United States v. Reed: No Temporal Limitation Required for a Cellphone Warrant Tied to an Ongoing Possession Offense of Unknown Duration

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date: August 12, 2026
Case: United States v. Reed, No. 24-6241

1. Introduction

United States v. Reed arises from a traffic stop involving a trailer suspected to be stolen, a subsequent search warrant for the defendant’s cellphone aimed at evidence of stolen property, and the discovery of child pornography during execution of that warrant. The defendant, Joseph Tyler Reed, was convicted of receiving and possessing child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) and § 2252A(a)(5)(B), and received concurrent 210-month sentences.

The appeal presented four clusters of issues:

  1. Traffic stop extension: whether officers had reasonable suspicion to investigate whether the trailer was stolen.
  2. Cellphone warrant scope: whether the warrant was overbroad or lacked particularity because it lacked a temporal limitation.
  3. Multiplicity (sentencing): whether the district court plainly erred by imposing multiplicitous punishments for receiving and possessing the same images.
  4. Guidelines adjustment: whether the appellate court could correct, under plain-error review, the district court’s failure to apply a two-level reduction where the issue was not raised below and would require fact development.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed both convictions and sentences. It held:

  • The officers had reasonable suspicion to investigate a possible trailer theft—supported by the trailer’s proximity to other stolen farm equipment discovered days earlier and by evidence suggesting deliberate removal of a GPS device.
  • The cellphone warrant was particularized because it targeted evidence of the specific crime of possessing stolen property, and it was not overbroad despite lacking a temporal limitation because the suspected possession scheme was ongoing and its duration was unknown—making any time cut-off arbitrary.
  • The court found no plain error in imposing concurrent sentences for receipt and possession because the record did not clearly or obviously show both counts rested on the same images.
  • The court rejected the guideline-reduction argument under plain-error review because the defendant failed to raise it below, the record contained no necessary facts, and the defendant bore the burden to prove entitlement to a decrease.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The opinion is built around three recurring doctrinal pillars—reasonable suspicion in traffic stops, Fourth Amendment limits on warrants (particularity/overbreadth), and plain-error constraints in sentencing appeals—each anchored by prior authority.

A. Reasonable suspicion to prolong/expand a traffic stop

  • United States v. Leon, 80 F.4th 1160, 1165 (10th Cir. 2023): cited for the proposition that even if a stop takes longer than necessary for the traffic mission, it remains lawful if supported by independent reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity.
  • United States v. Daniels, 101 F.4th 770, 776 (10th Cir. 2024): supplies the standard that reasonable suspicion requires an “objective and particularized basis” for suspecting wrongdoing.
  • United States v. Frazier, 30 F.4th 1165, 1172 (10th Cir. 2022): establishes de novo review of the legal conclusion and the requirement to view evidence in the government’s favor.
  • United States v. Sanchez, 13 F.4th 1063, 1071 (10th Cir. 2021): used by analogy; prior recovery of stolen items from the same location can support suspicion that other nearby property is stolen.
  • United States v. Pettit, 785 F.3d 1374, 1379 (10th Cir. 2015): underscores that reasonable suspicion can exist even when innocent explanations are plausible; officers need not eliminate innocence.

