United States v. Henderson: Supplemental Safety‑Valve Briefing as Good Cause for Late Guideline Objections and the Evidentiary Threshold for Firearm Enhancements

I. Introduction

United States v. Michael Henderson, a published decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Nov. 17, 2025), addresses two recurring and practically important issues in federal sentencing:

1. When, and under what circumstances, may a district court allow the government to raise late objections to a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), particularly to seek additional Guideline enhancements?
2. What evidentiary showing is sufficient to sustain a firearm enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) where the defendant never physically handled the gun in the officers’ presence but allegedly exercised constructive possession through associates?

Chief Judge Diaz, writing for a unanimous panel (Chief Judge Diaz and Judges Wilkinson and Wynn), affirms a 188‑month sentence imposed on Michael Henderson following his guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine mixture, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

The opinion is significant for at least three reasons:

• It holds that a district court’s order for supplemental briefing on safety‑valve eligibility can, by itself, supply “good cause” under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(D) to permit the government to raise untimely Guideline enhancements.
• It reiterates and applies the principle that a sentencing court has an independent obligation to correctly calculate the Guidelines range, regardless of the parties’ failures or omissions, so that even governmental forfeiture will not necessarily insulate a defendant from legally applicable enhancements.
• It clarifies the evidentiary threshold for the § 2D1.1(b)(1) firearm enhancement in a drug case where the defendant is incarcerated but directs the movement and use of firearms through coded phone calls and intermediaries.

The case also underscores the importance for defense counsel of:

• Maintaining and renewing objections to PSR factual narratives, not only to guideline calculations;
• Understanding that a prior written objection may be deemed forfeited if effectively withdrawn at sentencing; and
• Developing concrete arguments for prejudice on appeal if plain-error review applies.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

Henderson was a passenger in a vehicle stopped by law enforcement. A K‑9 alerted to a bag that turned out to be his; inside were five bags of methamphetamine. Testing showed approximately 1,921.2 grams of pure “ice”—far over the 1.5‑kilogram threshold that drives a high base offense level under the Guidelines.

While detained pretrial, Henderson made multiple recorded jail phone calls to associates, especially one Bonnie Cagle. Investigators believed the calls used coded language: “sockets,” “soft tools,” and “hard tools” for drugs; “black puppy” and “silver puppy” for firearms. Cagle later confirmed to law enforcement that:

• “Puppies” meant guns, and
• “Sockets,” “soft tools,” and “hard tools” referred to drugs.

Henderson instructed Cagle to give his “black puppy” and “silver puppy” to his “brother” when he came to town, directing that:

• The black gun should be kept at home; and
• The silver gun could be carried by the brother.

The police ultimately recovered a black firearm from Cagle and a silver firearm from Cagle’s mother’s house.

B. Procedural Background

Henderson pleaded guilty to a single count of possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a methamphetamine mixture under § 841(a)(1). Before sentencing:

• The initial PSR recommended a two-level firearm enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1).
• Henderson timely objected both to the enhancement and to the PSR’s factual “recitation of the facts and circumstances” regarding the guns.
• The government did not object to the PSR nor respond to Henderson’s objections within the extended Rule 32(f) deadline.
• In response to Henderson’s objection, the probation officer removed the firearm enhancement but left the underlying factual narrative unchanged. The revised PSR also recommended a three‑level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

The parties then filed sentencing memoranda. Henderson sought a below‑guideline sentence of 120 months; the government asked for a sentence at the top of the guideline range (based on the PSR then in effect).

At that point, the district court ordered supplemental briefing on safety‑valve eligibility under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). Citing this court’s then‑recent decision in United States v. Jones, 60 F.4th 230 (4th Cir. 2023), the court recognized that Henderson’s criminal history did not categorically bar him from safety‑valve relief under § 3553(f)(1), and it asked the parties to address whether he satisfied the remaining statutory criteria (prongs (2)–(5)).

