United States v. Figueroa: Sharpening the Limits of the Cronic Presumption and Client-Autonomy Claims in the Second Circuit

Introduction

On 11 August 2025 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a non-precedential summary order, affirmed the conviction and life sentence of Carlos Javier Figueroa for narcotics conspiracy, firearm offenses, and murder in furtherance of drug trafficking. Although summary orders lack formal precedential force, United States v. Figueroa offers an unusually thorough exposition of the boundary between mere attorney error and the “constructive abandonment” that triggers an automatic presumption of prejudice under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).

The decision also clarifies the scope of a defendant’s “autonomy rights” under McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414 (2018), and the showing required to demonstrate an actual conflict of interest. Finally, the panel signals its continued reluctance to enlarge the factual record for ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal, steering such claims toward collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Summary of the Judgment

Convictions affirmed. The panel found no Sixth-Amendment violation in trial counsel’s performance.
No Cronic presumption. Counsel’s miscues were not the type of “complete” failure that constitutes constructive abandonment.
No violation of client autonomy. Decisions about which witnesses to call remain within counsel’s tactical domain, absent an explicit directive from the client to concede guilt.
No actual conflict of interest. Disagreements and criticisms between attorney and client, without more, do not create conflicts warranting reversal.
No remand for fact-finding. Any Strickland claim must be pursued through § 2255 where a fuller record can be developed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). Provides the presumption of prejudice where counsel’s failure is “complete.” The panel emphasized the narrowness of that category.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The familiar two-prong deficiency/prejudice test, contrasted with Cronic’s per-se rule.
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002). Reiterates that Cronic applies only to total or near-total failures. The Second Circuit relied on Bell to dismiss the “abandonment” theory.
McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414 (2018). Recognizes a defendant’s right to maintain innocence. The panel distinguished McCoy, stressing that tactical witness decisions are counsel’s, not the client’s.
Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242 (2008). Cited for the proposition that myriad trial decisions—including witness selection—are delegated to counsel.
Other Second Circuit authorities—Greiner v. Wells, Luciano, Restrepo, DiTomasso, Melhuish—were used to parse strategic choices from constructive failures and to express institutional caution about deciding ineffectiveness on direct appeal.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s doctrinal architecture unfolds in four steps:

Defining “constructive abandonment.” The panel located abandonment at the extreme end of attorney dereliction: sleeping through trial, refusing to test the prosecution’s case entirely, or failing to appear at critical stages. Counsel’s filing of a defective suppression motion, not proposing jury instructions, or eschewing a risky witness plainly fall short.
Separating strategy from deficiency. Even questionable choices were potentially strategic—avoiding self-incrimination by withholding standing arguments, steering clear of perjured testimony, and preventing harmful exploration of uncharged murders at sentencing. The court treated these as within the “wide latitude” afforded to counsel under Strickland.
Narrow reading of autonomy rights. Unlike counsel’s concession of guilt in McCoy, declining to call a co-defendant witness did not override a fundamental decision reserved to the client. The court underscored the attorney’s ethical duty to refrain from presenting testimony believed to be false.
Conflict-of-interest framework. The panel reiterated that an “actual conflict” exists only where counsel’s interests diverge from the client’s in a way that compromises performance. Mere friction or reputational self-defense during court colloquies is not enough.

Potential Impact

Reinforced high bar for Cronic. Future defendants in the Second Circuit face a steep hurdle when invoking constructive abandonment. The decision signals that filing flawed motions or omitting strategic steps will rarely suffice.
Clarified division of trial authority. By framing witness selection as counsel’s province, the court cabins the expansion of McCoy-style autonomy claims.
Channeling claims to § 2255. The order exemplifies the Circuit’s preference for post-conviction forums where evidentiary hearings can flesh out attorney-performance allegations.
Guidance for defense counsel. Lawyers now have a clearer map of actions unlikely to be deemed per-se prejudicial, but the opinion simultaneously flags practices—copy-pasted briefs, unexplained omissions— that invite grievance-panel scrutiny.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Constructive Abandonment: An extreme situation where defense counsel’s performance is so deficient that it is as if the defendant had no lawyer at all. When found, prejudice to the defendant is automatically presumed.
Cronic Presumption: A legal shortcut: if counsel’s failure is “complete” at a critical stage, the court dispenses with the usual need to prove prejudice.
Strickland Standard: The two-part test requiring (1) objectively unreasonable performance and (2) a reasonable probability of a different outcome but for counsel’s errors.
Client Autonomy Rights: Fundamental decisions—pleading guilty, waiving a jury, testifying, or maintaining innocence—belong to the defendant. Tactical choices—motions, witnesses, evidence—belong to counsel.
Actual Conflict of Interest: A real, not speculative, divergence between the lawyer’s interests and the defendant’s that adversely affects representation. When proven, prejudice is presumed.

Conclusion

United States v. Figueroa may wear the modest label “Summary Order,” yet it crystallizes several recurring Sixth-Amendment questions for litigants in the Second Circuit:

Only total failures—sleeping, absenting, refusing to cross-examine—trigger automatic reversal under Cronic.
Strategic misjudgments, even serious ones, remain subject to the Strickland regime and its demanding prejudice inquiry.
Decisions about witnesses generally remain counsel’s prerogative; they do not implicate the defendant’s autonomy rights unless they amount to an explicit surrender of innocence.
Hostility or disagreements between lawyer and client do not, without more, equate to an actual conflict of interest.
Appellate courts will rarely enlarge the record for ineffective-assistance claims, directing defendants instead to § 2255 proceedings.

Practitioners should view Figueroa as both a cautionary tale about minimalist lawyering and a doctrinal checkpoint delimiting when such shortcomings cross the constitutional red line. While the defendant here failed to demonstrate constructive abandonment or conflict, the opinion provides a detailed blueprint for distinguishing subpar advocacy from constitutionally fatal non-representation.