University Duty to Control Recognized Fraternities Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315(a) to Prevent Foreseeable Hazing and Alcohol Harm

I. Introduction

Martinez v. Wash. State Univ. (Wash. July 30, 2026) addresses whether Washington State University (WSU) owed a tort duty to protect a freshman, Samuel H. Martinez, who died of acute alcohol intoxication during an off-campus fraternity hazing event associated with the Gamma Chi chapter of Alpha Tau Omega. Samuel’s parents, Hector Martinez and Jolayne Houtz (individually and as co-personal representatives of Samuel’s estate), sued WSU for wrongful death negligence.

The threshold issue was duty: specifically, whether WSU had a special relationship with Gamma Chi such that WSU had a duty to control the fraternity’s conduct to prevent foreseeable harm to foreseeable victims under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315(a). The trial court granted summary judgment to WSU (no duty). The Court of Appeals reversed, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the reversal.

The decision is significant because it recognizes that a university’s relationship with a recognized fraternity—structured by agreements, benefits, monitoring, and sanctioning authority—can be sufficiently “definite, established, and continuing,” and sufficiently “controlling,” to create a § 315(a) duty even when the harm occurs off campus and not at a university-sponsored event.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court held that WSU owed Sam Martinez a duty of reasonable care under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315(a) because:

  1. WSU had a definite, established, and continuing relationship with Gamma Chi (through annual recognition and formal agreements) that gave WSU insight into the fraternity’s dangerous practices and made harm to pledges foreseeable.
  2. WSU had some ability to control Gamma Chi’s conduct through recognition leverage, required policies and reporting, advising infrastructure, investigations, and a range of sanctions up to loss of recognition—control mechanisms aimed at preventing alcohol misuse and hazing.

The court distinguished Barlow v. State (where no § 315 duty was found as to protecting a student from another student’s off-campus assault) by emphasizing that WSU’s relationship with a recognized fraternity is materially different from its relationship with an individual student.

The court expressly limited its holding to the existence of duty and did not decide breach or causation, remanding for further proceedings.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Duty as a question of law and summary judgment framing

  • Turner v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 198 Wn.2d 273, 493 P.3d 117 (2021): Cited for the propositions that summary judgment is appropriate only where no genuine issues of material fact exist, and that duty is a threshold legal issue reviewed de novo. The Martinez court uses Turner to situate duty analysis as a purely legal question at this procedural posture.
  • Dalton M, LLC v. N. Cascade Tr. Servs., Inc., 2 Wn.3d 36, 534 P.3d 339 (2023): Cited to justify not reaching alternative duty theories because only the § 315(a) theory was pursued on review. This keeps Martinez tightly focused on special-relationship duty.

2. The controlling “special relationship” framework under § 315(a)

  • Barlow v. State, 2 Wn.3d 583, 540 P.3d 783 (2024): The central comparator. In Barlow, the majority rejected § 315(a) and § 315(b) duties for a university to protect a student from another student’s off-campus sexual assault, emphasizing insufficient university insight, inability to identify potential victims, and insufficient control over the assailant.

    Martinez uses Barlow as a template: it adopts Barlow’s articulation of the § 315(a) elements and then holds that, unlike Barlow, WSU did have insight, could identify a class of victims (freshman Greek recruits/pledges), and could exert meaningful control over Gamma Chi via recognition.
  • Volk v. DeMeerleer, 187 Wn.2d 241, 386 P.3d 254 (2016): Provides the two-part § 315(a) test applied in Martinez: (1) a definite, established, and continuing relationship that creates foreseeability; and (2) an ability to control the third party to prevent harm. Volk is also used to clarify that “absolute control is unnecessary” and that “diverse levels of control” can yield “corresponding degrees of responsibility.” Martinez analogizes WSU’s tools (monitoring, conditions, sanctions) to outpatient psychiatrist controls discussed in Volk.
  • Ests. of Morgan v. Fairfield Fam. Counseling Ctr., 77 Ohio St. 3d 284, 1997-Ohio-194, 673 N.E.2d 1311: Quoted (via Volk) for the “diverse levels of control” concept, supporting a flexible control inquiry rather than a binary “custody/no custody” approach.

