2. Background and Procedural History
The prosecution and repeated changes of counsel
Newton was indicted in January 2021. After the government dismissed six charges, her first trial began in June 2023 but ended in a mistrial during jury deliberations. Her retrial commenced on July 8, 2024.
Across the proceedings, thirteen attorneys represented or assisted Newton in various capacities. Repeated disagreements led to withdrawal motions, requests for replacement counsel, and periods of proposed or actual self-representation. This history mattered because the court evaluated Newton’s final election against an extensive record, rather than an isolated statement made immediately before trial.
Newton received an initial set of warnings about self-representation in May 2022. The magistrate judge explained the disadvantages of proceeding without legal training and the serious consequences of conviction. Newton insisted that she wanted to represent herself and denied having psychological problems. She later retained attorneys who represented her through the first trial.
Before the retrial, further attorney-client difficulties arose. At a June 2024 hearing, the district court offered three alternatives: proceed with available counsel, represent herself with standby counsel, or retain another attorney ready for the existing trial date. After emphatic warnings that self-representation was a “terrible idea,” Newton stated, “I want to represent myself” and “It’s my choice.” The court overruled her objection to proceeding without representation on the morning of retrial, and standby counsel assisted throughout.
The border search
In July 2017, Customs and Border Protection agents stopped Newton at Logan Airport upon her return from Kenya. They seized her phone and conducted a forensic examination that produced incriminating messages concerning Arbor.
The government maintained that agents suspected international money laundering. Its information included former employees’ statements about money going to Kenya and a receipt indicating a $1.7 million deposit into a Kenyan bank. Newton’s pretrial suppression motion challenged the absence of a warrant and the involvement of a prosecuting Assistant United States Attorney in requesting the search.
The district court found reasonable suspicion, while describing the question as close, and admitted the messages. On appeal, however, Newton advanced a different contention: that the information known to agents was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.
The sentence
The presentence report calculated a total offense level of 43. That calculation included a 24-level enhancement for losses between $65 million and $150 million and a two-level enhancement for sophisticated means. The latter rested on evidence of substantial concealment through Kenyan financial accounts.
Newton received 144 months’ imprisonment, three years of supervised release, a $250,000 fine, and restitution of $99,734,517.50. Her appellate sentencing arguments sought a credit for services Arbor allegedly supplied and challenged the characterization of her Kenyan accounts as offshore.
4. Analysis: Precedents Cited and Legal Reasoning
A. The constitutional choice between counsel and self-representation
The governing framework
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), supplies the decision’s constitutional foundation. Although the Sixth Amendment expressly guarantees assistance of counsel, it also protects a defendant’s choice to conduct her own defense. Because exercising that choice sacrifices important protections, the waiver of counsel must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
The court used Faretta v. California both to protect Newton’s autonomy and to identify the trial court’s protective obligation. Judicial disagreement with a defendant’s decision does not eliminate the right to make it. Indeed, the warnings established that the district court strongly discouraged self-representation rather than casually permitting it.
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942), appears through the formulation that a defendant must understand what she is doing and choose “with eyes open.” This directs attention to actual comprehension, not merely the recitation of a warning formula.
United States v. Belin, 868 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2017), supplied the First Circuit’s review framework. Review of the waiver record is “effectively de novo,” and the waiver stands when the record supports a reasoned conclusion that the defendant understood both the right to counsel and the disadvantages of proceeding alone. Consequently, the appellate court examined the entire history of Newton’s warnings and experience.
Why the warnings were sufficient
Newton did not principally argue that the warnings’ wording was inherently inadequate. Instead, she maintained that her particular difficulties prevented her from understanding them. The court therefore considered their substance alongside her responses and the surrounding circumstances.
The warnings described her lack of legal training, the technical demands of evidence and procedure, the difficulties of examining witnesses and selecting a jury, and the seriousness of the potential sentence. Their repetition in 2022 and 2024 strengthened the conclusion that Newton appreciated the risks.
United States v. Jones, 778 F.3d 375 (1st Cir. 2015), closely supported this conclusion. There, a warning explaining the general dangers of self-representation and describing it as a “terrible idea” was sufficient. The similar language here helped demonstrate that Newton received a direct and understandable warning.