In its supplemental memorandum, the government:

• Argued Henderson was ineligible for safety‑valve relief because he:
  • used or possessed firearms in connection with the offense (§ 3553(f)(2));
  • was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor (§ 3553(f)(4)); and
  • failed to truthfully disclose all information about the offense (§ 3553(f)(5)).
• For the first time, objected that the revised PSR omitted three applicable adjustments:
  • the § 2D1.1(b)(1) firearm enhancement,
  • a § 3B1.1(c) leadership‑role enhancement, and
  • a reduction for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1(a) (which, in the government’s view, should not be applied).

Henderson responded that the government had forfeited these enhancement arguments by not objecting within the Rule 32(f) deadline to the revised PSR.

The district court ruled that:

• The government had not forfeited its objections because they were made in response to the court’s safety‑valve briefing order, which implicitly reopened those issues.
• Even apart from timeliness, the court had an independent duty to correctly calculate the Guideline range, which includes proper consideration of all applicable enhancements.
• Based on the PSR facts, Henderson:
  • Constructively possessed firearms in connection with his drug trafficking operation (supporting a § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement), and
  • Managed or supervised others in the scheme (supporting a § 3B1.1(c) role enhancement).
• Henderson did not qualify for safety‑valve relief under:
  • § 3553(f)(4) because he was a leader/manager (as reflected by the role enhancement), and
  • § 3553(f)(5) because his guilty plea alone did not constitute truthful disclosure and he had not provided meaningful information about his source, accomplices, customers, or methods.

Importantly, the district court also opined that Henderson’s firearm possession did not disqualify him under § 3553(f)(2), because it related only to “relevant conduct” rather than the “offense of conviction.” That issue, however, was not outcome‑determinative because §§ 3553(f)(4) and (f)(5) independently barred relief.

At sentencing, Henderson did not object to the facts in the (revised) PSR; the court therefore adopted them as its factual findings. The Guideline calculation was:

• Base offense level 36 (for at least 1.5 kilograms of actual methamphetamine (“ice”));
• +2 for the firearm enhancement;
• +2 for the leadership enhancement;
• −3 for acceptance of responsibility;
• Total offense level: 37.

Combined with Henderson’s criminal history category, this yielded an advisory range of 292 to 365 months. The district court, however, noted that if the same weight had been treated as a “mixture” rather than pure “ice,” the range would have been 188 to 235 months. The court elected to sentence at the bottom of that lower range—188 months—and imposed five years of supervised release.

C. Issues on Appeal and Holdings

Henderson raised two principal sentencing challenges:

1. The district court abused its discretion by permitting the government to raise late Guideline enhancement arguments in the safety‑valve supplemental brief.
2. The district court erred in applying the § 2D1.1(b)(1) firearm enhancement because the record did not adequately support it, and because the court relied on PSR facts he had earlier “disputed.”

The Fourth Circuit held:

• It was within the district court’s discretion under Rule 32(i)(1)(D) to treat its safety‑valve briefing order as “good cause” to allow new (late) government objections to the PSR. In any event, given the court’s independent obligation to apply the Guidelines correctly, any error in hearing those arguments was harmless.
• The record evidence, particularly the jail calls and corroborating firearm recoveries, was sufficient to support the firearm enhancement under a clear‑error standard.
• Henderson forfeited any ongoing factual objections to the PSR narrative regarding the firearms by failing to raise them in supplemental briefing and by expressly stating at sentencing that he had no objections to the PSR’s facts. On plain‑error review, he could not show that any error affected his substantial rights.

