The Second Amendment Does Not Protect False Actual-Buyer Statements in Firearm Purchases

1. Introduction

In United States v. Jaghoori, the Tenth Circuit rejected an attempt to use the Second Amendment as a defense to conspiring to make a false statement during a firearm purchase. The central distinction was between acquiring a firearm and lying about the identity of its actual buyer. Although firearm ownership receives constitutional protection, the court held that the protection does not extend to the false statements involved here.

Habibullah Jaghoori challenged his conviction for conspiring with his sister, Fatima Jaghoori, to violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6). Both siblings were legally eligible to possess firearms. Nevertheless, Fatima’s representation that she was the actual buyer, when she was purchasing the firearms for Habibullah, remained material to the transaction’s lawfulness.

The opinion addresses two connected questions: whether the Second Amendment protects the conduct underlying the conspiracy charge, and whether a false actual-buyer statement becomes immaterial when both the intermediary and the intended recipient may lawfully possess firearms. The court answered both questions against Habibullah.

2. Background and Procedural History

On March 22, 2021, Fatima purchased two Glock pistols from a federally licensed firearms dealer. As part of the transaction, she completed ATF Form 4473. Question 21.a asked whether she was the “actual transferee/buyer” and expressly warned that a person acquiring firearms on another person’s behalf was not the actual buyer.

Fatima answered affirmatively, although she purchased both firearms for Habibullah. The stated explanation was that the arrangement would allow him to benefit from her military discount. Neither sibling was prohibited from owning firearms at the time.

In August 2022, the government indicted both siblings. As relevant to the appeal:

• Count 1 charged both siblings under 18 U.S.C. § 371 with conspiring to violate § 922(a)(6).
• Count 2 charged Fatima with directly violating § 922(a)(6).

The siblings jointly moved to dismiss these counts under the Second Amendment. They argued that Habibullah had a protected ability to acquire firearms through his sister, making her answer about the actual buyer immaterial.

The district court denied the motion, reasoning that the charges concerned lying and conspiring to lie on a government form, not constitutionally protected firearm possession. Habibullah subsequently pleaded guilty to Count 1 and received an eight-month prison sentence. His appeal challenged the denial of the dismissal motion.

3. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and reviewed the constitutional dismissal ruling de novo. It affirmed on two principal grounds.

1. The challenged conduct fell outside the Second Amendment’s text. The relevant conduct was conspiring to make false statements about the actual firearm buyer. Because the Second Amendment does not protect those false statements, the court ended its constitutional analysis at the first step of the governing framework.
2. The statement remained material despite both siblings’ eligibility. Supreme Court precedent establishes that falsely identifying a firearm’s actual buyer can violate § 922(a)(6) even when both participants could legally possess firearms.

The court therefore did not undertake a historical-tradition analysis of the actual-buyer disclosure requirement. Its holding was narrower: the Second Amendment did not defeat this prosecution for conspiring to falsify the purchaser’s identity.

4. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Brune

United States v. Brune, 767 F.3d 1009, 1015 (10th Cir. 2014), supplied the standard of review. A district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on constitutional grounds receives de novo review. The appellate court therefore independently assessed the constitutional issue rather than deferring to the district court’s legal conclusion.

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), provided the controlling Second Amendment framework. As described in the opinion, the challenger must first show that the Amendment’s plain text covers the regulated conduct. Only if it does must the court consider whether the regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.

This sequencing determined the appeal. The court identified the regulated conduct as false statements, rather than firearm possession, and concluded that the textual threshold was not satisfied. The connection between those statements and an intended firearm acquisition did not itself require historical analysis.

District of Columbia v. Heller

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), supplied both the underlying individual-right principle and an important qualification. The opinion recognized the right to possess and carry weapons for confrontation, while recalling District of Columbia v. Heller’s assurance that its holding did not cast doubt on laws imposing conditions and qualifications on commercial firearm sales.

This supported the distinction between protecting firearm ownership and permitting regulation of firearm transactions. The court did not, however, treat that passage as blanket approval of every commercial-sales restriction.

Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis

Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis, 121 F.4th 96, 113 (10th Cir. 2024), reinforced the general proposition that the government may lawfully regulate firearms notwithstanding the Second Amendment. Its role was contextual: constitutional protection does not eliminate all regulatory authority over firearm transactions.

United States v. Ogilvie

United States v. Ogilvie, 153 F.4th 1098 (10th Cir. 2025), supported the court’s articulation of the two-step analysis and the principle that some firearm-related regulations concern conduct outside the Second Amendment’s protection.

A footnote also invoked that decision’s recognition that firearm rights may be restricted based on suspicion of criminal guilt. The panel regarded identifying firearm ownership as a comparatively lesser intrusion and suggested that a full constitutional analysis would reach the same result. That observation was supplementary, not an independently developed historical justification. The actual holding remained grounded in the first-step textual inquiry.

United States v. Knox

United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77, 79 (1969), supplied the foundational distinction between challenging a reporting requirement and lying in purported compliance with it. The Supreme Court explained that someone furnishing false information to the government in “feigned compliance” cannot defend the fraud by attacking the underlying requirement’s validity.

Applied here, that principle meant Habibullah could not defeat the conspiracy conviction simply by arguing that the actual-buyer question should not have appeared on Form 4473. The constitutional objection to the question and criminal responsibility for deliberately answering it falsely were distinct matters.

United States v. Holden

United States v. Holden, 70 F.4th 1015 (7th Cir. 2023), directly addressed § 922(a)(6) and false statements on Form 4473. The Seventh Circuit distinguished the government’s authority to collect accurate information from its authority to prohibit particular people from owning firearms.