United States v. LaBare, 191 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 1999), gave additional significance to Newton’s experience observing her first trial. A defendant who has already attended her own criminal trial ordinarily understands that litigation involves witnesses, objections, and procedural and evidentiary rules. Newton’s experience supplemented the spoken warnings; it did not replace them.
Newton relied on allegedly distorted perceptions, language difficulties, statements by former counsel, correspondence, and nonresponsive answers. The court nevertheless found no colorable record-based claim that she failed to understand her choice. It considered her apparent ability to manage complex financial arrangements, the judges’ opportunities to observe her, and the absence of a request for psychological examination from either the government or her numerous attorneys.
United States v. Agramonte-Quezada, 30 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2022), supported reliance on judicial observation and the absence of requests for a competency hearing. That precedent concerned circumstances in which declining to order a hearing was not an abuse of discretion. Its role here was contextual: no single factor automatically established competence, but the combined record supported the court’s assessment.
Why the election was unequivocal
United States v. Woodard, 291 F.3d 95 (1st Cir. 2002), requires an election of self-representation in unequivocal language. Newton’s statements—“I want to represent myself” and “It’s my choice”—met that requirement.
United States v. Kar, 851 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 2017), reinforced the conclusion because similarly direct statements had been treated as unmistakable assertions of the right. The court distinguished Newton’s expressed present decision from her preference for a different future arrangement.
Newton repeatedly hoped that restrained assets would be released so she could retain counsel of her choice. But wanting counsel later did not negate choosing self-representation now. United States v. Proctor, 166 F.3d 396 (1st Cir. 1999), recognizes that a defendant may retract a waiver of counsel. That possibility explains why a present waiver need not imply a permanent commitment to proceed without representation.
United States v. Gonzalez-Arias, 946 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2019), further establishes that dissatisfaction with available alternatives does not necessarily make the final election ambiguous. A defendant may dislike her options yet clearly choose one. Newton’s preference for an attorney she could not then retain therefore did not invalidate her express election.
This reasoning should not be read as making every waiver irrevocable. The opinion upheld Newton’s waiver in its particular procedural setting; it did not establish a universal rule governing every later request to restore representation.
Why requiring a choice did not violate the Sixth Amendment
The court rejected the argument that Newton was unconstitutionally forced to choose between unwanted counsel and self-representation. Both United States v. Kar and United States v. Proctor recognize that such a choice can be permissible when effective representation remains available.
The decisive distinction was between an attorney whom a defendant does not want and an attorney whose representation is constitutionally inadequate. The record did not establish the latter. Attorney Miner remained willing to represent Newton, and the court viewed her preparation favorably. The court also addressed a central scheduling disagreement by helping counsel accommodate an earlier trial date.
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983), supplied the principle that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a “meaningful relationship” between defendant and counsel. Personal distrust or dissatisfaction, without constitutionally significant impairment of representation, does not itself require replacement.
United States v. Gottesfeld, quoting United States v. Reyes, directed attention to whether conflict had produced a total lack of communication. The court found no such breakdown. United States v. Allen, 789 F.2d 90 (1st Cir. 1986), likewise supported the proposition that a defendant’s loss of confidence alone does not establish good cause for new counsel.
Case-management considerations reinforced that conclusion. Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1976), as quoted in United States v. Gonzalez-Arias, recognizes that courts need not tolerate unwarranted delays merely because a defendant remains dissatisfied with counsel. United States v. Woodard similarly permits consideration of undue delay and orderly judicial procedure.
These authorities did not create unrestricted power to deny replacement counsel. Their application depended on the court’s finding that effective representation remained available and on the extraordinary history of attorney changes as retrial approached.
The related asset-restraint proceedings
United States v. 5 Real Props. provided important factual context rather than the governing constitutional standard. In the related civil forfeiture litigation, Newton sought release of restrained property to finance preferred counsel. The court found her supporting affidavit inadequate and identified substantial assets she had not satisfactorily accounted for, including apparently available unrestrained funds.