III. Detailed Analysis

III.A. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Opinion

1. Sentencing Review and Abuse of Discretion

• United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468 (4th Cir. 2007): Pauley establishes the framework for reviewing sentences, emphasizing that appellate courts look for “significant procedural errors” such as failure to properly calculate the Guidelines, reliance on clearly erroneous facts, or arbitrary decisionmaking. Henderson’s panel cites Pauley for the standard that sentencing decisions—including decisions to consider late PSR objections—are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
• United States v. McCollum, 80 F. App’x 825 (4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (unpublished): Cited as additional authority that trial courts’ handling of PSR objections is reviewed deferentially. McCollum supports the proposition that the timing and consideration of objections fall within the trial court’s sound discretion.
• United States ex rel. Nicholson v. MedCom Carolinas, Inc., 42 F.4th 185 (4th Cir. 2022): Although a civil False Claims Act case, Nicholson is invoked for the broader point that an appellate court will not reverse simply because it would have decided the matter differently; there must be truly arbitrary or irrational conduct. This underlines the high bar Henderson faced in challenging the district court’s management of late sentencing arguments.

2. Rule 32 and “Good Cause” for Late Objections

• Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(f)(1): Requires parties to submit PSR objections within 14 days of receiving the report (subject to court‑ordered extensions).
• Rule 32(i)(1)(D): Authorizes the court, “for good cause,” to allow a new objection “at any time before sentence is imposed.”
• United States v. Aidoo, 670 F.3d 600 (4th Cir. 2012): A key precedent holding that a district court’s finding of “good cause” for late objections may be implicit rather than expressly articulated. Henderson’s panel uses Aidoo to support the conclusion that the court’s order for supplemental safety‑valve briefing implicitly constituted a finding of good cause to entertain untimely enhancement arguments.

3. Independent Duty to Calculate the Guidelines

• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Gall establishes that a sentencing court must begin by correctly calculating the advisory Guideline range; that range is the “starting point and initial benchmark” for sentencing. Henderson’s panel invokes Gall to emphasize that a judge cannot simply rely on the PSR’s recommendations or the parties’ concessions if those would result in an incorrect range.
• United States v. White, 875 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1989): White holds that a sentencing judge is not confined to the PSR’s recommendations or the arguments that parties choose to advance; the court may independently consider relevant facts and law in determining the correct Guideline calculations. Here, White is used to anchor the proposition that the district court remained free—and obligated—to apply otherwise applicable enhancements, regardless of whether the government had timely objected.

4. Safety Valve Background

• 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f): The “safety valve” statute allows sentences without regard to certain mandatory minimums if the defendant meets five conditions relating to criminal history, non‑violence/no dangerous weapon, non‑fatal offense, non‑leadership role, and complete and truthful disclosure of all information about the offense.
• United States v. Jones, 60 F.4th 230 (4th Cir. 2023): Jones held that § 3553(f)(1) disqualifies a defendant from safety‑valve relief only if he meets all three listed criminal‑history disqualifiers in that subsection, not if he meets just one. In Henderson, the district court’s decision to order supplemental briefing was explicitly tied to Jones, because under Jones Henderson’s criminal history did not automatically disqualify him and the court needed to examine the remaining prongs.

5. Firearm Enhancements and Constructive Possession

• U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1): Provides a two-level enhancement if “a dangerous weapon (including a firearm)” was possessed. The commentary and case law interpret this broadly in drug cases.
• United States v. McAllister, 272 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2001): Clarifies that the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement applies when the defendant possessed the weapon “in connection with drug activity that was part of the same course of conduct or common scheme as the offense of conviction.” This incorporates the Guidelines’ relevant conduct concept into firearm‑enhancement analysis.
• United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621 (4th Cir. 2010): Provides two key principles:
  1. The government need not show “precisely concurrent acts” (e.g., gun-in-hand while storing drugs); constructive possession and broader temporal or spatial connections can suffice.
  2. A sentencing court may “take reasonable account of the settled connection between firearms and drug activities,” allowing inferences that guns in a drug trafficker’s residence or control are typically connected to drug operations.
• United States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 2006): Defines constructive possession for criminal law purposes: the government may prove it by showing that the defendant “exercised, or had the power to exercise, dominion and control” over the item.
• United States v. Banks, 10 F.3d 1044 (4th Cir. 1993): Cited for the standard of review: factual findings underlying a sentencing enhancement, such as possession of a weapon, are reviewed for clear error.

