4. Analysis: Statutory Interpretation, Legal Reasoning, and Precedents
4.1. The Statutory Framework
The production charges arose under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), with attempts punishable under § 2251(e). The disputed language prohibits using a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of that conduct. Section 2256(2)(A)(v) includes within “sexually explicit conduct” an actual or simulated “lascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals, or pubic area.”
The possession charge arose under § 2252A(a)(5)(B). Its relevant definition of child pornography likewise depended on a visual depiction involving a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Consequently, the meaning of “lascivious exhibition” affected both the production and possession convictions.
Morgan argued that these provisions required sexual conduct by the child, not merely a sexualized representation created by the photographer. The court rejected that interpretation as inconsistent with established circuit precedent.
4.2. Lasciviousness Describes the Depiction, Not the Child
The foundational precedents
United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1987), supplied the foundational distinction. Although an adult’s lascivious pose might communicate an intentional sexual invitation, importing that assumption into cases involving children would misunderstand their vulnerability. A child may neither comprehend nor intend the sexual meaning imposed by a photographer. Accordingly, lasciviousness describes the exhibition arranged for the photographer or a like-minded audience, rather than a characteristic of the child.
The Tenth Circuit adopted that approach in United States v. Wolf, 890 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1989). There, the court upheld a conviction involving a photograph of a sleeping child. The absence of conscious sexual behavior did not prevent the photograph from constituting a lascivious exhibition. United States v. Morgan treats this reasoning as binding, rather than as a new departure.
Morgan attempted to distinguish United States v. Wolf by suggesting that the photographer had physically manipulated the child before taking the photograph. The court rejected that distinction: the earlier decision had not made such manipulation a necessary factual or legal premise. The exploitative depiction itself was central.
United States v. Wells, 843 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2016), reinforced the principle in the hidden-camera context. The child there engaged in ordinary bathroom activities and understood her conduct as nonsexual. The court nevertheless examined the recordings’ content, their focus on intimate areas, the setting, and evidence of the defendant’s sexual interest. That precedent closely answered Morgan’s claim that innocent bathing could never become the subject of prohibited sexually explicit material.
The “use” element
United States v. Theis, 853 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2017), drawing on United States v. Sirois, 87 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 1996), explained that intentionally photographing a child to create pornography satisfies the statutory requirement of “use.” The government therefore did not have to prove an additional sexual performance independent of the lascivious depiction.
This reasoning separates the child’s innocence from the defendant’s conduct. A child may behave innocently while the defendant uses the child as the subject of an exploitative visual exhibition. The court did not, however, equate every photograph of a nude child with pornography: the depiction must still be lascivious.
Supporting authorities and legislative purpose
United States v. Reedy, 845 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1988), supported treating “lascivious” as the commonsense equivalent of “lewd.” United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781 (8th Cir. 1999), similarly located the relevant exhibition in the producer’s or editor’s work, not the child’s intentions.
The opinion also identified a substantial body of consistent authority:
- United States v. Johnson, 639 F.3d 433 (8th Cir. 2011), recognized that lasciviousness can originate with the producer or editor.
- United States v. Holmes, 814 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2016), accepted that a recorder’s actions can make depictions of otherwise innocent conduct lascivious.
- United States v. Donoho, 76 F.4th 588 (7th Cir. 2023), emphasized context, including framing.
- United States v. Sanders, 107 F.4th 234 (4th Cir. 2024), rejected the proposition that a lascivious exhibition necessarily depicts a sex act or conduct connoting one.
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), supplied the broader child-protection rationale: using children as subjects of pornography can injure their physical, emotional, and mental well-being. The opinion connected that rationale with congressional findings in the Child Protection Act of 1984. Exploitation does not cease to be harmful merely because a child did not understand the photographer’s purpose.
4.3. Attempted Production: Specific Intent and a Substantial Step
Under United States v. Isabella, 918 F.3d 816 (10th Cir. 2019), and United States v. Faust, 795 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 2015), attempt requires both specific intent to commit the substantive offense and a substantial step toward its completion.
Specific intent could be inferred from the entire course of conduct
The court did not examine each recording in isolation. Morgan purchased concealed recording equipment, placed it where children would be nude, reviewed footage, extracted an enlarged image, moved the camera closer, and used the same setting and equipment to create completed sexually explicit recordings. Evidence of his sexual abuse and possession of child pornography further supported the inference that he intended to create lascivious depictions rather than merely record ordinary household activity.