Those findings weakened the suggestion that Newton had no realistic alternatives. Nevertheless, the appellate opinion did not independently decide a constitutional challenge to the asset restraint. Its holding concerned the validity of her election on the record presented.
B. Competence to waive counsel is not legal skill to conduct a defense
Newton argued that Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), established a higher, constitutionally required competency threshold for self-representation than for standing trial. The court rejected that interpretation.
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), supplied the controlling distinction: the relevant competence is the ability to waive counsel, not the ability to perform effectively as one’s own lawyer. A defendant’s lack of trial skill therefore does not itself defeat an otherwise valid waiver.
Indiana v. Edwards permits a state to insist on representation for a defendant who is competent to stand trial but whose severe mental illness makes self-representation inappropriate. It does not impose a mandatory, separate competency tier in every case.
United States v. Garrett, 42 F.4th 114 (2nd Cir. 2022), supported that reading by collecting decisions from other circuits treating Indiana v. Edwards as permissive rather than mandatory. Together with United States v. Agramonte-Quezada, these authorities supported the conclusion that Newton could competently choose self-representation.
The distinction preserves both autonomy and protection. Courts may have authority to require counsel in qualifying severe-mental-illness cases, but a defendant cannot obtain reversal merely by showing that trained counsel would have conducted a better defense.
Finally, Newton’s reply brief introduced a separate ineffective-assistance argument concerning counsel’s understanding of her psychological difficulties. Under Aldea-Tirado v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 101 F.4th 99 (1st Cir. 2024), a new argument raised only in reply was waived. The court therefore did not adjudicate that claim’s merits.
C. Border searches and the requirement to preserve the specific suppression ground
The substantive Fourth Amendment framework
Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2021), supplied the governing background rule: a non-routine border search requires reasonable suspicion that it will uncover evidence of activity violating laws enforced or administered by CBP or Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
The government invoked that standard because CBP investigates international cash money laundering. It relied on the employees’ information, the Kenyan deposit receipt, and the suspected role of Newton’s phone in facilitating the activity.
Crucially, the First Circuit did not decide whether those particular facts satisfied reasonable suspicion. The appeal failed at the preservation stage. Accordingly, the opinion should not be treated as substantive approval of that evidentiary combination for future device searches.
Why the appellate theory was not preserved
Newton’s pretrial motion asserted that the search lacked a warrant and had been requested by a prosecutor. Those contentions were distinct from arguing that the agents lacked sufficient particularized information to establish reasonable suspicion. Her subsequent response appeared to dispute the applicability of the reasonable-suspicion standard, but it did not present the factual-insufficiency argument advanced on appeal.
United States v. Lindsey, 3 F.4th 32 (1st Cir. 2021), requires a party to raise an argument “squarely” below. It also establishes that unpreserved suppression theories are unreviewable absent good cause under Rule 12(c)(3). United States v. Torres, 162 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 1998), reinforced the requirement that suppression grounds be presented before trial.
The relevant unit of preservation was therefore the particular ground for suppression, not the general subject of the phone search. Filing a suppression motion did not preserve every possible Fourth Amendment challenge to the evidence.
Why the district court’s discussion did not cure the omission
The government discussed reasonable suspicion, and the district court expressly decided that it existed. Nevertheless, those actions did not substitute for Newton’s obligation to raise her own specific challenge.
United States v. Bashorun, 225 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2000), establishes that the Rule 12 bar may apply even when the district court ultimately addresses the omitted issue on its merits. United States v. Galindo-Serrano, 925 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2019), and United States v. Walker-Couvertier, 860 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017), supported the same approach.
United States v. Walker-Couvertier also explains the limited significance of a district court’s discussion: it may help create a factual record, but it does not itself overcome the procedural default.
United States v. Arias, 848 F.3d 504 (1st Cir. 2017), clarified why older cases applying former Rule 12(f) remained relevant. The pertinent language moved to Rule 12(c)(3), but the governing good-cause standard remained the same.
Nor did the district court’s statement that Newton’s objection was preserved expand its scope. That assurance covered objections actually articulated; it did not authorize new theories on appeal.