6. PSR Objections, Forfeiture, and Plain Error

• United States v. Brack, 651 F.3d 388 (4th Cir. 2011): Holds that a district court may accept the PSR’s factual findings as true if the defendant does not object; failure to object amounts to an admission of those facts for sentencing purposes.
• United States v. Hamilton, 701 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 2012): Sets out the plain-error standard on appeal for unpreserved sentencing arguments: an error must (1) be made; (2) be plain (clear or obvious); and (3) affect substantial rights.
• United States v. Hernandez, 603 F.3d 267 (4th Cir. 2010): Clarifies that in the sentencing context, an error affects “substantial rights” only if, “absent the error, a different sentence might have been imposed.” Henderson’s panel applies this standard to hold that any failure to reconsider his original PSR objections did not affect his substantial rights.

III.B. Legal Reasoning on Issue One: Late Government Enhancement Arguments

1. The Rule 32 Framework

Rule 32(f)(1) sets a straightforward 14‑day window after service of the PSR for parties to file objections. The district court here even extended that window. The government failed to object before that extended deadline, even though the original PSR contained a firearm enhancement to which Henderson had objected.

Another key facet is Rule 32(i)(1)(D), which allows a district court, for good cause, to entertain new objections at any time before sentencing. The phrase “good cause” is undefined and has been deliberately left flexible, giving sentencing judges “wide latitude” in determining whether fairness or accuracy justifies departing from strict deadlines.

Henderson argued that the government’s failure to object by the extended deadline constituted forfeiture of any later attempt to resurrect the firearm enhancement (or to add leadership or acceptance‑of‑responsibility adjustments), and that nothing occurring after the deadline could cure that forfeiture absent an express finding of good cause.

2. Implicit “Good Cause” Via Safety‑Valve Briefing

The appellate court rejected Henderson’s timeliness argument by recognizing an implicit good‑cause determination arising from the district court’s request for briefing on safety‑valve eligibility. The key steps in the court’s reasoning are:

1. The district court’s order for supplemental briefing explicitly asked the parties to address:
   • “the implication of Jones,” and
   • “whether Mr. Henderson me[t] the remaining safety valve criteria.”
2. The safety valve criteria in § 3553(f) expressly reference determinations made “under the sentencing guidelines,” such as whether the defendant was an “organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor” (prong (4)).
3. Whether certain Guideline enhancements apply is therefore inextricably linked to whether particular safety‑valve prongs are satisfied:
   • If a leadership enhancement applies under § 3B1.1(c), then—by the statute’s own terms—§ 3553(f)(4) is not satisfied.
   • Similarly, facts that support a firearm enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1) overlap heavily with whether the defendant “possess[ed] a firearm or other dangerous weapon in connection with the offense” for § 3553(f)(2).
4. Consequently, by inviting detailed briefing on whether Henderson met the safety‑valve criteria, the district court necessarily opened the door to arguments about Guideline enhancements and underlying factual predicates.
5. Under Aidoo, a district court’s good‑cause finding may be implicit. Here, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the court’s order for safety‑valve briefing “fairly implicated” the firearm and leadership issues and thus functioned as an implicit finding of good cause under Rule 32(i)(1)(D).

The practical effect is that the government’s supplemental briefing, although filed after the Rule 32(f) deadline, was treated as timely in light of the district court’s request. Importantly, the appellate court did not require the district judge to recite the magic words “good cause”; it sufficed that the context and content of the order reasonably encompassed the disputed enhancements.

3. The Independent Obligation to Correctly Calculate the Guidelines

The Fourth Circuit bolstered its ruling with an alternative and independent rationale: even if the government’s objections were technically untimely, the district court had its own obligation to ensure an accurate advisory Guideline calculation.

