Third Circuit Establishes Two Key Rules: (1) Guns-for-Drugs Trades Are Per Se “Possession in Furtherance” Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); (2) Taylor’s Traditional Categorical Approach Governs “Felony Drug Offense” Enhancements Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)

Introduction

In United States v. Miguel Rosario (3d Cir. July 1, 2026), the Third Circuit addressed a wide-ranging appeal arising from a jury’s drug-trafficking convictions tied to (i) an overdose death and serious bodily injury and (ii) a firearms-for-drugs exchange. The principal parties were the United States (appellee) and Miguel Eduardo Rosario (appellant), also known as “Deuce.”

The appeal raised five clusters of issues: (1) whether a state search warrant for Facebook records violated the Fourth Amendment and whether a Franks hearing was required; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient, including for a firearm-in-furtherance conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); (3) whether certain hearsay statements were improperly admitted; (4) whether 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) is unconstitutional or should be “harmonized” with the First Step Act’s amendments to other subsections; and (5) whether the sentencing court used the wrong analytical method to decide whether Rosario’s prior Pennsylvania drug convictions were “felony drug offense[s]” under 21 U.S.C. § 802(44).

Summary of the Opinion

  • Convictions affirmed. The court upheld the denial of suppression, rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence (including the § 924(c) count), and found no reversible error in the evidentiary rulings.
  • Sentence vacated and remanded. The court held the district court used the wrong approach in determining whether Rosario’s prior state convictions qualify as “felony drug offense[s]” for § 841(b)(1)(C)’s recidivist life enhancement; the correct method is Taylor’s traditional categorical approach.
  • Two precedential holdings of first impression/clarification.
    • A defendant who accepts a firearm in exchange for drugs both “possesses” the firearm under § 924(c) and does so “in furtherance of” drug trafficking—treated as a per se rule in this context.
    • The “felony drug offense” enhancement in § 841(b)(1)(C) is conviction-based, triggering the traditional categorical approach rather than the Third Circuit’s “looser categorical approach.”

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Search warrants, suppression, and the good-faith exception

  • Illinois v. Gates and United States v. Burton framed the baseline probable-cause standard (“fair probability” evidence will be found).
  • United States v. Leon, Hudson v. Michigan, Herring v. United States, United States v. Katzin, and United States v. Caesar drove the court’s central suppression holding: even if a warrant is defective, suppression is a “last resort,” and evidence is typically admissible when officers act in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant.
    • United States v. Caesar and United States v. Ninety-Two Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars & Fifty-Seven Cents supported the court’s choice to resolve the Fourth Amendment challenge via good faith without reaching probable cause.
    • Herring v. United States supplied the deterrence-centered lens: suppression is reserved for “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct” or “recurring or systemic negligence.”
  • United States v. Zimmerman and United States v. Hodge supplied the Third Circuit’s four circumstances where good faith does not apply.
  • United States v. Tracey and United States v. FranzUnited States v. Tracey.
  • Pinkney v. Meadville, Pennsylvania
  • United States v. Dowdell

2) Franks doctrine

  • Franks v. Delaware
  • United States v. YusufUnited States v. Brown
  • United States v. Desu

3) § 924(c) firearms doctrine and “in furtherance” analysis

  • Watson v. United States
  • United States v. Clark
  • Holland v. Warden Canaan USP
  • United States v. SparrowUnited States v. Walker
  • United States v. Gurka, United States v. Gardner, United States v. Robinson, United States v. Sterling, United States v. Frederick, United States v. Doody, United States v. Mahan, United States v. Luke-Sanchez, and United States v. Miranda

4) Hearsay and Rule 804(b)(3)

  • Williamson v. United States
  • United States v. MosesWilliamson is not a per se bar and requires contextual analysis.

