No Plain Tapia Error Where Treatment Rationale Is Intertwined with Public Safety and No Objection Preserves the Issue; “Jurisdiction” Mislabeling Cannot Cure Forfeiture

1. Introduction

This published Fourth Circuit decision resolves an appeal from a resentencing ordered after the court vacated one of Yonathan Melaku’s convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Melaku’s underlying conduct involved multiple shootings at military-related sites in Northern Virginia in 2010 and his 2011 arrest at Arlington National Cemetery while carrying items including spent shell casings, spray paint, and ammonium nitrate intended for use on veterans’ grave markers.

After the Fourth Circuit’s earlier decision in United States v. Melaku, 41 F.4th 386 (4th Cir. 2022), vacated Count 2 (§ 924(c)) and directed resentencing on the remaining counts, the district court imposed consecutive statutory-maximum sentences on the two remaining counts (120 months + 120 months), totaling 240 months. The district judge also set a hearing 30 days before release to ensure appropriate release protocols and discussed Melaku’s need to remain adherent to a medication regimen for schizophrenia.

On appeal, Melaku challenged the resentencing on four grounds, including a claim that the district court impermissibly lengthened incarceration to ensure treatment compliance (a Tapia theory), procedural and substantive unreasonableness, and an argument that the court lacked “jurisdiction” to order a pre-release hearing.

2. Summary of the Opinion

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Forfeiture, waiver, and plain-error architecture

• Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944): supplied the opinion’s opening and organizing principle—arguments can be forfeited by failure to timely assert them before the tribunal empowered to decide them. The court uses Yakus to frame why two appellate challenges could not be considered on ordinary standards.
• Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009): emphasized the policy basis for plain-error review—timely objections allow trial courts to correct mistakes and develop the record; absent objection, relief is “difficult.”
• United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993): provided the canonical statement that plain error begins with a “deviation from a legal rule” and that plain-error relief has multiple prongs beyond mere error.
• Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503 (2021): reinforced that defendants bear the burden on the remaining prongs and that failure at any prong ends the analysis.
• United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2012): applied plain-error review to a forfeited Tapia claim and illustrated that even where error exists, relief may fail at prong three (substantial rights). Bennett also served as the panel’s authority for applying Rule 52(b) to Melaku’s unpreserved § 3582(a) argument.
• United States v. Davis, 855 F.3d 587 (4th Cir. 2017), and Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266 (2013): together structured prong-two analysis. Davis supplied the Fourth Circuit’s test for when an error is “plain” (explicit statutory language or settled Supreme Court/Fourth Circuit law), while Henderson fixed the time of assessment (at appellate review).
• United States v. Gallagher, 90 F.4th 182 (4th Cir. 2024): supplied the “doubly forfeited” concept used to dispatch Melaku’s challenge to the pre-release hearing order (not raised below and no developed plain-error argument on appeal).
• United States v. Robinson, 744 F.3d 293 (4th Cir. 2014): addressed waiver of issues by explicit withdrawal, used here only to explain why the court did not address the appeal-waiver question after the government abandoned it.

B. Tapia / rehabilitation limits on imprisonment

• Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011): the centerpiece. Tapia held that 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) precludes imposing or lengthening imprisonment “in order to promote” rehabilitation. The Melaku panel treated Tapia as controlling in principle but held the record and law did not make any violation “clear or obvious” under prong two.
• United States v. Alston, 722 F.3d 603 (4th Cir. 2013): clarified that Tapia does not forbid discussing treatment needs at sentencing and is not triggered where the court does not tie sentence length to a program’s duration. Alston supported the panel’s reading that the district judge’s treatment-focused remarks could be permissible sentencing discussion.
• United States v. Lemon, 777 F.3d 170 (4th Cir. 2015): particularly influential on prong two; Lemon held that ambiguity in the sentencing transcript about rehabilitation does not establish “clear or obvious” Tapia error. Melaku’s facts were treated as Lemon-like: the district court “could have been more precise,” but ambiguity and mixed rationales defeated plainness.
• United States v. Fowler, 948 F.3d 663 (4th Cir. 2020): cited for the unresolved question Tapia reserved—whether a court may impose less imprisonment to promote rehabilitation. The panel declined to resolve Melaku’s appeal on Fowler’s suggestion, instead emphasizing the absence of “settled law” forbidding consideration of leniency for rehabilitation in the first place.

