2. Background and Procedural History
A. Fraudulent nursing employment
Gallarzo had previously been convicted in Texas and Michigan for conduct involving fraudulent nursing employment. Following her 2017 federal conviction, she served a period of supervised release that ended in August 2021.
In 2022, she again sought nursing work in Michigan, this time using the license number of a registered nurse identified in the opinion as “L.T.C.P.” One prospective employer discovered a discrepancy and rejected her application. Another hired her, and she began working as a floor nurse in August 2022. She subsequently transferred to a skilled nursing facility as a unit manager responsible for supervising other nurses. Performance problems later led to her demotion.
Investigators learned that her responsibilities included administering medication, including narcotics; starting intravenous lines; removing PICC lines; checking vital signs; and supervising nursing assistants. These duties placed her in direct contact with patients and required clinical judgment and technical competence.
In 2023, Gallarzo also sought an after-hours nursing position at a hospice facility using the same license number. That employer terminated her employment after a background check disclosed her prior federal conviction and exclusion from federal healthcare programs. The resulting complaint led to further investigation.
B. Convictions and the sentencing dispute
A federal grand jury returned a six-count indictment. Gallarzo ultimately pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A and one count of false statements relating to healthcare matters under 18 U.S.C. § 1035. The government dismissed the remaining counts.
While awaiting sentencing, Gallarzo absconded on bond. During that period, she obtained medical employment in Illinois using a physician assistant’s identity and worked as a nurse in California using another registered nurse’s license number. She was arrested in September 2025 and returned to Michigan.
The amended presentence report recommended a two-offense-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A) because the offense involved a conscious or reckless risk of death or serious bodily injury. Gallarzo objected. Although she acknowledged lacking formal nursing education and licensure, she maintained that her medical training and experience enabled her to work safely.
Her claimed preparation included a purported nursing degree from Belford University, which was a fraudulent online institution; medical assistant training; incomplete medical assistant studies at Davenport University; and years of work in medical settings. She asserted that she had not known Belford University was fraudulent when she attended.
The district court rejected her objection, finding that she was unqualified and untrained in many of the nursing activities she performed. It imposed a sentence of 75 months’ imprisonment. Gallarzo appealed the risk-of-injury enhancement.
4. Analysis
A. Governing guideline and standard of review
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A) addresses offenses involving a “conscious or reckless risk of death or serious bodily injury.” The relevant inquiry therefore concerns the dangerousness of the conduct, not merely its fraudulent character.
The opinion also invokes the Guidelines’ definition of “serious bodily injury” in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, comment note 1(L):
“[I]njury involving extreme physical pain or the protracted impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or requiring medical intervention such as surgery, hospitalization, or physical rehabilitation.”
This definition distinguishes the enhancement’s concern with substantial physical harm from ordinary inconvenience or minor injury. The potential consequences of mishandling narcotics or invasive medical lines fit the seriousness contemplated by the provision.
The court reviewed the district court’s risk finding for clear error. Under that deferential standard, the appellate question was whether the finding was plausible in light of the entire record—not whether the appellate judges would independently have drawn precisely the same inference.
B. Precedents cited and their influence
United States v. Wala, 166 F.4th 583 (6th Cir. 2026)
United States v. Wala supplied the principal framework for reviewing the enhancement. The Sixth Circuit cited it both for clear-error review and for the distinction between actual injury and actual risk.
Most importantly, United States v. Wala established that the sentencing court need not identify a patient who suffered harm. It must instead find that the reckless risk itself was real rather than speculative. That distinction allowed the court to assess the danger inherent in Gallarzo’s actual responsibilities without requiring proof of an adverse medical outcome.
The opinion does not describe the underlying facts of United States v. Wala. Its stated influence is therefore doctrinal: it provides the review standard and the governing risk requirement, rather than a developed factual analogy.
United States v. Grant, 15 F.4th 452 (6th Cir. 2021)
United States v. Grant supplied the formulation that a factual finding should be affirmed “so long as [it] is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.”
This principle was especially important because the evidence concerning Gallarzo’s demotion was open to competing interpretations. She argued that her performance problems might have concerned matters such as tardiness rather than deficient nursing skills. The court concluded that this alternative possibility did not make the district court’s inference implausible.
Thus, United States v. Grant supported deference to a permissible factual inference despite uncertainty in the record.
