United States v. Yasinov: When Omitted § 111(b) Elements in a General Verdict Form Do Not Require Reversal, and When Multiple § 111(b) Counts Are Not Multiplicitous

1. Introduction

In United States v. Igor Yasinov (4th Cir. Sept. 2, 2026) (unpublished), the Fourth Circuit reviewed a prison-assault prosecution arising from a physical altercation at the Chesapeake Detention Facility (“CDF”). A jury convicted Igor Yasinov—who represented himself at trial with standby counsel—of four counts of assaulting federal officers resulting in bodily injury under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), (b). The district court imposed concurrent 110-month sentences.

On appeal, Yasinov challenged: (i) the validity of his waiver of counsel; (ii) the district court’s handling of voir dire (including supplemental questioning outside his presence); (iii) jury instructions and the use of a general verdict form that did not separately list § 111(b)’s “bodily injury” element; (iv) whether four convictions were multiplicitous (charging one offense in multiple counts); and (v) denial of a continuance of sentencing. The court affirmed in part and dismissed in part.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Scope of appeal / notice of appeal: The court dismissed the continuance issue because the denial occurred after Yasinov filed his notice of appeal; that issue was not encompassed by the notice.
  • Faretta waiver: The court held the district court conducted a sufficient hearing and that Yasinov’s waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
  • Voir dire outside defendant’s presence: Even assuming error in supplemental voir dire outside Yasinov’s presence, Yasinov could not show plain-error prejudice because the only two jurors expressing potential bias were not seated.
  • General verdict form / § 111(b) element: Although § 111(b)’s bodily injury element must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, any omission of that element from the verdict form did not amount to reversible plain error where the indictment and jury instructions clearly included it and evidence of bodily injury was overwhelming.
  • Multiplicity: The four convictions were not multiplicitous because trial evidence (including video) showed multiple distinct assaultive acts during the altercation, supporting separate counts.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Appellate jurisdiction and notices of appeal

Manrique v. United States, 581 U.S. 116 (2017) supplied the controlling principle for the partial dismissal. The Fourth Circuit applied Manrique to hold that because the sentencing continuance denial occurred after the pro se notice of appeal was filed, that later order was not properly before the court. The result is a procedural gatekeeping rule: a notice of appeal cannot automatically sweep in later rulings unless properly noticed.

2) Self-representation and waiver of counsel

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) is the foundational self-representation case requiring a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel.

The court used two Fourth Circuit decisions to operationalize Faretta:

  • United States v. Snyder, 181 F.4th 494 (4th Cir. 2026) provided the three-part test (clear/unequivocal; knowing/intelligent/voluntary; timely) and the de novo standard of review for waiver validity.
  • United States v. Roof, 10 F.4th 314 (4th Cir. 2021) supported the proposition that no “script” is required, but the court must ensure the defendant understands charges, penalties, counsel’s assistance, and risks of self-representation.

3) Presence at critical stages and voir dire

United States v. Rolle, 204 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2000) shaped both the constitutional framing (right to be present at critical stages where absence could undermine fairness) and the plain-error posture (because Yasinov did not object).

Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a)(2) was cited for the rule-based right to be present at jury impanelment and the return of the verdict. Rolle then supplied the prejudice requirement under plain-error review—especially the insistence that a speculative change in jury composition is not enough; the defendant must show actual prejudice affecting substantial rights.

4) Elements increasing the statutory maximum; verdict forms and instructions

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) supplied the constitutional rule: any fact increasing the statutory maximum is an element that must be charged and proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. In the § 111 context, that principle matters because § 111(b) elevates punishment based on, among other things, bodily injury.

United States v. Jackson, 126 F.4th 847 (4th Cir.) (cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 825 (2025)) provided the plain-error framework for unpreserved instructional/verdict-form challenges.

United States v. Campbell, 259 F.3d 293 (4th Cir. 2001) supplied the specific § 111(b) proposition: bodily injury is a necessary element that must be charged and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The panel treated that as settled law and assessed whether any verdict-form omission nevertheless caused plain-error prejudice.

5) Multiplicity and the “unit of prosecution” under § 111

The court’s multiplicity analysis relied on several Fourth Circuit cases clarifying when the government may charge multiple counts under the same statute:

  • United States v. Slocum, 106 F.4th 308 (4th Cir. 2024) defined a multiplicitous indictment as charging a single offense in multiple counts.
  • United States v. Thomas, 669 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2012) was central: for § 111, multiple counts may be used only when the government shows “distinct successive criminal episodes,” not merely “two phases of a single assault.”
  • United States v. Goodine, 400 F.3d 202 (4th Cir. 2005) supported the broader proposition that multiple prosecutions/charges are permissible where each is based on discrete acts each constituting a crime.
  • United States v. Fall, 955 F.3d 363 (4th Cir. 2020) was cited to allow the panel to assume (without deciding) that plain-error review applied even if there was a potential waiver for failing to challenge the indictment pretrial.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Dismissal of the continuance issue (scope of notice of appeal)

The panel treated the notice of appeal as a jurisdictional/claim-processing boundary. Because the continuance denial occurred after the notice was filed, Manrique v. United States required dismissal of that portion of the appeal. This reinforces a practical appellate rule: litigants must ensure that later, separate orders are properly noticed if they want review.