C. Sentencing reasonableness review

• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): provided the “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard” for procedural and substantive review and the requirement that appellate courts ensure no selection of sentence based on clearly erroneous facts.
• United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669 (4th Cir. 2011): reinforced district courts’ broad discretion in weighting § 3553(a) factors—important to upholding a large upward variance.
• United States v. Abed, 3 F.4th 104 (4th Cir. 2021): supplied the “rare” defendant formulation for substantive unreasonableness, underscoring the uphill nature of Melaku’s challenge.

D. Jurisdiction vs authority; why “jurisdiction” labels do not immunize forfeiture

• United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822 (1984): quoted for the definition of subject-matter jurisdiction as authority to hear a type of case.
• Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States, 598 U.S. 264 (2023), and United States v. Hartwell, 448 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2006): anchored the proposition that 18 U.S.C. § 3231’s broad grant is the “beginning and the end” of the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction in federal criminal prosecutions.
• United States v. Beasley, 495 F.3d 142 (4th Cir. 2007), and Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ., 523 U.S. 83 (1998): distinguished subject-matter jurisdiction from the court’s “remedial authority”—the latter is not jurisdictional.
• United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002): supported the move from “not jurisdictional” to “ordinary waiver/forfeiture rules apply.”
• United States v. Wahi, 850 F.3d 296 (7th Cir. 2017), and Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2011): treated as nonbinding and not contrary; the panel distinguished Wahi (ancillary jurisdiction to reopen a closed case) and read Reeb as concerning remedial scope, not true subject-matter jurisdiction.
• Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006): invoked to warn against “profligate” use of the term “jurisdiction,” reinforcing the court’s reclassification of Melaku’s claim as non-jurisdictional.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The published rule-like takeaway: mixed public-safety/treatment explanations rarely make Tapia error “plain” without preservation

The panel’s operative move was not to declare Tapia irrelevant, but to channel Tapia claims into the strict demands of prong-two plain-error review when not preserved. Melaku pointed to the district court’s statement that “some period of additional incarceration is necessary” “to protect the public and to provide the defendant with the medical care and correctional treatment in a manner most effective.” The Fourth Circuit treated the record as at most ambiguous and held ambiguity cannot satisfy prong two under United States v. Lemon.

Two prong-two uncertainties were dispositive:

• Whether ensuring adherence to treatment for an incurable condition (schizophrenia) is “rehabilitation” under § 3582(a): The panel emphasized the lack of authority “holding” that ensuring treatment for such a condition constitutes “promoting correction and rehabilitation,” and it juxtaposed § 3582(a) with § 3553(a)(2)(D), which requires considering “needed … medical care … in the most effective manner.” Without “explicit language” or “settled law” on Melaku’s theory, any error was not “plain.”
• Intermingled causation with § 3553(a)(2)(C) public protection: Even assuming treatment talk could implicate Tapia, the panel stressed that the transcript could reasonably be read as: protecting the public depended on continued treatment, not that sentence length was chosen to promote rehabilitation for its own sake. Because Tapia error requires that rehabilitative needs be “causally related to the length of the sentence” (the court’s framing from United States v. Lemon), the absence of a clear causal linkage—especially in a mixed-motive public-protection narrative—defeated prong two.

B. Procedural reasonableness: the court treated “terrorism” and prison discipline remarks as permissible characterizations, not clearly erroneous facts

Melaku argued procedural error based on (i) the district court labeling his conduct “a form of terrorism,” (ii) an asserted misreading of his prison disciplinary history, and (iii) an alleged failure to address mitigation (including treatment readiness). Applying Gall v. United States, the panel held no reliance on “clearly erroneous facts.” It read “terrorism” as a descriptive assessment of fear and symbolic targets rather than a finding of an uncharged offense or Guidelines enhancement. It likewise upheld the district court’s assessment that only some disciplinary issues were attributable to mental health struggles, noting the court was not bound by parties’ statements from earlier proceedings.

