prejudice because he litigated the point at trial by cross-examining witnesses about damage and causation.

4. Retaliation: intent inferred from circumstantial evidence under heightened review

Because Franklin failed to move for acquittal on retaliation, the panel applied United States v. Perez and would reverse only for a “manifest miscarriage of justice.” Under 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b)(2), the key issue was specific intent to retaliate for reporting information about a federal offense. Citing United States v. Tapia, the panel accepted inferential proof: Franklin’s anger during the June incident, the ensuing federal investigation (including search warrants), racist and profane messages about Wilson after June, and messages that seeing Wilson later “pissed him off.” This supported an inference that the December damage was retaliatory, and the evidence was not so tenuous as to make the conviction “shocking.”

5. Race-based selection enhancement: “because of” requires but-for causation

The opinion applied United States v. Bryan’s but-for understanding of “because of” to U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(a), emphasizing that race need not be the sole cause, but must be a necessary one (the “straw that broke the camel’s back”). The court pointed to repeated racial slurs during June and evidence of saved racist memes. From this, the jury could infer Franklin would not have targeted Wilson in the same way absent Wilson’s race.

6. Sentencing: Keene finding and substantive reasonableness of an upward variance

The district court’s explicit statement that it would impose the same 66-month sentence even if the obstruction enhancement did not apply triggered United States v. Keene, allowing the Eleventh Circuit to bypass the disputed Guidelines calculation and review substantive reasonableness assuming Franklin’s preferred (lower) range. The panel then upheld a roughly nine-month upward variance (as framed by the court), relying on United States v. Shaw for the adequacy of the justification (seriousness, respect for law, just punishment, and the aggravating race-based victim-selection finding), and on United States v. Goldman for the significance of being far below the 240-month statutory maximum. The panel rejected the claim that the court ignored mitigation, invoking United States v. Olson (weighting of factors) and United States v. Amedeo (no requirement to address each mitigating item expressly).

C. Impact

  • Threats plus proximity can suffice for “forcible assault” under § 111(a): The decision reinforces that credible threats, combined with situational ability (e.g., a tractor inches from a vehicle), can meet the “forcible” tier without physical contact.
  • Farm equipment and attachments can satisfy § 111(b)’s weapon element: Building on Gumbs, the court’s reasoning supports treating tractors (and their functional extensions) as dangerous weapons when used to strike or endanger federal employees.
  • Variance challenges face a high practical bar absent surprise/prejudice: The opinion signals that hyper-technical distinctions (tractor vs. implement; “ram” vs. “scrape”) will likely fail when the defendant had fair notice of the theory and a full chance to defend.
  • Retaliation intent may be proved by post-incident communications: Text messages showing ongoing anger, fixation, and awareness of official reporting can be pivotal circumstantial proof of retaliatory motive under § 1513(b)(2).
  • But-for causation for “because of” in race-based selection findings: By importing Bryan’s but-for approach into § 3A1.1(a), the decision bolsters the view that race must be a necessary factor, not necessarily the only factor—an analysis likely to recur in hate-motive or bias-selection sentencing litigation.
  • Keene findings remain a powerful appellate shield: The case illustrates how an explicit alternative sentence can insulate a judgment from Guidelines disputes, shifting the appellate fight to substantive reasonableness.
  • Nonprecedential posture: As “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the decision does not establish binding circuit precedent, but its reasoning may be cited as persuasive authority where permitted and is indicative of how the court applies existing published precedents.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

18 U.S.C. § 111 “simple,” “forcible,” and “aggravated” assault
The statute is treated as three escalating offenses: (1) simple assault (least severe), (2) forcible assault (threats/attempts creating fear of immediate serious harm with apparent ability), and (3) aggravated assault (forcible assault plus use of a deadly/dangerous weapon).
“Apparent present ability”
The defendant need not actually carry out harm; it is enough that the circumstances make it look like the defendant could immediately do so (e.g., a large vehicle positioned to strike).
“Dangerous weapon”
An object not inherently a weapon (like a vehicle or tractor) can qualify if used in a way capable of causing serious injury.
Indictment “variance”
A variance exists when trial proof differs materially from what was charged; reversal generally requires both a meaningful difference and prejudice—surprise that impaired the defense.
“Manifest miscarriage of justice” review
A very deferential appellate standard used when the defendant did not properly preserve a sufficiency challenge at trial; reversal occurs only if the evidence on an essential element is extremely weak.
“Because of” and but-for causation
“Because of” means the outcome would not have happened in the same way without that factor. The factor can be one among several—so long as it was necessary.
Keene finding
When a district judge states clearly that the same sentence would be imposed regardless of a contested Guidelines issue, the appellate court may affirm without deciding the Guidelines dispute if the sentence is substantively reasonable.

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished decision in United States v. William Charles Franklin affirms that (1) threat-based conduct can constitute “forcible assault” under § 111(a) without physical contact when coupled with apparent present ability and reasonable fear; (2) a tractor and its attachments can support “aggravated assault” under § 111(b) as a dangerous weapon when intentionally used to strike; (3) retaliation intent under § 1513(b)(2) may be established through circumstantial evidence including post-incident communications; (4) “because of” in U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(a) is satisfied by but-for race selection, even if race is not the sole motive; and (5) a properly stated Keene alternative sentence can render a Guidelines dispute non-dispositive on appeal so long as the sentence remains substantively reasonable under § 3553(a).