United States v. Dralle: Plain Error to Rely on a Co-Defendant’s Prior Violence as “Context” at Sentencing Absent Joint Undertaking, Foreseeability, or a § 3553(a) Nexus

Introduction

In United States v. Dralle (2d Cir. May 12, 2026), the Second Circuit vacated an above-Guidelines sentence imposed after Chase Dralle pleaded guilty to illegal receipt of a trafficked firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 933(a)(2) and 933(b). The Guidelines range was 12–18 months, but the district court imposed 30 months.

On appeal, Dralle challenged the sentence as procedurally flawed and “shockingly high,” arguing the district court improperly considered: (1) uncharged bail-period conduct (the “Trumbull gas station” incident) without proof by a preponderance; and (2) a co-defendant’s involvement in two shootings that were not part of any jointly undertaken criminal activity or conspiracy with Dralle.

Applying plain error review (because Dralle did not object below), the panel majority held that the district court plainly erred by factoring in the co-defendant’s shootings without articulating any permissible basis under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), given the absence of any allegation that Dralle jointly undertook that conduct or even knew about it. The court remanded for a full resentencing. Judge Sullivan dissented.

Summary of the Opinion

  • The Second Circuit held it was plain error for the district court to consider the co-defendant’s two shootings when sentencing Dralle, where there was no allegation or evidence of a joint undertaking, conspiracy, or Dralle’s awareness.
  • The panel rejected the notion that merely calling the shootings “context” sufficed; the sentencing judge must connect such third-party conduct to a proper § 3553(a) rationale relating to the defendant.
  • Because this error warranted vacatur and remand, the court did not decide whether the district court also plainly erred in considering uncharged conduct from the Trumbull incident without an explicit preponderance finding and reliability assessment.
  • On remand, the court instructed that if Dralle disputes the Trumbull allegations, the district court must determine whether the government proves them by a preponderance of the evidence, using sufficiently reliable information.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Sentencing review framework and plain error

  • United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc): Cited for the general abuse-of-discretion standard in sentencing, while acknowledging that unpreserved procedural claims are reviewed more deferentially for plain error.
  • United States v. Williams, 998 F.3d 538 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam): Used to justify applying plain-error review to Dralle’s procedural objections because they were not raised in the district court.
  • United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258 (2010): Provided the four-part plain error test (error, plainness, effect on substantial rights, and impact on fairness/integrity).
  • Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129 (2018): Supported the majority’s conclusion that there was a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different, and that the integrity of proceedings is compromised when sentencing is infected by clear error.

2) Uncharged conduct at sentencing: reliability and proof by a preponderance

  • United States v. Cossey, 632 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2011): Confirmed that sentencing courts can consider a wide array of information (including evidence inadmissible at trial), but due process requires accuracy; also emphasized that reliance on unsupported factual findings undermines judicial integrity.
  • United States v. Juwa, 508 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2007): Central to the panel’s discussion of limits on sentencing discretion: due process requires sentencing to be based on accurate information, and facts must have “some minimal indicum of reliability beyond a mere allegation”; sentencing facts must be found by a preponderance.
  • United States v. Guldi, 141 F. 4th 435 (2d Cir. 2025): Cited for the proposition that district courts have procedural flexibility in resolving sentencing disputes and need not always hold a full evidentiary hearing.
  • United States v. Cordoba-Murgas, 233 F.3d 704 (2d Cir. 2000): Cited to underscore that the preponderance standard generally applies for relevant uncharged conduct at sentencing.
  • United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (per curiam) and McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986): Referenced via Cordoba-Murgas as Supreme Court support for using a preponderance standard at sentencing for relevant conduct.
  • United States v. Maturo, 982 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1992): Used to illustrate the need for explicit affirmative findings on contested sentencing facts.

The panel also looked to out-of-circuit authority on the reliability of police reports at sentencing, not as binding law but as persuasive guidance in evaluating what a district court must do when it relies on such materials:

  • United States v. Jordan, 742 F.3d 276 (7th Cir. 2014)
  • United States v. Harrison, 809 F.3d 420 (8th Cir. 2015)
  • United States v. Padilla, 793 F. App'x 749 (10th Cir. 2019)

These cases reinforced the majority’s concern: police reports are not categorically reliable, and when used to establish sentencing facts, courts should identify the source material, assess indicia of reliability on the record, and make a preponderance finding when the facts are disputed.

3) Co-defendant conduct and “jointly undertaken criminal activity”

  • United States v. Johnson, 378 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2004): The controlling Second Circuit authority for attributing others’ acts to a defendant—requiring findings that the acts were within the scope of the defendant’s agreement and foreseeable.
  • U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B): The Guidelines provision governing relevant conduct from jointly undertaken criminal activity (scope, furtherance, and reasonable foreseeability).
  • United States v. Burnett, 827 F.3d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2016) and United States v. Presendieu, 880 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2018): Cited to support the proposition that it is error—indeed plain error in some contexts—to rely on third-party conduct that predates a defendant’s involvement or lies outside jointly undertaken activity.

