Affirmative Waiver Forecloses Appellate Review of Career-Offender Status; Unexplained Urinalysis Testing Condition Is Not Plain Error When It Mirrors a Statutory Mandatory Condition

1. Introduction

United States v. Vincent Sumpter (4th Cir. July 2, 2026) is an unpublished per curiam decision affirming a lengthy resentencing imposed after partial post-conviction relief. The case sits at the intersection of (i) resentencing after Johnson v. United States invalidated the ACCA residual clause, (ii) the appellate consequences of withdrawing a Guidelines objection in the district court, and (iii) the extent to which a court must explain special supervised-release conditions—particularly where a condition closely resembles a statutory “mandatory” condition.

Parties: The United States (Appellee) and Vincent Sumpter (Appellant).
Key issues on appeal: (1) whether Sumpter could challenge the career-offender enhancement after explicitly withdrawing the objection below; (2) whether the district court plainly erred by not explaining a urinalysis-testing supervised-release condition; and (3) whether the 420-month sentence was substantively unreasonable.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit affirmed. It held:

  • Career-offender challenge not reviewable because Sumpter affirmatively waived the issue by explicitly withdrawing his objection in writing and in open court.
  • No plain error in the district court’s lack of explanation for a urinalysis-testing condition, where the condition is “nearly identical” to a mandatory condition under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), and Sumpter failed to show the omission affected his substantial rights.
  • Substantive reasonableness affirmed: a below-Guidelines sentence carried a presumption of reasonableness, and the district court acted within its broad discretion in weighing rehabilitation and disparity concerns under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Resentencing context after ACCA changes

  • Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015): The district court granted partial § 2255 relief because Sumpter was no longer an armed career criminal after Johnson held the ACCA residual clause unconstitutionally vague. This sets the procedural posture for resentencing and frames why the Guidelines (career offender) became the remaining driver of the sentencing range.

B. Appellate sentencing framework: procedural then substantive review

  • United States v. Barronette, 46 F.4th 177 (4th Cir. 2022): Supplies the “deferential abuse-of-discretion” standard for sentence reasonableness review.
  • United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2019): Provides the sequencing rule—appellate courts must confirm procedural reasonableness before reaching substantive reasonableness. The panel relied on Provance to justify ordering supplemental briefing on Guidelines calculations and supervised-release conditions even though the initial appeal emphasized substantive reasonableness.
  • United States v. Banks, 104 F.4th 496 (4th Cir. 2024): Catalogues “significant procedural error,” including Guidelines miscalculation and inadequate explanation, which framed the court’s lens for the supplemental issues.
  • Clark v. Sweeney, 607 U.S. 7 (2025) (per curiam) and United States v. King, 91 F.4th 756 (4th Cir. 2024): Emphasize party-presentation and the defendant’s burden under plain-error review—important because, beyond the issues he developed, the court declined to rescue any other potential procedural deficiencies not properly carried by Sumpter’s argument.

C. Waiver doctrine: withdrawal of an objection eliminates appellate review

  • United States v. Ivey, 60 F.4th 99 (4th Cir. 2023): Defines waiver as the intentional relinquishment of a known right.
  • United States v. Robinson, 744 F.3d 293 (4th Cir. 2014): Supplies the controlling rule applied here: identifying an issue and then explicitly withdrawing it constitutes waiver; and “a valid waiver means that there was no error at all” for purposes of appellate review.
  • United States v. Morehouse, 34 F.4th 381 (4th Cir. 2022): Reinforces that waived claims are not reviewable “even for plain error.”
  • Clendening v. United States, 19 F.4th 421 (4th Cir. 2021): Although addressing a reply-brief problem, it reinforces the opinion’s strict approach to preservation and the orderly presentation of arguments.

D. Supervised-release conditions: explanation requirement and plain-error limits

  • United States v. Van Donk, 961 F.3d 314 (4th Cir. 2020): States the baseline requirement: sentencing courts must provide an “individualized explanation” for special conditions of supervised release.
  • United States v. McMiller, 954 F.3d 670 (4th Cir. 2020): Establishes plain-error review when no objection is made to supervised-release conditions.
  • United States v. Garrett, 141 F.4th 96 (4th Cir. 2025): Reiterates that the defendant must show the error affected “substantial rights.”
  • United States v. Notgrass, 130 F.4th 129 (4th Cir. 2025): Critical to the disposition: holds that a district court need not explain mandatory conditions of probation. The panel analogized Sumpter’s urinalysis condition—“nearly identical” to a mandatory supervised-release condition under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)—to conclude any lack of explanation was not “plain.”
  • United States v. Nsahlai, 121 F.4th 1052 (4th Cir. 2024): Used for the definition of “plain” error (i.e., clear or obvious under current law).
  • United States v. Green, 996 F.3d 176 (4th Cir. 2021): Provides the substantial-rights standard (“reasonable probability of a different outcome”) and is also cited for a factual premise relevant to Sumpter’s variance argument.
  • Grayson O Co. v. Agadir Int'l LLC, 856 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2017): Supports the court’s refusal to address other special conditions only referenced “generally and in passing.”

