I. Introduction

United States v. Jason Starr & Darin Starr, Nos. 24‑10131 & 24‑11499 (11th Cir. Nov. 19, 2025), is a published Eleventh Circuit murder‑for‑hire decision that addresses four significant issues:

• the constitutional right to present a complete defense when a defendant seeks to point to an alleged alternate perpetrator;
• the scope of the hearsay “excited utterance” exception as applied to a domestic‑violence‑context death threat prediction;
• the admissibility of law enforcement testimony recounting out‑of‑court statements “for their effect on the listener” to explain investigative steps; and
• the sufficiency of largely circumstantial evidence to sustain a murder‑for‑hire conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1958.

Jason Starr, enraged by a divorce decree that imposed substantial financial obligations to his ex‑wife, Sara Starr, recruited his brother Darin to travel from Texas to Alabama and kill her. The government’s case relied heavily on:

• Jason’s written expressions of hatred and resentment toward Sara after the divorce;
• a pattern of financial transfers and provision of a motorcycle to Darin shortly before the killing;
• cell‑site data placing Darin’s phone near Sara’s home on multiple days, including the morning of the murder;
• eyewitness and video evidence of a motorcycle near the scene around the time of the killing; and
• incriminating jail calls in which Darin asserted that Jason “owed” him and could get him out.

The Starrs sought:

• acquittal based on alleged insufficiency of the evidence;
• or, alternatively, reversal based on:
  • the exclusion of their proposed alternate‑perpetrator theory focused on one Leonard Michalski;
  • admission of Sara’s statement “He’s going to kill me” as an excited utterance; and
  • admission of FBI Agent VanHoose’s narrative of investigative steps based on what others told him.

Judge Newsom, writing for the panel and joined by Judge Jordan and District Judge Honeywell (sitting by designation), affirmed the convictions and life sentences. Judge Jordan concurred separately, questioning the correctness of the Supreme Court’s standard governing when trial courts may exclude third‑party perpetrator evidence without violating the defendant’s right to present a defense.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

After a contentious divorce, Jason Starr was obligated to pay Sara approximately $3,500 per month (about 52% of his net income) in child and spousal support, to maintain her health insurance, to carry a life‑insurance policy for her benefit, to pay her $10,000 for home equity, and to transfer about $55,000 in inheritance funds. Jason documented his intense resentment in vulgar, misogynistic notes on his laptop, railing against lifetime spousal support and explicitly questioning what Sara would be required to “give” him in return—including a crude sexual reference.

Sara’s fear of Jason was corroborated by her friend and pastor, Lawrence Leuci, who testified that when Jason unexpectedly appeared at her new, secret residence, she became visibly terrified and repeatedly told Leuci, “He’s going to kill me.”

Jason had earlier “half‑jokingly” proposed murder as a solution to a friend’s divorce problems, suggesting that he “knows somebody” (Darin) who could “take care of your problems for two to $3,000.”

In the months leading up to the murder:

• Darin purchased a Triumph motorcycle for $300; Jason paid $260 of that price via Zelle to the seller, Mahler.
• Through Mahler as an intermediary, Jason sent Darin an additional $2,600 via Zelle with innocuous descriptions (e.g., “tire maintenance,” “clutch,” “tickets,” “Phoenix”).
• Although the last payment was ostensibly to fund Darin’s trip to Phoenix, cell‑site data showed Darin instead traveling east from Texas to Coffee County, Alabama.
• A neighbor saw a “heavy cruiser style bike” near Sara’s residence the evening Darin arrived; cell data put Darin’s phone near Sara’s residence on multiple days thereafter.
• On the morning of the murder, a neighbor heard two rapid gunshots around 6:40 a.m. from the direction of Sara’s home; a motorcycle was captured on nearby video at 6:49 a.m.; Sara was found shot twice with a shotgun in her carport at approximately 8:25 a.m.; by 8:31 a.m. Darin’s phone was moving westward, and he was back in San Antonio shortly after midnight.

After Darin’s later arrest in Texas on an unrelated motorcycle theft charge, he made jail calls stating that he could not explain why, but “Jason has the money for me and he can get me out,” that his “little brother owes me,” and that Jason “owes me a big favor.”

A federal grand jury indicted both brothers for using interstate commerce facilities (travel and financial transfers) in the commission of a murder‑for‑hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958. A jury convicted both, and the district court imposed mandatory life sentences.