3. Washington § 315(a) duty in other control relationships

  • Taggart v. State, 118 Wn.2d 195, 822 P.2d 243 (1992): Used to show that control may include authority to respond to violations in ways that prevent future foreseeable harm (e.g., arrest for parole violations). Martinez analogizes WSU’s ability to suspend or revoke recognition as a comparable “responsive-but-preventive” tool.
  • Hertog v. City of Seattle, 138 Wn.2d 265, 979 P.2d 400 (1999): Used to show control sufficient for § 315(a) can be less than Taggart’s parole-officer authority; monitoring and reporting can suffice. Martinez compares WSU’s monitoring/investigation/sanctioning structure to Hertog’s probation counselor oversight.
  • Petersen v. State, 100 Wn.2d 421, 671 P.2d 230 (1983): Cited as another instance of § 315(a)-type duty where a defendant has a relationship with and some control over a dangerous third party (psychiatric context).

4. Nonindividual “special relationship” references

  • Niece v. Elmview Grp. Home, 131 Wn.2d 39, 929 P.2d 420 (1997) and H.B.H. v. State, 192 Wn.2d 154, 429 P.3d 484 (2018): Cited to rebut WSU’s argument that § 315 special-relationship concepts cannot apply to nonindividual entities. While those cases are referenced as § 315(b) examples, Martinez uses them to reject a categorical “must be a person” limitation.

5. Dissent’s cited authorities (contextual, not adopted by the majority)

Justice Madsen’s dissent invokes additional authorities to argue Martinez conflicts with Barlow and improperly equates disciplinary power with preventive control, including: Helfman v. Ne. Univ., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Ct., Honcoop v. State, and Bradshaw v. Rawlings. The majority does not adopt these, but the dissent highlights a live doctrinal tension: whether post-violation sanctions can constitute the kind of “control” § 315(a) requires.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The court’s doctrinal move: from “university-student” limits to “university-fraternity” control

Martinez accepts the general rule emphasized in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315: no duty to control third parties absent a special relationship. It then identifies § 315(a) as the operative path: a duty based on the defendant’s relationship with the dangerous third party (Gamma Chi), not on a custodial relationship with the victim.

The court’s key reasoning is that the relationship between WSU and Gamma Chi is not merely incidental: it is a structured, voluntary, annually renewed relationship in which WSU confers valuable benefits (recognition, recruitment support, use of trademarks, administrative support, access to resources, and the ability to house first-year students under an Approved Housing Agreement), and in return imposes rules and oversight focused on alcohol and hazing prevention.

2. Foreseeability grounded in institutional knowledge and chapter history

The opinion devotes substantial factual attention to WSU’s prior knowledge: task force findings about Greek risk, repeated sanctions, Gamma Chi’s prior hazing/alcohol episodes, and ongoing concerns regarding its “live-out” house. This record supports the first § 315(a) element by showing WSU had “insight into the danger” and could identify the likely victims—freshman pledges like Sam—as a class.

3. “Control” as recognition leverage plus compliance architecture

The majority’s most consequential legal conclusion is that WSU had “some ability to control” Gamma Chi. It does not require custody or “absolute control.” Instead, it treats WSU’s recognition regime as a meaningful control mechanism because it:

  • requires written agreements (Relationship Agreement; Approved Housing Agreement) with alcohol and hazing prohibitions;
  • creates reporting, meetings, advising, and compliance expectations (CFSL involvement);
  • authorizes investigations and sanctions that can change fraternity operations and restrict activities; and
  • culminates in suspension or revocation of recognition, which the court characterizes as a powerful lever with real-world preventive effect.

The court explicitly answers the “discipline is only after-the-fact” critique (raised in the dissent and reminiscent of Barlow’s discussion of student codes) by reasoning—through Taggart v. State and Hertog v. City of Seattle—that responsive mechanisms can function as preventive tools when they reduce the risk of recurrence (e.g., probation conditions, activity restrictions, compliance plans, monitoring, and removal of institutional support).

4. Distinguishing Barlow without overruling it

Martinez frames its holding as consistent with Barlow v. State by applying the same factors and reaching a different result on materially different relationships and facts. In Barlow, WSU lacked:

  • sufficient insight into the assailant’s dangerousness,
  • ability to identify the particular victim, and
  • sufficient control over the assailant’s off-campus behavior.