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985)
The court invoked Anderson v. City of Bessemer City through the quoted passage in United States v. Grant. It supplied the underlying Supreme Court authority for the whole-record plausibility formulation of clear-error review.
Its relevance was methodological rather than specific to healthcare fraud. It reinforced the distinction between reviewing a trial court’s factual assessment for error and replacing that assessment with an appellate court’s preferred reading of the evidence.
United States v. Sosa-Baladron, 800 F. App’x 313 (6th Cir. 2020)
The opinion cited United States v. Sosa-Baladron through United States v. Wala for the proposition that “the reckless risk” must be “actual, not conjectural.”
This requirement prevents the enhancement from becoming automatic whenever fraud occurs in a setting where injury is theoretically possible. In Gallarzo’s case, the court identified the necessary connection through the particular clinical procedures she performed and the evidence bearing on her ability to perform them safely.
As with United States v. Wala, the opinion does not recount the earlier case’s underlying facts. Its contribution is the legal boundary between demonstrable exposure to danger and speculation.
C. Linking the fraud to patient danger
The court did not treat the offense as a purely administrative misrepresentation. Gallarzo used another nurse’s credentials to obtain access to clinical responsibilities that can cause grave harm when performed incorrectly. The fraudulent credentials therefore enabled the very activities that generated the relevant risk.
This connection matters. A false statement on an employment application does not necessarily create a risk of serious physical injury. Here, however, the misrepresentation placed an unqualified individual in a role involving medication administration, invasive procedures, and supervision of patient care.
The court’s reasoning consequently moved from the general fact of fraudulent employment to specific sources of potential bodily harm.
D. The significance of education, licensing, and experience
Gallarzo’s principal argument was that her practical experience compensated for her lack of formal nursing education and licensure. The court rejected that argument on this record, explaining that nursing education and licensing exist precisely to ensure that otherwise dangerous clinical responsibilities are performed safely.
The decision did not establish that practical experience is always irrelevant. Rather, it held that Gallarzo’s asserted experience did not make the district court’s contrary assessment clearly erroneous. Her medical assistant studies and purported degree did not require the court to regard her as competent to perform registered-nurse duties.
Nor should the opinion be read as declaring that every licensing defect necessarily triggers this enhancement. Its analysis relied on a combination of circumstances: lack of appropriate qualifications, dangerous clinical responsibilities, and performance problems.
E. The disputed inference from the demotion
The most contestable part of the reasoning concerned Gallarzo’s performance-based demotion. The record did not clearly establish whether the underlying problems involved clinical competence or nonclinical shortcomings.
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that ambiguity but concluded that it was not implausible to interpret an unlicensed nurse’s performance-related demotion as evidence of nursing ineptitude. That conclusion reflects the limited appellate inquiry. The court accepted the inference as permissible; it did not establish that the demotion definitively proved a particular clinical failure.
This distinction preserves the opinion’s proper scope. A more demanding claim—that the record conclusively demonstrated unsafe performance—would go beyond what the court decided.
F. Questions the opinion did not resolve
The opinion does not separately develop a test for the enhancement’s “conscious or reckless” requirement or extensively analyze Gallarzo’s subjective awareness. Its reasoning concentrates on whether the claimed risk of serious harm was supported by the record.
Likewise, the court did not determine that any identified patient actually suffered injury, announce a rule covering every unlicensed healthcare worker, or independently rely on Gallarzo’s prior convictions and later misconduct as substitutes for proof of the relevant risk. Those events supplied background, while the appellate analysis focused on her nursing duties, qualifications, and performance.
G. Potential impact
The opinion offers persuasive guidance for sentencing cases in which credential fraud enables access to safety-sensitive work. It suggests that the strongest justification for the enhancement connects deficient qualifications to identifiable tasks capable of causing serious harm, rather than relying solely on the existence of fraud.
For prosecutors, the decision illustrates the importance of developing a concrete account of the defendant’s actual responsibilities and the risks associated with performing them improperly. Proof of injury is unnecessary, but proof of a genuine risk remains essential.
For defendants, the opinion highlights the limitations of generalized assertions of experience. Evidence addressing competence in the particular hazardous tasks—and clarifying whether employment problems were clinical or administrative—may be more significant than simply demonstrating years of medical employment.
Finally, the case underscores the practical importance of sentencing factfinding. Once the district court draws a plausible inference from the record, an alternative explanation may not suffice to obtain reversal under clear-error review.