Drawing on Gall and White, the court underscored that a sentencing court:

• Must begin by correctly calculating the Guidelines; and
• Is not restricted to the PSR’s recommendations or the parties’ positions in identifying applicable enhancements or adjustments.

In Henderson’s case, the district court:

• Independently examined the PSR’s factual findings (which Henderson ultimately did not dispute at sentencing);
• Concluded—first in the safety‑valve order and then at sentencing—that the firearm and leadership enhancements applied; and
• Articulated reasoning for each enhancement grounded in those facts.

The appellate panel reasoned that, because the district court would have been obligated to apply those enhancements even if the government had remained silent, any procedural irregularity in allowing the government to argue them late was harmless error. There was no indication that the court’s assessment of the facts or law depended on the timing of the government’s objections.

The upshot is a strong reaffirmation that, in the Fourth Circuit:

• Parties’ procedural defaults do not create a safe harbor from applicable Guideline enhancements; and
• Accuracy of the Guideline calculation remains paramount, even at some cost to finality or strict adherence to deadlines.

III.C. Legal Reasoning on Issue Two: The Firearm Enhancement

1. Standards and Substantive Law

The court reviewed the application of § 2D1.1(b)(1) for clear error, as it is a factual determination. Under this standard, the appellate court will not reverse unless it has a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed” after reviewing the entire record (Manigan).

Substantively, three principles control:

1. The enhancement applies if the defendant possessed a firearm “in connection with drug activity that was part of the same course of conduct or common scheme as the offense of conviction.” (McAllister)
2. The government does not need to prove “precisely concurrent acts,” such as the defendant physically holding the firearm while storing drugs. Temporal or spatial separation does not defeat the enhancement where the firearm is reasonably connected to the drug offense. (Manigan)
3. Constructive possession can suffice; the government meets its burden by showing that the defendant exercised, or had the power to exercise, “dominion and control” over the firearm. (Moye)

In determining whether a firearm is linked to drug activity, courts may draw on the “settled connection between firearms and drug activities,” meaning that guns associated with a drug trafficker typically are assumed to facilitate or protect the drug enterprise. (Manigan)

2. Application to Henderson’s Coded Jail Calls

The PSR described a series of jail calls where Henderson:

• Discussed drugs using coded terms (“sockets,” “soft tools,” “hard tools”) with his associates, especially Cagle; and
• Instructed Cagle to give his “black puppy” and “silver puppy” to his brother, including directions about where each gun should be kept or carried.

Cagle’s statements to police that “puppies” were guns, combined with the recovery of exactly such black and silver firearms from locations associated with Cagle and her mother, provided corroboration for the PSR’s narrative.

From this, the district court drew two factual conclusions:

1. Henderson exercised dominion and control over the firearms despite being incarcerated. His directions to Cagle about to whom, when, and where the guns should be given, and how they should be stored or carried, showed constructive possession.
2. The firearms were possessed “in connection with” Henderson’s drug trafficking enterprise. His “brother” was coming into town to assist with the drug operation, and the guns were to be placed in his hands and stored in locations tied to participants in the conspiracy. One of the guns was recovered from the residence of a known drug associate (Cagle), a location from which the court could reasonably infer that the gun facilitated or protected drug activities, consistent with Manigan.

The Fourth Circuit held that these inferences were well within the district court’s discretion and that the evidence adequately supported the firearm enhancement. There was no clear error given:

• The correlation between the coded terminology and Cagle’s explanation;
• The discovery of the specifically described weapons in locations tied to Henderson’s drug associates; and
• The contextual connection between the arrival of Henderson’s “brother” to help with drug distribution and the arming of that person with Henderson’s firearms.

III.D. Treatment of Disputed PSR Facts, Forfeiture, and Plain Error

1. Henderson’s Original Objection and the Revised PSR

Initially, Henderson did two things in his PSR response:

• He objected to the firearm enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1); and
• He objected to the PSR’s “recitation of the facts and circumstances” supporting that enhancement.