United States v. Wilson, 142 F.4th 1045 (8th Cir. 2025), was especially relevant because it treated concealed cameras placed where minors were likely to be naked, extended recording, and selected screenshots as evidence of the necessary intent. United States v. Wells similarly supported consideration of camera positioning, genital focus, and demonstrated sexual interest. United States v. Isabella permitted an inference of intent from evidence of a common scheme.
The court’s references to bathrooms and bedrooms as potentially sexually suggestive settings were contextual, not categorical. United States v. Larkin, 629 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2010), cited through United States v. Wells, supported considering such locations as possible settings for sexual fantasy. Nothing in the decision makes every bathroom recording inherently lascivious.
Two limits remained important:
- United States v. Soderstrand, 412 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2005), cited through United States v. Isabella, establishes that mere nudity is insufficient.
- United States v. Helton, 302 F. App’x 842 (10th Cir. 2008), an unpublished decision drawing on United States v. Horn, supported the proposition that complete nudity is not invariably necessary. This mattered to Count 7, involving covered genital areas.
The distinction is between nudity as one evidentiary consideration and lascivious exhibition as the statutory requirement. Neither nudity nor clothing determines the issue automatically.
Morgan progressed beyond preparation
United States v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 2013), and United States v. Fleming, 667 F.3d 1098 (10th Cir. 2011), describe a substantial step as conduct adapted to and approximating the offense, likely in the ordinary course to produce its commission. The defendant need not complete the final act. United States v. Faust, citing United States v. Irving, 665 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2011), emphasizes that this inquiry is highly fact-specific.
Morgan did considerably more than acquire equipment or entertain an intention. He positioned cameras, directed children toward the recording area, and actually recorded or photographed them. For Count 7, he placed his phone between MV2’s legs. For the other attempt counts, he concealed and operated the bathtub camera. A rational jury could find that these acts sufficiently advanced the intended production even where the resulting material did not capture the lascivious exhibition charged as the intended result.
The governing sufficiency standard
United States v. Xiang, 12 F.4th 1176 (10th Cir. 2021), citing United States v. Delgado-Uribe, 363 F.3d 1077 (10th Cir. 2004), supplied de novo review. But that review remained highly deferential to the verdict: under United States v. Griffith, 928 F.3d 855 (10th Cir. 2019), reversal required the absence of a rational basis for finding the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Simpkins, 90 F.4th 1312 (10th Cir. 2024), and Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237 (2016), required viewing the evidence favorably to the government.
Accordingly, the appellate court’s task was not to choose the inference it preferred, but to determine whether the jury’s inference of criminal intent and substantial steps was rational.
4.4. Attempt Instructions Must Require Intent, but Are Read as a Whole
Morgan objected that “knowingly attempted to use” permitted conviction on knowledge rather than specific intent. The court acknowledged that these mental states differ.
United States v. Blair, 54 F.3d 639 (10th Cir. 1995), drawing on United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980), and United States v. Hall, 805 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1986), distinguished voluntary, nonaccidental action from action undertaken with the required specific purpose. For attempt, the jury had to find that Morgan intended to commit the prohibited offense, not merely that he deliberately operated a camera.
The challenged wording was nevertheless embedded in instructions that twice explained the intent requirement. They required an intent to make a depiction of sexually explicit conduct and expressly stated that the defendant must have intended to commit the crime. Under United States v. Theis, the intended creation of such a depiction also supplied the intended “use” of the child.
Wilson v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 80 F.4th 1170 (10th Cir. 2023), quoting Henning v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 530 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2008), required evaluating the instructions as a whole. Applying that approach, the court found no legal misstatement.
Practical significance: The decision tolerates the particular wording in context; it does not recommend “knowingly attempted” as a model formulation. Clear instructions should directly identify the intended prohibited result.
4.5. Editing an Existing Recording Can Produce a New Lascivious Depiction
Count 8 presented a distinct question: had Morgan used MV2 to produce pornography when he enlarged a frame from an existing recording, or had he merely used an electronic device?
The court rejected that either-or distinction. The device was the means of production; MV2 remained the real child whose image Morgan exploited. By selecting a suitable frame and enlarging her genitals, he created the lascivious depiction supporting the conviction.
This conclusion followed the reasoning of United States v. Wolf, United States v. Wells, and United States v. Theis: exploitation can occur through how a photographer arrays the depiction, and statutory “use” does not require an additional sexual performance by the child.
The court also invoked § 2256(8)(C), which addresses adapted or modified depictions, as evidence that Congress did not limit protection to unaltered original images. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002), supported the distinction between altered images implicating real children and material produced without children. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008), reinforced the corresponding limitation on the child-protection rationale.