E. Substantive reasonableness: presumption and deference

  • United States v. Devine, 40 F.4th 139 (4th Cir. 2022): Provides the “totality of the circumstances” test tied to § 3553(a).
  • United States v. Bennett, 986 F.3d 389 (4th Cir. 2021): Establishes the presumption of substantive reasonableness for within-or-below-Guidelines sentences.
  • United States v. Henderson, 107 F.4th 287 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 578 (2024): States how the presumption may be rebutted—by showing unreasonableness measured against § 3553(a).
  • United States v. Smith, 75 F.4th 459 (4th Cir. 2023) and United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 2008): Emphasize that appellate courts do not substitute their judgment for the sentencing court’s.
  • United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669 (4th Cir. 2011): Describes the sentencing court’s “extremely broad discretion” in weighing § 3553(a) factors—central to rejecting Sumpter’s request for a greater variance.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Waiver eliminated the career-offender issue

The decisive procedural move was Sumpter’s conduct in the district court: he objected to the career-offender enhancement and then “explicitly withdraw[ed]” the objection “both in writing and in open court.” Applying United States v. Robinson and United States v. Morehouse, the panel treated this as waiver, not mere forfeiture. That distinction is outcome-determinative: forfeiture permits plain-error review; waiver forecloses review entirely because, doctrinally, the waived “error” is treated as non-existent on appeal.

This part of the opinion reinforces a practical rule for resentencings: if the defense withdraws a Guidelines objection to secure another benefit (or for any reason), it may not resurrect the issue on appeal even under the forgiving plain-error framework.

B. No plain error for an unexplained urinalysis condition that tracks a mandatory condition

The court accepted the general proposition from United States v. Van Donk that special conditions require an individualized explanation. But because Sumpter did not object, the panel applied plain-error review under United States v. McMiller.

Two steps drove the outcome:

  1. Not “plain”: The urinalysis condition was “nearly identical” to a mandatory supervised-release condition in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Relying on United States v. Notgrass (no explanation needed for mandatory conditions) and United States v. Nsahlai (what qualifies as “plain”), the panel concluded it was not clearly or obviously erroneous to omit an explanation here—especially where Sumpter did not identify a meaningful distinction between the imposed condition and the statutory mandatory analogue.
  2. No effect on substantial rights: Under United States v. Garrett and United States v. Green, Sumpter had to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent the error. Given the condition’s close alignment with a mandatory requirement, the court found he did not carry that burden.

C. Substantive reasonableness: rehabilitation credited, “windfall” avoided

The district court imposed a 420-month sentence after granting a downward variance, and the Fourth Circuit treated the below-Guidelines outcome as presumptively reasonable under United States v. Bennett. Sumpter’s rebuttal focused on (i) rehabilitation and (ii) a timing argument: he “would not have been classified as a career offender” had resentencing occurred before the 2023 Guidelines amendments.

The panel held those points did not establish an abuse of discretion because:

  • The sentencing judge did credit rehabilitation and explicitly treated Sumpter’s recent prison conduct as “its most important factor” in “significantly lowering his sentence.”
  • Further reduction based on the resentencing’s timing would create a “windfall” and potentially increase disparity among similarly situated offenders—an outcome in tension with § 3553(a) goals.
  • The court emphasized deference to the sentencing judge’s weighing of the § 3553(a) factors, citing United States v. Smith, United States v. Evans, and United States v. Jeffery.
  • Sumpter’s criminal history—“decades-long, escalating pattern of robberies”—supported the weight given to public-safety and deterrence considerations.

3.3 Impact

Although unpublished and “not binding precedent,” the decision is instructive in three recurring areas of federal sentencing practice:

  • Resentencing strategy and record preservation: The opinion underscores that an explicit withdrawal of a Guidelines objection is an appellate dead-end. Counsel making tactical withdrawals should treat them as effectively irrevocable for appeal.
  • Supervised-release condition explanations under plain-error review: The decision suggests that when a condition closely tracks a statutory mandatory condition (here, via 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)), the lack of an individualized explanation will be difficult to challenge without a contemporaneous objection and a developed argument showing why the differences matter.
  • Timing-based “windfall” arguments after legal changes: The court signaled skepticism toward using resentencing timing (e.g., around Guidelines amendments) as an independent reason for substantial additional reduction, particularly where it risks creating disparity.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (post-conviction relief): A federal prisoner’s mechanism to challenge a conviction or sentence as unlawful. Here it led to resentencing because the ACCA enhancement no longer applied after Johnson.
  • ACCA and “residual clause”: ACCA (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)) increases penalties for certain repeat offenders. Johnson v. United States invalidated the “residual clause” as unconstitutionally vague, which can remove ACCA status and require resentencing.
  • Career-offender enhancement (Guidelines): A Sentencing Guidelines designation that substantially increases the advisory range based on prior convictions and the current offense type.
  • Variance vs. departure: A variance is a sentence outside the Guidelines range based on § 3553(a) factors (what happened here).
  • Waiver vs. forfeiture: Waiver is an intentional relinquishment (e.g., explicitly withdrawing an objection), which bars appellate review. Forfeiture is a failure to raise an issue, typically reviewed only for plain error.
  • Plain-error review: A demanding standard applied when an issue was not preserved. The appellant must show a clear/obvious error that likely affected the outcome.
  • Supervised-release “mandatory” vs. “special” conditions: Mandatory conditions are required by statute; special conditions are discretionary but must be justified. This opinion treats a condition that is “nearly identical” to a mandatory statutory condition as unlikely to require reversal on plain-error review even if not explained.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Sumpter reinforces two practical appellate rules in federal sentencing: (1) an explicit withdrawal of a Guidelines objection is a true waiver that forecloses appellate review of that issue; and (2) absent an objection, an unexplained supervised-release condition that closely mirrors a statutory mandatory condition is unlikely to constitute reversible plain error—particularly without a developed showing of prejudice. On substantive reasonableness, the court reiterated strong deference to the sentencing judge’s balancing of § 3553(a) factors, including the discretion to credit rehabilitation while resisting timing-based reductions that would create “windfalls” or disparity.