In response, the probation officer removed the firearm enhancement from the PSR, but crucially did not modify the factual narrative about the guns. Thus, from the probation office’s perspective, the facts remained, but the recommendation changed.

Henderson later contended on appeal that the district court “relied on disputed facts” because it treated the PSR’s factual description about the guns as undisputed.

2. Failure to Maintain Objections and Forfeiture Under Brack

The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument on procedural grounds. Two points were decisive:

1. In his supplemental safety‑valve briefing, Henderson did not raise or renew any factual challenges to the PSR’s discussion of the firearms. Despite the government’s clear re‑elevation of the firearm issue, he did not press his earlier factual objections.
2. At the sentencing hearing itself, Henderson affirmatively told the district court that he had no objections to the PSR’s factual statements. The district court then adopted those facts as its findings.

According to Brack, a district court may generally accept PSR facts as true when a defendant fails to object. Henderson’s earlier written objections were effectively abandoned at sentencing; the court thus treated them as forfeited, not preserved.

Henderson’s argument that he “didn’t need” to object in the supplemental brief because the then‑current PSR contained no enhancement misunderstands the scope of the court’s safety‑valve order. The court’s request for safety‑valve briefing signaled that the parties needed to address underlying facts relevant to firearms, leadership, and cooperation. If Henderson disputed those underlying facts, he was obliged to say so at that juncture—and again at sentencing when the court specifically inquired.

3. Plain-Error Review and Lack of Prejudice

Because Henderson forfeited his factual objections, the appellate court reviewed any alleged error only for plain error under Hamilton. The panel focused on the third prong—whether the alleged error affected Henderson’s substantial rights.

Under Hernandez, a sentencing error affects substantial rights only if, but for the error, a different sentence might have been imposed. This standard requires more than speculation; there must be some plausible, non‑conclusory argument that the error likely influenced the length of the sentence.

Here, Henderson argued that if the district court had been aware of his initial written objections to the PSR’s firearm “facts,” it might have reached a different conclusion about the enhancement. The panel found this unpersuasive:

• The district court twice independently assessed the firearm facts (once in the safety‑valve order; again at sentencing), and nothing in the record suggested that the court would have materially changed its view had it re‑examined the written objections.
• Henderson did not explain how his factual objections would undercut the core evidence of constructive possession (coded calls, Cagle’s statements, recovery of guns) or how a different factual finding would plausibly have led to a lower sentence.

As a result, even assuming arguendo that the district court somehow erred in treating his initial objections as moot or abandoned, Henderson failed to show that the alleged error affected his substantial rights. Consequently, he could not prevail under plain‑error review.

III.E. Impact and Broader Significance

1. Procedural Flexibility and “Good Cause” for Late Objections

The most notable doctrinal contribution of Henderson is its treatment of “good cause” under Rule 32(i)(1)(D) in the context of safety‑valve litigation. The decision makes clear that:

• When a district court orders supplemental briefing on issues—such as safety‑valve eligibility—that are closely intertwined with Guideline enhancements, that order itself may supply implicit good cause for late objections.
• Courts need not explicitly recite a “good cause” finding; the nature of the issues and the scope of the order can suffice to show that the court permissibly reopened the PSR for further challenge.

This has practical implications:

• Prosecutors cannot rely on this case as a license for indifference to Rule 32(f) deadlines, but they can take some comfort that when the court itself reopens related issues—particularly safety valve, which is statutorily linked to Guideline determinations—late enhancement arguments may still be heard.
• Defense counsel cannot safely assume that the government’s silence at the original objection deadline immunizes the defendant from enhancements. Once the court reengages with overlapping issues, all relevant Guideline factors are effectively back in play.

2. Reinforcement of the Court’s Independent Duty

Henderson also reinforces a consistent theme of federal sentencing jurisprudence: the advisory Guidelines remain central to sentencing, and district courts bear independent responsibility to get them right. The appellate court’s reliance on Gall and White underscores that:

• A misstated Guidelines range is a serious procedural error; and
• Courts must correct that error regardless of whether it benefits the defendant or the government, and regardless of whether either side raised it in a timely manner.