The holding is anchored to a real child: Morgan adapted his recording of an actual victim into a lascivious image of that victim. The opinion does not establish that wholly synthetic material, ordinary image editing, or every alteration of a child’s photograph violates § 2251.
4.6. Dost Factors May Guide the Jury Without Defining the Offense
The six factors and their proper function
United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1986), identified six considerations for evaluating whether a depiction is a lascivious exhibition:
- Whether the focal point is the child’s genitalia or pubic area.
- Whether the setting is sexually suggestive.
- Whether the child appears in an unnatural pose or inappropriate attire, considering age.
- Whether the child is clothed, partially clothed, or nude.
- Whether the depiction suggests sexual coyness or willingness to engage in sexual activity.
- Whether the depiction is intended or designed to elicit a sexual response.
The Tenth Circuit had already endorsed these considerations in evaluating evidence through United States v. Wolf and United States v. Wells. Morgan argued that their use in a jury instruction was a different matter.
The court’s answer was qualified: a district court does not categorically err by allowing jurors to consider the factors as nondefinitional aids. The instruction here required consideration of the depiction’s overall content and made the factors optional. It neither substituted them for the statutory requirement nor required a mechanical tally.
Precedents supporting this approach
United States v. Rivera, 546 F.3d 245 (2d Cir. 2008), was especially influential. It recognized the factors’ imperfections while explaining their usefulness in reducing purely visceral responses and facilitating reasoned jury deliberation. United States v. Heinrich, 57 F.4th 154 (3d Cir. 2023), likewise characterized them as guidelines rather than a checklist.
The opinion identified published decisions accepting their use in some instructional capacity: United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Sanders; United States v. Wilkerson, 124 F.4th 361 (5th Cir. 2024); United States v. Ward, 686 F.3d 879 (8th Cir. 2012); and United States v. Arvin, 900 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1990).
The Tenth Circuit’s own United States v. Kroeker, No. 24-3060, 2025 WL 1878790 (July 8, 2025), had already approved a comparable instruction, but was unpublished. United States v. Freeman, 70 F.4th 1265 (10th Cir. 2023), citing United States v. Austin, 426 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2005), explained why the court could use that decision persuasively without treating it as binding precedent.
The acknowledged disagreement among circuits
The court did not portray the approach as universal:
- United States v. Guy, 708 F. App’x 249 (6th Cir. 2017), accepted the factors in an unpublished instructional decision.
- United States v. Charriez-Rolón, 923 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2019), treated the factors as relevant without specifically approving jury instructions using them.
- United States v. Hunter, 720 F. App’x 991 (11th Cir. 2017), reflected the Eleventh Circuit’s lack of a definitive adoption despite their inclusion in its pattern instructions.
- United States v. Price, 775 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2014), affirmed their use on plain-error review but discouraged routine use.
- United States v. Hillie, 39 F.4th 674 (D.C. Cir. 2022), expressly rejected instructing juries on the factors.
Thus, United States v. Morgan establishes the Tenth Circuit’s position while preserving an acknowledged inter-circuit disagreement.
Nudity and subjective arousal cannot independently establish guilt
Morgan argued that allowing jurors to choose the factors’ weight could let them convict solely because a child was nude or because an image aroused him. The court agreed that either basis, standing alone, would be legally insufficient.
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, and United States v. Wiegand establish that private fantasies or a defendant’s personal estimation do not transform an otherwise non-lascivious image into prohibited material. Judge Higginbotham’s concurrence in United States v. Steen, 634 F.3d 822 (5th Cir. 2011), vividly illustrated the problem: a sexual response to an ordinary photograph does not make the photograph pornographic.
Nevertheless, United States v. Wells allowed subjective sexual response to be considered as part of the sixth factor. The opinion identified similar treatment of subjective intent in United States v. Donoho, United States v. Wilkerson, United States v. McCoy, 108 F.4th 639 (8th Cir. 2024), and United States v. Boam, 69 F.4th 601 (9th Cir. 2023). It contrasted that approach with the objective-only treatment in United States v. Heinrich and the authority cited in the supplied text by the short form Spoor, 904 F.3d at 150–51.
The reconciliation is that subjective evidence may assist the inquiry, but the image’s overall content must independently support the jury’s determination of lasciviousness. A viewer’s reaction cannot replace that determination.
United States v. Woodmore, 127 F.4th 193 (10th Cir. 2025), citing United States v. Dowlin, 408 F.3d 647 (10th Cir. 2005), required contextual reading of the instructions. United States v. Rudolph, 152 F.4th 1197 (10th Cir. 2025), drawing on Stouffer v. Duckworth, 825 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. 2016), and United States v. Fleming, supplied the presumption that jurors follow them. Those principles supported rejecting hypothetical readings that ignored the mandatory overall-content inquiry.