4) Government’s “context” cases distinguished

  • United States v. Small, No. 22-1622, 2024 WL 1173046 (2d Cir. Mar. 19, 2024) (summary order): Distinguished because the co-conspirators’ harms were tied to the defendant’s drug operation, illustrating dangers associated with the very trafficking activity the defendant led.
  • United States v. Davis, 82 F.4th 190 (2d Cir. 2023): Distinguished because the sentencing judge’s reference to a rise in local gun violence related to deterrence and was not premised on attributing specific third-party shootings to the defendant.
  • United States v. Hatch, 909 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2018) (per curiam): Distinguished because the sentencing rationale rested on general deterrence and documented gun-flow dynamics; it did not involve using a particular non-joint associate’s prior shootings to aggravate a defendant’s sentence.

Legal Reasoning

1) The core procedural error: third-party violence without a permissible sentencing link

The district court justified its upward variance by citing “the nature and circumstances” of Dralle’s offense and stating it must consider the “greater context of Mr. Bagley’s activities,” including that Bagley’s vehicle was involved in two shootings. The Second Circuit held this was plain error because:

  • There was no allegation of a joint undertaking or conspiracy connecting Dralle to the shootings.
  • There was no evidence Dralle knew of the shootings.
  • The shootings occurred before Dralle’s receipt of the firearm, undermining any suggestion that Dralle’s conduct contributed to or related to them.
  • The district court did not articulate how these shootings meaningfully informed any § 3553(a) factor as applied to Dralle (beyond an unexplained invocation of “context”).

The majority’s insistence on an articulated § 3553(a) basis is not a demand for “robotic incantations,” but a demand for reviewable reasoning where the sentencing record otherwise suggests that a defendant may have been punished based on another person’s violence.

2) Uncharged conduct: the panel’s guidance for remand

Although the panel did not definitively hold that the Trumbull-incident consideration was plain error (because the co-defendant-shootings error required vacatur anyway), it provided a roadmap for resentencing:

  • If Dralle objects, the government must prove uncharged conduct by a preponderance of the evidence (consistent with United States v. Juwa and United States v. Cossey).
  • The district court should identify what it is relying on (e.g., police report, video, probation petition) and ensure the defense has it.
  • The court should evaluate reliability before treating allegations as fact.

Impact

  • Sharper boundary on “context”: Sentencing judges may not aggravate a sentence by referencing a co-defendant’s unrelated violence as “context” unless they explain—under § 3553(a)—why that violence is relevant to the defendant’s own offense, history, deterrence, or risk, without effectively punishing the defendant for another’s acts.
  • Protection against guilt by association: The decision reinforces procedural safeguards against sentences that implicitly rest on association with a violent person rather than the defendant’s conduct and proven relevant conduct.
  • Record-building at sentencing: Prosecutors seeking to use surrounding circumstances must develop a record showing relevance to the defendant (e.g., knowledge, foreseeability, or a credible link to seriousness/deterrence), while defense counsel should object promptly to preserve issues and force reliability/preponderance findings.
  • Practical effect in firearms cases: In trafficking/receipt cases, courts frequently describe the broader violence associated with illegal guns. Dralle signals that linking a defendant to that broader violence cannot be done through unrelated anecdotes about others; it requires careful justification rooted in the defendant’s circumstances and the statutory factors.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Plain error review: If the defense did not object at sentencing, the appellate court reverses only for a clear, outcome-affecting error that undermines confidence in the proceeding.
  • 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a): The statutory checklist for sentencing, including the nature of the offense, the defendant’s history, deterrence, public protection, and avoiding unwarranted disparities.
  • Relevant conduct / jointly undertaken criminal activity (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3): A defendant can sometimes be held responsible for others’ acts, but only when those acts fall within the scope of a shared criminal plan and were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.
  • Preponderance of the evidence: The government must show something is more likely true than not before it can be treated as fact at sentencing (when disputed).
  • Indicia of reliability: Allegations must be supported by dependable signs of accuracy (e.g., corroboration, internal consistency, identifiable sources), not just asserted.

Conclusion

United States v. Dralle establishes a meaningful constraint on sentencing-by-association: even under plain-error review, a court commits reversible procedural error when it relies on a co-defendant’s prior violent acts as “context” to aggravate a defendant’s sentence without a demonstrated joint undertaking, foreseeability, or a clearly articulated connection to the § 3553(a) factors as applied to the defendant. The opinion also signals heightened attention on remand to the mechanics of using uncharged conduct at sentencing—requiring disclosure, reliability assessment, and preponderance findings when facts are contested.