B. Cellphone warrant: particularity, overbreadth, temporal limitations

  • United States v. Santiago, 135 F.4th 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 2025): provides de novo review for challenges to warrant validity.
  • United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1131 (10th Cir. 2009): cited for the Fourth Amendment requirement that a warrant must particularly describe the items to be searched/seized.
  • United States v. Palms, 21 F.4th 689, 698-99 (10th Cir. 2021): supports the key move that a description is sufficiently particular if it targets evidence of a specific crime—even without a temporal limitation.
  • United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 605 (10th Cir. 1988): supplies the overbreadth test: a warrant is overbroad when it reaches property not supported by probable cause; later revisited to contrast discrete-incident probable cause with broad seizures.
  • Armendariz v. City of Colo. Springs, 169 F.4th 1036, 1062 (10th Cir. 2026): establishes that for discrete-time crimes, lack of a temporal limitation can contribute to overbreadth.
  • United States v. Tew, 171 F.4th 1210 (10th Cir. 2026): demonstrates concern about expansive cloud-account warrants when the listed offenses are “extremely broad,” risking a de facto general search.
  • United States v. Luman, 624 F.2d 152, 155 (10th Cir. 1980): used to justify inference: unexplained possession of recently stolen property can support an inference that the possessor stole it—important to the court’s view that the scheme could predate known theft reports and extend beyond the field.
  • United States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 973 (9th Cir. 2009) and United States v. Shilling, 826 F.2d 1365, 1369 (4th Cir. 1987) (per curiam), abrogated on other grounds by Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994): persuasive authority that time limits are not required where the government does not know the duration of the criminal conduct.
  • United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1095 (10th Cir. 2009): invoked to reject overbreadth objections where the defendant fails to propose a workable narrowing methodology compatible with thorough evidence search.
  • United States v. Robertson, 21 F.3d 1030, 1033-34 (10th Cir. 1994): supports the view that more specific warrant language is unnecessary when it would not meaningfully guide agents in identifying what to seize.

C. Waiver/forfeiture, plain error, and multiplicity in receipt/possession cases

  • United States v. Benoit, 713 F.3d 1, 6-7, 15-16 (10th Cir. 2013): establishes that possession is a lesser-included offense of receipt; a defendant cannot be punished for both based on the same image(s). It also authorizes consulting “the entire record” to assess multiplicity.
  • United States v. Rosales-Miranda, 755 F.3d 1253, 1257 (10th Cir. 2014) and Hancock v. Trammell, 798 F.3d 1002, 1111 n.3 (10th Cir. 2015): distinguish forfeiture (plain-error review applies) from waiver (no review).
  • United States v. Venjohn, 104 F.4th 179, 183 (10th Cir. 2024) and United States v. Finnesy, 953 F.3d 675, 684 (10th Cir. 2020): provide the plain-error framework and the “clear or obvious” requirement.
  • United States v. Robertson, 946 F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Sturm, 673 F.3d 1274, 1288 (10th Cir. 2012): pivotal to the disposition: where the record is ambiguous about whether the receipt and possession counts rested on the same files, any error is not “clear or obvious,” defeating plain-error relief.
  • United States v. Schnittker, 807 F.3d 77, 83 (4th Cir. 2015) and United States v. Halliday, 672 F.3d 462, 471 (7th Cir. 2012): cited to support rejecting multiplicity where the record indicates separate evidentiary foundations (or at least does not clearly show overlap).
  • United States v. Bowline, 917 F.3d 1227, 1230-38 (10th Cir. 2019), United States v. Yurek, 925 F.3d 423, 438 (10th Cir. 2019), Lowe v. Raemisch, 864 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2017), and United Food & Comm'l Workers Union, Local 1564 v. Albertson's, Inc., 207 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2000): collectively frame the procedural overlay: multiplicity challenges to indictments generally must be raised pretrial (or may be treated as waived), while some earlier cases applied plain error based on party agreement; the court stresses that decisions not addressing an issue are not precedential.
  • United States v. Vance, 893 F.3d 763, 769 (10th Cir. 2018) and United States v. Fernandez-Barron, 950 F.3d 655, 663 (10th Cir. 2019): enforce waiver principles for arguments omitted from pretrial motions or opening briefs and raised too late (e.g., in a reply brief).