B. Issues on Appeal and Holdings

1. Right to present a “complete defense” by offering third‑party perpetrator evidence:
   The Starrs argued that exclusion of evidence pointing to Leonard Michalski as an alternate perpetrator violated their constitutional rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Relying on Holmes v. South Carolina and Eleventh Circuit precedent, the court held there was no violation because the proffered evidence was speculative and lacked the required “nexus” connecting Michalski to the crime. The exclusion was proper under Rule 403 and did not abridge the right to present a defense.
2. Admission of Sara’s statement “He’s going to kill me” as an excited utterance:
   The defense challenged the admission of Sara’s out‑of‑court statement to Leuci as hearsay. The court held that the statement qualified as an “excited utterance” under Fed. R. Evid. 803(2) because it related to a startling event (Jason’s unexpected arrival at her secret residence) and was made while she remained under its stress and excitement, as evidenced by her extreme distress.
3. Admission of Agent VanHoose’s narrative testimony about out‑of‑court statements:
   The defense objected to Agent VanHoose’s testimony about what others had told law enforcement during the investigation. The court held that these statements were admissible for a non‑hearsay purpose—showing their “effect on the listener” to explain investigative steps—so long as they were not offered for their truth. The court emphasized the government’s careful questioning (“I learned X, which made me do Y”) and the trial court’s limiting instructions.
4. Sufficiency of the evidence under § 1958:
   Reviewing de novo, the court held that, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, a rational jury could find all elements of murder‑for‑hire under § 1958 beyond a reasonable doubt. The circumstantial evidence of Jason’s intent, payments and inducements, and Darin’s travel and presence near the scene sufficed.

The panel therefore affirmed the convictions and sentences.

C. The Concurrence

Judge Jordan concurred in full but wrote separately to criticize the Supreme Court’s articulation in Holmes of when the exclusion of third‑party perpetrator evidence violates the right to present a defense. He suggested that:

• Because defendants have no burden to prove innocence, the proper question is whether the defense evidence “tends to create a reasonable doubt” about guilt, not whether it “sufficiently connects” the third party to the crime.
• The older standard from Alexander v. United States, allowing exclusion only where third‑party evidence has no legitimate tendency to show that the third party could have committed the crime, is more faithful to the presumption of innocence.
• A workable standard might be whether the proffered evidence would be enough to support probable cause if the third party were the target—a “not high bar,” as District of Columbia v. Wesby describes probable cause.

Bound by Holmes, he nonetheless agreed that the exclusion of Michalski‑related evidence was not reversible error under current doctrine.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. The Right to Present a Complete Defense and Third‑Party Perpetrator Evidence

1. Governing constitutional and evidentiary framework

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to a “meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” This right is derived from the Compulsory Process, Confrontation, and Due Process Clauses. The panel cites:

• Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006);
• United States v. Machado, 886 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2018); and
• United States v. Ifediba, 46 F.4th 1225 (11th Cir. 2022) (de novo review of constitutional evidentiary issues).

Yet that right coexists with “well‑established rules of evidence.” As Holmes explains, courts may exclude evidence whose probative value is outweighed by risks such as unfair prejudice, confusion, or misleading the jury (Fed. R. Evid. 403).

Specifically for third‑party perpetrator evidence, Holmes and Eleventh Circuit precedent impose a “nexus” requirement:

“A trial judge may exclude evidence regarding an alternate perpetrator if it ‘does not sufficiently connect the other person to the crime.’ Evidence may be excluded where it is ‘speculative or remote,’ or where it does ‘not tend to prove or disprove a material fact in issue.’”
—Holmes, 547 U.S. at 327 (internal citations omitted).

The Eleventh Circuit has framed this similarly:

“[T]here must be some showing of a nexus between the [alternate perpetrator] and the particular crime with which a defendant is charged.”
—Cikora v. Dugger, 840 F.2d 893, 898 (11th Cir. 1988).

2. The Starrs’ proffer regarding Leonard Michalski

The defense sought to present Michalski as an alternative perpetrator, arguing that:

• He had an “unsettling” encounter with Sara at a Wal‑Mart nine days before the murder.
• He told Jason that Jason would be the prime suspect if something happened to Sara.
• He later left a suicide note denying involvement in Sara’s murder.
• He owned both:
  • a Harley‑Davidson, allegedly similar to the “heavy cruiser style bike” seen near Sara’s residence the evening before the murder; and
  • a car allegedly “similar” to a vehicle seen on nearby video the morning of the killing.

