United States v. Deluna: Harmless-Error Treatment of Potentially Coerced Interview Confessions and Relevance of Firearms Displays/Photos in Straw-Purchase Prosecutions

Introduction

In United States v. Deluna (5th Cir. Aug. 6, 2026), the Fifth Circuit affirmed Karina Deluna’s convictions for conspiracy to make false statements and seven counts of making false statements on federal firearms paperwork, stemming from “straw purchasing”—checking “Yes” on ATF Form 4473’s “actual buyer” question while buying firearms for others for a fee. The Government’s case relied heavily on ATF interviews (two recorded), a written confession, cooperating witness testimony (Haley Medlin), and extensive phone evidence.

On appeal, Deluna raised three sets of issues: (1) whether her recorded statements in the second and third interviews were involuntary under the Due Process Clause; (2) whether certain firearms-related evidence (a physical Barrett .50 caliber rifle and photographs of other firearms) was improperly admitted under Rules 401 and 403; and (3) whether her within-Guidelines 87-month sentence was substantively unreasonable.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Second interview: Voluntary under the totality of the circumstances; lack of Miranda warnings and counsel did not by itself establish coercion. A warning that Deluna’s story could “implicate” her mother was not coercive.
  • Third interview: Circumstances were more coercive (including threats to charge, references to detaining Deluna, and a potential CPS/child-services call), but the panel declined to decide voluntariness because any error in admitting the recording was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • Evidentiary rulings: No abuse of discretion in displaying the Barrett rifle or admitting twelve firearms photos from Deluna’s phone.
  • Sentence: Within-Guidelines sentence was presumed reasonable, and Deluna’s disparity/aggregation arguments were foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Straw purchasing and Form 4473’s “actual buyer” question

The opinion’s background relies on Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169 (2014), to explain how ATF Form 4473 implements federal record-keeping and purchaser-verification requirements, and why lying on the form is punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(a). While Abramski is not the central dispute on appeal, it supplies the legal and practical foundation: Deluna’s false “Yes” answers to Question 11a are the core conduct.

2) Voluntariness doctrine and standards of review

The court frames voluntariness as a Due Process question under Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), and assigns the Government the burden to prove voluntariness by a preponderance under United States v. Restrepo, 994 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1993). It quotes United States v. Shows Urquidi, 71 F.4th 357 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)) for the “will overborne” formulation, and underscores via United States v. Mendez, 885 F.3d 899 (5th Cir. 2018) that there must be coercive police activity.

On review standards, the panel cites United States v. Alvarado-Palacio, 951 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Mullin, 178 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1999)) to separate deference to factual findings from de novo review of the ultimate voluntariness determination, but avoids resolving whether plain-error review applied (because no suppression motion was filed), concluding Deluna loses even under de novo review.

The statutory factor list in 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) provides the court’s non-exhaustive voluntariness checklist, while United States v. Cantu-Ramirez, 669 F.3d 619 (5th Cir. 2012) supplies the totality-of-circumstances framework.

3) Miranda warnings as context, not an automatic voluntariness defect

Deluna was not Mirandized in any interview, but she did not raise a Miranda claim on appeal. The panel nonetheless uses Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U.S. 446 (1971), to emphasize that lack of warnings and absence of counsel are typically relevant only insofar as they help show a coercive setting. It cites United States v. Courtney, 463 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2006), for the proposition that Miranda warnings are not required for voluntary statements in non-custodial encounters.

4) Threats involving relatives: less coercive when the relative is plausibly tied to the crime

The second interview featured a warning that Deluna’s story might “implicate” her mother. The panel relies on States v. Hall, 711 F. App'x 198 (5th Cir. 2017), which in turn relied on Allen v. McCotter, 804 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1986), to treat threats involving relatives as less coercive when the family member is plausibly linked to the offense. It aligns this approach with other circuits’ decisions: United States v. Hufstetler, 782 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 254 (6th Cir. 2003); and United States v. Jones, 32 F.3d 1512 (11th Cir. 1994).

5) Harmless error for potentially involuntary confessions

While acknowledging the third interview had more coercive features, the panel resolves the issue through harmless error, citing United States v. Clay, 408 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 2005), for the proposition that admission of an involuntary confession is subject to harmless-error review, and relying heavily on Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)) for the confession’s probative power and the rigorous “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.

