A. Precedents Cited and Their Significance
Hunter v. United States (Hunter I), 146 S. Ct. 1702 (2026)
This Supreme Court decision supplies the controlling rule. An agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when enforcement would leave in place an egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute. The exception is a “safety valve for extreme cases,” not a general authorization to correct sentencing mistakes despite a waiver.
The Supreme Court’s examples included sentences exceeding statutory authority, blatant constitutional violations such as reliance on race, and sentencing proceedings lacking a minimum of civilized procedure. These examples identify fundamental failures of legality, constitutional legitimacy, or adjudicative process. They are illustrative rather than an exhaustive list.
Equally important was the Supreme Court’s exclusion of “standard-fare” sentencing mistakes. Because Guidelines calculations and sentencing factors are complex, errors inevitably occur. The Fifth Circuit relied on this distinction to conclude that Chaney’s incorrect career-offender designation did not satisfy the exception, even though the error was clear.
Chaney v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 2785 (2026)
The Supreme Court granted review, vacated the earlier judgment, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Hunter I. That disposition required application of the new exception; it did not establish that Chaney qualified for relief. The Fifth Circuit therefore reconsidered enforceability under the new rule and reached the same ultimate disposition.
United States v. Chaney, 120 F.4th 1300 (5th Cir. 2024); United States v. Keele, 755 F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 2014); and United States v. Bond, 414 F.3d 542 (5th Cir. 2005)
The earlier United States v. Chaney decision applied the established inquiry into whether an appeal waiver was knowing and voluntary and covered the circumstances presented. Its formulation came from United States v. Keele, which quoted United States v. Bond.
These authorities provide the baseline waiver framework. The Supreme Court’s intervention displaced the earlier panel’s refusal to recognize any miscarriage-of-justice exception, but it did not eliminate the ordinary enforceability analysis. On remand, the question was whether the new exception overcame a waiver already found valid and applicable.
United States v. Minor, 121 F.4th 1085 (5th Cir. 2024)
This decision supplied the substantive basis for recognizing Chaney’s sentencing error. It explains that the Guidelines’ meaning of “controlled substance” is determined by reference to the federal Controlled Substances Act. Under that approach, the Louisiana marijuana offense’s inclusion of hemp made it broader than the relevant federal definition. Chaney’s conviction therefore could not serve as the asserted controlled-substance predicate.
United States v. Arayatanon, 980 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2020), and United States v. Gomez-Alvarez, 781 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2015)
The court cited these decisions to explain that Minor, although published after Chaney pleaded guilty, applied existing Fifth Circuit precedent rather than announcing a new approach. Their role was to support the continuity of the substantive rule, not independently to define the miscarriage-of-justice exception.
United States v. Kimmons, No. 25-30371, 2026 WL 1587522 (5th Cir. June 3, 2026), and United States v. Hill, No. 24-30669, 2025 WL 2222989 (5th Cir. Aug. 5, 2025)
Chaney principally relied on these unpublished decisions, both issued after his sentencing. In each, the parties conceded—and the panel recognized—error in applying the career-offender enhancement to the same Louisiana offense.
The court distinguished them on two grounds. First, unpublished decisions did not bind the panel. Second, their conclusions under the plain-error framework did not establish the considerably more demanding miscarriage-of-justice exception. Their recognition of a sentencing mistake did not answer whether an appeal waiver must yield.
United States v. Hunter (Hunter II), 183 F.4th 416 (5th Cir. 2026)
This post-remand decision helped establish how the Fifth Circuit would implement Hunter I. The opinion cited it both for the nonbinding status of unpublished decisions and for the distinction between ordinary plain-error principles and the new waiver exception.
Hunter II described a clear or obvious error as one apparent under controlling law without requiring an extension of precedent. Chaney’s case demonstrates that satisfying that description is not enough: the waiver exception additionally concerns the exceptional character and institutional seriousness of the error. Hunter II also supplied an example of enforcing a waiver after applying the Supreme Court’s new rule.
United States v. Nyandoro, No. 23-10579, 2026 WL 2619961 (5th Cir. Sept. 4, 2026)
This decision articulated the relationship between the two standards: plain-error cases may inform whether an error is obvious, but they do not define the distinct waiver inquiry. The court relied on that distinction to reject Chaney’s attempted transfer of favorable plain-error reasoning into the appeal-waiver context. It also cited Nyandoro as another application of Hunter I resulting in dismissal.
Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266 (2013)
Henderson establishes that, for plain-error review, obviousness is assessed at the time of appellate consideration rather than at trial. The Fifth Circuit noted that Hunter I did not specify the corresponding temporal benchmark for its exception.