The government moved in limine to exclude this evidence. The district court found, and the appellate panel stressed, that:

• Michalski had a solid alibi for the time of the killing; multiple eyewitnesses confirmed that he was preparing for or piloting an Army helicopter at Fort Novosel when Sara was shot.
• The defense had “no evidence, and made no argument, that implicates Michalski as the shooter or triggerman.”
• The fallback theory—that Michalski might have hired some unknown third person—was unsupported by any identified intermediary, communications, or motive of that hypothetical killer. Defense counsel could not identify who Michalski supposedly hired, responding: “Well, your Honor, I think only Leonard Michalski could answer that question.”

3. Application of the Holmes / Cikora “nexus” standard

Against this backdrop, the panel agreed that the proffer was “too speculative to connect [Michalski] to Sara’s death.” The court reasoned that:

• Although there was some evidence of a “complicated relationship” between Sara and Michalski, that alone did not create the necessary nexus.
• The alibi evidence broke any direct causal chain between Michalski and the shooting itself.
• The hiring‑a‑hitman theory was wholly unsupported by specific evidence of:
  • communications between Michalski and a supposed killer;
  • any financial transfers; or
  • identification of the alleged triggerman.
• Admitting the evidence would have posed a serious Rule 403 risk of misleading the jury and confusing the issues by allowing speculative finger‑pointing at a person not realistically connected to the crime.

Thus, the exclusion was upheld as a straightforward application of Holmes and Cikora.

4. Judge Jordan’s critique of the Holmes standard

Judge Jordan’s concurrence is the most intellectually provocative aspect of the decision. He argues that the current “sufficient connection” / “speculative or remote” test for third‑party evidence does not adequately reflect the presumption of innocence and the government’s burden of proof.

His key points:

• The defendant’s role is to create reasonable doubt, not prove an alternate perpetrator.
  Under Victor v. Nebraska, reasonable doubt is a “doubt which would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act,” and it must be “actual and substantial as opposed to merely possible.” A defendant has no obligation to “sufficiently connect” anyone else to the crime; he need only raise doubts about the government’s theory.
• A more appropriate standard appears in Alexander (1891):
  In Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353 (1891), the Supreme Court stated that third‑party evidence may be excluded only if it is:

  “so remote or insignificant as to have no legitimate tendency to show that [the third party] could have committed the murder.”

  Judge Jordan suggests this “no legitimate tendency” test is more consistent with the defense’s limited burden.
• Probable cause as a possible yardstick:
  Drawing on academic work by Blume, Johnson, and Paavola, he proposes that a logical standard might be:

  “If the evidence proffered by the defendant would permit the state to proceed with a criminal prosecution against the third party, then the defendant must be permitted to tell the story of third party guilt.”

  Because probable cause is “not a high bar” and requires only a “probability or substantial chance of criminal activity” (Wesby), this would tilt closer to the defendant’s right to tell a coherent exculpatory story, while still excluding far‑fetched theories.
• Consistency concerns:
  The government’s own theory in Starr depended on the notion that Jason used an accomplice (Darin) to carry out the murder. Judge Jordan notes that it is “not far‑fetched” to imagine Michalski might have done the same; yet the defendants were handicapped because they could not identify any such accomplice.

Importantly, despite these critiques, Judge Jordan concludes that Holmes binds lower courts. Under that framework, the exclusion of Michalski evidence passes muster. His opinion thus reads as an invitation to the Supreme Court to revisit this area and perhaps clarify or adjust the constitutional standard.

5. Practical implications

For practitioners in the Eleventh Circuit:

• Defense counsel must be prepared to offer more than:
  • evidence of animosity or a “complicated relationship,” or
  • ownership of generally similar vehicles or weapons.
  They must marshal concrete evidence that the third party had some specific connection to the crime—through time, place, means, communications, or motive—sufficient for the court to find a genuine nexus and non‑speculative inference.
• Prosecutors can rely on Starr to resist what are essentially “shadow suspect” theories based primarily on character or generalized suspicion.
• Litigators generally may find Judge Jordan’s concurrence useful as an advocacy tool—either to press for a more generous standard in future cases or to support petitions for certiorari arguing that Holmes should be clarified or realigned with Alexander.