The court then uses Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (and its “cumulative + overwhelming” formulation), and Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), to hold the third interview cumulative given the second interview and the written statement, plus extensive corroborating testimony and phone evidence.

It adds an important practical consideration from United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 2004): when voluntariness is vigorously contested at trial and the jury is instructed on it, erroneous admission is more likely harmless.

The panel also deems Deluna to have forfeited any appellate challenge to the written confession because it was not briefed, citing United States v. Wadi, 153 F.4th 465 (5th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-7177, 2026 WL 1513302 (U.S. June 1, 2026).

6) Evidence: physical firearm display and unrelated firearms photos

The court reviews evidentiary rulings under abuse of discretion and harmful-error analysis per United States v. Sanjar, 876 F.3d 725 (5th Cir. 2017), stressing trial-court latitude under United States v. Rao, 123 F.4th 270 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Alaniz, 726 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 2013)).

On the Barrett rifle, Deluna cited United States v. Klebig, 600 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 2009), and United States v. Elmowsky, 501 F. Supp. 3d 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2020), but the Fifth Circuit emphasized its own acceptance of demonstrative firearm evidence in United States v. Weeks, 919 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1990), and noted other circuits permit limited weapons displays, including United States v. Perrotta, 289 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting McCormick on Evidence for “seeing is believing”).

On the twelve photos of other firearms, the court adopted the rationale of United States v. Chapa, 609 F. App'x 264 (5th Cir. 2015), treating such photos as relevant circumstantial evidence that makes “innocent bystander” explanations less probable and bears on knowledge/intent, particularly given that Deluna had faced (and was acquitted of) a smuggling count.

7) Substantive reasonableness of within-Guidelines sentences

Applying deferential review under United States v. Fatani, 125 F.4th 755 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Simpson, 796 F.3d 548 (5th Cir. 2015)), the court held Deluna failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness for a within-Guidelines sentence. Her arguments were foreclosed by: United States v. Lucas, 157 F.3d 998 (5th Cir. 1998) (aggregate sentence can exceed any single-count statutory max); United States v. Willingham, 497 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 2007) (national sentencing averages do not establish disparity); and United States v. Devine, 934 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1991) (co-defendant disparity alone is not abuse of discretion). It concluded Deluna had not shown improper factors or misbalancing, citing United States v. Rodriguez, 41 F.4th 728 (5th Cir. 2022).

Legal Reasoning

1) Second interview: noncustodial setting + minimal pressure = voluntariness

The panel’s voluntariness analysis is notably fact-sensitive. It treats the lack of Miranda warnings and counsel as contextual rather than dispositive (Procunier/Courtney), then looks for “coercive police activity” (Mendez). The lone arguably coercive component—warning that Deluna’s narrative implicated her mother— is characterized as a truthful consequence of Deluna’s own story and, under Allen/Hall, less coercive when the relative is plausibly connected to the crime.

Additional totality factors also supported voluntariness: the questioning occurred at Deluna’s home, near family, lasted about 90 minutes, and the recording reflected a “lively back-and-forth,” paralleling circumstances the court found voluntary in Cantu-Ramirez.

2) Third interview: coercion concerns sidestepped through rigorous harmless-error review

The court candidly acknowledges coercion indicators: a threat to “come back” and “charge” Deluna if she did not cooperate; references to detention; and an implied threat to involve child services if childcare could not be arranged. Rather than decide whether those pressures, combined with no warnings, crossed the due process line, the panel applied Fulminante’s harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.

The key pillars of harmlessness were:

  1. Cumulativeness: Deluna had already provided a recorded confession in the second interview and signed a written statement admitting she bought eight firearms for “Chino.” The third interview’s “new” information—knowledge of Medlin’s straw purchase—was independently supplied by Medlin’s testimony and corroborated by texts/emails/photos on Deluna’s phone.
  2. Overwhelming untainted proof: The confessions, witness testimony, and extensive phone evidence rendered the case strong even without the third recording.
  3. Limited prosecutorial reliance: The Government downplayed the third interview in closing and highlighted phone evidence instead (a Fulminante consideration).
  4. Jury consideration of voluntariness: Following Bell, the jury heard extensive argument on voluntariness and received an instruction on it, making it more plausible the verdict rested on untainted proof.