5) § 841(b)(1)(C): statutory interpretation, constitutionality, and categorical methodology

  • United States v. Zayas
  • Rosenberg v. XM VenturesGov't of Virgin Islands v. Knight
  • Lamie v. United States TrusteeConn. Nat'l Bank v. GermainGarland v. CargillUnited States v. Safehouse
  • Harmelin v. MichiganUnited States v. BurnettEwing v. California) underpinned rejection of the Eighth Amendment challenge; United States v. Walker
  • United States v. PollardUnited States v. Cardwell
  • For the remand-triggering holding, the court relied on:
    • Taylor v. United States
    • Descamps v. United StatesMathis v. United States
    • United States v. Aviles
    • United States v. Perez-ColonUnited States v. Dahl
    • United States v. PortanovaWilliams v. Att'y Gen. U.S.
    • United States v. Elder
    • Alleyne v. United States

Legal Reasoning

1) Fourth Amendment: Franks and good faith resolve suppression

The panel proceeded in two steps. First, it rejected Rosario’s effort to obtain a Franks v. Delaware hearing, finding no clear error in the district court’s factual determinations and no substantial preliminary showing of intentional or reckless falsity/material omissions. Notably, Rosario’s “Facebook vs. SMS” theory failed because it depended on “unproven technological assumptions,” and, in any event, the precise medium did not materially affect probable cause where the record supported that Rosario and Correa communicated about drugs via Facebook over time.

Second, rather than definitively adjudicating probable cause or particularity, the panel applied United States v. Leon and its Third Circuit progeny. It held none of the four Zimmerman circumstances defeated good faith. Even if the phrase “related to this death investigation” introduced some vagueness, the officer’s consultation with a prosecutor and approval by a neutral judge supported objective reasonableness under United States v. Tracey. The opinion is a reaffirmation that suppression is aimed at deterrence and is ill-suited for mere negligence.

2) § 924(c): guns-for-drugs trades are “possession” and “in furtherance”

On the firearms counts, the panel first clarified that Watson v. United States does not control because “use” is distinct from “possess,” echoing United States v. Clark. It then resolved an issue left open after Holland v. Warden Canaan USP: the Third Circuit now holds that a defendant who accepts firearms as payment for drugs “possesses” them under § 924(c) and does so “in furtherance of” drug trafficking. The court described this as an affirmative answer and aligned itself with “nearly all” sister circuits.

Independently, the court also explained that the evidence satisfied the Third Circuit’s United States v. Sparrow framework: the firearms served as currency integral to the transaction; they were delivered to Rosario’s home; they were accessible thereafter; and Rosario’s possession was illegal (as a felon). These circumstances, under United States v. Walker, were sufficient for a rational jury to find “in furtherance.”

3) Overdose death and serious bodily injury: sufficiency defers to the jury

Applying the deferential sufficiency standard, the court held the jury could rationally find Rosario’s distribution caused the 2018 serious bodily injury and 2019 death. The opinion emphasized the combination of expert testimony on mixed-drug toxicity, witness testimony connecting Rosario to Correa’s drug supply, investigative testimony, and Rosario’s admissions.

4) Evidence: Rule 804(b)(3) declarations against interest

The panel upheld admission of Correa’s statements to close relations (girlfriend, mother, friend) and a contemporaneous phone call on the night of death. It distinguished Williamson v. United States by relying on United States v. Moses

5) Sentencing: constitutionality upheld, but method incorrect

The court’s sentencing discussion made two major moves:

  • Statutory interpretation & constitutionality: The panel refused to “harmonize” § 841(b)(1)(C) with the First Step Act’s amendments to § 841(b)(1)(A) and (B). Citing United States v. Zayas and plain-meaning authorities, it held Congress intentionally left § 841(b)(1)(C) unchanged. It then rejected Eighth Amendment and Fifth Amendment challenges, relying on Harmelin v. Michigan, proportionality precedent, and rational-basis reasoning consistent with United States v. Cardwell.
  • Categorical approach error requiring remand: The district court used the Third Circuit’s “looser” conduct-analogy method (from United States v. Portanova and Williams v. Att'y Gen. U.S.). The panel held that was wrong because § 841(b)(1)(C) is triggered by a “prior conviction”—making it conviction-based under United States v. Perez-Colon. Therefore, Taylor v. United States’s traditional categorical approach applies, consistent with United States v. Aviles. The court also adopted the reasoning of United States v. Elder, highlighting textual signals, Sixth Amendment constraints (via Alleyne v. United States), and error-prone factual records (via Mathis v. United States). Because the wrong method was used, the life sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing under the correct approach.