In Martinez, the court finds WSU did have insight (years of documented Greek risk; Gamma Chi history), could identify likely victims (freshman pledges), and had a concrete control lever (recognition and its conditions). The court thereby preserves Barlow’s university-student limitation while expanding potential university exposure through a distinct § 315(a) relationship: university-recognized fraternity.

5. Policy and legislative alignment: antihazing norms and “Sam’s Law”

The court reinforces duty with “logic, common sense, justice, and policy,” emphasizing Washington’s antihazing statutes (RCW 28B.10.900-.908) and the 2023 passage of “Sam’s Law” (RCW 28B.10.905). While the court does not treat these statutes as the direct source of duty on review, it uses them to validate the policy reasonableness of imposing a duty on a university that actively recognizes, promotes, and regulates fraternities.

C. Impact

1. Expanded institutional duty exposure for Greek-life oversight

The practical rule emerging from Martinez is that when a Washington university recognizes fraternities and structures that recognition through enforceable conduct agreements, monitoring, and sanction authority—particularly around alcohol and hazing—the university may owe a § 315(a) duty to protect foreseeable victims (including members/pledges) from foreseeable fraternity misconduct, even off campus.

2. Litigation focus shifts to breach and causation

Because Martinez decides only duty, future cases will likely pivot to: (a) what “reasonable steps” require under the circumstances, (b) whether the university’s specific omissions were unreasonable given known risks, and (c) whether enhanced enforcement or conditions would have prevented the harm. Universities can expect discovery to target: prior incident knowledge, compliance audits, enforcement consistency, CFSL staffing/practices, and decisions not to impose heightened conditions despite known patterns.

3. Incentive effects: formal recognition structures may carry tort consequences

Martinez may encourage universities to re-evaluate how they design recognition programs: more robust monitoring and conditional recognition may reduce risk but can also supply plaintiffs with evidence of “ability to control.” Conversely, withdrawing from recognition frameworks could reduce control-based duty arguments but may raise other regulatory, reputational, and student-safety concerns.

4. Doctrinal tension with Barlow’s skepticism of “code-based control”

The dissent underscores a future fault line: whether sanctions and after-the-fact discipline are meaningfully “preventive” control. Martinez answers “yes” in the fraternity-recognition context. Future appellate disputes may test the outer boundary: at what point does a university’s regulatory framework become too attenuated to constitute “control” under § 315(a)?

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Special relationship (Restatement § 315(a)): A relationship where the law requires one party to take reasonable steps to control a third party’s conduct to prevent harm to others. It is an exception to the general rule that you do not have to stop someone else from causing harm.
  • Foreseeable harm / foreseeable victim: Harm is foreseeable when the risk is sufficiently predictable based on known facts; a foreseeable victim can be a person or a class of persons (here, freshman pledges) whom the defendant should anticipate is at risk.
  • “Some ability to control”: Not custody or total control. It can include institutional levers—monitoring, conditions, sanctions, restrictions, and termination of privileges—so long as these tools can realistically reduce the risk of the foreseeable harm.
  • Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling that ends a claim when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the law favors one side. Here, the central summary-judgment issue was whether WSU owed any duty at all.
  • Recognition (in Greek life): A university’s official approval conferring benefits (recruitment support, branding, resources, housing privileges), typically conditioned on compliance with university policies; loss of recognition can function as a powerful deterrent and operational constraint.

V. Conclusion

Martinez v. Wash. State Univ. establishes that a Washington university may owe a duty under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315(a) to protect students from foreseeable harms caused by a recognized fraternity when the university has a definite, established, and continuing relationship with the fraternity and possesses meaningful control levers—especially recognition-conditioned policies, monitoring, and sanctions—aimed at preventing alcohol misuse and hazing.

The court’s central contribution is conceptual: it distinguishes the relatively diffuse university-student relationship in Barlow v. State from the structured, benefit-for-compliance, enforcement-backed relationship between a university and its recognized fraternities. In doing so, Martinez places university Greek-life governance squarely within Washington’s § 315(a) special-relationship duty framework, aligning tort doctrine with Washington’s stated public policy against hazing.