4.7. Uncharged Sexual Abuse: Relevance Is Not a Hearsay Exception
The district court admitted the sexual-abuse evidence both as intrinsic evidence, or res gestae, and under Federal Rule of Evidence 414. The appellate analysis carefully distinguished those relevance grounds from the separate rules governing hearsay.
United States v. Piette, 45 F.4th 1142 (10th Cir. 2022), describes intrinsic evidence as inextricably intertwined with the charged conduct and therefore outside Rule 404(b)’s general restriction on other-act propensity evidence. United States v. Kimball, 73 F.3d 269 (10th Cir. 1995), describes such evidence as part of the proof of the charged offense.
Morgan relied on United States v. Cass, 127 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 1997), and United States v. Hinson, 585 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir. 2009), to argue that the government improperly used investigative-background statements for their truth. But those authorities addressed hearsay concerns, not whether evidence was intrinsic. Showing truth-related use did not, by itself, undermine the district court’s relevance classification.
Morgan had not contemporaneously objected on hearsay grounds to Detective Elledge’s initial testimony and did not seek plain-error review in his opening brief. United States v. Bradley, 97 F.4th 1214 (10th Cir. 2024), relying on United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2019), and United States v. Wright, 848 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2017), supported treating that appellate argument as waived. Morgan also disclaimed a hearsay argument concerning that initial admission.
Important limitation: The court did not hold that intrinsic evidence is automatically admissible hearsay. It expressly recognized that res gestae is not a hearsay exception. The result depended on the arguments actually preserved and presented.
No remand for an additional Rule 403 explanation
United States v. Perrault, 995 F.3d 748 (10th Cir. 2021), and United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326 (10th Cir. 1998), supplied the usual abuse-of-discretion standard for Rule 403 decisions. United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1998), requires a reasoned, recorded Rule 403 explanation when admitting character evidence under Rules 413–415; Seeley v. Chase, 443 F.3d 1290 (10th Cir. 2006), supports remand when the required explanation is absent.
Morgan sought that explanatory remand rather than substantive review of the balancing. The court declined because the evidence also rested on an effectively unchallenged intrinsic-evidence ground. The special character-evidence concern underlying United States v. Castillo therefore did not require remand.
This ruling does not exempt intrinsic evidence from Rule 403. It concerns the additional explanation requirement and the independent basis on which this evidence had been admitted.
4.8. Rule 807 Does Not Permit More Vivid Repetition Merely Because a Child Is Reluctant
The government recalled Detective Elledge after MV3 testified and used him to introduce more detailed statements from her forensic interview. Morgan preserved a hearsay objection to that second presentation.
Rule 807 requires sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness and greater probative value on the relevant point than other evidence reasonably obtainable. Trustworthiness was not disputed. The issue was whether the prior statements were more probative than MV3’s live testimony.
The controlling comparison: Burgess and McFadden
United States v. Burgess, 99 F.4th 1175 (10th Cir. 2024), recognized that a child’s availability does not categorically prevent admission of earlier statements under Rule 807. There, inconsistency between the child’s trial testimony and earlier accusations supported the district court’s ruling.
United States v. McFadden, 116 F.4th 1069 (10th Cir. 2024), drew the limiting distinction. Where trial testimony reflected the original allegation, a less forceful presentation did not justify supplementing it with more emphatic, consistent hearsay. Ambivalence alone was insufficient.
The same caution followed from United States v. Hammers, 942 F.3d 1001 (10th Cir. 2019), and United States v. Dalton, 918 F.3d 1117 (10th Cir. 2019): the residual exception must not become a means of routinely bypassing the hearsay rule. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), cited through United States v. McFadden, supplied background concerning the exception’s place within hearsay doctrine.
Application to MV3’s testimony
MV3’s testimony was reluctant and lacked detail, but it did not contradict her forensic interview. She described unwanted touching, nudity, photographs, and exposure. Those statements already established the relevant point: Morgan’s sexual interest in children.
The prosecution was trying pornography charges, not the uncharged sexual assaults themselves. More detailed descriptions of those assaults therefore added, at most, marginal probative value on the point for which the evidence was offered. The court held that these circumstances did not justify Rule 807 admission.
The significance is evidentiary precision: “more probative” must be assessed against the actual proposition at issue, not equated with greater detail, emotional force, or prosecutorial usefulness.
