United States v. Anthony Lynch: Ground-Specific Preservation of Rule 11 Errors and the Limits of Appeal Waivers
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Case: No. 24-4343
Decided: November 10, 2026
Disposition: Affirmed in part and dismissed in part; unpublished per curiam opinion.
Precedential status: The opinion expressly states that it is not binding precedent in the Fourth Circuit. Its significance lies in its application of existing rules governing guilty pleas, preservation of objections, plea withdrawal, and appellate waivers—not in the creation of a new binding rule.
1. Introduction
In United States v. Anthony Lynch, the Fourth Circuit examined how an enforceable appeal waiver interacts with challenges to the validity of a guilty plea. The decision also illustrates an important preservation principle: moving to withdraw a plea does not preserve an objection to the plea colloquy unless the motion challenges the adequacy of that colloquy.
Anthony Lynch pleaded guilty under a plea agreement to attempted enticement of a minor to engage in criminal sexual conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), and commission of a felony offense involving a minor while required to register as a sex offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2260A. The Eastern District of Virginia sentenced him to 300 months’ imprisonment—25 years.
On appeal, appointed counsel filed a brief under Anders v. California, reporting no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning the denial of Lynch’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and the reasonableness of his sentence. The Government sought dismissal based on the plea agreement’s appellate waiver.
During its independent review, the Fourth Circuit identified an additional issue: the district court had not advised Lynch that he had a right to appointed counsel “at every other stage of the proceeding,” as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(D). After supplemental briefing, the court held that the omission did not justify relief, upheld the denial of plea withdrawal, and enforced the waiver against the sentencing challenges.
2. Summary of the Opinion
The decision rests on five principal conclusions:
- The appeal waiver was valid. The record established that Lynch knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his convictions and sentence, subject to exceptions that did not apply.
- The sentencing challenges were waived. They fell within the waiver’s scope, so the court dismissed that portion of the appeal without deciding whether the sentence was substantively or procedurally reasonable.
- The guilty plea remained reviewable. A valid appeal waiver does not foreclose review of the validity of the plea supporting it.
- The Rule 11 omission did not warrant reversal. Lynch had not preserved that particular objection. Under plain-error review, he failed to establish a reasonable probability that he would have declined to plead guilty had the omitted advice been given.
- Plea withdrawal was properly denied. Although Lynch’s constitutional allegations permitted review notwithstanding the waiver, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding no fair and just reason for withdrawal.
The Fourth Circuit therefore granted the Government’s dismissal motion in part, dismissed the issues covered by the waiver, and otherwise affirmed.
3. Analysis: Precedents Cited and Their Influence
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)
Anders supplied the procedural framework for the appeal. Counsel represented that no meritorious appellate grounds existed, while identifying potential issues for review. The Fourth Circuit nevertheless independently examined the record and identified the omitted Rule 11 advice, prompting supplemental briefing.
The case demonstrates that an Anders submission does not replace judicial scrutiny. At the conclusion of that scrutiny, the court found no meritorious grounds for appeal and directed counsel to inform Lynch in writing of his right to seek Supreme Court review. It also specified the procedure for counsel to request withdrawal if Lynch sought a petition that counsel considered frivolous.
United States v. Carter, 87 F.4th 217 (4th Cir. 2023)
Carter established the governing appellate-waiver inquiry. Enforceability is reviewed de novo, and a waiver is enforced when it is valid and the disputed issue falls within its scope. Validity depends on a knowing and voluntary agreement, assessed through the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant’s experience, conduct, educational background, and understanding of the agreement.
Applying that framework, the court concluded that Lynch’s waiver was valid and that his sentencing arguments were covered. The opinion did not treat the existence of a signed agreement alone as dispositive; it expressly grounded its conclusion in review of the record.
United States v. Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603 (4th Cir. 2021)
Boutcher explains why questioning about an appeal waiver during the Rule 11 hearing is important. When the district court addresses the waiver and the record demonstrates that the defendant understood the rights surrendered, the waiver will generally be upheld.
This authority supported enforcement of Lynch’s waiver while reinforcing that the relevant question is informed consent, not merely the presence of waiver language in a contract.
United States v. Taylor- Sanders, 88 F.4th 516 (4th Cir. 2023)
This precedent performed several functions. First, it established that an appellate waiver does not bar review of the underlying guilty plea’s validity. Second, it described Rule 11’s protections: the defendant must understand the charges, applicable mandatory minimum and maximum penalties, and rights relinquished; the court must also determine voluntariness and a factual basis.
Third, it supplied the harmless-error rule under which a Rule 11 deviation requires reversal unless the Government demonstrates harmlessness. Together, these principles prevented the waiver from ending the inquiry before the court considered whether Lynch’s plea was legally sound.