In practice, this means that:

• Accuracy trumps tactical silence: defendants cannot strategically rely on prosecutorial forfeiture to preserve an artificially low Guideline range.
• Appellate courts may find harmless error where the district judge clearly stated and relied on its own independent view of the evidence and the Guidelines, separate from any procedural lapses in the parties’ filings.

3. Firearm Enhancements in Drug Cases

On the substantive side, Henderson confirms and slightly extends existing Fourth Circuit doctrine on firearm enhancements:

• The enhancement can be sustained based entirely on circumstantial evidence and constructive possession, especially where coded communications, cooperating witness explanations, and corroborating recoveries converge.
• The fact that the defendant is incarcerated and not physically near the firearms does not insulate him from the enhancement; directing associates on the disposition, storage, and use of the guns can be enough.
• Courts may continue to draw strong inferences about the drug‑related use of firearms recovered from locations closely associated with traffickers (Manigan’s “settled connection”).

For defense practitioners, this highlights the importance of:

• Challenging the meaning of coded terms and seeking to undermine cooperators’ explanations where they are the linchpin for the firearm narrative;
• Emphasizing any alternative, non‑drug‑related explanations for the origin, location, or intended use of the guns; and
• Making a record, through objections and evidence, wherever the connection between guns and drugs is tenuous or speculative.

4. Safety Valve and Guideline Enhancements

Although the panel did not squarely decide every safety‑valve question present in the record, the opinion illustrates several key interactions:

• A finding that a defendant is an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor under § 3B1.1(c) will typically foreclose safety‑valve relief under § 3553(f)(4), because the statute directly incorporates Guideline role determinations.
• A guilty plea alone is not sufficient to satisfy § 3553(f)(5)’s requirement that the defendant “truthfully provide[]” all information about the offense; defendants must affirmatively cooperate by disclosing sources, accomplices, customers, methods, and other relevant information.

The district court’s statement that Henderson’s firearm enhancement did not defeat safety‑valve eligibility under § 3553(f)(2) because the firearms were associated with “relevant conduct” rather than the “offense of conviction” is noted but not analyzed in depth by the Fourth Circuit. Because Henderson was independently disqualified under (f)(4) and (f)(5), the court had no need to pass definitively on that (potentially controversial) interpretation of (f)(2).

5. PSR Practice and Preservation of Objections

Finally, Henderson sends a clear procedural message regarding PSR objections:

• It is not enough to object once, in writing, to a PSR’s factual narrative and assume that objection carries forward indefinitely. If the PSR is revised, the government changes its position, or the court reopens issues (e.g., via safety‑valve briefing), defense counsel must be prepared to re‑articulate any factual disputes.
• Statements at sentencing that the defendant has “no objections” to the PSR’s facts can effectively waive or forfeit earlier objections, limiting appellate review to plain error.
• On appeal, counsel must articulate concrete arguments for prejudice—i.e., how the sentence would “might have been” lower absent the error—rather than relying on generalized assertions that the court “may have” reached a different conclusion.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. What Is the Federal “Safety Valve”?

Many drug offenses under federal law carry mandatory minimum sentences—often 5, 10, or more years. The safety valve, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), is a statutory mechanism allowing a judge to sentence below the mandatory minimum, but only if the defendant meets five strict conditions:

1. Limited criminal history (essentially, not having certain numbers or types of prior convictions).
2. No use of violence, credible threats of violence, or possession of a firearm/dangerous weapon in connection with the offense.
3. No serious bodily injury or death resulted.
4. The defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense and not involved in a large-scale continuing criminal enterprise.
5. Before sentencing, the defendant truthfully discloses to the government all information he has about the offense and related conduct.

If any one of these conditions is not met, the safety valve does not apply, and the court must respect the mandatory minimum (though it may vary above it based on other considerations).