2) Faretta waiver: adequacy of colloquy over formality

Applying United States v. Snyder and United States v. Roof, the court emphasized substance over a scripted formula. The district judge: (i) reviewed offense elements and maximum punishments; (ii) answered the defendant’s questions; and (iii) confirmed understanding of the risks of proceeding pro se. Based on that record, the panel held the waiver valid and the use of standby counsel appropriate.

3) Supplemental voir dire outside defendant’s presence: plain-error prejudice is the barrier

The court assumed, arguendo, that conducting supplemental questions outside Yasinov’s presence could be error under United States v. Rolle and Rule 43. But under plain-error review, the decisive issue was prejudice. The only jurors who expressed potential bias (based on Yasinov wearing prison attire) were not seated, and Yasinov did participate in later follow-up questioning. Thus, any potential error did not affect substantial rights.

4) General verdict form omitting “bodily injury”: instructions and overwhelming evidence can defeat plain-error reversal

The panel accepted the Apprendi/Campbell premise that bodily injury is an element of § 111(b) that must be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The critical move was separating:

  • the constitutional requirement (jury must find the element), from
  • the mechanism (whether the verdict form must expressly list that element).

Even if the verdict form’s omission were “plain” error, the court found no effect on substantial rights because: (i) the indictment charged bodily injury; (ii) the jury instructions expressly required finding bodily injury and defined qualifying injuries; and (iii) evidence of officers’ injuries was “clear and overwhelming.” In other words, the panel treated the verdict form as potentially imperfect but not outcome-determinative given the instructions and evidentiary record.

5) Multiplicity: multiple injured officers alone is not the test; distinct acts/episodes are

The panel framed the correct “unit of prosecution” inquiry under United States v. Thomas: multiple counts under § 111 require proof of “distinct successive criminal episodes,” not merely multiple victims or multiple phases of a single continuous act.

Applying that standard to the trial record (notably video surveillance and officer testimony), the court concluded Yasinov committed “multiple distinct assaultive acts” during the altercation, resulting in injuries to four officers. That evidentiary finding defeated the multiplicity claim even on plain-error assumptions under United States v. Fall.

C. Impact

Although unpublished and “not binding precedent,” the opinion is practically instructive in three recurring federal-criminal contexts:

  1. Verdict-form challenges in element-enhanced offenses: The decision signals that, at least on plain-error review, an incomplete general verdict form is less likely to yield reversal when the indictment and instructions plainly require the element and the evidence is overwhelming. Defendants must preserve objections to verdict forms and instructions to avoid the stringent plain-error prejudice hurdle.
  2. § 111 multiplicity litigation: The panel reinforces Thomas’s episode-based approach: the government should marshal evidence of distinct acts (temporal breaks, changed intent, separate blows/contacts, renewed aggression, or separable sequences) rather than relying solely on the number of officers involved.
  3. Appellate procedure for later orders: The dismissal under Manrique underscores that defendants must file (or amend) notices of appeal to capture later rulings, including post-notice sentencing-related decisions.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Faretta hearing / waiver of counsel
A court must ensure a defendant understands what they are giving up by representing themselves: the charges, potential penalties, and disadvantages of proceeding without a lawyer. No magic words are required, but the record must show informed choice.
Plain-error review
When a defendant did not object at trial, an appellate court will reverse only for an obvious error that likely affected the outcome (the defendant’s “substantial rights”) and seriously undermines the fairness or integrity of the proceedings.
Apprendi element
If a fact increases the maximum punishment allowed by law, it must be treated like an element of the crime—charged in the indictment and found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
General verdict form
A form where the jury simply finds “guilty” or “not guilty” on a count without listing each element. Problems arise if the form obscures whether the jury found a necessary element; courts then look to the instructions and record to determine whether the jury necessarily made the required finding.
Multiplicity
Charging the same offense multiple times in separate counts. For § 111 assaults, multiple counts are permissible if the evidence shows distinct acts/episodes, not just one continuous assault described in multiple ways.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Yasinov affirms four § 111(b) assault convictions by emphasizing (i) the sufficiency of a substance-focused Faretta colloquy, (ii) the demanding prejudice requirement under plain-error review for voir dire and verdict-form issues, (iii) the ability of clear jury instructions and overwhelming evidence to cure (or render harmless) a verdict-form omission of a sentencing-enhancing element, and (iv) the episode-based framework for rejecting § 111 multiplicity challenges when the record demonstrates multiple distinct assaultive acts.