United States v. Williams, 811 F.3d 621 (4th Cir. 2016)
Williams distinguished ordinary harmless-error review from plain-error review when a defendant has not properly raised a plea-related error in the district court. That distinction mattered because the applicable standard determines which party bears the burden of showing whether the omission affected the outcome.
United States v. Golestan, 151 F.4th 634 (4th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1499 (2026)
Golestan confirmed that the Government bears the burden of proving harmlessness under harmless-error review. Its role was principally comparative: Lynch, rather than the Government, ultimately bore the relevant burden because his particular Rule 11 objection was unpreserved.
United States v. Smith, 157 F.4th 366 (4th Cir. 2025)
Smith was the most influential authority across the disputed plea issues. It established that a plea-withdrawal motion preserves a challenge to the Rule 11 colloquy only when the motion actually contests the colloquy’s adequacy. In Smith, an ineffective-assistance allegation did not preserve a different objection concerning the plea hearing.
The same reasoning controlled Lynch’s appeal. Although he had sought withdrawal, he had not complained about the missing advice. His later challenge therefore received plain-error review.
Smith also supplied the substantial-rights inquiry: whether there was a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have pleaded guilty absent the error. It supported considering information contained in the written plea agreement and the practical attractiveness of the bargain in light of incriminating evidence. Finally, it supplied the abuse-of-discretion standard and the six-factor framework for reviewing denial of plea withdrawal.
United States v. Cabrera-Rivas, 142 F.4th 199 (4th Cir. 2025)
Cabrera-Rivas supported the requirement that an error affect substantial rights before plain-error relief may be available. Read alongside Rule 11(h), it helped identify the common substantive concern under harmless-error and plain-error review: whether the omission mattered to the defendant’s decision. The allocation of the burden, however, remained different.
United States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727 (4th Cir. 1994)
Attar supplied the exception permitting review of certain plea-withdrawal decisions despite an appeal waiver. The exception applies when the withdrawal motion presents a colorable claim that constitutional error—such as involuntariness or ineffective assistance—tainted the plea agreement and therefore its waiver.
Lynch alleged both ineffective assistance and involuntariness associated with his emotional and mental condition. Those allegations allowed appellate consideration of the withdrawal ruling. They did not establish that withdrawal was warranted.
Hunter v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 1702 (2026)
The court cited Hunter for the proposition that an appeal waiver is unenforceable when enforcement would produce a miscarriage of justice. The citation reinforced the constitutional limits identified in Attar. The court did not find that Lynch had established a miscarriage of justice or use this principle to reopen his waived sentencing arguments.
United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1991)
Moore originated the six nonexclusive factors governing whether a defendant has shown a fair and just reason to withdraw a guilty plea. Through Smith, those factors structured the court’s review of Lynch’s motion. They require attention to both the reliability of the plea and the consequences of undoing it.
United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 2005)
Lemaster supplied the strong evidentiary weight given to sworn statements during a Rule 11 hearing: absent extraordinary circumstances, their truth is conclusively established. The Fourth Circuit relied on that principle because Lynch’s later assertions of innocence and an unknowing or involuntary plea conflicted with his sworn statements.
The principle is qualified, not absolute. The opinion does not suggest that sworn plea statements can never be overcome; it holds that Lynch’s showing did not justify doing so.
4. Analysis: The Court’s Legal Reasoning
A. Separating Waiver Validity, Waiver Scope, and Plea Validity
The court treated these as distinct questions. A knowing and voluntary waiver may cover sentencing challenges, yet it cannot prevent examination of whether the plea supporting the agreement was valid. Likewise, a constitutional challenge to the agreement may permit review of a withdrawal ruling without invalidating the waiver in advance.
This sequencing avoids circularity: the Government cannot rely conclusively on an agreement to prevent examination of a substantial claim that the agreement itself was constitutionally defective. But unsuccessful validity challenges do not erase an otherwise enforceable waiver.
B. Preservation Depends on the Ground Raised
Lynch’s withdrawal motion did not challenge the adequacy of the Rule 11 colloquy. Consequently, the district court had not been asked to address the omission later identified on appeal.
The important distinction is between seeking a particular remedy and identifying a particular error. A request to withdraw a plea does not preserve every possible legal justification for withdrawal. Under Smith, Lynch’s failure to raise the colloquy defect shifted the burden to him under plain-error review.
C. The Omission Did Not Affect Substantial Rights
The district court substantially complied with Rule 11 but omitted the required advice concerning appointed counsel at other stages. The appellate court did not excuse that omission as proper compliance. Instead, it asked whether the error affected Lynch’s decision to plead guilty.