It also rejected the proposition that statutory materiality creates a privilege to lie whenever the underlying legal requirement faces a constitutional objection. This reasoning supported the Tenth Circuit’s separation of truthful disclosure obligations from substantive firearm restrictions.

United States v. Scheidt

United States v. Scheidt, 103 F.4th 1281, 1284 (7th Cir. 2024), reinforced that approach by holding that a defendant cannot lie on Form 4473 and then challenge the resulting § 922(a)(6) conviction on the ground that the information requirement is invalid.

The Tenth Circuit cited it as further persuasive support for rejecting a constitutional defense built on the alleged invalidity of the question answered falsely.

United States v. Manney

United States v. Manney, 114 F.4th 1048 (9th Cir. 2024), supplied the closest analytical parallel. It held that the Second Amendment did not bar a § 922(a)(6) conviction for false statements on Form 4473 because the statute regulated false representations, not firearm possession.

The Tenth Circuit adopted this characterization. The requirement ensured truthful identification of the purchaser; it did not prohibit Habibullah from buying the firearms himself. This precedent was especially influential in explaining why the inquiry ended at the textual stage.

Abramski v. United States

Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 171–72 (2014), resolved the separate statutory materiality argument. It establishes that a false statement about a firearm’s actual purchaser is material even when the participants may lawfully possess firearms.

Consequently, Habibullah’s eligibility did not make Fatima’s answer legally inconsequential. This authority independently defeated the contention that no material misrepresentation occurred.

5. Legal Reasoning

A. The court focused on the prohibited conduct, not its ultimate objective

The pivotal analytical choice was the level at which the court described the conduct. Habibullah emphasized his ultimate objective: acquiring firearms. The court instead examined what § 922(a)(6) prohibited in this prosecution: knowingly making a materially false statement during acquisition, and conspiring to do so.

That distinction prevented a constitutionally protected objective from automatically extending protection to the deceptive means used to pursue it. The court did not dispute that firearm acquisition implicates Second Amendment interests generally; it held that those interests did not protect the particular false statements at issue.

B. The historical inquiry was unnecessary

Because the challenged conduct was not covered by the Amendment’s plain text, the court did not require a historical analogue for the actual-buyer question. This was an application of the framework’s threshold requirement, not an exception to historical analysis where protected conduct is regulated.

Accordingly, the opinion should not be read as establishing that every firearm-purchase information requirement necessarily survives constitutional scrutiny. It resolved an as-applied challenge arising from deliberate falsification.

C. Truthfulness and materiality remained separate requirements

Section 922(a)(6) does not criminalize every inaccurate statement connected with firearms. As relevant here, it concerns knowingly false statements about facts material to the lawfulness of a firearm sale or disposition.

The court’s rejection of a constitutional privilege to lie did not eliminate materiality as an element. Instead, Abramski v. United States supplied the answer: the actual purchaser’s identity remained material despite both siblings’ lawful eligibility.

D. The discount did not create a constitutional entitlement

The court also rejected the practical justification for the arrangement. Habibullah could have purchased the firearms himself; the siblings used Fatima’s purchase to obtain a discount he was not entitled to receive. As the opinion put it, paying full price for a firearm is not a Second Amendment violation.

This observation addressed the asserted burden in this case. It did not establish a general rule about every firearm-related charge, tax, or pricing restriction.

6. Potential Impact and Limits

Persuasive alignment across circuits. The decision reinforces the reasoning of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits: a firearm-related transaction does not transform false statements into protected Second Amendment conduct.

Consequences for intermediary purchases. Where a purchaser falsely identifies herself as the actual buyer, the intended recipient’s legal eligibility does not defeat materiality. The opinion does not, however, decide the legality of every intermediary arrangement, gift, or later transfer.

Importance of framing. Future challenges may turn on whether a court identifies the regulated activity as protected firearm acquisition or as independently prohibited deception. This opinion supports the latter characterization for false actual-buyer statements, not necessarily for every regulation associated with purchasing firearms.

Limited precedential force. Because the disposition is expressly nonprecedential, it does not itself bind later panels as ordinary circuit precedent. Its broader influence will depend on its persuasive reasoning and the binding authorities it applies. The judgment nevertheless retains the expressly identified effects under law-of-the-case and preclusion doctrines.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

As-applied constitutional challenge

An argument that a law is unconstitutional in the challenger’s particular circumstances, rather than invalid in all its applications.

De novo review

The appellate court decides the legal question independently, without deferring to the lower court’s legal answer.

Materiality

The required connection between a false statement and the sale’s lawfulness. Here, falsely identifying the actual buyer remained material even though both siblings could legally possess firearms.

Actual transferee/buyer

The person genuinely purchasing the firearm, rather than someone acting on another person’s behalf. Completing the paperwork did not make Fatima the actual buyer on these facts.

Conspiracy

A separate offense involving an agreement to commit an unlawful act and the required furtherance of that agreement. Habibullah’s conviction concerned participation in the plan to make the false statement, although Fatima completed the form.

Historical-tradition analysis

The second stage of the Second Amendment framework, examining whether a challenged regulation accords with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court did not reach it here.

Law of the case and preclusion

Doctrines that can give a judgment continuing effect within the same litigation or prevent relitigation of resolved claims or issues, even when the opinion is not generally binding precedent.

8. Conclusion

United States v. Jaghoori draws a clear distinction between the right to acquire firearms and responsibility for materially false statements made during acquisition. The Second Amendment did not protect the conspiracy to misidentify the actual buyer, and both siblings’ legal eligibility did not negate materiality.

Although nonprecedential, the decision meaningfully reinforces existing authority: constitutional protection for firearm ownership does not supply a defense to the deliberate actual-buyer deception presented in this case.