2. What Is a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR)?

A PSR is a detailed document prepared by the probation office after a defendant is convicted or pleads guilty. It:

• Summarizes the offense conduct;
• Describes the defendant’s criminal history and personal background;
• Calculates the advisory Guideline range; and
• Often makes sentencing recommendations.

Both the defense and the prosecution receive the PSR in advance of sentencing and can object to factual statements or legal conclusions. If they do not object, courts generally treat the PSR’s factual recitations as admitted.

3. What Is “Constructive Possession”?

“Constructive possession” is a legal concept used when a person does not physically hold an object but still effectively controls it. A person constructively possesses an item if:

• He has the power to exercise control over it (directly or through others); and
• He intends to exercise that control.

In Henderson’s case, even though he was in jail and the guns were physically held by Cagle and her mother, his directions about who should receive the guns, where they should be held, and how they should be used supported a finding that he constructively possessed them.

4. What Is “Plain Error” Review?

When a defendant fails to object to an issue in the trial court, the appellate court generally reviews only for plain error. This is a stringent standard. The defendant must show:

1. An error occurred.
2. The error was “plain” (i.e., clear or obvious under current law).
3. The error affected “substantial rights,” meaning there is a reasonable probability that, absent the error, the result would have been different (in sentencing, that “a different sentence might have been imposed”).
4. (Even if all three are shown, the court still has discretion whether to correct the error, often reserved for cases where the fairness or integrity of the proceedings is seriously undermined.)

In Henderson’s appeal, any failure by the district court to revisit his original PSR objections could only be reviewed for plain error, and the Fourth Circuit concluded that he did not meet the “substantial rights” prong.

5. What Is a “Leadership Role” Enhancement?

Under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, a defendant’s offense level is increased if he was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of criminal activity. For smaller cases, § 3B1.1(c) provides a two‑level increase if the defendant supervised or managed at least one other participant.

This enhancement does double duty in drug cases: it not only raises the Guidelines range but, via § 3553(f)(4), also typically disqualifies a defendant from safety‑valve relief.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Henderson is a consequential Fourth Circuit decision at the intersection of federal sentencing procedure, Guideline enhancements, and safety‑valve litigation. The opinion crystallizes several important principles:

• A district court’s order for supplemental safety‑valve briefing can constitute “good cause” to allow otherwise untimely PSR objections, including the government’s efforts to add Guideline enhancements.
• District courts retain an independent obligation to correctly calculate the Guidelines, irrespective of the parties’ procedural missteps or strategic silence. That duty can render procedural errors in considering late objections harmless when the court clearly would have applied the enhancements on its own.
• The evidentiary threshold for the § 2D1.1(b)(1) firearm enhancement in drug cases remains relatively low: circumstantial evidence of constructive possession—such as coded communications, corroborating witness accounts, and the recovery of described weapons from associates’ locations—can suffice under clear‑error review.
• Defendants must diligently preserve PSR objections, particularly to factual narratives. Earlier written objections can be forfeited by subsequent silence or by expressly stating at sentencing that there are no objections to the PSR facts.
• On appeal under plain‑error review, defendants must demonstrate concrete prejudice—showing that the sentence might have been lower absent the alleged error—rather than relying on abstract speculation.

In the broader legal landscape, Henderson underscores the judiciary’s continuing emphasis on accurate Guideline calculations and the courts’ willingness to look past procedural technicalities when necessary to achieve that accuracy. At the same time, it serves as a cautionary tale for defense counsel: do not assume that government inaction or a favorable revision of the PSR eliminates the need to press factual objections or to anticipate how safety‑valve litigation can reopen dormant enhancement issues.

For practitioners, the case is a reminder that sentencing is a dynamic, multi‑stage process, in which guideline issues, statutory provisions like the safety valve, and PSR practice interact in complex ways. Vigilant advocacy and careful preservation of issues at each stage are essential to maximizing a defendant’s chances of a favorable and legally sound sentence.