C. Substantive reasonableness: large upward variances survive when explained through § 3553(a) and the record

The panel acknowledged the dramatic variance (33–41 months Guidelines range vs. 240 months imposed), but deferred under Gall v. United States. Key to affirmance was the district court’s articulated reliance on: the dangerousness and multi-incident nature of the offense conduct; the presence of bomb-making materials; the fear imposed on the public; the role of luck in avoiding injury; and the forward-looking concern that decompensation without medication correlated with dangerousness. With United States v. Jeffery emphasizing broad discretion in weighting factors, the panel found no abuse of discretion.

D. “Jurisdiction” claim reframed: subject-matter jurisdiction existed; any challenge was to non-jurisdictional authority and was forfeited

Melaku attacked the pre-release hearing order as beyond the district court’s “jurisdiction.” The panel rejected the premise: under § 3231, federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over federal criminal prosecutions, and that ends the jurisdictional analysis (Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States; United States v. Hartwell). At most, Melaku challenged the scope of permissible post-sentencing management (a remedial-authority issue), which is not jurisdictional (United States v. Beasley; Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ.). Because the issue was non-jurisdictional, ordinary forfeiture applied, and the panel emphasized Melaku did not object below and did not argue plain error on appeal—rendering the issue “doubly forfeited” under United States v. Gallagher.

3.3. Impact

• Tapia claims will be difficult to win on plain-error review where the sentencing judge links treatment compliance to public safety: This opinion strengthens the practical lesson that mixed rationales and imperfect phrasing rarely become “clear or obvious” Tapia violations without a timely objection that forces clarification.
• Defense counsel must preserve Tapia issues at sentencing: The panel explicitly noted that a timely objection could have prompted the district court to clarify its rationale or alter course, potentially avoiding appeal or creating a record capable of meeting prong two.
• “Jurisdiction” labeling is policed: By reclassifying a purported “jurisdiction” challenge as a non-jurisdictional authority question, the court limits defendants’ ability to evade forfeiture rules through nomenclature.
• Large upward variances remain defensible when the record supports danger/fear and the court explains its § 3553(a) calculus: Even a many-multiples variance can be affirmed if anchored to offense seriousness, deterrence, public protection, and individualized findings.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Forfeiture vs. waiver: Forfeiture is a failure to timely raise an issue (often accidental), which triggers plain-error review. Waiver is an intentional relinquishment (e.g., explicitly withdrawing an argument), which generally makes the issue unreviewable.
• Plain-error review (Rule 52(b)): To win on an unpreserved issue, a defendant must show (1) error, (2) the error is “plain” (clear/obvious), (3) it affected substantial rights (usually outcome), and (4) it seriously affects the fairness/integrity/public reputation of proceedings. If any prong fails, the claim fails.
• Tapia / § 3582(a): Courts may not impose or lengthen prison “in order to promote” rehabilitation. But courts may discuss treatment opportunities and must consider medical-care needs under § 3553(a)(2)(D). The dispute often turns on whether treatment talk actually drove sentence length.
• Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural concerns the method (correct Guidelines, accurate facts, adequate explanation, response to arguments). Substantive concerns the outcome’s overall reasonableness in light of § 3553(a).
• Subject-matter jurisdiction vs. remedial authority: Jurisdiction is the court’s power to hear the case type (here, granted by § 3231). Disputes about what orders a court may issue within a case usually concern authority, not jurisdiction—and can be forfeited.
• “Doubly forfeited”: A claim can be forfeited twice—first by not raising it below, and second by failing to argue the appropriate standard (plain error) on appeal.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Yonathan Melaku is a preservation-driven sentencing decision with two notable clarifications for Fourth Circuit practice. First, unpreserved Tapia challenges will not succeed where the transcript supports a reasonable reading that treatment compliance is discussed as a mechanism of public protection, and where the law does not clearly label medical-management considerations—especially for serious mental illness—as prohibited “rehabilitation” under § 3582(a). Second, defendants cannot avoid forfeiture by recasting non-jurisdictional objections as “jurisdictional” ones; § 3231 supplies subject-matter jurisdiction, and challenges to the scope of a sentencing court’s ongoing supervisory orders must be timely raised or satisfy plain-error review.