Two considerations defeated his showing:
- Actual notice through the agreement: Lynch’s plea agreement contained the omitted information. He had signed and initialed the agreement and reviewed it with counsel.
- The evidentiary and bargaining context: The court considered the incriminating evidence substantial and the plea favorable, concluding that a rational defendant would have accepted the bargain.
These considerations supported the conclusion that Lynch had not shown a reasonable probability of choosing differently if properly advised in court. The opinion does not detail the incriminating evidence or quantify the bargain’s benefits, so its factual reasoning should not be extended beyond the record it describes.
Importantly, this was a failure to give required advice—not a finding that Lynch was actually denied counsel. Nor did the court hold that written agreements invariably cure oral omissions.
D. The Plea-Withdrawal Motion Failed on Its Merits
The court reviewed denial of withdrawal for abuse of discretion, applying the six Moore factors:
- Credible evidence that the plea was unknowing or involuntary;
- A credible assertion of legal innocence;
- Delay between entering the plea and requesting withdrawal;
- Close assistance of competent counsel;
- Prejudice to the Government; and
- Inconvenience to the court and waste of judicial resources.
The appellate court found that the district court had carefully weighed the relevant factors. It particularly emphasized Lynch’s contradictory sworn statements and the finding that he received close assistance from competent counsel during plea negotiations.
The opinion does not provide separate factual findings on delay, Government prejudice, or judicial inconvenience. It therefore supports affirmance of the overall discretionary assessment, not assumptions about how each undisclosed factor operated. Its discussion of counsel also concerns the withdrawal ruling; it is not an exhaustive adjudication of every conceivable ineffective-assistance claim.
5. Potential Impact and Practical Significance
Although nonbinding, the opinion offers a useful illustration of existing Fourth Circuit doctrine.
- For defense counsel: Preservation requires identifying the specific Rule 11 defect in the district court. A motion based only on innocence, emotional condition, or deficient representation does not necessarily preserve a separate colloquy objection.
- For district courts: Complete oral compliance with Rule 11 remains important. Written agreements may demonstrate actual knowledge, but they do not remove the obligation to provide required advice.
- For appellate litigants: Challenges to plea validity, denial of withdrawal, and sentencing must be analyzed separately. A waiver may permit review of the first two while foreclosing the third.
- For defendants seeking withdrawal: Later assertions ordinarily must overcome the substantial evidentiary force of sworn plea-hearing statements.
- For Anders review: Independent record examination can identify an issue not presented in counsel’s initial discussion, even where an appeal waiver exists.
The decision’s limits matter equally. It does not make every constitutional allegation sufficient for relief, every written disclosure a cure for an incomplete colloquy, or every sentencing issue reviewable through an attack on the plea. Its conclusions depend on the governing standards and Lynch’s particular record.
6. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Rule 11 colloquy
- The judge’s required conversation with a defendant before accepting a guilty plea, designed to confirm understanding, voluntariness, and a factual basis.
- Appellate waiver
- An agreement to surrender specified appeal rights. It is enforceable only within its lawful scope and does not automatically shield the plea’s validity from review.
- Waiver versus forfeiture
- An appeal waiver intentionally relinquishes rights through an agreement. Forfeiture occurs when a party fails to raise an objection in time. Lynch’s sentencing issues were waived; his particular Rule 11 objection was forfeited.
- Harmless error and plain error
- Under the harmless-error standard discussed here, the Government must establish harmlessness. For Lynch’s unpreserved objection, plain-error review placed the burden on him. The court resolved the issue because he failed to show an effect on substantial rights.
- Substantial rights
- In this setting, whether the error mattered to the plea decision: was there a reasonable probability the defendant would not have pleaded guilty without it?
- Colorable constitutional claim
- A sufficiently plausible constitutional challenge to permit consideration. It is a gateway to review, not proof that the challenge succeeds.
- Abuse of discretion
- A deferential standard examining whether the district court’s decision exceeded permissible judgment, rather than whether appellate judges would have made the same choice initially.
7. Conclusion
United States v. Anthony Lynch illustrates the balance between enforcing plea agreements and protecting the validity of guilty pleas. An appeal waiver did not prevent scrutiny of Lynch’s plea or his constitutional grounds for withdrawal, but those challenges failed under the applicable standards.
The central practical lessons are specific: preserve the particular Rule 11 objection, distinguish access to review from entitlement to relief, and recognize the weight of informed written agreements and sworn plea statements. The court affirmed the matters properly reviewed and dismissed the sentencing challenges covered by the waiver—applying established doctrine in a nonbinding opinion.