B. Hearsay and the Excited Utterance Exception: “He’s Going to Kill Me”

1. The legal standard

Hearsay is an out‑of‑court statement “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted” (Fed. R. Evid. 801(c)) and is generally inadmissible unless it fits a recognized exception.

Rule 803(2) creates one such exception for an “excited utterance,” defined as:

“A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.”

The rationale, as the Court articulated in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990), is that the excitement leaves little time or capacity for reflection or fabrication, thus substituting spontaneity for cross‑examination as the guarantor of reliability.

The Eleventh Circuit has emphasized that the key question is not strict contemporaneity but whether the declarant was still under the stress of the event. In United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 817 (11th Cir. 2010), the court held that a statement made four to five hours after an assault could still be an excited utterance, depending on the totality of circumstances.

2. Application to Sara Starr’s statement

The timeline and circumstances were critical:

• Sara had secretly moved into a church parsonage to escape Jason.
• Jason appeared unannounced shortly after the move.
• Leuci testified that Sara:
  • “was absolutely terrified beyond anything [he] had ever seen”;
  • “turned pale,” “could barely stand,” was “shaking”;
  • remained “shaking, crying, not able to really say much” and “completely broke down” even after Jason left.
• According to Leuci, “[t]he second he arrived,” and “immediately” after he left, Sara said, “He’s going to kill me.”

On these facts, the panel had little difficulty affirming the trial court’s conclusion that:

• Jason’s sudden appearance at Sara’s secret location constituted the “startling event.”
• Sara’s observable physical and emotional reactions showed that she remained under the stress of that event during and immediately after the interaction.
• Her statement “He’s going to kill me” both “related to” that event and was temporally close to it, further supporting spontaneity.

Accordingly, the court held that the statement was properly admitted as an excited utterance under Rule 803(2), and the district court did not abuse its discretion.

3. Broader significance

Although the opinion does not discuss the Confrontation Clause, this holding is particularly salient in domestic‑violence and intimate‑partner‑homicide cases, where:

• victims frequently make predictive or fear‑based statements (“He’s going to kill me”) before any assault has yet occurred;
• those victims often later become unavailable (through death or intimidation), making such statements pivotal; and
• defendants commonly argue that such predictions are speculative opinions rather than descriptions of events.

Starr reinforces that such statements can be admissible when:

• they are tightly tied to a startling and contemporaneous event (e.g., the abuser’s unexpected intrusion at a refuge location); and
• the declarant’s demeanor clearly reflects ongoing stress caused by that event.

C. “Effect-on-Listener” Testimony and Course‑of‑Investigation Evidence

1. Non‑hearsay purpose: effect on the listener

Under Rule 801(c), a statement is hearsay only if it is offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” An out‑of‑court statement can be admitted for other purposes. One common non‑hearsay purpose is to show its “effect on the listener”—for example, to explain why an officer took a particular investigative step.

The Eleventh Circuit relies here on:

• United States v. Mateos, 623 F.3d 1350, 1364 (11th Cir. 2010) (statements introduced to explain an investigation are not hearsay if not offered for their truth); and
• United States v. Kent, 93 F.4th 1213, 1220 (11th Cir. 2024) (limiting instructions that statements may be considered only for their effect on the listeners “reduced the risk” of improper use).

2. The challenged testimony

Agent VanHoose described how various statements obtained during the investigation prompted further steps:

• County police interviews with Jason’s children revealed that Darin had been in Alabama for Thanksgiving, which led VanHoose to speak with their mother, Mary Starr.
• Mary told him that Darin had arrived on a motorcycle for Thanksgiving; knowing a motorcycle was seen near the crime scene shortly after the murder, VanHoose then focused his investigation on Darin.
• Mahlers’s interview established that she had sold Darin the motorcycle; this in turn triggered forensic accounting and subpoenas for Jason’s bank records to trace payment for the motorcycle.

The government carefully structured the direct examination to avoid eliciting the substance of third parties’ statements as factual proof. The prosecutor instructed the witness to confine himself to a pattern of “I learned this fact, which made me do the next thing.” The district court:

• warned the prosecution to be careful how the questions were phrased; and
• gave a detailed limiting instruction making clear that any out‑of‑court statements relayed by VanHoose could be considered only for their effect on his investigation, not for their truth.