D. Plain error and missing facts for guideline reductions

  • United States v. Berryhill, 140 F.4th 1287, 1293 (10th Cir. 2025) and United States v. Eckstein, 163 F.4th 1326, 1328 (10th Cir. 2026): confirm plain-error posture and require obvious, prejudicial error.
  • United States v. Kirk, 894 F.2d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir. 1990): key allocation rule: the defendant bears the burden to prove facts supporting sentence decreases.
  • United States v. Frost, 684 F.3d 963, 977 (10th Cir. 2012) and United States v. Saucedo, 950 F.2d 1508, 1518 (10th Cir. 1991): establish that missing determinative facts in the record—caused by failure to object—generally foreclose plain-error relief.
  • United States v. Martinez, 2024 WL 3887290 (10th Cir. Aug. 21, 2024) (unpub.): addressed only to reject the defendant’s attempt to shift the burden; it reiterates that defendants bear the burden for reductions.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Reasonable suspicion justified continued detention to investigate the trailer

The panel assumed arguendo that the stop for the mismatched tag took longer than necessary. The dispositive question became whether officers had independent reasonable suspicion that the trailer was stolen. The court treated the suspicion as reasonable based on two concrete facts:

  • Five days earlier, the trailer was present in a field with four other pieces of stolen farm equipment.
  • A GPS device on the trailer had been removed under circumstances suggesting more than casual discovery—close inspection and an effort to defeat tracking.

Importantly, the court acknowledged potentially exculpatory details (the VIN check did not match reported thefts; GPS removal could be innocent), but held that reasonable suspicion does not require conclusive proof and can survive plausible innocent explanations (reinforced by United States v. Pettit). The combination of proximity to proven stolen goods and anti-tracking behavior provided an “objective and particularized basis” to investigate theft.

B. Particularity: tying the warrant to a specific crime can substitute for time limits

On particularity, the defendant focused on the lack of a temporal limitation. The court rejected the premise that time limits are categorically required, reasoning (via United States v. Palms) that a warrant is sufficiently particular when it targets evidence of a specific crime. Here, the warrant was limited to evidence of “possession of stolen property,” which the defendant conceded was an explicit limitation.

C. Overbreadth: no time limit required where the offense is ongoing and its duration is unknown

The overbreadth analysis was the doctrinal heart of the opinion. The court contrasted:

  • Discrete-time crimes (where time limits may be feasible and necessary), as discussed in Armendariz v. City of Colo. Springs; and
  • Continuing offenses/ongoing schemes (where time limits may be impractical), a category the defendant conceded often includes drug trafficking and possession of child pornography.

The court classified the suspected stolen-property conduct as continuing: evidence suggested storage of stolen equipment over an eight-week period rather than a single moment. Crucially, even though police knew when owners reported thefts, the court held that did not fix when the defendant began possessing (or stealing) the items, especially because some theft reports predated the defendant’s access to the field. That temporal uncertainty mattered in two ways:

  1. It supported an inference (citing United States v. Luman) that the defendant might have stolen items and thus needed earlier storage locations.
  2. It made any proposed start date speculative; without knowing when the scheme began (or whether it extended beyond the five known items), a time limit would be “arbitrary,” aligning with United States v. Banks and United States v. Shilling.

The court also deployed a practical burden-shifting concept: if a defendant claims a warrant should have been narrower, he must articulate a workable alternative. Invoking United States v. Burgess, the panel rejected overbreadth where the defendant offered no “readily apparent” feasible temporal boundary consistent with unknown crime duration.

D. Late-raised narrowing argument (farm equipment vs. stolen property generally)

Reed’s suggestion that the warrant should have been limited to farm equipment (referencing Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1713.1) was deemed undeveloped in the opening brief and elaborated too late in reply—therefore waived under United States v. Vance and United States v. Fernandez-Barron. The court added that, even on the merits, the defendant did not explain how such narrowing would meaningfully guide the search, aligning with United States v. Robertson, 21 F.3d 1030.

E. Multiplicity (receipt and possession): ambiguity defeats plain error

The court accepted the underlying principle from United States v. Benoit: receipt and possession cannot both be punished for the same images. But because Reed did not raise the issue below, the panel proceeded (assuming forfeiture rather than waiver) under plain-error review and focused on whether any error was “clear or obvious.”