3) Evidence rulings: “seeing is believing” and intent/knowledge via circumstantial photos

The Fifth Circuit’s Rule 403 analysis reflects a practical view of weapons evidence. It rejected the notion that the Barrett rifle’s size alone created unfair prejudice that “substantially outweighed” probative value, especially because the rifle was directly tied to the charged conduct and forfeiture. The court treated the display of a single relevant firearm as far from the “two dozen firearms” concern addressed in Klebig.

For the twelve photos of other firearms, the court accepted a chain of relevance: photos suggest familiarity with firearms, which in turn makes “unknowing involvement” and claimed ignorance of wrongdoing less probable. Chapa served as the closest Fifth Circuit analogue for admitting firearms photos as circumstantial evidence.

4) Sentencing: reaffirmation of deference and rejection of disparity-based attacks

The sentencing discussion primarily consolidates existing circuit rules: within-Guidelines sentences are presumed reasonable; consecutive sentencing can produce an aggregate above any single-count maximum (Lucas); national averages do not prove unwarranted disparity (Willingham); and co-defendant disparity alone is insufficient (Devine).

Impact

  • Interview-litigation strategy: The decision underscores that Fifth Circuit panels may avoid close voluntariness determinations when the record supports Fulminante/Van Arsdall harmlessness—particularly where the Government possesses multiple confessions and strong corroboration (texts, emails, photographs, cooperating witnesses). Defendants challenging interview tactics should anticipate a “cumulative + overwhelming” harmlessness response and develop a record showing the statement was uniquely pivotal.
  • Threats involving relatives and third parties: Deluna reinforces Allen/Hall’s principle that warnings about potential investigation of a relative are less coercive if the relative is plausibly tied to the offense. Expect the Government to frame such statements as truthful explanations of exposure rather than illegitimate leverage.
  • Weapons evidence at trial: The opinion signals that, in firearms paperwork and conspiracy cases, a limited display of a relevant weapon is likely to survive Rule 403, especially when tied to forfeiture questions. It also supports admitting firearm photos not charged in the indictment when used to rebut “innocent” narratives and show knowledge/intent.
  • Sentencing challenges: The court’s reliance on Lucas/Willingham/Devine reiterates the difficulty of arguing substantive unreasonableness based on aggregate totals, national averages, or co-defendant comparisons absent additional indicia of improper factor-weighing.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Straw purchasing
Buying a firearm for someone else while falsely claiming on ATF Form 4473 that you are the “actual transferee/buyer.” In this case, the false “Yes” to Question 11a was the core misrepresentation.
Voluntariness (Due Process)
A confession is inadmissible if police coercion overbore the suspect’s will. Courts examine the “totality of the circumstances,” including warnings, custody, length and setting of questioning, and threats or promises.
Miranda vs. voluntariness
Miranda concerns custodial interrogation warnings; voluntariness is a broader Due Process inquiry into coercion. A statement can be voluntary even if Miranda warnings were not given (especially in noncustodial settings), and Deluna did not press a Miranda claim on appeal.
Harmless error
Even if evidence was admitted improperly, a conviction stands if the appellate court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not affect the verdict, often because the evidence was cumulative and guilt was otherwise overwhelmingly proven.
Rule 403 “unfair prejudice”
Evidence is not excluded merely because it hurts the defendant; it must carry a risk of provoking an improper emotional or irrational verdict that substantially outweighs its probative value. The court held one relevant rifle and a limited set of firearm photos did not cross that line.

Conclusion

United States v. Deluna is a Fifth Circuit roadmap for how voluntariness challenges can fail even amid coercion-like interview features: where other confessions and corroborating evidence are strong, the court may affirm through Fulminante harmless-error analysis without resolving the constitutional boundary. The decision also confirms broad trial-court discretion to admit (and physically display) a relevant firearm and to use firearm photos as circumstantial evidence of knowledge and intent, and it reiterates entrenched Fifth Circuit limits on substantive-unreasonableness arguments premised on aggregation, national averages, or co-defendant sentencing disparities.