The panel expressly declined to resolve that question. Its discussion of Minor and earlier circuit authorities should therefore not be mistaken for a holding that appellate-time assessment necessarily governs miscarriage-of-justice claims.
Wright v. Admin. Rev. Bd., U.S. Dep't of Lab., 836 F. App’x 248 (5th Cir. 2020), and N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
These authorities supported the limited proposition that speed does not itself establish improper adjudication. Wright observed that insistence on haste generally does not indicate prejudicial bias. The quotation from N.Y. Times Co. v. United States—“prompt judicial action does not mean unjudicial haste”—came from Chief Justice Burger’s dissent, not the Court’s holding.
Their function was illustrative: a quick ruling, without more, does not demonstrate that a defendant was denied minimally acceptable procedure.
United States v. London, 186 F.4th 884 (5th Cir. 2026)
The court cited this decision alongside Hunter II and Nyandoro as another post-Hunter I case enforcing a waiver and dismissing an appeal. The opinion noted a pending certiorari petition. It did not describe London’s underlying facts, so its significance here is the consistency of the circuit’s restrictive application of the exception.
B. Legal Reasoning
1. The substantive error and the right to appeal were separate questions
The court did not avoid deciding whether Chaney’s classification was wrong. It expressly concluded that the Louisiana conviction failed to qualify and that the district court had committed a clear or obvious error.
But establishing an error did not establish a right to appellate correction. Chaney had relinquished ordinary appellate review as part of a negotiated plea agreement. Unless an express reservation or the exceptional miscarriage-of-justice rule applied, the waiver remained an independent barrier to relief.
This distinction also separates a sentence above a Guidelines range from one above a statutory maximum. An erroneous Guidelines calculation does not, without more, show that the sentence exceeds the limit Congress authorized. Chaney’s express reservation concerning the statutory maximum therefore did not itself resolve this challenge.
2. Obviousness was necessary to the exception, but not sufficient
Hunter I requires an obvious error, yet its concern extends beyond obviousness. The error must be extreme or egregious enough to threaten confidence in the judicial system’s basic integrity.
The Fifth Circuit accordingly rejected the inference that a mistake apparent under controlling law must satisfy the waiver exception. It classified Chaney’s mistake within the category that Hunter I specifically described as insufficient: ordinary errors in applying sentencing law.
The holding is therefore narrower than a declaration that sentencing errors never overcome waivers. It establishes that this clear career-offender error, without the exceptional features required by Hunter I, did not do so.
3. A procedural challenge required more than an allegedly inadequate ruling
Chaney separately argued that the district court had failed to apply sentencing law and had summarily accepted a probation officer’s position. The panel treated these as allegations and concluded that, even assuming the asserted deficiency, the exception was not satisfied.
Chaney had an opportunity to object and justify his objection. The court’s disagreement—even a quick and erroneous disagreement—did not establish a proceeding devoid of minimally civilized procedure.
This reasoning does not certify that every aspect of the sentencing process satisfied every ordinary procedural requirement. It holds only that the alleged defect fell far short of the exceptional procedural breakdown needed to defeat the waiver.
4. The disposition preserved the difference between error and remedy
The court dismissed the appeal rather than ordering resentencing. Thus, it did not endorse the career-offender classification as correct. It concluded that the acknowledged error did not provide a sufficient basis to disregard Chaney’s agreement not to appeal.
C. Potential Impact
Appeal-waiver enforcement. The opinion reinforces the continuing force of plea-agreement waivers after Hunter I. Recognition of an exception does not convert waived appeals into ordinary sentencing review.
Guidelines litigation. Defendants cannot establish the exception merely by identifying controlling law that makes a career-offender designation clearly wrong. They must explain what makes enforcement exceptionally unjust, rather than simply demonstrate the underlying legal mistake.
Procedural challenges. The decision discourages repackaging a routine sentencing dispute as a fundamental procedural failure. An opportunity to present an objection matters, even where the court’s response is brief and substantively mistaken.
Plea negotiations. The decision underscores the practical importance of express appellate reservations. A defendant who wishes to preserve review of a disputed Guidelines issue cannot assume that the miscarriage-of-justice exception will supply a substitute.
Limits on the precedent. The opinion does not resolve the temporal benchmark for assessing obviousness, quantify the sentencing effect of Chaney’s erroneous designation, or establish that every conceivable Guidelines error is categorically outside the exception. Its central contribution is the separation of ordinary sentencing illegality from the extreme injustice necessary to override a valid waiver.