Why the error was harmless
United States v. Washington, 653 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2011), citing Burks v. Okla. Pub. Co., 81 F.3d 975 (10th Cir. 1996), confirms that an erroneous evidentiary ruling does not warrant relief if harmless. Under United States v. Blechman, 657 F.3d 1052 (10th Cir. 2011), the applicable standard here was nonconstitutional harmless error.
United States v. Chavez, 976 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2020), and United States v. Roach, 582 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2009), ask whether the error substantially influenced the outcome or leaves grave doubt about that effect. United States v. Ledford, 443 F.3d 702 (10th Cir. 2005), placed the burden of establishing harmlessness on the government.
That burden was met because the improperly admitted statements largely duplicated the sexual-interest evidence already before the jury. United States v. McFadden, drawing on United States v. Torrez-Ortega, 184 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999), and United States v. Otuonye, 995 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2021), explains why evidence insufficiently additional to satisfy Rule 807 may also be cumulative for harmless-error purposes. Smith v. Sec'y of N.M. Dep't of Corr., 50 F.3d 801 (10th Cir. 1995), supplied the related principle concerning proof of matters already established.
The court also considered four limiting instructions. Its reliance on instructions as mitigation followed United States v. Chavez and the authority styled United States. Richter, 796 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2015), in the supplied opinion.
The holding remains case-specific. It does not make erroneous admission of a child’s prior statements automatically harmless.
4.9. Multiple Children in One Depiction: No Plain Error, but No Definitive Unit-of-Prosecution Holding
Morgan challenged separate convictions involving different children within the same recordings. The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple punishments for a single offense, so the issue was what Congress designated as a separate offense under § 2251.
United States v. Aguilar, 168 F.4th 1319 (10th Cir. 2026), and United States v. McCullough, 457 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 2006), define multiplicity. United States v. Jenkins, 313 F.3d 549 (10th Cir. 2002), and United States v. Morris, 247 F.3d 1080 (10th Cir. 2001), explain the corresponding multiple-punishment concern.
United States v. Elliott, 937 F.3d 1310 (10th Cir. 2019), drawing on United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2009), and United States v. Rentz, 777 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 2015), frames the inquiry as identifying the statutory “unit of prosecution”—the minimum conduct constituting a new, independent violation.
Why Esch did not resolve the question
In United States v. Esch, 832 F.2d 531 (10th Cir. 1987), the court upheld separate counts for multiple photographs taken during one session involving the same children. Each photograph involved a separate use of the children.
Morgan read that decision to establish an exclusive one-offense-per-depiction rule. The court disagreed. United States v. Esch addressed separate photographs, not separate children within a photograph. Its reasoning did not clearly prohibit the charging approach used here.
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), and United States v. Williams, 685 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1982), supported the earlier decision’s treatment of distinct criminal acts. The latter is separate from the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision bearing the same case title.
The decisive role of plain-error review
Because Morgan did not raise the issue before trial, United States v. McCullough and United States v. Graham, 305 F.3d 1094 (10th Cir. 2002), supplied plain-error review. Under United States v. Egli, 13 F.4th 1139 (10th Cir. 2021), United States v. Ibarra-Diaz, 805 F.3d 908 (10th Cir. 2015), and United States v. Piper, 839 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 2016), an error ordinarily must be clear under controlling precedent or a consensus of other circuits. United States v. Miller, 978 F.3d 746 (10th Cir. 2020), also recognizes plain error from clear statutory language.
Neither route established obvious error. The phrase “any minor” plausibly supports separate offenses when a defendant depicts each child’s sexually explicit conduct. United States v. Shrader, 675 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2012), supported considering whether each alleged offense requires proof of a distinct fact; proving the depiction of one child’s sexually explicit conduct differs from proving another’s.
The court expressly reserved the ultimate question. It held only that Morgan had not shown plainly multiplicitous convictions. It also declined to decide the government’s separate contention that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 independently barred the challenge.
4.10. Cumulative Error Requires More Than One Qualifying Error
Hanson v. Sherrod, 797 F.3d 810 (10th Cir. 2015), citing the en banc decision in United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir. 1990), requires at least two errors for cumulative-error analysis. This Tenth Circuit decision is distinct from the Second Circuit’s 2008 United States v. Rivera concerning Dost factors.
United States v. Lopez, 131 F.4th 1114 (10th Cir. 2025), and United States v. Kepler, 74 F.4th 1292 (10th Cir. 2023), further establish that unpreserved errors do not enter that analysis unless plain. With one preserved error and no additional plain error, there was nothing to aggregate.