The key move came from United States v. Robertson, 946 F.3d 1168, and United States v. Sturm: if the record can reasonably be read as involving different images for different counts, the error is not clear or obvious. The panel examined trial references and found that the possession count was supported by Government’s Exhibits 27, 40, and 41 (descriptions of prepubescent nude posing, bondage, and masturbation), while the receipt count was supported by Government’s Exhibit 30 (oral sex depictions) and Government’s Exhibit 32 (download folders/links). Because the record did not unambiguously show the same images underlay both convictions, plain-error relief was unavailable.

F. Guidelines reduction under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(1): missing facts preclude plain error

Reed sought a two-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(1) (receipt/possession without intent to distribute). The court held the claim failed under plain error because:

  • The defendant bears the burden to prove reductions (United States v. Kirk).
  • No record facts existed on intent to distribute because Reed did not raise the issue, giving the government no reason to develop the evidence.
  • Under United States v. Frost and United States v. Saucedo, missing determinative facts caused by failure to object ordinarily bar plain-error findings.

3.3. Impact

The decision’s most salient forward-looking effect is its articulation of when a digital-device warrant may omit a temporal limitation without becoming overbroad: when probable cause concerns an ongoing possession offense and investigators cannot reasonably know the scheme’s start date or duration. Several practical implications follow:

  • Digital warrants in property-crime investigations: The case is a roadmap for defending broad time-spanning cellphone searches when the crime is possession-based (stolen property) and the timeline is indeterminate. It also signals that courts will demand a concrete alternative from defendants alleging overbreadth.
  • Boundary between discrete incidents and ongoing schemes: By contrasting Armendariz v. City of Colo. Springs and United States v. Leary with the continuing nature of possession, Reed encourages litigants to frame (or resist) crimes as “discrete-time” depending on the warrant-limitation dispute.
  • Multiplicity litigation strategy: The opinion reinforces that receipt/possession multiplicity claims are difficult to win on appeal under plain-error review unless the record clearly shows the same images supported both counts. Practically, defense counsel must preserve the issue and press for clarifying findings or tailored instructions/record references to avoid “ambiguity defeats plain error.”
  • Sentencing preservation: The § 2G2.2(b)(1) discussion underscores that guideline reductions are fact-sensitive and must be raised in the district court. Appellate courts will not supply missing facts under plain error where the defendant had the burden to create the record.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Reasonable suspicion
A lower threshold than probable cause. Officers need specific, objective facts suggesting criminal activity; they do not need proof or to rule out innocent explanations.
Particularity
The warrant must tell officers what they are allowed to look for and seize with enough specificity to prevent a “general search.” A common way to satisfy this is by limiting the search to evidence of a specific crime.
Overbreadth
Even if a warrant is specific in wording, it can still be unconstitutional if it authorizes searching/seizing more than what probable cause justifies—i.e., it sweeps in material not sufficiently connected to the suspected offense.
Temporal limitation
A date range restricting what time period of data may be searched (e.g., messages from Jan–Mar). Courts are more likely to require it when the suspected crime happened at a single time, and less likely when the crime is ongoing and investigators cannot know when it began.
Multiplicity (receipt vs. possession)
Charging/sentencing a defendant twice for what is effectively the same criminal act. Because possession is a lesser-included offense of receipt, punishment for both is improper if both counts are based on the same images.
Forfeiture vs. waiver; plain error
Forfeiture is an accidental failure to raise an issue; appellate review may occur under “plain error.” Waiver is an intentional relinquishment (or certain rule-based failures), often eliminating appellate review entirely. Plain error is a demanding standard requiring a clear or obvious mistake that affected the outcome and seriously harms the fairness or integrity of proceedings.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Reed affirms convictions and sentences but, more importantly, clarifies how the Tenth Circuit evaluates temporal limits in digital search warrants. The court holds that when probable cause targets an ongoing possession offense and law enforcement cannot reliably determine the scheme’s duration, the absence of a temporal limitation does not, by itself, render a warrant overbroad or insufficiently particular. The decision also reinforces two appellate realities: ambiguous records rarely support plain-error relief for receipt/possession multiplicity, and guideline reductions dependent on undeveloped facts must be raised in the district court or they will likely be lost on appeal.