3. The court’s reasoning and safeguards

The panel endorsed this approach, holding that:

• The testimony properly explained the “course of the investigation” and why certain steps were taken.
• Because the statements were not offered as proof of what the declarants asserted, they were not hearsay under Rule 801(c).
• The limiting instruction—explicitly telling jurors that they could not take the statements for their truth—mirrored the safeguards upheld in Kent and reduced the risk of misuse.

4. Cautionary notes and practice points

Course‑of‑investigation testimony is a frequently abused evidentiary category; there is a real risk that prosecutors smuggle in damaging hearsay under the guise of “effect on the listener.” Starr offers a relatively careful model of how to do this properly but also signals the boundaries:

• For prosecutors:
  • Confine questions to the general nature of what was learned (“I received information that X,” “I learned that the suspect had been in the area”) and immediately link it to the next investigative step.
  • Avoid eliciting detailed, accusatory narratives from non‑testifying declarants; the more specific and prejudicial the content, the harder it is to maintain the fiction that it is not being offered for its truth.
  • Request and accept limiting instructions explaining the proper, limited use of such testimony.
• For defense counsel:
  • Press the court to enforce a narrow scope; object when the government uses “effect on listener” to introduce detailed accusation rather than just investigative context.
  • Request a contemporaneous limiting instruction, as in Starr, and then highlight that limitation in closing argument (e.g., “You heard that only to understand what the agent did next, not because those statements are true.”).

D. Sufficiency of the Evidence in a Circumstantial Murder‑for‑Hire Case

1. Standard of review

The court applied the familiar sufficiency standard:

• Review is de novo (United States v. Trujillo, 146 F.3d 838, 845 (11th Cir. 1998)).
• The conviction stands if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt” (Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 7 (2011), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
• All reasonable inferences and credibility choices must favor the government (United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1253 (11th Cir. 2007)).
• A guilty verdict need only be “reasonable, not inevitable,” based on the evidence (id.).

The court also reiterated that circumstantial evidence is not disfavored:

“[C]ircumstantial evidence is intrinsically no different from testimonial evidence in criminal cases.” —Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954).
“[W]e evaluate circumstantial evidence and direct evidence identically.” —United States v. Henderson, 693 F.2d 1028, 1030 (11th Cir. 1982).

2. Elements of 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a)

Citing United States v. Buselli, 106 F.4th 1273, 1282–83 (11th Cir. 2024), the panel described the elements of § 1958(a) as:

1. Traveling in or causing another to travel in interstate or foreign commerce;
2. With intent that a murder be committed in violation of state or federal law;
3. In return for a promise or agreement to pay anything of pecuniary value.

In this case, the theory was that:

• Jason “caused” Darin to travel from Texas to Alabama by providing pecuniary incentives (the motorcycle and $2,600 in payments);
• Darin in fact traveled interstate and committed the murder; and
• They did so with the mutual understanding that the payment was for killing Sara.

3. Evidence supporting Jason’s intent and inducement

The panel pointed to multiple strands of evidence establishing Jason’s murderous intent and financial inducement:

• His intense and vulgar written hostility toward Sara and the divorce decree, especially the prospect of long‑term spousal support.
• His earlier “kidding but not kidding” suggestion to his friend Riley that he “knows somebody” (Darin) who could “take care of your problems for two to $3,000”—precisely the monetary range of his later payments to Darin.
• The payments themselves:
  • Using Mahler as an intermediary, Jason paid $260 of Darin’s motorcycle purchase price and then transferred an additional $2,600—totaling $2,860, within the $2‑3,000 range he had previously used when describing a murder “solution.”
  • Payments were captioned with benign descriptions (“tire maintenance,” “clutch,” “tickets,” “Phoenix”), but the actual travel pattern (east to Alabama rather than west to Phoenix) rendered those descriptions highly suspect.
• The timing: a final “Phoenix” payment immediately preceded Darin’s eastward journey toward Coffee County, where Sara resided.