Impact

1) Firearms-for-drugs exchanges in the Third Circuit

The most immediate doctrinal effect is the Third Circuit’s explicit alignment with the broad circuit consensus: accepting a firearm as payment for drugs satisfies § 924(c)’s “possession in furtherance” element. Practically, this reduces litigation over “in furtherance” where the gun is literally the consideration for the drug sale—making the transaction itself the nexus.

2) Sentencing litigation under § 841(b)(1)(C)

The remand holding will shape future § 841(b)(1)(C) cases in at least two ways:

  • Methodological clarity: District courts must treat § 841(b)(1)(C)’s enhancement as conviction-triggered and apply Taylor’s traditional categorical approach, not a conduct-based inquiry.
  • Potential narrowing of qualifying priors: Where state drug schedules or statutory elements are broader than the federally referenced substance categories in § 802(44), defendants may contest whether prior convictions categorically “relat[e] to” the specified federal substance types. The panel did not decide whether Rosario’s Pennsylvania priors qualify under the correct approach, leaving meaningful work for the remand court and future cases.

3) Suppression motions for social-media warrants

Although the panel avoided a definitive probable-cause/particularity ruling, its good-faith analysis signals that suppression will be difficult absent strong evidence of culpable drafting or execution—especially where officers consult prosecutors and obtain judicial approval. For digital-warrant practice, the opinion encourages careful process documentation (consultations, scope explanations, neutral review), as those facts are repeatedly treated as good-faith anchors.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Franks hearing: A mini-trial to challenge a warrant affidavit. You only get it if you can preliminarily show the officer likely lied (or recklessly omitted key facts) and that the lie mattered to probable cause.
  • Good faith exception (Leon): Even if a warrant is flawed, evidence often stays in if officers reasonably relied on the warrant; suppression is reserved for deterrence of serious police misconduct.
  • Particularity/overbreadth: A warrant must clearly describe what is being searched and what is being seized; broad phrases can be challenged, but good faith can still save the evidence if reliance was reasonable.
  • § 924(c) “possession in furtherance”: The government must show the gun helped advance the drug crime. Here, the court held that when the gun is the payment, possession is inherently “in furtherance” because the sale is completed by receiving the gun.
  • Rule 804(b)(3): Allows certain hearsay if the speaker is unavailable and the statement is against the speaker’s own penal interest—i.e., admitting criminal conduct in circumstances suggesting truthfulness.
  • Categorical approach (Taylor): To see if an old conviction triggers a sentencing enhancement, courts compare the elements of the prior statute to the federal definition—without relitigating what the defendant actually did.
  • “Looser” categorical approach: A Third Circuit variant used only when the enhancement is conduct-focused; Rosario holds § 841(b)(1)(C) is conviction-focused, so the looser method does not apply.

Conclusion

United States v. Miguel Rosario is significant for two durable rules. First, the Third Circuit now holds that accepting a firearm as payment for drugs constitutes “possession” and “possession in furtherance” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), aligning the circuit with the dominant national consensus. Second, and with major sentencing implications, the court held that § 841(b)(1)(C)’s recidivist enhancement is conviction-triggered and therefore requires Taylor’s traditional categorical approach—leading to vacatur of Rosario’s mandatory-life sentence and a remand for resentencing under the correct methodology. The opinion also reaffirms the judiciary’s limited role in statutory “fixes” and underscores the continued strength of the Leon good-faith doctrine in digital-evidence investigations.