No procedural exemption for self-represented defendants
Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886 (1st Cir. 1997), establishes that self-represented litigants remain subject to procedural and substantive law. Newton’s decision to proceed without counsel therefore did not excuse the missing suppression ground.
Because she offered no good cause, United States v. Lindsey foreclosed review, including ordinary plain-error review. This is a significant distinction from the sentencing issues: Rule 12 imposed a specific threshold that Newton never crossed.
D. Sentencing: specific objections and developed plain-error arguments
The governing standards of review
United States v. Guía-Sendeme, 134 F.4th 611 (1st Cir. 2025), quoting United States v. Mendoza-Maisonet, 962 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2020), described a multifaceted abuse-of-discretion framework. Legal interpretation and application of the Guidelines receive de novo review, factual findings receive clear-error review, and discretionary judgments receive abuse-of-discretion review.
Preservation alters that framework. Under United States v. Leach, 89 F.4th 189 (1st Cir. 2023), unpreserved sentencing challenges receive only plain-error review.
As explained in United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2001), and repeated in United States v. Leach, the appellant must establish an error that is clear or obvious, affects substantial rights, and seriously impairs the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
The loss calculation and claimed value of services
For the calculation at issue, the court treated loss as the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm resulting from the offense. Approximately $99.7 million in loss placed Newton within the Guidelines’ $65 million-to-$150 million bracket and produced a 24-level enhancement.
On appeal, Newton invoked the Guidelines commentary allowing credit for the fair market value of services rendered before detection. She claimed Arbor had provided services worth at least $38,012,000. If accepted, that subtraction would have moved the loss below $65 million and reduced the enhancement by two levels.
Her objections below, however, challenged the evidentiary sources and accuracy of the loss figures. They did not ask the court to deduct the value of legitimate services. Those are materially different arguments: one attacks the support for the government’s number; the other asserts a particular offset.
United States v. Hassan-Saleh-Mohamad, 930 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2019), quoting United States v. Soto-Soto, 855 F.3d 445 (1st Cir. 2017), requires sufficient specificity to alert the sentencing court to the asserted error. Newton’s general evidentiary objections did not satisfy that requirement for the services-credit theory.
The separate failure to argue plain error
Even after failing to preserve the theory, Newton could have sought plain-error review. Her principal brief, however, neither invoked that standard nor explained how its requirements were satisfied.
Schuster v. Wynn Ma, LLC, 118 F.4th 30 (1st Cir. 2024), quoting United States v. Benjamin-Hernandez, 49 F.4th 580 (1st Cir. 2022), treats that briefing failure as waiver of the argument. Thus, Newton encountered two separate procedural problems: inadequate preservation below and inadequate presentation of the remaining route to appellate review.
In an alternative observation, the court found no apparent plain error anyway. Newton identified no record support establishing that patients ineligible for the billed services nevertheless qualified for lesser services Arbor actually provided, or that those lesser services would have been covered.
That observation is limited. The court did not hold that legitimate services can never reduce loss in a health care fraud case. It held that Newton’s unpreserved and inadequately supported claim did not justify relief.
The sophisticated-means enhancement
Section 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) provides a two-level enhancement for fraud involving sophisticated means. The commentary describes especially complex or intricate conduct in executing or concealing an offense and identifies hiding assets through offshore financial accounts as an example.
Newton argued that depositing funds in Kenya was not an offshore transaction because she was born there. The court did not resolve a general definition of “offshore” based on nationality. Instead, it found that the challenge had not been preserved and that Newton again failed to develop a plain-error argument. United States v. Leach and Schuster v. Wynn Ma, LLC therefore supplied the dispositive procedural framework.
Her complaint about an earlier presentence report was also insufficient because the final report contained the relevant factual basis, and she did not properly challenge that basis.
Alternatively, the court explained why the enhancement was far from clearly erroneous. Newton concealed more than $10 million in Kenyan accounts over six years, acquired property and businesses there, and placed assets beyond American authorities’ reach. The scheme also involved false patient files, training records, and billing documents, together with multiple corporate entities and hundreds of employees.
The significance lay in the coordinated execution and concealment of the fraud, not merely the foreign location of a bank account. These alternative observations support the result without establishing that every foreign transfer warrants the enhancement.