4. Evidence tying Darin to the killing

While there was no direct eyewitness tying Darin to the trigger pull, the circumstantial evidence was substantial:

• Cell‑site data showed Darin’s phone traveling from west of San Antonio to Coffee County over two days, arriving shortly before the murder window, and being present near Sara’s residence on multiple dates leading up to the killing.
• A neighbor saw a “heav[y] cruiser style bike” outside facing Sara’s residence the evening Darin arrived; a motorcycle was then caught on camera passing by shortly after the gunshots on the morning of the murder.
• On the evening of the neighbor’s sighting, Darin texted Jason:

  “I've been here at the deer stand for over an hour no show no deer know though I must pass out and dehydration I don't know what to do now
  I know delete !!!”

  Jason responded, “I think you sent this to the wrong person. Maybe go get water, hahahaha.” Darin replied, “Your right, wrong person. I sorry.” Jason wrote back, “Hahahaha. Love you brother!”
  The jury could reasonably read this as a clumsy attempt to disguise or retract a message about his surveillance or attempted attack.
• Cell‑site data showed Darin leaving the area immediately after the killing and returning to Texas, fitting a classic hit‑and‑run pattern.
• Darin’s jail calls later referenced Jason owing him money and a “big favor” that he could not discuss—consistent with payment for a serious, clandestine act.

5. Rejection of defense alternative explanations

The defense suggested innocuous explanations:

• The Zelle payments were for motorcycle repairs and ordinary expenses, not murder‑for‑hire.
• Darin’s trip to Alabama was to visit his mother for Thanksgiving, not to kill Sara.
• The “deer stand” text literally referred to hunting activity, not surveillance of Sara’s home.

The court declined to grapple with each alternative in detail, emphasizing that under Jackson/Cavazos:

• the question is not whether the evidence could be interpreted innocently, but whether a rational jury could interpret it as proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when viewed collectively and in the government’s favor;
• once that threshold is met, competing inferences are for the jury, not the appellate court.

Considering the cumulative weight of the financial trail, travel evidence, text messages, neighbor and video observations, and post‑crime statements, the court had no difficulty concluding that the evidence was sufficient against both brothers.

E. Impact and Future Significance

1. Third‑party perpetrator evidence in the Eleventh Circuit

Substantively, Starr does not revolutionize third‑party perpetrator doctrine; it reaffirms Holmes and Cikora in requiring a substantial, non‑speculative nexus between the alternate suspect and the charged crime. Procedurally, however, it provides a relatively detailed example of how trial courts should analyze such proffers:

• Verify whether the alleged alternate perpetrator has an alibi that fully removes him from the crime scene.
• Ask whether the defense has identified any concrete evidence of:
  • communications arranging the crime;
  • financial or logistical support for the killer;
  • linkage to specific tools (weapons, vehicles) actually used; or
  • a plausible opportunity to plan and execute or direct the crime.
• Weigh the probative force of the proffer against the risk of confusing the jury and devolving into pure speculation.

Judge Jordan’s concurrence, though not controlling, may influence future litigation by:

• providing language for defense counsel to argue for a lower bar (“any legitimate tendency” to show possible third‑party guilt) consistent with Alexander;
• framing a doctrinal test around probable cause; and
• highlighting tension between current language in Holmes and the reality that defendants need not prove alternative guilt, only reasonable doubt.

2. Excited utterances in domestic‑violence‑influenced homicide cases

Starr will be a useful citation whenever prosecutors seek to admit statements of impending harm made shortly after a threatening or frightening encounter, particularly:

• where the declarant expresses fear (“He’s going to kill me”) rather than describing a past physical assault;
• where the defendant argues that such statements are speculative predictions rather than responses to a “startling event.”

The decision underscores that:

• a “startling event” can be psychological and situational, not just physical violence;
• visible signs of terror and distress can cement the “stress of excitement” requirement even when a few minutes have passed.

3. Limits and use of effect‑on‑listener testimony

The panel’s acceptance of carefully‑structured, “I learned X, so I did Y” testimony—combined with a strong limiting instruction—gives prosecutors a road map for explaining investigative choices without necessarily calling each informant as a witness. At the same time, Starr adds to a growing line of cases warning:

• that such testimony must be tightly cabined,
• that it cannot become a conduit for otherwise inadmissible substantive evidence, and
• that trial courts should be proactive in managing both questioning and jury instructions.

4. Circumstantial proof in interstate murder‑for‑hire prosecutions

Finally, on the substantive criminal law side, Starr illustrates the modern evidentiary toolkit for proving § 1958 offenses:

• digital financial transfers (Zelle or similar platforms) to show pecuniary inducement;
• cell‑site location data to track travel and presence near the crime scene;
• video surveillance and neighbor observations regarding distinctive vehicles;
• contemporaneous electronic communications (texts) revealing consciousness of guilt; and
• post‑arrest jail calls revealing the economic relationship between mastermind and triggerman.

The opinion reinforces that:

• direct evidence of the murder‑for‑hire agreement (e.g., a recorded bargaining session) is not required;
• a coherent pattern of circumstantial evidence can suffice to prove “intent” and “in return for anything of pecuniary value” under § 1958.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Right to Present a Complete Defense” vs. Evidence Rules

Defendants have a constitutional right to tell their side of the story, including offering evidence that someone else committed the crime. But that right is not unlimited. Courts can still exclude evidence that is:

• only weakly connected to the case,
• too speculative, or
• likely to confuse or distract the jury.

The key question is whether the proposed evidence genuinely helps prove or disprove something important in the trial, rather than just raising unfocused suspicion.

B. Hearsay and the “Excited Utterance” Exception

Hearsay is when a witness repeats something said by someone else, outside of court, to prove that what was said is true. Because the original speaker is not present to be cross‑examined, hearsay is usually not allowed.

An excited utterance is a special exception: if a person blurts out something while they are still under the shock or stress of a startling event, that statement can be admitted because it is considered reliable—there has been no time for reflection or fabrication.

In Starr, Sara’s “He’s going to kill me,” made while she was visibly terrified during and immediately after Jason’s sudden appearance at her secret home, qualifies as such an excited utterance.

C. “Effect on the Listener” and Course‑of‑Investigation Testimony

Sometimes, statements are introduced not to prove they are true, but to explain what someone did next. For example:

“I received a tip that the suspect had fled east, so we checked the highway cameras.”

In that case, the statement “the suspect fled east” is not being used to prove that he actually did so, only to justify the officer’s decision. This is called offering the statement for its “effect on the listener,” and it is not considered hearsay.

The danger is that jurors may unconsciously treat such statements as true. That is why courts often give limiting instructions telling jurors how they may—and may not—use such evidence.

D. Circumstantial Evidence

Circumstantial evidence is indirect proof—evidence that suggests a fact by implication, rather than directly showing it. For example, finding someone’s fingerprints at a crime scene is circumstantial evidence that they were present, even if no one saw them there.

The law treats circumstantial evidence as fully valid. Juries may convict based entirely on circumstantial evidence if, taken together, it convinces them of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

E. Murder‑for‑Hire under 18 U.S.C. § 1958

The federal murder‑for‑hire statute applies when:

1. Someone travels across state lines (or causes someone else to do so);
2. They do it with the intent that a murder will be committed; and
3. They are acting in exchange for something of value (money, property, etc.).

It is not necessary that the murder be completed, but in Starr it was. Nor is it necessary that the parties use overt language like “I will pay you to kill X”—the agreement can be inferred from patterns of payment, travel, and conduct.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Starr is an important Eleventh Circuit decision at the intersection of constitutional criminal procedure, evidentiary doctrine, and federal homicide law. It confirms that:

• Defendants may not introduce speculative third‑party perpetrator theories lacking a concrete nexus to the crime, even when framed as an exercise of the right to present a complete defense;
• Victims’ emotionally charged statements predicting future harm can qualify as excited utterances when triggered by a startling event and made under the stress of that event;
• Law‑enforcement agents may describe out‑of‑court statements to explain investigative steps, so long as such testimony is narrowly tailored and accompanied by limiting instructions; and
• A coherent circumstantial case—built from financial records, cell‑site data, electronic communications, and post‑crime statements—can establish all elements of interstate murder‑for‑hire under § 1958.

At the same time, Judge Jordan’s concurrence flags a live doctrinal tension: how to calibrate the threshold for admitting third‑party guilt evidence in a way that respects both the presumption of innocence and the trial court’s gatekeeping role. His call to revisit or refine the Holmes standard, possibly by returning to the broader “legitimate tendency” test of Alexander or embracing a probable‑cause‑based yardstick, may influence future litigation and, ultimately, higher‑court review.

In sum, Starr both solidifies existing evidentiary principles in the Eleventh Circuit and sketches the contours of emerging debates over the scope of the right to present a complete defense in complex, circumstantial criminal prosecutions.